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OPENING REMARKS
PRECEDING PAGE BLANK NOT FILMEDJerome F. Lederer
At the System Safety Conference three hazards to prevent them is a grand strategy
years ago to which Mr. Bolger alluded, we directed towards curtailing losses throughout
explained what system safety could do, we re- the life of: the hardware. This is in contrast
viewed its early applications, and hinted at its to the ok! way of doing things, which was the
potential. Then when Bob Helgeson summa- tactical :approach of waiting to search and
rized the conference, he said that system destroy the immediate enemy (accident when
safety has come of age and it is time to it occurred.) We now try to foresee these
consolidate the gains. We meet today to hear undesired events through system safety. We
_" about the gains and view the broader in- of course favor the strategical approach in
. dustrial scope of system safety. I feel that one place of the tactical approach though both of
of the important gains is that its reception course are necessary.
among engineers and executives is far better The constraints of schedule, cost, per-
now than it was two years ago. To do this the formance and production which I mentioned
_ engineers,executivesand program managers before and even publicpressuresmust be in-
ha_a to surrender some of their instinctive eluded in the grand strategy. Hazards are not
_ feeling that they know all there ig to know limited to hardware. They include software,,¢
_ about safety; that therefore there is no need procedures, awareness. All assumptions on
for a separate discipline on design or opera- which decisions are based should be recordedtional safety, no need f r a well-prepared for periodic review. System safety comes at
plan of checks and balances to combat the an opportune time. Risks of great magnitude
i elements that are antagonistic to the identi- are increasing. This may mean a single risk _,
fication and control of undesired events. Some such as an Apollo or the Alaska pipeline or it
_f these antagonistic elements are meeting may mean millions of people exposed to indi-
schedules, cost constraints, production prob- vidual risks as on the highways or the railways. :
lems, performance, and the "not invented here As management of industry or government
factor." Dr. George Mueller, who at that time projects becomes more beset by the political,
• i
was head of the Office of Manned Space Flight, economic or loss of prestige implications of
stimulated system safety by defining system m._ssion failures, they will be impelled to turn
safety as "organized common sense." The with increasing attention to the systematic !
Office of Manned Space Flight Safety In 1967 approach to loss prevention known as System :
recognized system safety as a separate dis- Safety.
cipline and prepared the Apollo Program In his welcome remarks at out first con-
System Safety Directive. System Safety has ference, Dr. John Clark, our host, had some
since become part of the NASA Safety Manual words of wisdom. I'd like to quote them. He
and the concept is spreading throughout NASA. said, "In order to sell the project manager on
System Safety means the identification and the necessity for integrating safety into the
control of foreseeable hazards as well as the total p_:ogram, he must be sold ontheidea that
documented rationale of residua _. risks that preject safety is synonomous with project
have to be accepted. The historical role of success." A specialist in the field of safety is
safety was to take corrective action afte..__._rthe needed to look after safety, to help line man-
undesired event had occurred. Of course the agement, to handle the whole safety Job, not
lesson learned from the undesired events are do it with their left hand, so to speak. Both
required inputs to system safety. But we now groups must work together. Safety should be
try to act beforehand to prevent rather than instituted in the conceptual design, before
react to a loss. The old-fashioncd waiting for hardware design is started. One has to build
an accident and then taking corrective action in safety st this point if there is to i;e a good
is commonly referred to as "tombstone" chance of achieving it further downstresm. \
safety. The problem of trying to foresee the Then when the prototype hardware is ready to
.
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go into test, make sure _he testtng isadequate, accident prevention, including fire. Another
This can be a hazardous procedure. It is a very powerful influence for promoting system
time when one must be very careful to integrate safety is the insurance industry, especially
the safety plans with a review of the adequacy that part of the insurance industry that writes
of the total system, product liability insurance. The costs of law
There are very powerful forces that are suits and settlements are becoming ever
pushing for the acceptance of system safety, larger. The best defense for industry is proof
The most prominent force is the adoption of to the Jury that it has made a well organized
system safety by Government agencies, the and documented attempt to foresee and deal
Department of Defense, NASA, Department of with identifiable hazards. The Kemper In-
Transportation, Federal Aviation Agency. The surance Co. of Chicago has put out a book
consumer movementsspearheadedbyGovern- called "Product Liability" which tells its
ment agencies such as the National Commis- insured how to protect themselves in the case
sion on Product Safety, the Special Assistant of a law suit. This little booklet is just another
to the President for C" asumer Affairs, the definition of system safety. Incidentally, it
Highway Safety Act, the National Transporta- includes "motivation" which sometimes is
tion Safety Board, as well as non-Government forgotten in the s y s t e m safety pro-
consumer protective groups, all are acting in gram.
such a way that guarantees the future of system With these forces pushing system safety
safety or its concept by whatever name it is ahead, I foresee a fine future for it. The
called. I prefer Risk Management. marriage of management with risk analysis,
In the home product field last year there safety engineering, test procedures, will save
weze 30,000 people killed, 20,000,000 injured, much suffering and untold btlltons of doUars
a total loss of $5.5 billion. This shows where by putting hindsight where our foresight should
system safety has scope In fields other than be. It may he difficult ff not impossible to
space and aviation. The new Occupational prove such gains have been made, but we
Health and Safety Act will create a safety should all watch for them so tharwhenwe have
cltmate that win reach clown to the smallest this conference in 1974 you will be able to
business enterprise, when the Department of report on them.
Labor begins to enforce its standards. Self- I quoted some words of wisdom from
defense will compel industry to adopt the sys- Dr. John Clark, our host, I would now like to
tern safety approach for the lndustrlal type of introduce him.
I
!
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Thank you Mr. Bolger, Congressman billty function tool. An analysis which begins
Pettls, and Ladies and Gentlemen. GoodMorn- with the definition of an undesired event and
ing and welcome to the Goddard Space Flight works down from the highest level aubassem-
Center. blies may well point up risks which a method
We are pleased to again host the Govern- that begins at component level may not.
ment-lndustry System Safety Conference here Development of the team approach between
at Goddard. We hope your meeting will be the safety specialist and the line manager
successful and your ,qtay 'n the Washington requires mutual respect and confidence be-
area will be pleasant, tween the two. In practical application, it
I noted from the Program that you willhave must be understood by the line manager that
many interesting topics and able speakers safety is his respons'bility. It cannot be sep-
during the next few days, and I hope to be able arated from his man_;em-nt functions any
to drop in from time to time to hear some o; more that coordinatioL or decision=making
the sessions. I understand that Goddard is can. The safety specialist's effort, therefore,
represented by approx!mately 50 members of must be in addition to this line management
our staff and so I am sure your discussions responsibility, not substituted for it.
will impact the Center's thinking. My third point stressed the importance of ,
At the last conference I made three points including in the review cycle at various stages
which I felt were basic to the promotion of assurance that collaboration between the safety
safety programs. The first is the necessity specialist and the line manager takes place.
to persuade the project manager that project I think this straight-forward concept requires
safety is synonymous with project success, little explanation. It is important, however, to
Second,thata team approachbetween theline extendthe review beyond Justhardware sys-
manager and thesafetyspeciallstisnecessary terns.The operationsperformed by people
to detectthe unanticipatedhazards, theones must also be considered.At Goddard priorto
thathurtus most. Third,thata formalsystem each ApoUo mission we have our medicalstaff
Is requiredto bring thesafetyspecialistand review the records of our key personnel to
thelinemanager togetherduringatleastthree assure thatthey have inoculationsfor virus
phases of a pro]ect;the review of the con= and other prevalent illnessesas well as a
ceptualdesign,review prior to thetestingof recentphysical.Ina_dition,we try toprovide :
prototype hardware and during the Flight contingency plans to cover the emergency
Readiness Review. absence of a key figure.We try to expend
Itseems tome thattheseelements_reJust adequate thought and analysis to determine
as applicabletoday as theywere threeyears back up requirementstoeliminatetheneces-
. ago. Today, however, with the theme of this sity for individuals to work extended shifts
conference being "Applications and Ex- which might tax their efficiency. These are
perience" gainedsincethelastconference,it examples of the type of personnel systems
might be prudentfor me toexplorethisidea review thatneeds tobe addressedinaddition
further and discussthe applicationof these to hardware review. Responsible managers
ideas.Clearly,System Safetyhas a placein must provide positiveassurance that their
Manned Flight, but for unmanned missions personnel systems are as error-free as is
some feel mission success is more directly their hardware.
dependent upon reliability and quality control In keeping with the theme of this year's
' functions.This seems to me to demonstrate conference,I have triedto elaborateon my
, a lack ofunderstandingofwhat system safety openingremarks of three years ago, expand
is. There is an excellentshortarticleinthe them and speak of theirapplication.We hope
September 1970 issue of Machi,ue Desigln that conferencessuch as thiswillhelp lead
' entitledSpottingTrouble Before ItHappens the way toward not only applicationofknown
which puts thiscomparison intolanguagethat principlesbut in exploringthe frontiersof
a projectmdnager might readilyunderstand, thestateofthe artof_iskmanagement.
The _rtlclecompares fault tree analysis, Thank you for honoringthe Centerby your
frcqucntl_ used as a systems safety tool, with presence. We hope you will have a successful
failuremode analysislong used as a relia- and enjoyablemeeting.
i I0
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Lederer, The System Safety concept -- the principles
distinguished speakers, ladies and gentlemen, and the professional know-how -- may be much
It would be presumptuous of me to try to more important than we've realized.
tell this audience anything about System Safety. I am aware that the theme of my address
You are the experts on that subject. I'm sure may seem to be a little bit pretentious -- "Sys-
you'll be even more expert after you've bee_- tern Safety--Planet Earth". Are we ready
exposed to the excellent progrem that NASA for it? How much longer can we do without
has assembled here for you. it?
However, I am vitally interested in all as- What I'd like to do Loday is to expose -- and
pects of System Safety. My years as a corn- try to clarify -- a concept. The concept is rele-
mercial pilot instilled in me a profound re- vant to this conference because the principles
spect for any policy, procedure, or system that of safety -- especially when applied with the
: would contribute to the improved sa'_ty of my expertise of systems _anagement -- are of
; passengers, my airplane, or myself, universa' value.
_: More recently, my years of service on the This gathering is symboF.c of a much
.. House Science and AstronauticsCommittee largersociety.You representmany aspectsof
have enabled me to appreciate--at first our national life.We have in Americ_ a
hand -- the unprecedented hazards, bothonthe complex system of government, purpcsely
_-_ ground and inspace,thathave been generated representativeof alleleme...sofour modern
i:_ the Space Age as we have responded to man's civilization. Among you here today _re safety-
eternalchallengetoexplorehisenvironment-- orientedleadersf£om diverseindustries,col-
_ and to satisfy his always urgent need to know. leges and universities, and a wide spectrurv
I have seen the magnificent response by crea- of government agencies. Over sever,ty diife-'ent
tire and dedicatedprogram managers and types of groups can be identified,More spe-
safetyengineers--like many of you here-- ciflcally,you are professionallyinterestedin
who have worked togetherwithyour partners al}armed services,allmodes of transporta-
and associatesinindustrytomake spacetravel tlonand thenationalspace program. The AEC
the safestmode oftransportatlondevelopedfor HEW, FAA, Interior,the PostOfficeDepart-
Earth men -- so far. ment, the TVA, the Library of Congress, the
You know, I think it's safer to be on an GSA, the National Bureau of Standards, the
Apollo flight crew than it is to be in Congress National Transportation Safety Board -- as
these days--what with bombing the Capitol well as the District o_' Columbia and other
building--the May Daydemonstrattons--and Community and State governments--are all
the recent threats to _top the normalfunct/ons h_re.
of our national government, ff we can't make it's safe to say that most of you are pro-
our governmental systems safe, how can we fe, mional safety engineers, or managers with
ensure the safety of our citizens? How about safety responslbilit/es. Your common Interes_
some of you working on System Safety Capiwl provides a common bond. It has brought you
Hill? I don'tbelieveitwould be any tougher together with NASA as the catalyst.Mutual
than making the Apollo Saturn safe. interests and responsibilities motivated you
At any rate, since I'm not a Safety Engineer, to join us I- :e today. Why?
O.
I thought Pd talk about the application of oystem Why are we so interested in safety? Be-
Safety Principles toward the solution of plane- cause it's our Job? Or do we believe in -- are
tary problems. American space travel via we dedicated to--the principles behind the
Mercury, Gemini and Apollo--has proven safety concept--the presewatlon of human
that we have learned _o control the hazards llfe, the conservation of matexlals, and the
we've encountered. Space travel via Planet assurance of mission _uccesa?
Earth -- throughout recorded history -- has Were you taught that Self Preservation was
proven much more difficult. We might almost the first law of Human Nature? I was. The
say that the hazards seem to have controlled tradR/onal right of self defense -- for an
us. Surely, we can learn to do something about individual or a nat/on -- derives from that
that. If we could put six Americans on the moon, fundamental Law of Self Preservation. There
we can do anything -- if we care enough to try. is an even more basic law in Nature _- related
13
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to the tnsttnc" to survive -- to grow to matur- Self Preservation is inseparable from
try -- and to reproduce In kind. Survival, de- global ecology. The planetary system environ-
fense and preservation of self--are directly merit and our own viability as a part of that
related to the safety concept, system are totally inter-related. They always
The concept of freedom seems to be a have been. But we are now becoming very
natural extension -- or a more evolved de- aware of this vital relationship. Conservation
velopm_nt -- of that Law which recognizes has now become an urgent mission, not just
that a man must live in freedom truly to pre- a part-time past-time.
serve himself. We've tried to develop a way of Politically, the current problem seems to
Life in America that provides the best possible be, how to work for conservation without ap-
environment -- and the safest -- in which to pearing too conservative.
live and grow. National Safety is also National I understand that three years ago you held
Security. the first of these System Safety Conferences.
We recognize "inalienable rights " that pro- It must b=ve Leen extremely successful. Look "
tect individual freedoms to llve and grow -- as to _laat has been accomplished in those few
long as those rights are not distorted into years.
license--to deny another's freedom or his We've landed three Apollos on the moon. ,
rights. This freedom or these rights are never Six men from Earth have leaped around In
relevant, unless we value the individual units moon dust -- and even "mullig r .4,, -. and
of society as being human beings. Rights and have returned to share unique expe: ences with
freedoms become meaningful on_ tf we value Earth-bound men. Leaders like Jerry I.ederer,
the human belngand his na.,lve rights -- to live, Phil Bolger and their safety teammates must
to grow, or to beconie responsible for his own get due share of the credit -- as should all of
choices, you who helped them. A very special mention
Our founding fathers were concerned with should go to a canine astro-pup called Snoopy --
safety. They believed in the value of a human perhaps the most successful safety engineerof
life. They even believed that the principle of all. Magnificent "mission success", shared
freedom was Inherent In a Law of Nature con- with all humanity -- in the face of unprece-
celved by Nature's Creator. Whether we share dented risk to life -- with fantastic operational
that belief, it Is undoubtedly the reason that hazards to be overcome.
Americans, traditionally, have set high values The tremendous learning experience of
upon human life, their own or someone else's. Apollo 13 may have been the most Impressive
For nearly 200 years we have believed In c f al'_-.. In retrospect. The whole world was
this principle so much that we have often able to appreciate what value we placed upon
risked -- and even sacrificed -- our own lives, the lives of astronauts. Perhaps we came mush
that others, weaker or more threatened than closer to the realization of System Safety
I1
, we, could also share the blessings of Liberty". Planet Earth as a result.
What dosE, _hls have to do with System Of course, human Life, prlmary though it is,
Safety? Well, we sometimes refer to our Is not the only safety consideration. There ts
"system of government", or even "the free- the economy of resources--of time, energy,
enterprise system". But more "right on", money, and materials--of equipment and
perhaps, the value of the life Is essential to the facilities -- that Is always at stake'and riding
safety concept. If life has no value, why protect with the mission -- not to mention the malnte-
It? nance of public support for our manned space
But we donlt always obey" law -- even a program Itself. In this total Light, the Safetyof
Natural Law. We are just beginning to recog- the System becomes paramount. |
raze, on a planetary scale o- thanks to our How can the uninitiated ever appreciate the 1Space Age perspective -- some of the awesome value of the system safety concept? It reallyproblems that we face when we disregard or Isn't easy. That may be why travel through
disobey the laws of nature. "Self preservation" space on Planet Earth has been so hazardous.
now pertains to all humanity, f_lanetary Set ar- It takes experience and intelligence. Wisdom
lty Is directly related to the essential natural is better -- though much more rare, It takes
resources of our planet, discipline and training and knowledge com,,ined
14
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kwith skill. But even more, it takes alertness -- naut on board -- not with so much riding on the
or "awareness" -- and a very special kind of mission.
caring that produces individual responsibility. Space flight safety provided more complex
It all adds up to what can be called -- 'Tluman problems to solve -- but the principles were
Reliability" -- the most essential ingredient the same. And all through the process -- the
in any mission, priceless ingredient was always -- and will
Instinct helps but we can't fly to the moon always be -- what might be called, the Human
by the "seat of our pants". That seems to be Reliability Factor -- in the careful identifies-
the way we've been "piloting our planet", tion and evaluation of hazards--to human
But it wasn't instinct that permitted man to life -- to the economics of time, materials and
fly, Our physical bodies weren't optimized for money -- and to ultimate mission success. The
flight. We had to learn to counteract the effects principles apply to humans and to hardware,
of the Law of Gravity -- or, more accurately, People make the hardware. People use the
we had to learn to cooperate _ith a Natural Law hardware. People must control the environment
that we call "gravity" in a way to make manned or the environment will control the people.
flight feasible. All these factors directly affect the "viabil-
I recall many steps in the process. Ground ity" of the System -- and the viability of any
school training -- the flight simulator -- fly- "human systems" whose lives are risked. The
ing, with an instructor -- the dual controls -- human systems, at least to us, are the most
level flight -- rake-offs and, you hoped, safe priceless of all subsystems.
landings, and finally -- the solo, Then more We recognize now that system safety must
difficult maneuvers -- instrument flying, in be foremost in the minds of managers through-
worse than "field-grade" weather--and the out all phases of research and development
responsibility for other lives in an aircraft programs as well as during operation of the :
under your control. And then, an entirely dlf- systems. We recall the historic battle--(or :
ferent set of standards for piloting commercial was it the kingdom?) -o that was lost for lack
passengers -- on scheduled flights, of a horseshoe nail. ;
The basic Idea of System Safety was In- During your last Confert.nce, three years
herent in the training of a pilot from the very ago, Dr. George Meuller described System
first day. You were taught to recognize dif- Safety Engineering as being "organized common
ferent kinds of dangers -- like the approach to sense". I'll buy that-- but common sense seems
a stall -- or entering cloud or turbulent forms- to be getting more un._..commonevery day.
,Ions. You had to achieve the unnatural dlsct- There are some bright spots though andI'd
pline of total reliance on l_struments. You like to reflect a little light from one of the
learned that most fatalities were caused when brightest. I'm sure all of you have heard of
pilots ignored the "envelope of danger". That's "Spaceship Earth" by now. It's a useful, though
;ast as true today. I still fly my own airplane rather challenging concept being effectively
and I still have to obey all the rules. You're expressed by its inventor, Buckminster Fuller.
particularly aware when you have your own (Itm sure the more "pragmatic" types would
family on board. Airline passengers take It for label it "simplistic".) |
granted that the pilot is behaving like a System "Bucky" Fuller, now art energetic 75 or so, tSafety Engineer -- on duty -- and totally recently wrote a book called "Operating Manualaware, for Spaceship Earth", Since then he has also
Space Flight has forced us to advance and invented and developed the "World Game". I'm
accelerate the state of the art of System Safety. sure Fuller has defined the patterns related to
The System Safety process involves anorderly "System Safety Planet Earth" better than I
understanding of the hazards to be en- coald. He thought about the concept andunder-
countered--and the development of reliable s:ood our planet Earth as an integrated sys-
ways to control them, There is a lesson here tern -- a long time before the Apollos made
for solvtng planetary problems. :heir impacts on our minds and hearts.
Whether it's ground safety, industrial safety Fuller is optimistic about our cbances
or flight s_.fet_ -- 99')_, reltabilit_ i_u't good for safely piloting the passengers anti crew
enough -- not any more -- not with an astro- of Spaceship Earth into a more creative,
15
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harmonious and prosperous future -- i_ffweput Unless we know our purpose we never can de-
our Dest minds and strongest wills to ac- fine what's "Lelevant". If youdon'tknowwhere
complish inission success, you're going -- or why -- how do you know
Buckminster Fuller is not just a dreamer -- what to take along -- how to train yourself --
although he's not afraid to dream -- or to make or what kind of guidance you will need7
full use of his fertile imagination. He has as- Maybe when we see the world, as Bucky
sembled impressive credentials. Fuller has Fuller does, as a complex unity -- of inter-
developed more than 150 separate patents in related and dynamic systems -- we mightgive
58 countries of the world. 10,000 of his geo- better thought to the original System De-
destc domes -- like the one assembled at signer -- and try to discover and define His
Expo 67 -- are scattered over the glove. His system concept. If He didn't have mission
name has 26 henorary degrees tagged on behind success in mind -- then nothing has much
it. He's a multi-disciplinary systems-manage- meaning. And if -- He was capable of design-
ment task force, all in one -- being simultan- ing -- even the simplest atom -- and settingit
eously described as architect, cartographer, in motion -- then He could have had in mind a
cosmogonist, designer, engineer, inventor, perfect System Safety plan for us to follow.
mathematician, philosopher -- thinker and The traumatic and inspiring experience of
problem-solver -- and even a poet. He's young Apollo i3 now can be given profound symbolic
and very idealistic, for his age. How can we meaning. The life on board became vitally im-
train more "specialized generalists" like portant to millions of fellow passengers on
Bucky? When asked to describe himself, Spaceship Earth. For a few moments in history
Fuller says, "I am a random element." we glimpsed the highest priority. The support
Are you wondering whether Bucky Fuller is crew focussed on solving the most urgent -
relevant to a conference on System Safety? I problem -- and succeeded like seasoned pro-
think he is. Just as relevant as a conference on fessionals.
System Safety is to the mission success of Can we ever keep our planetary passengers
Spaceship Earth. safe7 Can System Safety Planet Earth ensure
We understand that System Safety Engineers ultimate mission success? Or will the imma-
must consider carefully all aspects of the en- turity and irresponsibility of some of the crew
vironment in which the system is to operate, members prove fatal to the mission? Will !
Recently, we have learned something about the some of us -- always be willing to escalate the ;
hazards in space. We have also learned-- risks and amplify the hazards--like playing
through costly centuries of history -- some- "chicken" on a planetary scale -- using risk as
! thing about the hazards on board Spaceship a weapon system with which to threaten, intim-
Earth. On a planetary scale, we haventt learned idate, and take over the controls of Spaceship
enough yet about hazard analysis, risk avoid- Earth--in a ruthless attempt to hijack--
, ance or over-all systems management. We willing even to abort the mission unless they
have a long way to go toward controlling our can command the ship--absolutely--once,environment. We are just beginning to under- and for all?
stand the Life Cycle of the System. Our essen- To enjoy life on Earth as a "viable human-
tlal feedback is all too often--distorted, !ty"--"capable of sustaining life and
garbled in transmission or completely blacked growth" -- we must also maintain a viabl____._e
out. planetary system. To achieve mission success
In accordance with the System Safety ap- we must first Identify our mission on this
proach, could we revise the mission to reduce planet. When we begin to even understand that
exposure to hazard and minimize our risks? question and to formulate a "common sense"
Revise the planetary mission? Perhaps--if approach to find the answer--only then will 1
we knew what our mission really was. That"s- wc begin to be se:ure -- for the first time in '
been the age-old riddle for mankind to solve, all of human history.
16
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I was pleased as well as honored when system. It is an important part of my office's
Jerry Lederer invited me to deliver the "kick function to help lead the Department toward
off" remarks to this Second Government-In- development of a unified, consistent, sTstems
dustry System Safety Conference. view of transportation safety.
To those who have beenworldngondevelop- Before discussing the kinds of systems
ment of new and sophisticated hardware, the safety activities that we are considering, iUs
notion of a systems approach to problemsol_- worth taking a few moments to examine what
ing is old hat. Everyone in NASA understands is now being done. Icannotover-emphastzethe
what is meant by a systems approach and that importance attached to safety within the De-
is surely an important reason why this Second partment of Transportation. The legislation
Sy3tem Safety Conference can be addressed to which established the Department specifically
applications and not to continued discussion of requires that it develop "national transporta-
what is meant by a "systems" approach to tion policies and programs conducive to the
safety problems, provision of fast t safe_ efficient, and convenient
As Assistant Secretary for Safety in the transportation." The word safe, which is
Department of Transportation it is a function strongly emphasized in thelegislation, is given
of my office to try to help lead the Department utmost attention throughout the Department,
in the safety area. I believe the systems ap- and continues to grow in importance.
proach to safety problems can make significant Each of the major operating administrations
contributions in improving transportation within the Department has one or more of its
safety. The infusion of systems concepts and key offices devoted exclusively or almost ex-
thinking into the overall approach to safety clusively to safety. The Federal Highway Ad-
programs will, in my judgment, be of benefit ministration has an Associate Administrator
to all concerned. I'm certain I wontt have any who is responsible for Motor Carrier and Hlgh°
difficulty selling the idea of a systems ap- way Safety.
proach to transportation safety to this group. The Coast Guard has key offices respons-
I am sure that my colleagues in the Department ible for Merchant Marine and Boating
, of Transportation are equally interested. Safety.
Although the Department of Transportation And the Federal Railroad Administration
is four years old the decision was only re- has a Bureau of Railroad Safety.
cently made to establish a single, high-level These are all positions at thehighest levels
advisor with Department-wide responsibility within their agencies. Safety is, of course, what
for safety coordination. The Secretary expects the National Highway Traffic Safety Adm!nis-
me to assist him in establishing uniform safety tratlon is all about. To a very great extent, the
policies and practices throughout the Oepart- same is true of the Federal Aviation Admin-
" ment and to help him evaluate the responsive- lstratlon. The Offices of Hazardous Materials
ness of our safety programs to the public need. and Gas Pipeline Safety are pure safety regu-
He outlined my responsibilities quite clearly latory organizations.
when he said, and I quote: The National Transportation Safety Board,
"The DepartmenUs safety programs are created by Congress under the Transportation
now administered under differing philo- Act of 1966, has broad powers to recommend
sophical and procedural concepts. Some of safety practices in all modes of transportation.
these differences are caused by the various It determines the probable cause of accidents,
statutes which created the programs and and proposes corrective actions throughsafety
some have been a matter of administrative recommendations.
choice. I believe that all of these safety Secretary Volpe has clearly indicated that
programs, although administered by dif- the operating administrations within the De-
ferent elements of the Department should partment shall retain their safety responst-
be administered under uniform policies to bllitles. However, he expects my office "to
. the extent possible." assist in the development of more compre-
In short, what the Secretary had In mind henslve, coordinated and cohesive vehicle and
w;_ that the Department's safety programs be system safety programs in and among the
regarded as a unified transportation safety operating administrations."
18
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, The preceding comments indicate the very vided -- or, at least, that the questions are
high priority given to safety in the Department explicitly raised.
of Transportation. The presence of several Comparing 1970 with 1969, there was a 2
speakers from our Department at this meeting percent decline in fatal transportation acci-
is further witness to the importance we attac'- dents. This decline was dominated by, and
to safety. I know that excellent system safety principally reflects, a 2 percent decline in
efforts are going forward within individual motor vehicle accidents. However, in 1970
'\
modes of transportation. But I am far less accidents either declined or held steady
certain about our basis for determining how in all modes of transportation. This oc-
safety resources and efforts should be allo- curred despite considerable growth in
" cated among either competlng programs within transportation usage. Aviation fatalities
Individual modes, or among all of the modes, declined by about 10 percent, and rail-
I feel confident that we do a good job of ap- road fatalities declined by about 5 per-
plying systems safety skllls to particular prob., cent. At the same time, the two other
: lem areas. But I have doubts about the perspec- major areas of transportation fatalities--
tlve with which we allocate our systems safety marine and grade-crossing acc I de n t s=-
resources among the numerous demands on remained roughly unchanged.
; these resources. I will try to Illustrate this Such comparative data pose an interesting
point with several examples of situations mat question for Department of Transportation sys=
_t we face within the Department of Transporta- terns safety specialists to ponder. Could we,
lion. or should we, set ourselves arbitrary safety
; Consider that motor vehicle accidents ac- targets? For example, we could establish an
_ count for over 90 percent of__all transportation objective that the number of fatalities in each
i fatalities in the United States. As a result, a transportation mode should not be permitted to
one percent Increase in the motor vehicle death Increase. Such an objective would doubtlessly
toll would hav an approximately equivalent le d to wide disparities in the amounts Spent
_: effect on total lives lost as a 10 percent in- for lives saved in different modes, and couldcrease in the combined death toll from all other probably not be justified on economic grounds
causes of transportation fatalities. Viewed the alone. Nevertheless, information on the cost of
_ other way around, if we could reduce motor such a policy objective would be of Immense
vehicle fatalities by one percent, we would save value to tbe Secretary.
roughly the same number of lives as we would Secretary Voipe recently temttfled before a
if we reduced fatalities in all of other modes Senate Committee that it is a Department of
combined by 10 percent. This simple lllustra- Transportation goal to cut in half by 1980 the
,, tton poses what should be an obvious question, number of people killed on our highways. This .
Namely: What arethe relative results of safety provides a specific goal for the Department of
improvements in the various modes of our Transportation. The questions that ltssystems
transportation system? And, are we making safety specialists ask are: First, what are the
our transportation system safety investments alternatives available for achieving this spe-
In ways that promise to maximize the number ellis goal? Second, what are the costs asso-
of lives saved? Itm not convinced that the elated wtth each of these alternatives? Some
answer to such questions have bee n explicitly of these costs will be ," ensured In dollars,
worked out or furnished to the Secretary of while others will be measured in terms of con-
Transportation. straints Imposed on operators of motor re-
It seems clear that the answer to suchsys- hlcles. ,
terns safety questions would place the Secretary I believe there Is an Important need for de-
in a better position to make decisions on aUo- velopment of information on the safety options
eating the Department's safety resources available to agency or department top manage-
among the several modes, I have a strong ment, and on the costs associated with these
suspicion that such questions go unanswered options, In the Department of Transportation,
in many Government agencies. We, as safety the options should include such choices as
specialists, should be concerned that answers holding the line oI_.Increases in accidents, or
to such broad systems safety questions are pro- cult, _g accidents in hail by some particular
19
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time, This is the kind of information which from use of autos to use of far safer public
will provide top management with perspective modes of transportation.
on their safety problems, and will furnish Research now going forward in theDepart-
them with the material they need to go forward ment of Transportation provides an example of
with safety programs. It is my impression that systems safety analysis which, I believe, very
such information is now sorely lacking in many, nicely illustrates the kinds of broad perspective
if not all, government agencies, in which safety can and should be approached.
My office has been assigned the responsi- Safety would be improved if travelers couldbe
bility for initiating work on development of a induced to use public transportation instead of
series of _oals and objectives for the Depart- their own autos. It is observed that common
ment of Transportation safety programs, carriers are required to maintain a degree of
Initial steps in carrying out this assignment safety far In excess of that in user operated
will Involve making forecasts of the numberof modes. This high level of safety Is ultimately
accidents that can be expected in each of the reflected in the cost tothefare-payingpassen- .
several modes of transportation, and of ex- get. On the other hand, the costa of the Na-
staining trends and accident rates. Thereafter, tlonal Highway Safety Program have been
It will be necessary to consider possibleacci- largely borne by the public at large through v
dent reducing measures as well as thesavings general taxation. As a result of these actions,
that will result from the reduced accidents, safety costs on private transportation are sub-
As l have tried to emphasize, this is the kind sidtzed by the Government. Such governmental
of information the Secretary needs for all action tends to raise the cost ofapublic trans-
modes of transportation. He needs to know a portation mode, and to lower the cost ofa prl-
great deal more about the cost and results of vate transportation mode. As a result, govern-
system safety improvements. He has no choice mental action in this case tends to encourage
i but to view the safety problem in the perspec- a shift from safer public modes of transporta-
ttve of costs and benefits. As safety specialists, tion to a less safe private mode of transports-
we should also try to view the problems this tton. Viewed strictly from a safety viewpoint,
way. Then we will be in a position to provide and one must remember there are other con-
our bosses with the Information they need. stderations, this behavior is possibly the re-
We must approach our problem broadly, verse of what it ought to be.
Thus, analyses of means to reduce automobile I believe that a systems approach to safety
accidents is not limited to such considerations can have Its largest payoff tn the broad area of
as the building of better roads and more crash- development of safety policy. To be effective at
worthy ears. It also examines such options as the highest levels of government, systems
expenditures for Improvement of traffic law safety analysts must learn to view our problems
! enforcement. Or for more prominently salver- in the same terms as the top management of
tislng the dangers of drinking and driving. Or our agencies. We must also learn to work out
for (and subsidizing) state the kinds of safety trade-offs that top manage-Improving perhaps
auto inspection programs. The point is that re- ment of our agencies can easily understand and
ducing automobile accidents is a systems prob- easily utilize. We must become skilled at taking
lem in the broadest sense, and the mechanical account In our analyses o¢ the full range of
steps that mtght be taken to Improve the situs- options available. If we learn to do all of these
tton should be viewed as nothing more than things well, we will have contributed slgnlfi-
segments amoag a broad array of alternatives, cantly to making America a safer place In which
Indeed, these alternatives should include pos- to live.
sible steps that might be taken to divert people Thank you.
¢
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INTRODUCTION relations and lay communication l talk risk -
it seems a nicer, more generally a-_'eptable
All decisions are based consciously or un- word.
consciously on the balance between benefits In addressing this subject to the safety
and risk. That is true for all of us, at all community, I should point out that system
times. I am going to discuss this balance, and safety is a most important part of the risk
for that purpose will divide applied technology technology and holds a specially politically
into two parts. Benefit-oriented and Risk or sensitive position in the eyes of management.
Uncertainty-oriented. Benefit technology in-
cludes design, development, manufacturing or COMIvlUNICATION: A PRIMARY NEEO
construction, operations. Risk or uncertainty
technology includes safety, reliability, quality Nearly all engineers are dedicated to their
assurance, test, maintenance, as shown in work; system safety engineers are no exception
fig. I. This picture is key to the decision- nor are other types of engineers workinglnthe
making process. The process maybeinvisible, risk technologies. But being trusted is not
taking place in the decision-makerts mindfrom enough; we must |ustffy our utility in the eyes
his knowledge of the problem, or at the other of the decision-makers in relation ro that of
extreme, it may involve a process with inde- others who bear other technical responsibili-
pendent benefit and risk departments support- ties. It is not sufficlent to argtm the importance
ing and, at times, confronting each other. But of the work; we must convey its value. It must
always the decision will be affected bythebal- be expressed in realistic terms and attractive
ante with which relevant information of the form; and it must make it possible for the de-
benefit and risk technologies have reached the cision-maker to compare the benefit-risk ratio
consciousness of the policy maker and stimu- of alternative courses of action.
lated his interest. The responsibility for deciding how much
It is the importance of this balance, its risk to take is generally viewed as the ex-
present and potential status that is the subject elusive province of top or near-top manage-
of this paper. The premise of the discussion taunt. And indeed top management's activities
_:_ that follows is thatfordecisionandpolicymak- are almost exclusively focused on balancing
"_ ing at all levels, knowledge of the consequences risk against benefits on s macro scale, but
-_ of risk is as imporutnt as knowledge |rid con- down the line innumerable rlsk-benefit micro
sequences of benefits, decisions are made without knowledge of higher
¢ I_rhaps the purpose of the paper is best msnapment. Some of these turn out not to be
depl_ted in the two cartoons of fig. 2 and 3. micro at ill, and become known only when their
l_ig. 2 represents current unbalanced benefit effects become visible, sometimes too latefor ":
; of risk presentations, while fig. 3 represents correction or late enough for correction to be ?
balanced conditions, more helpful to the deci- costly.
_ sion maker. There are a number of remsons for Judg-
_ The discussion of risk brings different meat to be slanted in favor of benefit, meaning :_
things to mind to different people. Here, I use that there is a tendency to take more risk than
the term very broadly. Risk exists because one would seem desirable. This con-4ition can be _
is uncertain about some things. These un- reversed followings serious accident or crisis. _
certainties could range in technology from Then, for a while, exceptionalattention is given i
_ areas beyond the state of the art, and lack of to understanding risk and reducing it. But the
_ knowledge about the environment, to analyses full effect is usually temporary. There is a
and tests not made, capabilities not used, and natural tendency to return to tim state of mind
_ human errors of all kind. that existed prior to the crisis, to degrade or
::_ I treat risk and uncertainties as synony- even forget some of the "lessens learned.', The
_ mous. Technically Ipreferuncertainties-Risk trend rapidly accelerates as the team that ,_
implies s number, often of vague meaning, lived threughthetensestmOSl_lmreofthecrisis
Uncertainty gives a sense of needing to know is dispersed among other programs. Some
• more and wanting to do something about it. procedures whlchwereadopmdmayberetslned
Professionally 1 thin_._kkuncertainty; for public but the degree of attention givm to them tends
•  ING PAGLANK NOT FILMED
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to drop, and theriskengineershave a harder Intechnicf.llyorientedorganizations,how-
time achievingeffectivecommunication, ever, there exist departments specifically
Each typeofriskactivityincludesavariety orientedto certainareas of risk.Some, like
of steps,procedures and techniques,butthey system safety and reliability,are mainly
have a common ultimate purpose. It is to analytical;otherslikequalityassurance and
warn of the probabilityofimpendingtrouble, tests (ofthe qualifyingand acceptance type)
the resourcesand time requiredtoreducethat are largelyprocessing.These areas provide
probabilityand reduce theprobabledamaging information on uncertaintiesand tend to
effectsifitoccurred.The warning isslvento counteract the normal tendency to under-
the appropriatelevelsof the benefitactivity, estimaterisk.
With thisinformationthedecision-makerisin
a positionto decidewhether the riskis suf- THINK-POSITIVE SYNDROME
flcientlylow topermitoperationor whether it
is preferable to take steps to reduce it.
The decision-maker's Judgment as to the The titles of the risk activities--Safety,
desirable benefit-risk ration depends on a Reliability, Quality Assurance, Test, etc.--
number ofconsiderationsand theirbalanceis appear on the doors ofthesedepartment,but .
affectedbycurrentmaterialandpoliticalpres- when one enters one hears about failures,
sures. ThisJudgment isa very personalmat- accidents,defectsand anomalies.Why? Be-
ter.A gambler willunder-valuerisk,a miser cause the terms "reliability,""safety,"
willovervalueit--atleastfrom thepointofthe "qualityassurance" and "tests"are reassur-
middle-of-the roader, tng, while "failures, .... accidents, .... defects"
Facts and analytical logic limit the area and "anomalies" are not. But professionally
, within which Judgment must rule. Outside this the specific work consists in reducing these
judgment area quantitative facts dominate, uncertainties, and any effort to quantify them
Experience shows that hard data tends to dis- focuses on estimating the probability of their
place the softand tenuous,even logic,some- occurrence.
times with little regard to importance. In the One can refer to these "risk departments"
soft area It often happens that the personality as "uncertainty control departmznts" a._ better
of him who presents the Information has more describing the type of work. Risk gives one a
Impact than the Information Itself. sense of a number, often of uncertain meaning,
In most organizations which are not tech- while uncertainty brings to mind the specific
nlcally oriented, no group is assigned the elements that produce risk and even a desire
specific responsibility of assessing risk; to do something about each one. When uncer-
, everyone is exp...,_d to know that risk exists tainty professionals talk to pollcy-makers they
and make decisions within the area of hispro- will use the terminology of their titles: they
ductive responstb!lttT in accordance with his will state, for instant;e, that the reliability is
best Judgment. But does everyone at each .9992 and not that the probability of failure is
decisionlevelgiveconsiderationtothebalance 8 x 10-4 -- rell2bllltysoundsbetterthanprob-
betweenbenefitsand risk?The answer isyes: abilityoffailure,for thesame reasonthatbet-
Everyone does, but often it is done uncon- tlng on a horse is based not on the probability -
sciously with little conscious realization of the of its losing but of its winning.
risk introduced. Seldom is the risk involved This type of phenomenon I have termed the
systematicallycommunicated to higherman- "Think-PosltiveSyndrome.*
agement. The effectiscumulatlve;asonedecl- In industry,as in government, positive
slon influences another the risks add, and many achlevemen: Is psychologically a must. As in
uncertsintles -- assumptions, approximations, the horse racing analogy, man loses interest
conflicts, etc. -- are los; to the decision- in probabilities which involve consideringlos-
making process, ing rather than winning, even though the mathe-
Expressed in this way, it would st'. m that matical odds are not affected. Given the option,
current decision-making process is turrlble. "Wilmott, I%M. "Er,g/nwrtng Truth In Canlm_
We know, however, that it is not so; decisions Ravlr_ement." IERIS Spectrum. Vok 7. May 1970.
, are on the whole good, except sometimes .... pp 45.49
26
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his interest will focus on benefits rather than engineers. The pragmatic reason is that the
uncertainties, latter are in a sense disposable. Design engi-
While the think-positive state of mind is neers are essential to build hardware, and
essential to a program, it has some damaging operational engineers to operate it, but un-
consequences,the common basis of which is certaintlyengineersare needed to pointout
the tendencytounbalancethebeneflt-riskratio how uncertaintiescould be reduced, but pri-
infavorofthebenefits, marily only tohelpthe policymakerwithrisk
The problems itengenders startwiththe data and analyses;and policymakershave for
statementof goals.These are mainly of the centuriesmade policieswithoutthem. While a
benefittype,most of which can be expressed few managers, designand operatingengineers
quantitativelysuch as payload of so many are beglnningtowelcome the analysesandad-
pounds, cost so many dollars,scheduleof so viceofsystem safetyandreliabilityengineers,
many days and equipmentofspecifiedphysical the majorityfindthem tobe a nagginginter-
characteristicsto make measurements or ference with gettingon withtheirwork. They
observations.In the riskarea theprobability oftenconsider thatexistingtalentIn design,
offailureisdifficulttoquantify.Numbers here, operations and policymaklng can meet sub-
for reasons difficultto refute,are currently stantiaLlyall such peripheralrequirements.
discredited.The desire to achieve benefit Under stressthere is a great temptation to
goals puts pressure to underestimate un- save money and time by reducing or even
certaintiesand risk.The pressure ishighbe- eliminatingthe riskdepartments.
cause the goals are set at a levelsomewhat Is itdesirabletocarry out such a policy?
beyond the state of the art and risk estimates At first glance it would seem so, for in these
give way relatively easily because of the flext- areas there are no techniques which a design
billtyofcurrenttechniquesfor expreasingun- engineerwould finddifficulttounderstandand
certainties in numbers, learn. Why, then, did such disciplines as system
In one form or another the syndrome affects safety and reliability separate themselvcs from
all stages of a program. It tends to make a design engineering to a grester extent than such
whole organization lean toward giving more specialized functions as structures, thermal
consideration to performance information analysis, communications, etc.?
(usually hard data) rather than to uncertainties There are two reasons for maintaining risk
(often soft or tenuous data) regardless of im- and benefit technologies in separate depart-
portanc_, or more pragmatically Solean toward merits. One is the importance to quality of,the
underestimating rather than overestimating work interest of the individual worker and the
cost and time, and later in the program to other is the benefit that is derived from con-
sacrifice too readily risk-reducing activities frontatton.
to protect schedule and budget. The think-
positive syndrome tends to make communlca- WORK INTEREST
tion difficult and inefficient, because the
analysis of risk inevitably focuses on un- The worker must be interested in his work
cert;Inties, which to the non-professional are for it to be consistently well done. If he has to
negative aspects of engineering and manage- cover two areas, in the first of which he has
ment, although uncovering, assess/nganddoin S considerably more interest than in the second,
something about them is clearly one of the he will inevitably give mors than proportionate
most pooltive things an engineering group can attention to the first. The difference is par-
do. tlcularly noticeable when he is working under
It is under stress, when funds and schedules the pressure of s tight schedule. If consistently
are tight, when crises occur, that theundeslr- high quaUt7 is required, the two areas should
able features of the think-positive syndrome be separated and given to different workers.
are most likely to be prominent. Under these The separation will have the advantage that
conditions, the communication gap between each worker will become more knowledgeable
pollcymakers and uncertainty engineers is in the area to which he has been assigned, but _N,
particularly great, much greater than the gap much mort, Lr,portent is that each area will be
that often exists with design and operations the primary Interest and will receive the
27
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primary attention of a worker. This situation Even this handicap of long versus short
exists strongly in the relation between the term. in glving greater attention to uncertalnties
benefit and risk technologies. Design engineers might be overcome In time, if the _'sk area a
are typically much more interested tn the out- were to provide tvformatton Important and use°
puts and techniques of design than the:' are in ful to making policy. They can warn of danger,
those of system safer_ and rel;abtllty; they are they can advise nestgn regarding improve-
not, therefore, likely r.o have equal Interest or meat, but it is difficult for them to develop a
give consistent attention to the risk area, if basis for statements such as "The design h;Js
they are required to cover both. deficiencies which will probably cost $X over
In the attached table I have listed my tin- its life, which could be reduced by $Y for a
presston of the relative degree of Interest of cost of SZ and a delay of T." Without this type
five groups -- Management, Design Engineer- of Information how can a rattona _ decl,Jlon be
lag and the three risk assessment _roups-- made? This is the hard kind of data which
Safety, Reliability ana Maintenance. Primary design engineers can provide. Uncertainty
Interest is Indicated by a dark circle and see- engineers tend to provide soft data; safety
ondary by a grey triangle. The number 1 in- engineers often provide only a list of some of
dtcat s a somewhat greater interest than the the th:ngs tha_ could happen. As already
number 2. The major difference In the Interest stated, experience indicates that hard data
is between the primary and ._econdary. This displaces soft almost regardless of Importance.
difference Is to be judged not by verbal opinions
but by action, by the extent to which under BENEFIT F_OM CONFRON'[ATION
stress the secondary Interest wtll be sacrificed A passive organization stagnates. Confron-
for the primary; the extent to which system tation is essential to achievement, to progress
safety, for instance, will be sacrificed for
and innovation. It can also be destructive, if
! schedule or for payload carried by a space- itdevelopsintopersonalcorfllcts.Ideallyitis
', craft; the extent to which as insistent a demand controlled and has a strong element of cooperl-
I ismade and expectedforcompetencelnsystem tlon toward a common purpose. I apply the
safety as in design; the importance given to words confrontattve and conflict in thec]ashof
1 introducingsystem safetyconsiderationsatthe
opinions to imply different atrltudeg. I visualize
initial, the conceptual, as well as in the later confrontation as an objective presentation
stagesofa program, d_ffelences.Conflictincludesan elem_n',of
The tablealsoshows thatintheprocess of
emotion and antagonism.Confrontstlveiscor_
policy making three factors -- cost, time, and structlv_;, conflict is destructive. In complex
key performance parameters -- dominate the programs there is commonly a clash between
uncertainty control areas and the non-key per- fu,cttonal and institutional managers. The
; formance parameters. Is the status of un- initial confrontattve sometinies degrades into
certainty control in policy-making process conflict. On the whole thn'clash is beneficial
low because uncertainty contx'ol is not Ira- But the most potentially valuableconfrontstion
portant? for effective decision-making is between the
The answer is that it Is Important, oftenthe beneht and risk areas. It would seem tmpor-
{ most important element when the whole life of rant, therefore, to 'keep them separate, each
j the unit is the criterion, but often it Is not Ira- one as fully integrated ns other practical con-
portant for the short term. And one must re- slderattons perrrdt.
member the forces on the policy-maker. For
him the short term dominates, and longterm
1 effects and goals are considered only when KNOWLEDGE: DESIGN AND UNCERTAINTIES
1 short term needs are not pressing -- and the
i latter .:ondltlon hardly ever occurs. There are We know what we can design with a con-
! few fields in which risk technologies have a slder_ble degree of confidence, and thlsknowl-
i standing at the top decision lewis equals to edge Is the stimulus that impels ustogo Ih_ad
that of benefit technologies. One outstanding with a program. However, we know little i
, exceptionisthe Officeof Manned Space Flight quantitativelyof the riskwe {ake In making I
t of NASA. these decisions. We know how to process all t128
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kinds of data, but while we have much data on The development of this technique and the
how to do things, we have lktle on assessing building of such a data bank would change
risk. We have universally great confidence in radically the importance and policy status of
the capability of those who design, but we look the uncertainty technology; it would rehabilitate
with a degree of suspicion on those who deal the status of the "numbers game;" it would
with uncertainties, bring estimates of risk, of the consequence and
In the course of developing a system we are penalties of potential deficiencies and un-
constantly reducing and deciding what un- certainties of a program to a level of manage-
certainties to retain. It would be folly tocarry ment appreciation comparable to that of the
out aU the analyses and tests we would like to projected benefits. Management would then at
make, but we should keep in mind that when- las__thave balanced information on benefits and
ever we de.-tde to eliminate something, some risk, without which decisions have to be largely
analysis or test, we are Increasing the un- a matter of unsupported judgment. Wecaneven
certainties. At the end of the process, in our consider that contractors could be induced to
review of what we have done, we should include estabUsh risk during the development of a com-
also what we have not done. Otherwise we can plex system in some systematic manner, so
hardly judge what uncertainties remain. The that both he and the buyer can assess and
uncertainties that remain are never zero. monitor the true progress of a project at each
Uncertainty is made up of a lot of little of its critical stages.
things. It includes also big, clearly visible
problems, but these are usually, though not CONCLUSIONS
always, well recognized and taken care of, buc
the little ones sltp by andcap easily beneglected No specific formula is presented on how to
or even deliberately disregarded, and the sum introduce into an organization the principles I
of them can be far from negligible. For that have outlined regarding the utility of the risk
reason, developing statistics is often difficult, technologies and their relationship to benefit
In the case of system safety, for instance, the technologies. Clearly the best operation will
number of accidents due to a specific deficiency vary greatly with the industry and its current
during a particular operation may be too small pattern of operation. Moreover, it is by no
for meaningful statistics. Inoperationalanom- means obvious where improvement would be
_alies, however, there lies a huge fund of valu- cost effective. Intuitively one can expect only
able d_ta largely unused. They could be aggre- slow advance in the science of risk technology
gated, listed with their source, cause, and the while it remains fragmented. Strong advance
analysis, reviews, tests, inspection where they could be expected by integrating its several
could or should have been caught. We should elements into a single department with its man-
not over-concentrate on major mission fall- ager responsible for warning of dangers aris-
ures; other anomalies are Just as important ing out of uncertainties.
rea!-life data to suplbort future design, reduc- The importance to quality of workerinterest
tlon of uncertainties, risk assessment, and and the value of confrontation points to the
decisions and to select, on the basis of their importance of separating the management of
efficiency, uncertainty removal techniques- risk and benefit technologies. There Is no
analysis, tests, reviews, etc. Applying such clear argument, however, whether raising the
datatoanals-.softhetypeoffalluremode and levelofeffortsoftherisktechnologieswould
effects,onecoulddevelop,]uantitative,occur- be beneficlalor not.
fence estimatesof theconai_'onsthatcould Lookingbackoverthisdiscussiononecan-
produceaccidents.We wouldthenbegintode- nothelpbutfeelthatin itsdevelopment,its
rive some sense of the probability of accidents data base and the degree of attention from
taking place though none had yet occurred and management, risk technologies lag far behind
even before a system was put into operation, benefit technologies. The lag in these areas
A substantial and effective data bank of de- Is undoubtedly the reason for the greater
rived uncertainty information mtght thus be attraction that benefit technologies have for
built up. engineers. That lag of Itself does not Justify
29
1972018311-024
t.
an increased effort in the risk area. Judging sider ourselves equal to the best and possibly
from the experie_:ce of some of the large pro- generally better in this field. But the urge
grams one could re3sonably come to the con- for progress is in our blood. How do we
clusion that adequate ottention is being given progress in a field without guide lines, with-
to uncertainties, even taking into account the out goals, without means of measurement?
details of performance achieved, the anomalies The process we have followed is first to rec-
experienced and the risks that they imply, ognize some weak spots in our operation, and
I have outlined a number of arguments .qhortly sure enough, some ambitious top
describing existing conditions and pressures management tries an approach different from
which laad to underestimating risk. All seem the current pattern for its type of operation.
valid, but what value would accrue if th_se Whether it is an improvement or notis a matter
areas were improved, it is difficult to judge, of opinion, for it is almost always impossible
The gain mlght indeed be little, but also it to measure. Success is usually more felt than
might be considerable. One might expect over- proven. To make such a move is generally
all performance of many large programs tobe d3ngerous to the individual, for criticism of
sensitive to the quality of.the decision process, managerial inovation, overt and covert, from
If that is so, a small improvement should managerial peers are easy to make and likely
produce valuable results. Among the critical to abound, while praise comes more reluc-
parameters of control one would expect to tantly. Experiments are difficult to carry out,
include risk at a level of attention noless than for administrative changes may be strongly
that given to any other parameter, i_.cluding resisted b," special groups and managerial
schedule and cost, and traded off on some levels. They generate barriers born of in-
reasonably comparable basis, security and fears - fear of being measured,
There is probably no controversy that an of loss of authority and of freedom of action.
: increased knowledge of risk in complex sys- The whole field is replete with prejudices and
i terns would help decision making. The con- protective mechanisms.
troversial question is whether the improve- So described the environment does not seem
ment warrants the effort. Many managers feel well suited to embrace a search for progress.
that the present decision process is satisfac- Yet, these barriers are constantly beingover-
tory; others dontt. Among the latter is Under- come, for progress has come consistently,
secretary of Defense Packard. The fact isthat Thls paper points to an area which is_ady _
: we ,80 not know; neither do we know what for progress. I believe it is a most i_ortant
ir.=reased risk we incur when, under tight area, one in which a quantum step o_rogress
budgets, when crises are more likely to occur, can prehaps be achieved. The dis_ssion of the ;:
we reduce the level of effort in the uncertainty paper was focused on technol_y, but the key _
areas, element- the unbalance between benefits and ::
It seems important to develop a better risk in thedecisionmakingp_ocess-elements _i
sense of the benefits that knowledge of risk far beyond the boundaries of technology. If a
could provide viathedecision-makingprocess, systematic attack is to be made on this un-
To carry this out will require an improved balance, technology is the logical first area to _
data base. By experiment and analysis on the approach, for there the problem is most _f
effects of increasing the contribution of risk clearly definable, and its individual risk areas _,_
technologies, one could develop abetter under- are well stocked, though still inadequately, ._
standing of their potentiality and limitations, wi,th data, techniques and expert personnel. _
The analysis in this paper has been written My personal but unsupported opinion is that
mainly withthe ideaofclarifyingto technolo- risk technologyis a great and coming field. _
gistsand analyststheplaceoftherisktechnol- Advance there is needed more than in other
ogles in the managerial environment. Can it technologies. It is not only needed in the hard "
also indicate to management a possible line of area of engineering, but even more so in the _
approach to some of itsneeds?Judgingfrom softarea of the socialsciences.Itisrapidly _
the demand of other countriesfor American changingfrom an art of|udgmentto atechnol-
management expertisewe cab reasonablycon- ogy where we can beginto see thepossibility
3O
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7of reliable numbers based on physics and If one does not include throughout a major
real lIfe experience. We still nave a long way project a systematic uncovering of uncer-
to go before we can approach the values that tainties and at each major milestone a thoroush.
this technology could provide. Risk assess- official assessment of risk, one probably loses
merit, supported bydataandtechniquesforpre- one of the most important benefits for the
diction, are receiving rapidly growing attention future the project can provide - developing real
in many fields, life statistical data and learning how to apply
I would like to add one final opinion appli- them to decision-making.
cable to both the public and private sectors: We still have much to learn'
|
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A NEW DISCIPLINE recommended readingfor every safety manager
desiring to adopt the systems approach to
Credit safety engineers for a new systems accident loss prevention.
theory to the complex aerospace industry. But
credit also the safety managers for m_ktng MANAGEMENT CAN BE DEFICIENT
their theory apply to the average industrial H, W. Hetnrlch0 (3) a pioneer in the field
management activity, of accident loss prevention, pointed out that
A system is simply anas_.emblageofthings accident events have (1) unsafe acts and/or
and parts that go to make up a whole. Space personal factors and (2) unsafe conditions.
engineers think of theircomplex and dangerous What Hetnrich did not discuss was the man-
manufacture and manipulation of space prod- ageria! failures or system breakdowns that are
ucts as a system. "All systems go" is their basic reasons for human errors and condition
famous watchwork. The Defense Department defects. These factors must be translated into
has a set of general requirements for applying broader areas of managerial responsibilities
systems safety engineering principles to the involving policies, organization, staffing, cam-
life-cycle of weapons systems including the munication, coordination° decisionmaking, etc.
conceptual design, engineering, fabrication, at all levels of the corporate hierarchy. In.
testing, installation, checkout, operation, and this concept, safety managers must stop visu-
d_'sposal. (1) alizing the problem only with the individual
This approach to optimal safety effective- (supervisor or employee), step back, and see
ness has given the engineering side of loss the problem from the systems point of view.
: prevention a "new look" that gives promise to
an exciting future for the technical safety PERFORMANCE ERRORS CALLED
experts. The application of systems theory, "ACCIDENTS"
however, is not limited to safety engineering
and hardware. It can and does apply to any Arcidents are only managerial excuses for
number of things, some of which are quite operational errors that result from manager
familiar to us. For example: a training system, failures. This concept was introduced in 1962
a transportation system, the Federal Reserve by Dr. John J. Brownfain who said, "In science,
System, the respiratory system, the solar sys- if you know the cause of an event, that event
tern, the school system, and so or. THE is not an accident." (4) He went on to explain
THEORY OF SYSTEMS CAN BE APPLIED TG that "In everyday life, if we do not like the end
: MANAGEMENT, result of this event, and at the same time want
to escape personal responsibility for it, we are
MANAGEMENT ISA SYSTEM inclinedtocallitan accider,t."
Dr. Brownfain's observations are important
In a very practical sense, managemen: it- in the system safety management approach to
self is a system every bit as complex as any reducing operational errors called accidents.
system of hardware. Organizations are man- Few will disagree that causes of most accidents "
made systems with many interrelated func- (events) are well docuraented. Thus, what safety
tional and subfunctlonal parts. Each is respon-
managers are really doing for management is
sible to the other in the accomplishment o.f a programming to eliminate performance fail-
common mission of the business. Each must
ures that produce injury and property damage.
work in harmony to accomplish mutual goals. Carrying this one step further, one can say that
"The systems concept can be primarily a
safety activities are Olrected more at man-
way of thinking about the Job of managing" agerial improvement than the reduction of
according to the authors oi a textbook that personal suffering, although the end result
presents management theory in a "systems" does not change.
framework. (2) This concept of visualizing
the system of management as a seriesofpsrts THE FUTURE OF SYSTEMS SAFETY
working together to contribute to a whole is MANAGEMENT
very exciting for safety managers. This book
along with the works of Gulick, Urwick, Blake, Systems safe W management holds great
Likert, Drucker, McGreggor, and others is promise as s new discipline for reducing
SS
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zoperating errors, conserving labor resources, From what has been said here, it should b,:_
avoiding operating costs due to mistakes, and fairly obvious that a safety professional v;ho
- for improving managerial techniques. The chooses the management direction of accident
management approach to safety involves the loss prevention must have a broad background
process of business viz-a-viz the process of of managerial expertise and experiencebeyoad
things. In this process we are concerned more that of a line manager. The art of management
with the interrelationships of all levels of man- is as important to the safety manager as the
agement in relation to the prevention of loss science of engineering is to the safety engt-
rather than only with the line manager (super- near. Some knowledge of both is an ideal sttua-
visor), tlon.
After six years of practical application and Remember, in the field of management,
research with the systems theory and safety interfunctlonal interest in safety begins withthe
management, it is my observation that: establishment of common program goals be-
* Improvement of a critical managerial tween the functional systems. This simply
"_ weakness in the organizational system means that the safety manager must know what
that contributes to operational errors the order functional manager is trying to do
can be equally as important as protect- for the organization and then tie safety objoc-
:_ ing a critical function of machinery. One tives to his objectives. For example, it would
# cannot succeed very long without the be extreme_,y difficult to obtain management
o other, interest in problems concerning "falls-of-
* The principle of redundancy (multiple persons" from a oersonnel officer - or even a
channels of operation to reduce possi- property officer. On the other hand, tellperson-
Bility of failure) can apply to theprocess nel it has a "training" deficiency that produced
of management as well as to a mechanical over 1,000 employee errors resulting in falls,
operation, or tell a property officer that design failures
* Systems reliabilitycan be as important are causing $200,000 of waste annually,need
to the excellenceofmanagement and its any more be said?Ineachcase,themanagerial
functionalentitiesas to the successful weakness is degrading the expectedoutputof
engineering of hardware components, the system in an area ofconcernthatcannot
In short,any operatingerror thatis re- be correctedby the safetymanager.
ported as an accident,can be examined for Others interestedin loss control(error-
managerial failuresas wellas human errors free-performance) willshow concern ifthat
and conditiondefects.The managerial deft- lossispresentedin a way thatrelatestofail-
cienciescan be tracedto theseveralmanage- urea intheirfuctionalmissionsor tothesblllty
ment systems and,inturn,tothe_.rmanagcrlal tooperateand manage forprofit.
subsystems. The isolation,quantification,and If you want management_s attentionto
cost evaluationof thesemanagerial concerns safety problems, then speak mansgementts
then become an importantpart of decision- language and be sensitivetomanagerial con-
making and eventual systems improvement, cams. Learn allyou can abouteach function
and subfunctionof your businessinthe same
,raythatan engineerisexpectedtoknow about
MANAGEMENT MUST BE STUDIED machinery he dealswith.This willenableyou
to make serious inroads to their decision-
The successful use of the systems theory making proc,=ss. ABOVE ALL--CONSTRUCT
with the management of accident prevention YOUR SAFETY SERVICES TO THEIR OR-
programs as appliedtocorporateorganizations GANIZATIONAL NEEDS NOT .IUST TO THE
requires the understandingby alllinesuper- REQUIREMENTS OF AN INDIVIDUAL.
visors that most-_auses of accidents can be
traced to staff support deficiencies. This in- CONSTRUCT AN INTRA-MANAGEMENT
formation about causes and costs becomes a INFORMATION SYSTEM
valuable management tool for self evaluation
(upwards) and a means for controlling and Control is the basic feature to the systems
planning with greater accuracy and efficiency, theory. You can solve s problem ff you don't
"* I 39
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have the facts about it.This means thata OperationsDivision,NationalOceanic & At-
safety management information system t_ mospheric Administration, U.S. Department of
basic to managerial improvement through Commerce, "They share responsibility for
loss prevention. This communication upward finding and identifying all accident losses. They
through ne levels of mana_'ement must be collectcausal data in usableform Insteadof
responsiveto managerial needs.Use a corn- simply keeping score. They bridgetheCom-
putertocollectand _toreaccldentdatarelated munlcations gap by addressing dollars and
to management systems. Used correctly, safety manhours lost instead of percentage of rates.
managers will not have to beg for top manage- This momentum is well timed to reinforce the
ment support. Functional managers at all levels new emphasis on "ZEROING-IN" on problems.
willseek safetysupport. But, before we pullthe trigger,let'sexamine
No system canexistwithoutcommunication, thetarget.Our purpose must be togiveeffec-
The first task in establishing a report network tive direction to the control of all accidental
is to develop a source document (accident re- losses, r.,)t to play one more hand of the same
port) that allows the line manager to identify tired game". (6)
systems failures. (5) He reports them, as he
sees them, in a manner thatcan be put intoa REFERENCE
computer. The computer can be calledupon (I)Refer to "Systems SafetyEngineeringof
tofeedbackdatafor perlodicanalysisinmean- SystemR and associatedSubsystems
Ingfulterms (Englishlanguage).This analysis and Equipment,General Requiremenrs
with supporting facts is then given to the line for MIL-STD 882" June 6, 1966, for
managers for direct action to staff managers all departments and agencies of the
for systems Improvements. Department of Defense.
*Reproduced by the National Safety News,
CONCLUSION NationalSafetyCouncil,May 1971
(2)Johnson,R.A.,Kast,F.E,,andRosenzweig,
In summary, itwould be a serious mls- J.E., "The Theory and Management of
take to thinkthatthe theory of systems and Systems, "McGraw-Hill Book Co.,New
safety appliesonly to hardware. Engineer- York, 1967,p.3
ing or technicalknowhow is not the prime (3)Heinrich,H. W., "IndustrialAccidentPre-
requisitefor allsafetyproblems. Expertise vention,"McGraw HillBook Co.,New
in se.fa.ty management requires a basic under- York, 4th ed. 1959
standing of human reeource management rather (4) Brownfain, J. J., Ph.D., "When Is An Ac-
thansclenriflcunderstandingof machines, cldent Not An Accident?",JOURNAL
To raP,ks the concept operational, safety of the American Society of Safety En-
manager,# must consider always the social gineers, Park Rigs, Ill., 1962, p. 19
benefits of employees--their needs, motlva- (5) Pope, W.C., and Nicloai, E.R., "In Case of
ttons, and asperations more _s groups than as Acc!,dent - Call the Computer", Per-
individuals. There is a great need for under- sonnel Pamphlet No. 23, U.S. Depart-
standing of group behavior and manager re- ment of the Interior 1970
latlonshlps and the safety manager may make (6) LeClerg, ILF., "A Revolution and How to
a realcontrilmtlontoerrorfreeperformanceby Treat It", FOCUS-Journal of the
the realization of this need. National Safety Management Society -
"Some loss controlprograms are now show- Environmental Control & SAFETY
lng refreshing signs of objectivity" says Robert MANAGEMENT, A.M. Best Co., March
LeClerg, Assistant Chief, Administrative 1971 p. 37 J
!
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ZThose friends of George Mandel who are variety of committees within NASA atad we ha;,e
wondering why it is that I am here in his place, panel membership on each of these committees.
I am happy to report that he is recovering We worry about cryogenics and low tempera-
nicely from a heart attack. :ures systems because we deal a great deal in
On the matter of the Aerospace Safety Re- propellants which are liquified gases, and we
search and Data Institute, about three or four have membership in the Compressed Gas
years ago, after the Apollo fire, NASA realized Association where much of this work is done.
that its safety organization could use a centex I won't detail all of these things but point out
where safety information accumulates and is that in addition to all else we deal with assorted
validated and interpreted for use by the Aero- NASA committees dealing with space-borne
space Industry. Our grot, p was set up in the radioactive materials. If]ouare wondering how
Cleveland laborazory to serve all of NAS _ and it is that NASA deals in radioactive materials
the Aerospace Industry. Three years agoIwas for space, I will remind you that the largest
a lone member of this group and t spoke to this soace station which will orbit the earth will
conference about our hopes. Now I am here to calr; electric producing systems which will
report how we have proceeded, what our points not use the sun as a source of heat but either
of view are, and where we stand at this time. a nuclear reactor or radioisotopes. This is a
Let's review for a minute and take a look at real concern to us at this time. The final corn-
our objectives. First, to support NASA and its mittee _e serve on is NASA's Spacecraft Fire
contractors with technical information and con- Hazard St eering Committee which I chair. This
i suiting or safety problems. To identify areas grew out o_ ,_,. concern for fire problems
where safety problems exist or where voids in on spacecraft, particularly manned spacecraft.
technology exist, and to initiate research pro- The question is, Whatis Safety Information?
; grams both in-house and ,,nder contract to fill We had to ask ourselves, we are going to collect
} these voids; to prepare state-of-the-art sum- information, but what? What is it? Is it that
maries and other uublications of use in our body of information that has a safety label at-
area. The key to all this is to establish and tached to it in someway? Well yes, it is that.
operate a safety data bank. But is it something else as well? Hereiswhat
It is my purpose today to go through this we feel constitutes the boundaries of safetyin-
quickly to give you an idea of our thinking and formation and I am sure this is an inadequate
where we stand. I might add, as an overall re- detail of these boundaries. First, safetyinfor-
mark, the emphasis we have given in our efforts ruction is a body of technical matter drawn to-
is to keep the user of the information in mind. gether from various disciplines in supportofa
That user isn't necessarily a safety specialist safety problem. This information is often in-
as you are, but can be any one of the engineers distinguishable from englneerfng, scientific or
' in the total System of engineering support• medical information. In a sense, what we are
There are decisions being made at all levels, saying is this, that safety tnforma'Aon can be
Many of our users are competent engineers who drawn from any part of the technical and scien-
are being called on to make decisions involving tific literature and we have to be prepared to do
technical information for which they have poor _ust that. Safety information Is also information
background, on hazard management techniques, and wher_
In order to maintain contacz with the user eqt lpment is involved, the associated equip-
population so that we do a useful job, we stay meat. It deals in failure advisories, accidents,
in detailed contact with the entire industry and reports, anti then the legal aspects of safety,
all institutional centers of NASA where prob- codes and standards.
lems are apt to arise. We also have member- Now, where we are dealing with a user-
ship on a host of committees. Obviously the oriented system, _he user generallycomestoa
apace shuttle is prime to NASA's interest at safety problem withcertatncategortesofques-
this time and I might add that in setttng up this tions in his m.M. He would'like for example 1
data bank wc try our best to do the work in to recognize when hazards exist, and under-
those areas of _mmedlate interest zoNASA and stand how he can detect the build-up of a haz-
then broaden our, interest as time allows. Space ardous condition. And so we like to organize _,
Shuttle is being controlled at this stage by a our Information that way. Or he would like to
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understand how to reduce the probability of a want to disagree with what I am going to say
failure or an accident. So we organize.our in- next.
: formation this way as well. He would like to be In the safety information that we reviewed,
able to assess the consequences of a failure, we often found that important portions of the
_" Oddly enough, when we look at the literature safety information are misapplied laboratory
for assessing the consequences of a failure we data. Data that was gathered not with a safety
don't go to the safety literature, we go to the problem in mind but simply a study ofa disci-
anti-safety literature. We look to the demolition pline, and somebody is using that information
expert and say, "what do you know about what improperly in a safety document. Safety reports
• would happen if we had an explosion". He would often deal in opinions masquerading as fact
like to be able to reduce the consequences of a and this is a11 too often the case. I think many
failure and he would like to have the informs- of you understand this. A large body of liters-
lion so structured that when he comes with this lure exists in some fields and little or none in
question in mind he can find that kind of infor- others, and sharply focused information is dif-
=-- matton, ficult to find for both reasons. There are times
Then there are certain scientific and engi- when you query an information system about a
neering fundamentals he has to have in order to certain aspect of a safety problem, you get
apply what information exists. We feel that here snowed with 2,000 documents. That is as good
U is a kep weakness in the communication of safety as giving you nothing unless you have enough
_ literature, information from the literature, and discretion in the field and are inquiring enough
that is the interpretation of what the literature to pick that which is useful from that which
_ tells you. We feel that in many areas, we, the isn't.
_: Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute, Much of the literature contains incremental
shall have to prepare documents which show contributions and a large mass of reports must
how the existing information in the literature be reviewed for answers to the safety questions.
is interpreted in terms of real problems. We This tells us that somewhere in our system we
haven't begun this process yet except lnavery have to boil down the information into review
limited way. It is a difficult thing to do, but I and summary reports and let that be the input
think it is a vital step. And we also, since the to our system and cut out the chaff of a large
legal aspects of safety are so important, have number of Incrementalreports. And too, a point
to make our engineer who is dabbling tn a safety I alludes on before, information is couched tn
problem aware that there are certain legal scientific terms which are unfamiliar to engi-
asg*cts to the safety problem, risers. In other words, the information isn't
When we took alookattheexistlnginforma- user-oriented. If you want to touch on this at
tton in safety and decided to create a safety all, give an engineer a man-machine problem,
data hank, we were first faced with what shall the business of Integrating man Into a machine
go in the bank7 We are proposing to have a system, and let him look at the data the
largely computerized bank and the first thing psychologists put out and try to make some ;
that hit me forcibly in this whole business was sense of it for himself. I'm not saying that :
the fact that if you use a computer as a bank, as psychologist's data is no good, but the pay-
s place In which to attire information, you dis- chologistts data is so couched In jargon that
cover how enormously,, enormously costly it the engineer is hopefully confused., _
is to do a .proper job of putting Information Into The preaer:retrievalsystems often lose the
a computer. We said we have to be careful what relevant information and cite many irrelevant _
goes in, not only from the standpoint of cost, references. When this happens, obviously there
but from the standpoint of credibility. Can the is a degradation in the service being provided.
people get Information out of our system and Here is what we said the components of a
depend on it? They are surely golcg to use thts safety data bank system ought to be.
as an authority for the actions they take and If First, we should use a computer, should be
we give them the wrong information or poor In- document references. These should have an
formation, it Is our respensibflity. Also, we appropriate abstract so that the person looking
looked _,t the quality of safety Information. Most at a document reference doesn't have to go by
of ycaa are old pros at this and I think you'll the title. Authors of reports are notoriously
43
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poor in titling their own reports so we prefer sure you're getting the latest in safety infor-
to have an abstract which helps a little. In the mation and then prepare safety reports and
work which we are going to be doing, which we advisories, much of which would be done
ask people to review literature in specialized under contract.
fields, we ask the reviewer who is an expert in Now where are we in this matter of estab-
the field to write hisown abstractin addition to ltshing the bank? First, our basic computer
the author's abstract, if he thinks the author's components have been acquired for the Lewis
abstract is misleading. Computer information Center and they are being up=graded which
should have references to other repositories makes me unfortunately say to you that we
that specialize in information, and I want to can't give youred-hotservicequiteyetbecause
bring up the point that we don't think we are the this up-grading step makes the computer un-
only safety data bank in existeace. We know available to us for long periods of time. We
there are many. We hope to be complementary h_v¢ now completed the computer programming
with them; not to overlap them, and in no case to give us a very flexible storage and retrieval
to totally absorb them unless it's worthwhile to system for information. First of all we give
do that. We do have to know where the other in- random access to documents and data citations
formation resides and to have the computer in the computer storage, in other words very
point it out as an answer to a query on informs- speedy retrieval. We can reach into any part
tion requests. It has to be able to store sys- of this storage imrr, ediately and pull out the
tematic accumulations of safety data and what reference without having to spin all tapes
I mean by systematic accumulations is this. through a monitor to pick up the information
Much of the information that a safety engineer, we are looking for. This reaches in and pulis
or person involved with safety problems needs it out in a fraction of a second, We can fix the
to use, have never been published. It has been retrieval of information by aurJior, by content,
garnered from research, completed in private in which we use an elaborate system of key
places and these are available to us as curve and words so that you can get sharply focused in-
graphs etc. plots, formulas -- we have to be able formation, by document or_,gin and number, and
to include that in our system so these come out. I might add by the contractor or other Agency
We can't rely entirely on documents. We then that did the work, by the program name that
need a list of specialists in safety and safety- created the work and so on. There are many
related fields and this goes back to our role of ways in which we can find documents under this
consulting. We ourselves don't feel that we are system. We believe in continuous key-word
capable in every field to give consulting. This Thesaurus development. These key words are
would be ridiculous for a group of about 16 the descriptives that descr'be the contents of a
technical people, and we couldn't hope to cover document. We know that as documents appear,
", all fields. What we hope to do in providing con- any fixed Thesaurus will not cover the contents
sultation is to find an appropriate person some- of an evergrowing field, and so the Thesaurus
where who can serve thatrole,butwe can't, thatwe are developingcan continueto grow
We donftintendto supplementthestandard with the literatureas itcomes inand we can
reference library with on-shelf references, always have an up-dated Thesaurus. When a
There is no sense in stickingthenormal ms- searcher comes tothecomputer andsaysIwant
terialsofa good libraryina computer.ThaUs to findsomething,what word shallIuse. the
on theshelfand thestandardlibrarytechniques computer gives him the very latestllstof
work very well.We hope tomicrofilm allthe words. The system isveryflexibleinthatifwe
informationthatisreferredtoinourcomputer= feelthathavingenlargedtheThesaurusand the
storedInformationso thatfftheperson wants descriptiveterms _at we allowedourselvesto
the refe_'encewe can sliphim microfilm.We use, we did an inadequatejob oftheexisting
nexthope tosetup a SafetyInformationAnalyo citationsin our files,we can go throughand
sisCenterforconsolidatingthisactofboiling change thekey words attachedtothatcitation.
thingsdown and having only afew,reportsin In the end we hope tobe freeofany business
the place of many; validating,inotherwords ofa Thesaurus and use freelanguageforchar-
gettingrid of tho Junk thatisnttcorrect;and acterizingcitations.Inotherwords you havea
updating,gettingrid of old stuffand making freedom from the constraint of using
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¢specialized terms. This is one o_ ,:,e dfffi- system is a file of about 35-36,000 documents
: culties of finding information ln acomputertzed in the nuclear safety field. The files of the
system. The systems, ff they are limited to a Cryogenic £ngineering Center and the National
Thesaurus, have a rather strange number of Bureau of Standards has already been placed
_- constraints, into our system. The FAA Aviation Safety
Let me give you an example of this: Suppose files, we are negoflating on. Recall we said
you were interested in cats. And in particular, that a complete information system would
since you are domesticated, you want a do- also include component failure rate files and
mesricated cat, you want a house cat and you here is the key word--IDEP--it is an infor-
want information on house cats. There are marion exchange program amongst the various
some retrieval systems that would say,"Okay, segments of the Government. It deals with
you can use the word house and you can use failure rates in the testing of components for
the word cat. Because the C in cat comes aerospace devices--airplanes, spacecraft. By
before H in house it will go into the computer putting this file, which exists on paper, into
, with the word with the C first so it goes into our computer we can maintain an up-to-date
the computer, not as house cat but as cat record of all failure rate studies going on,
house. Now who would think of looking, for that have gone in the past and those which
_- house cats under that. You can do a lot _,f are current. This will keep some branch of
_ games with this of course. Try venetian blinds the Government from repeating a failure rate
¢: for example. This is true, some systems are study on a piece of equipment which is a!ready
this way and give the searcher quite a game in progress by another Agency. You'll see a
_ to play to try to find the information that sample of the kind of print out this system
exists. We hope to break this block, gives.
We will include a file of document abstracts Within NASA, following the 204 fire four
and reviewers comments in which the re- years ago and then the Apollo i3 accident,
viewer will say the report is pretty good for both involving oxygen, and other oxygen acci-
this area of work but don't believe the rifle, dents within NASA, we undertook acomplicated
it just doesn't have very much information and rather involved study ofmaterialcompar, t-
in another area or, this is old stuff and itts billty with oxygen. Thiz file is going into our
wrong in this respect. We hop th revi wers computer so that one can find ',,-.formation more
comments will be tagged to most of these readily than the turning of pages in a book, •
citations. As I said before, we would have a which becomes very difficult,
method for accumulating incremental data in Here is some safety information that we
terms of tables and formulas etc. and also are asking others to gather with our support
the computer has devised within it a means and our help. Oxygen System Safety, this ,!
for assisting the searcher in going through grows out of the Apollo !3 accident, in which -:
the strategyof the search,itkeeps assisting we are collectingmeaningfulliteratureand
him with clues and if he doeJnttknow what to data and then we are collectingthepractices
do next, he asks the computer, "What next?" of others in design and operation of oxygen _
and thecomputer tellshim. systems. We are tryingto put togetherthe
_ Here is a view ofwhat we are tryingtodo tiretechnologyas itapplieslargelytospace- ,_
now. First of all we find that there are some craft and aircraft and ground test facilities in
excellent safety information files. Many of support of development of either of these.
them are computerized, some are not, many The National Bureat_of Standards has a con-
of them have thisso=calledInteractive--let tract with us to do thlo.They hav_ a fire
me say it this way--we are more or less safety technology group who are charge:l by
unique in having this easy intexacflve scheme Congress to conduct work in this area. This
of search and retrieval that many do not and portion of it is a cooperative effort with NASA
where it's Justified to absorb a given file or now.
information on safety so we can have this nice Human Factors, with emphasis on flight ;
access with our computer, we do this. In vehicles and especially the space shuttle. This "
particular, an excellent file of safety infor- study is 8oing forward un_ler the guidance of :
maflon, which has already been put into our the Human Factors people at our Ames
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laboratory in California and it is to be a major chart, the one that developed for the fire
effort. This Nuclear Isotope safety I mentioned problem, I think you can appreciate that it is
earlier has to do with on-board nuclear mate- a fairly involved chart. The hope that is on
rials. The business of non-destructive testing perusal by the user, the person who has a
and diagnostic techniques with structures on problem in mind and then comes to our sys-
machines safety codes and operating practices tern and says where can [ find information
for aircraft, fracture mechanics data for and we give him this, he gets a first clue into
structural alloys with special emphasis on low how to Interrogate the system to find his In-
temperature applications of metals and let me formation. What words does he use to the
cue you in here. NASA has found that every computer to say give me information along
time It took on the use of a high strength these lines and the computer will begin to
material, particularly those which retain their formulate a form.
: high strength at low temperature, It found it This chart is also used by the people who
had problems in fracture mechanics--the two input the Information Into the system and any
ran together. When you try to grab the ad- key words that they develop to describe the
vantage of a red-hot material that had a high contents of the documents they review go Into
strength to weight ratio and good toughness those blocks so that the user, the guy search-
at low temperatures particularly it had a ing sees the words that the Inputter created
fracture mechanic problem. The thing wanted to describe the information that exists there.
to crack easily, which appears to be a con- With regard to the IDEP record, this is
tradlction of terms, butthtststhewaylt works, the business of putting into the computer a
Mathematical techniques in safety analysts, record of the failure rates for equipment under
! that is only beginning for us. test. The purpose of our computer handling of
t In an effort to organize our information so this is to tell a searcher where he finds the
that the user can find his problem, we did this. record on the piece of equtpnaent he is con-
We said, the user comes with certain questions cerned for. The address, because the IDEP
in mind, very often he Is concerned with the system provides microfilms of all tests and
causes for failure In his systems and we are there is where the information he wants re-
taking as our Illustration this cryogenics fluid sides. The question is, where is it. In all of
safety grid and a means for characterizing the the tapes _;hat exist, all of the microfilms, in
information that exists in a given area and in other words, he Is looking for this address,
this area on cryogenic fluid safety, what are the microfilm address code number. Once he
the causes of failure? and we say the causes gets that code number, he knows how to spin
of failure under what conditions. When you are his microfilm to find out where the inform-
", transporting, where you are storing, when you mar.ton exists. Now he can find the component
are handling the fluids in systems. These are he is Interested in in a variety of ways. He
the blocks which represents an Intersection knows the accession number, (I won't try to
between this term, transportation storage or describe these terms in two much detail, I
system handling, and failure causes. Each of don't have rime) the manufacturer, say the
these blocks constitutes a range of problems company, "_f the equipment, the date It was
of interest and these then are the categories made or the date of the test, or the govern-
we create, this range of problems of interest, sent part number or a description of the part.
and place them in this chart so that a person May t e It Is a relay, the contact rating in this
with this problem on his mind under these area etc. He feeds this to the machine. The
conditions sees what has been done here. Not machine then prints out a page _hat looks like
only do we do this but all these words that are this and he can check and see whether this Is
descriptive terms for describing the literature truly the piece he wants, and is this the cor-
that exists in this area will appear in this feet part number if he has the part number of
block. That was a simplified view of things--I the Vendor's part and so he says, Yes that is
think you can read the rest and appreciate Its the right one and he knows where to search In
relevance to some of the remarks I made the microfilm. /
before. This is a simplified view only for our From tlme to time NASA puts out alerts t
purposes here. If I wet. to show you a true on parts and this we hope to have In the
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machine and the key issue here on the alert, base. We are trying to make our system
not worrying about anything else is this, that consistent with this point of view. If you want
-: people have in the machine a system of alert, to be part of this system and you want to query
If somebody is concerned about what the latest the information that we have, do you have to
alerts are, he simply queries the computer call us. I hope not. We would be available for
from a remote station, a console remote from any calls or for any letters in inquiry. What
our system, by telephone lines and asks what do you have on some kind of problem but we
is the latest alert. He gets a statement which hope that those who are principal users of
says failure analysis conforms something safety information will have their own console
_, about a part and the trouble with the seal, etc. substations which are reasonably cheap. A
"" and he can identify what the alert is tlying to $5,000 or $6,000 investment gives you such a
tell him. station. With this tie in, you dial the telephone,
With regard to other data centers, we have FTS or any other voice communication line
: identified about 150 data centers which we will put in communication with our computer
r think are useful in our business. There are and gives you the opportunity to access it for
,: probably more. We hope to have them within information only. This doesn't give you the
our computer and we ask for certain tnfor- opportunity to change the contents, only to get
mation and say what data centers would have the contents out.
_i_), information on particular things.The computer It is made of three major components.
:_ would print give a print out: which would give First a TV screen on which the print-out of
_: them the name of the information center, say the computer is placed and gives you all the
_; Electronics Properties Information Center, information regarding the document you are
and then what do they cover in that center. If looking for; a keyboard for instructing theyou are concerned for liquid metals and computer on what you want next; and if you
" hazards associated with these, this is the see something on the TV screen that you like
kind of coverage the liquid metals informs- and want to preserve after making a search,
tion center would give you. Not only do you you hit a button on the keyboard and a print-
get this, you get information on first, the out, permanent record hard copyappearshere.
name of the Center, where it is, how you get These are the three components. For an in-
information from them, do you call them up, vestment of $5,000 to $6,000, you get them all.
do you send them a letter, do you have a fee We hope that when our system is rich
to pay, etc. We hope that our Information enough to justify othershavingremotestations.
Center will be one of a network. There are Our hope is that we can handle many queries,
many good ones that have capabilities like 40 people on the line simultaneously.
ours and we hope that we can tuck them all That then concludes my description of the
' together in one network so that when you work we are doing.
query the system you query everybodies data Thank you.
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HOW SAFE IS SAFE ? aids to anticipating what was formerly unantici-
pated. The probabilities have been qualified
The question "How safe is safe?" will be and quantified. The result of these efforts per-
frequently directed to those who work at pre- mitted us to send men to the moon and bring
venting accidents. The question will often take them back safely. They can be used t_, many
these forms: How far do we have to go with other applications with similar success.
these precautions? how much money or effort
shall we spend ;:o prevent accidents7 do we THE ANSWER IS LAW
need "redundancy," "hack-up," "guards,"
.,fail-safe," "emergency procedures," "more But this search still does not answer the
training?" If we provide hackup for an opera- question fully--how safe is safe? It only tells
tton, shall we hackup the hackup? If we do, us that asking "what Jr?" often enough and pro-.
how much safer is it? If we spend money to vlding the answers ;,111 make our hardware,
reduce the hazards all the way, is it worth it? process or management safer. In fact, to be "
Is the benefit worth the risk? This last ques- able to go all the way, will require more than
tlon has become a most serious one for busl- human clairvoyance. I submit that in anygtven
hess men today In the light of Increasing situation the question of whether this process •
awareness of the public and attending claims has been followed to an adequate degree will
consciousness. While still not taken as a usually be explored in a court of law.
national policy, It is becoming more and more Safety is a state of being free from or the
recognized that "accidents can be prevented." absence of danger. Danger Is a positive ,, Jrd
,_ And so--how much prevention? and means that there is a potentlalfor harm or
We safety managers have a notion that we loss. (Inctdentially, the word for "safe" in
! know what Is safe. No doubt! Experience gusslantstheequtvalentinEngltshof"danger"
teaches us to know better than some others (oposnosti) plusthepreflx"wtthout"(bez)which
what is safer, and only perhaps what is unsafe, makes it "safe" i.e., without danger.) Harm Is
: But "safe" and "unsafe" are general, abstract, damage or hurt. And, unless the hurt is to the
unquantifted, relative terms. Here-to-fore we perpetrator himself, there can be a claim for
have been successful only to the extent that negligence. When negligence Is alleged in a
we have given more attention to eliminating court action to be the cause of the damage, we
or controlling conditions from which accidents are all set for a determination of "how safe is
can arise which are discernible to a trained safe" because the law will want to knowamong
eye. other things "How diligently did the responsible
The unconscious desire of specialists is person look for the causes of harm and what
to prevent change In their spectalty--(A quot- did he do about them."
able quote from one of the :ases)--"To a Throughout the eases of negllgenee, deqnt-
specialist "change" means unlearning a see- tions and court determinations are generally
tlon of knowledge, a painful process'" consistent. In general "negligence is an act or •
With the development of additional attention omission in violation of duty to exercise
and emphasis on safety andthegreaterurgency ordinary care by reason of which injury to q
•, t
technologically, socially and politically, we are person or property occurs."* i
_ refining the search to prevent accidents with Courts always imply that the negligence or l
the more diligent application of engineering failure to do or not do was what a reasonable
methods and the stricter use of logic and of or prudent person would do or would not do
computer selected information. Thus con- under the circumstances.
dltlons that were formally called "accident
causes," are found out or discovered, and PRUDENT PERSONS WILL ANALYSE
anticipated, and the potential for _.oss elimi-
nated, controlled, or otherwise negated. We It is my purpose to advance the ldeathat Infind that many so-called accident causes were some circumstances "what a reasonable or
not unforeseeable and unpredictable! We didn't prudent person would have done under similar
search with sufficient diligence! Thus system \
safety analyses become, not panaceas, but only *See. 32, 38 AM. Jurg, P643.
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circumstances" will be to make a systems Safety Analysis Report, Operations Readiness
analysis. So far I have been unable to find ad- Review, Fault Tree Analysis, Failure Mode
judicated cases where this has happened, though and Effects Analysis, etc., provides recorded
Pve been told it has. proof that one was diligent, not negligent.
If there are any, they are rare, so _ar. How= The day may be here already, considering
ever, one does not have to stretch the imagina- the advances in technical knowledge and tech-
tion to realize that under many circumstances, niques for retrieval of hazard information and
now developing in products safety, technical accident experience, that a man or person
operations, complex machinery, aircraft, pol- (corporation) may be considered negligent if he
lution and other modern situations, negligence has not used a system analysis in the degisn of
will consist "in" not having looked as sys- a product to offer to the public.
tematlcally as cne could have. "The policy If thin theory is to be of value, the question
of the law has relegated the determination of of admissibility of such proof will have to be
'._ such questions t) the jury (i.e., was he a considered. This will be touched later.
reasonably prudent man?}, under proper in-
struction from the court." When products and THE LAW CHANGES
processes become too complex for a jury to
_ understand or too technical for a judgc tocom= Argument for use of system safety tech=
prehend, some o_her means than rhetoric may nlques as a legal instrument is supported by
_- be needed. What is "ordinary care" may be several considerations. These techniques are
_+ quite difficult to explain. The searchfor negli- certainly new tools. They have accompanied
gence has already been extended all the way the growth of recent technologies-=atomic
_ back to defects in design. Such ca_es put a energy, aircraft, space. But law and lawyers
strain on laymen and technic_l terms before use new tools, too. The needs of a changing
the judge. What better way in atechnicalsitua- society will be reflected in the decisions in
tion to demonstrate to a jury how dillgently one the courts. This growth and change in the law
has sought out and eliminated those circum- is most interestingly dealt with in a book titledstances which could cause actionable harm or "How High is UP" by Loth & Ernst.* They
loss? Particularly is this so when the ex- trace, in some of those fields, the manner inpression "the analysis applies throughout the which law has adapted itself to modern new "
life cycle of the system" is honest/applied, problems beginning with the legal concept
From a case in the books--'A reasonably "caveat emptor" i.e., "buyer beware." They
prudent man will neither neglect wha_ he can show how this concept was changed in a few
foresee nor waste his anxiety, on events that years, b_ reason of the "Cardozo Revolution," :
are barely possible..." [What is barely pos- to a 180 attitude and is now "caveat vendor", >
stble has only been occasionally quantified in (seller beware).
legal thinking. Not so, in a system analyses. They, Loth & Ernst, show that concepts of
i In some analyses, the "barely possible" i_ liability in aviation brought about vastchanges
actually put into numbered probabilities.] Con- ia the law regarding ownership of land and air,
t)nuing the quotation--"but he, the reasonable and the effects on the posture of society in re-
man, will order his precaution8 by the mess- spec_ m noise, vibration, comfort, right of way,
i ure of what aupears likely in the known course personal injury.of thtr.gs, whether the particular act or acts I McPherson v. Buick, 1916 Judge Cardozo
charged in the petition were performed or said, "on the basis that science perfecredpre-
omitted and whether the performance or omis- viously undreamed of safeguards against inani-
ston of some of them was a breach of legal mate objects and also much more damaging
duty."* objects the vendor has a responsibility and a
This, in legal terms, describes what one liability if he was placing a dangerous object
does in a logicanalysis,' on the market." Later interpretationsplaced
Having made an analysis the step by step liability on aircraft manufacturers, based on
documentation required in practically every
*Bobbs=Mer:fll Co,_[_c., NYC. LIB CONG. 64:
*_c. 38-,28AmJusS. P645 15,a_5
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+the lack of reasonable care i_ the design and onstrations or tests by others in court orper-
control of quality. I_dare to predict that the law mit evidence of experiments performed out of
will recognize and use, logic techniques, tech- court..." This would seem to say that tests
nological advances in the storage of accident made as part of a hazards analyses, where the
information, system safety analyses, the tests probability (or improbability) of failure is t5 be
and measurements and requirementmfordocu- demonstrated, would surely be admissible.
-p
:nentation that the space industry has de= Similarly, tests which frequently became part
veloped, of a system analysis will probably be admis-
It Is not unreasonable to expect that in the slble.
field of negligence, warranty, breach of cJn-
tract and rules of evidence, the law will adapt RISK VERSUS BENEFIT
to more systematic assistance in seeking out
the truth in appropriate cases, by the very
means used to assure safe hardware. The queries "What is safe?" or "How un-
safe Is unsafe?" are also tied into the con-
struction which may be put on the concept of
AS EVIDENCE "benefit versus risk."
Ernst in "How High Is Up" says "So lawThe books say "Proof which is addressed
must always strike a balance between risk and
directly to the sense of the court or jury with-
recklessness." He mentioned this (he said)
out interposing the testimony of witnesses--is because it struck him as exceptionally plain inthe most convincing " The presentation of
charts, diagrams or tables which makeup the considering atomic energy." But use of atomic
energy is not the only situation where this ques-
analysis would, no doubt require the engineer
or persons qualified to be present. Diagrams tion is being posed. We see it frequently, for
or charts showing the basic assumptions of instance, with respect to environmental poLlu-
tion, now considered as a great risk. Here it
steps and stating the manner in which a sys-
tem safety analysis was made and the controls would seem that the law, when faced with this
which were applied will probably be allowed as dilemma, risk vs benefit, wiLl be greatly aided
evidence. The witnesses would be require_ to when the engineer or scientist applies his in-
be authenticated by the presiding judge, tormed logic before hand, in respect to what
the risk Is, that Is to be balanced. So it is pos-Let us look at another aspect of system
safety and evidence. How well would the docu- slble that the precise quantification of hazardsby technical analysis may more clearly help to
mentatton required a system safety analysis determine the values of risk and beneflt for the
serve the lawyers7 law as well as for the engineer.
"In general where a map, or a drawing is
,, offered as embodying in itself, the knowledge
ofthewitnesstowhichhe,inthisform deposes, ACCIDENTS FEED THE LAW
theverifyingwitnessmust be shown tohave
personalknowledge"ofthefacts oastoqualify Inthefieldofatomicenergytherehavebeen
him to testify to their correct representa- relatively few successful litigated claims for
[
+ ttons..." It Is my feeling that the step-by- damage. In fact, fewaccldents.lcanapeakhere!
i stepdocumentationotonlyprovidesthewit- withsome knowledge,sinceI wrotethefirst
+ ness with a most potent method of recall, but complete repertoire of all accidents involving
I italso demonstratesthatnothingwithinthe nuclear energy,which Is now an Atomicpower of the Intellect has been overlc:_ked in Energy Commission bl_,nnual report. At the
the search for safety, and that there was dLll- time there was no collected history, and I was
gence, somewhat surprlr_ed that the report sold over
7,000 copies at the Government Printing Office.
TESTS The whole application of • new energy source
and its integration Intosociety is an Instance
"The courts, :hough they do not favor ex- where the lack of accidents, due to the r/g/d
perlments and tests by the jury itself, nowvery requirements written into the law relating to
generally permit relevant experiments, dem- Its use, the extreme caution exercised/n the
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manu,acture and control of these hazardous me, and the possibilities of chgnging from
materials and the e_,_perience with other kinds absolute liability back to a defensive po_ition
of energy deprived the courts of prccendenton oy reason of an engineering procedure that
wnich tobase decl_ons.(Thtsfurthersupports looks at, identifies and eliminates hazards
the the_,is th_,t until there ts loss or damage we would seem quite real. "There are few con-
have no measure of what t_ saf? or unsafe.) It stants in the law but continued change. . ."*
will be _nteresting in the future as to what Given a hypothesis or doctrine c," strict
weight will b_ given by the courts to the ex- liability there must also be a corrollary zhat
treme care exercised in the cor,trol of this says "you may do .:omethmg or offer aproduct
hazard including the S_'_fety Analysis Review in the tirst place." That is, you are not pro-
system of analysis, hlblted to do so, bur ff you do so, r_e law says
When accidents do not occur, both plantiff you must be prepared ,,r be liable for it. In
and defendent arc ':e_r without a good raeaszre other wolds yes are _,eprtved of defe_mes
of the zelattonshtp of benefit and risk. For the normally available as to being a reasonable
q'aestion of excessive risk is going to depc;:d man. I sul_mlt again, subject to argument of
on what the cot.:ts decide ,_s _xcessive, thatls, course, that here is an ideal situation ,'or use
whether the controls were o_ w_re not what a of logical analysis of risk. By asing (and per-
reasonable man would have done--ar.:i whether h_s by u_age) a system safety analyses will
_ even so, the publ!c benefit prevails, allow you and the court to arrive at a more
precise idea of the true hazard, correct and
_ STKICT LIABILITY control them and provide proof thzt the pre-
",",ous strict liability is not to be assumed.
In certain sltuatiors a product or process
i is held to be hazardous without _urther proof APPLIED TO "_HE ENVIRONMENT
to the contrary. This raises a spee _latlon. In
• the doctrine of strict or absolute liability the The Nattor, al Environmental Policy Act of
person who puts a hazardous product on the 1969, P.L. 91-190, 1970 tmp_,ses requirements
market wlthout performing certain actions such on all Gcvernme_t agencies to Interpret and
as warnings and specific instruction to the administer their policies, regu:ations and puN-
buyer will be considered negllgentper se. How- lie laws In accordance with the policies _et
ever, it would seem the absolute liability might forth tn the Act. Those pe!Icies relate to con-
someday be successfully fought off and the servation and use cf the epvtronment, and
trend turned, al_ifting the liability back from a_,suring sa_e, healthy, productive, esthetic and
the vendor and giving him a chance to plead culturally vleastng surroundings, and other
' bet_eftt to the public and the absence of uneval- purposes. These requirements will fall on tn-
uated hazard. The law m_kes its changes in dustry to an increasing degree.
small steps. The apollcation of new methods of To accomplish these purposes the Congress
'_ engineering analysis are also steps usually in states under Sec. 102 _f the Act that the
the direction of greater precision and sounder agencies shall--
logic and safety. Perhaps these technical steps "(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary :
toward greater perfection will be the occasion approach which will insure the integrated use of
for new legal approaches. It may be possible to the natural and social sciences end the environ- :,
avoid throwing up onets hands and saying" I'his mental desl_T, ar,J In planning and In decision
machine is too dangexous to allow man to use making which may h_ve an impact on man's !
it." It was only a few years ago that, the 'dos- environment;
slbllity of atomic energy for powex was ab., (B) Identify and develop methods and pro-
bored--today the-e are many nuclear power endures, in consultation with the Council on
plants on the line in spite of the fears of the Environmental Quality established by Title q
public and the experience Is good. of this Act. which will insure that presently
When I became interested in the relationship unquantffled environmental amenlfles and
between system safety analyses and the law, I
had not looked at a law book In many years. "Effective Research- Price & Bltmer. 1953. Pren.,
Consequently, changes were very apparent to tlce-Hall. NYC
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valuesmay be given appropriateconsideration The commonly used term in theanalysesof
in decisionmaking along with economic and space systems is "tradeoff."Itaccuratelyde-
technicalconsiderations; scribeditem (IV)relationshipabove.
(C)Include In every recommendation or And flnallyitem (V) is e statementofthe
report ortproposalsfor legislationand other residualhazards and therequirementonwhlch
major Federal actionssignificantlyaffecting management decisionsmust be made.
{he qualit/of the human environment,a de- The usual hard requirement in a system
tailedstatement by the responsibleofficial a-_alysisis thateach stepisdocumented,and
on=- that the whole analysis pro¢ides for sound
(i)the environmentalimpact olthepro.. management deci_ions.
posed acr2on, The administrationoftherequirei..entsof
(il)any adverse environmentaleffects the Environmental Act placean added burden
which cannotbe avoidedshouldtheproposal on almostevery projectcz activityof any ir_-
be implemented, portanceand--itwouldsee1:qtba;system analy-
(ill)alternativestotheproposedaction, sis would providea simple atu effectivepro-
(iv)the relationship between local cedure toassurethat_ givenpro_ectmeet :KJe
short-termuses ofmants environmentand intentof thelaw.
the maintenance and enhancement oflong-
term productivity,and
(v)any h'reversibleand irretrievable Summary
commitments oI resources which should
be involvedin the proposed actionshoulu T_iefinalanswer tothequestionofsafeness
Itbe implemented." is statedby thecourts.W::atis"safe"changes
Itis the fivespecificsunder (C)thatde- withexperience.
serve our attentionwhen pursuingthesubjec_ As technologyadvances new toolsare de-
ofthetitleof thispaper, veloped. The new system safety analyses
As written,thoserequirementsparaphrase (methods)are such tools.
quite suitably the basis fora systems analysis. The law and lawyers use new tools.
The objective of a systems safetyanalyslststo The needs of society wall be reflected in
avoid an undesired event,In thiscase one decisionsofthe_courts.
whlch willpollutetheenvironment.Inasystems These decisionschange the law step by
' analysisof a piece of hardware thlseventis oeep.
t equivalent to a failure resulting in damage or It is not _,_reas,_nable to expect that the 1_ •
' loss of a mission, eventually adapts Its decisions as to whatls ,.:i
! The methods avatl_blesuch as FaultTree, is not safetotherealworld,and betterengl-
; ; FM & Effects, Gross Hazards Analysis could neertng analyses will be defense against llabll-
be used to Identify the events which will bring Ity all the way back to deMgn.
the pollution about. If, in the real world we find system analyses
The selection of ,vailable alternatives to useful, so aiso will the cea.;rt-% and they can
the propor,ed action as required in this law wlll flnd them so in negllgencs, warranty, breach
become poss/.ble when, in the analysis they are of contracts, evidence.
pin pol,Red.
J
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SESSION I
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
DR. CLARK: I am interested in the problem QUESTION: Concerning the supervisors re-
of liability of the vendor from the last speaker, porting on accidents, you seem to indicate that
On what basis do you say, at the present time, this supervisor knows what the problems are
: that this is the situation, when you notice that in this management system and you infer a
the percent of defective salea that are going to great deal of validity to what this man is saying,
: qualify a builder for settlement, are less than how do you know that what he is saying is that
1707 The National Commission on Product valid?
_ Safety has identified .05% as the typtcal qualtty POPE: I don't know that I can take your
reliability insurance plus settlement costs, question and give you the answer that you're
:_ MR. HAYES: I don't think I quite under- looking foc. The only thing that the aligned
stand your question--or did I just hear the first supervisor knows is that things are going wrong.
_- part of it. What we've done is, we coded, we have a
DR. CLARK: Why do you sav it tsupto the coding system, and wehavegtvenhtm anumber¢
_: vendor today, that the manufactt_rer is taking ,of questions which he can respond to, we
{_ the responsibility for _'s oroduct? literally ler.d him towards. For example, if he
MR. HAYES: I th."_ you 'xll find that those thinks personnel is not giving him a problem or
cases that have res'lited In very large settle- he has a problem, he then has a whole series of
ments and wl re he cases are completely things he looks at under personnel and one of
li_.igatt=,', (l.e. not settled out of court), that the them would be staffing. If he has a lifting prob.
responsibility in many cases today ends up on lem, he ,:an say, well we san go out and train
the vendor, them how to lift, yes, but I sbouldhave an extra
DR. CLARK: This is a very small percent man there too. He not only puts in that he has
of sales! The real responsibility remains on a condition of lifting but he also puts in that he
the buyer, has a personnel p'oblem related to staffing.
_ MR. HAYES: All right, I buy that but we are Then, when we go to the computer andask how
talking nout litigated cases. Many airplane many staffing problems we have had in accident
_bes e .u up in placing the negligence, a the situations related to personnel, we then cango
-,'_igner of the airplane. This is becoming more back to personnel with a cause and a cost, we
ah_ more frequent. It is my po4nt, that acieq-aacy go by cost, and say to our personnel function
Ofdesign Is important now in law suits and the that has something to do with staffing, do you
courts look at how the manufacturer designed realize that there is a staffing problem gen-
the proouct to determine whether or not the erally In this particular area of the organtza-
i manufacturer is liable when it is involved in an tlon which is shown by the number of cases that
accident, we've got that came out, notnecessarflyllfting
DR. CLARK: We were very Impressed in but staffing was the problem in many other :
the National Commission on ProdactSafety with instances too. These people are not happy withwhat a small percent of the produc_ taflures end their utafflng situation and it has cost us this
up in liability _ults. Most of these things of amount of money because of it; therefore, you
course get settled out of court, but it is a very have a responsibility, a concern to solve that
small percent that ends up as the manufac- particular problem, not me.
turer's respon:_ibillty. QUESTION: I would like to ask Mr. Ptnkel
MR. HAYES: Yes, but I think if those prod- about the datafax accessibility. Is it accessible
ucts happened to be pressure cookers or other at the present time only to NASA contractors
hazardous devices or vehlcies that get Into the and NASA personnel7
public's hsnds and create the accidents, I think MR. PINKEL: Anyone can request the t_-
_'_ you will find a larger percentage, formation he wishes to have. It Is availJt;h
t MR. BOLGER: It would be interesting to the community at large, -sally. No charge ,.; !
see how the settlements went too. involved.
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MR. BOLGER: That is the intent of itlsnVt MR. PINKEL: We can't keepacttizenfrom
it? It is to be used for the nation as a whole, having access to the bank.
right? MR. BOLGER: That poses the problem of
MR. PINKEL. It is for the nation as a whole, who is going to put infol ._ation in It, Right?
Of course, the interest is steered to the MR. LEDERER: Then he can be sure of his
aerospace community, but anyone has a right facts before he distorts them.
to it. MR. PINKEL: We'll distort them a little
QUESTION: Would the information be in- first, Jerry.
aeccsstblc to any lawyer to get information for
a law suit?
q
t
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As a participant of the first Air Force- Add typographical errors, and the problems
Industry Conference on System Safety in 1963, grow even more complicated. I have seen
I remember the alms and claims of the pro- AFR 127-100, Re,,ponsibilities for the Ex-
ponents of this new concept; the presentations plosives Accident Prevention Program (which
on why System Safety programs were neees- Involves relationships between the Air Force
sary; and other (hopeful) assurances that Sys- and the Armed Services Explosive Safety
tern Safety programs would minimize the Board), with which the contractor has no
number of accidents Involving new systems, concern, cited when AFM__.127-100, Explosives
After eight years, I believe we have neither Safety, was meant. Axioms #1 and 3 apply in
achieved the alms nor fulfilled the claims, such cases.
This paper will try to indicate why not, and An especially miserable requirement lhave
why they can continue to fail. My experience seen in a Statement of Work is: "The prin- .
has been with DOD activities, procedures, ctples in AFSC DH 1-6 will be observed."
specifications and standards, and my corn- What principles? I found one ....... and it
merits are predicated on thatexperienee. NASA was wrong. (In Design Note 4B2: Fuel/Pro-
personnel will probably be able to correlate pellant Equipment, it states: "Component de-
those comments related to DOD with their sign and selection must be based on the
own practices and problems, fail-safe principle, i.e., failure will cause
Let's start at the beginning, with theintttal minimum system degradation." Actually, the
requirement for a System Safety program in fail-safe principle is: first and foremost to
a Statemert of Work. prevent injury; secondly to prevent damage;
The item which can contribute most to and lastly, to prevent system degradation.)
failure of a System Safety program Is am- Next I would like to propound "Hammer's
btguity, lack of clear definition, use of ob- Law": The probability of failure of a System
solete requirements, and pure .typographical Safety program varies directly as the square
_, errors in a poor Statement of Work. of the time from system concept until a firm,
i This leads me to a set of axioms regarding clear, funded System Safety requirement is
contractors efforts. They apply to contractors issued in a Statement of Work. If the require-
_ for ditch-digging, the aerospace Industry, or ment isn't in early, there may be problems;
any other activity. They are not intended to be if it is left until the end of development, don't
derogatory; they are merely basic facts of expect much. It is easier to guide designers
life which everyone should understand. Into safe practices than it is to change pre-
Axiom #1 - No contractor will accomplish pared designs.
a task unless he is specifically and contrac- Another detriment to the success of any
tually required to do so. System Safety program is the use of "weasel"
,, Axiom #2 - No contractor will Include In a words in Statements of Work, specifications,
proposal for a contract any uncalled for effort standards and other criteria, Safety require-
which will increase his cost so he might not ments are indicated and then qualified by a -
be awarded the contract, following phrase, such as "as far as practl-
Axiom #3 - Any requirement which is not cable" or "if practical". Or a paragraph will
clearly stated will be Interpreted to the best state: "Designers should consider the follow-
advantage of the contractor, tng:" and then list requirements. The designer
Axiom #4 - A contractor will pay more considers them and then decides he'll stick to
attention to a requirement which stipulates a Axioms 1 to 4. If the procuring acttv.'ty be-
penalty for noncompliance, than to a require- lieves there _s a valid requirement, it should
ment for which no penalty Is indicated, be stated clearly, firmly and without quail-
When MIL-STD-882 was betngcoordInated, ftcatJon. If the contractor cannot meet the ;
some engineers argued (and won) that noother requirement or wants to deviate, he should
specifications or standards should be refer- request approval from the procuring activity.
enced; they should be _ncluded In the St_te- U_aless the safety requirements are stated
ment of Work. Frequently they are not. Some clearly, and where they ate readily apparent
Statements of Work still refer to specifications as firm requirements, some of them will be
and standards which have long been rescinded, overlooked by deslgncrs. The Air Force has
t
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placed much of its reliance for this on AFSC will result. Information derived from them
DH 1-6, which I believe failed miserably. The can be put to many uses.
; best document I have seen to this purpose is a. The various factors which can affect
the Navy's MIL-S-23069(Wep), Safety Require- safety and which must be considered in the
_ ments, Minimum, For Air Launched Guided development of a system or product are readily
Missiles. It was Jssued in 1961 and requires apparent. There wiU be no need for a Pre-
updating and other revisions, but even now is liminary Hazard Analysis. The first advantage
very useful, to this is that it will eliminate a sore point
The next major problem to accomplishment for competing contractors. No contractor likes
of a good System Safety program isMIL-STD- to point out that hazards exist in his system.
882 itself. The original System Safety speci- A contractor with the better System Safety
fication, which applied solely to the Air Force, engineer might be able to point out more
was MIL-S-38130. It was prepared in the DI- hazards, making his design appeal more
rectorate of Aerospace Safety at a time when dangerous, than that of a competitor with a
the Air Force was receiving new missiles less knowledgeable System Safety engineer.
and putting them into operational use with With this method, the contractor will not have
little prior warning of their hazards, and with to make a Preliminary Hazard Analysis. He
, inadequate safeguards. Some of the propel- can get on with his more detailedanalys._s.
/ lants were considered so toxic, reactive, and b. MIL-STD-882 now requires a PreUmi-
be explosive that the Air Force hardly wantedin- nary Hazard Analysis be prepared for use in
i on them revealed to the general next phase development, oneformation the of If wasn't
public. MIL-S-38130 was therefore prepared prepared in the previous phase, a problem
to alert Air Force safety people against the arises. With the concept I envision, the pro-
next hazards coming down the pike; and see- curing activity will indicate the problem areas
ondly, to permxt safegusrds to be provided which they have established from the Safety
during development. The Gross Hazard, and Consideration Tr__es; the contractor Indicates
now Preliminary Hazard, analysis was stipu- in his proposal how he will handle them; the
lated; primarily for the alerting process, and procuring activity either approves or requests
then to tntttate action to provide safeguards, more satisfactory information until it does
This procedure has generated problems and approve; and things get started immediately,
should be updated, in the current program. This method can be
I have contended for a long time that any used even In the Concept Phase where the
system (or product) will have only a limited contractors would be required to indicate
number of factors which will directly cause their provisions for safety for each of the
,, Injury or damage. I call these "primary" problem areas, In their syst_,'n specific_ttions.
hazards. There are numerous and various This is the point at which nccrporatlon of
_ contributory factors to each of these, but the safety requirements is needed most, Remem-
. primary hazards are limited. This ls true ber Hammer's Law. _
whether an aircraft, space staff.on, skate- c. When contractors are given the same
board, tank, radar or washing machine _ firm requirements on which to estimate and
being considered, prepare their System Safety efforts, they will
Figure 1 is a Safety Consideration Tree be more comparable. The effort, manpower
for a submarine, prepared to illustrate this and cost of each task can be broken down and
contention. It is indicative of what can be evaluated more easily. The procuring activity
i done. People more knowledgeable of subma- will also lind proposals easier to evaluate If
rtnes can probably Improve It. The block on they are consistent in substance.
"In ur "J y can be expanded in a manner similar There are other advantages to us _. of a
to the one on "Damage", The trees are easy method such as this:
to prepare, and should be prepared by the *Data files can be established using the
procuring activity for each system for whose same coding as that shown on the trees.
development It Is responsible. After a few *The Armed Services can ensure that each
iterations and reiterations, some fine trees factor or problem is covered by a suitable
"* _i _ 61
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requirement for safety in a military I dontt have many gripes about managers,
specification or standard, especially when I realize they are acttng wlthin
*Personnel working on any program can the four axioms I pointed out. Other than that
be assigned to those problems which they I can only say that contractor (and maybe
are mo ,t capable of handling, procuring _ctivity managers too) have a hard
_ *It is a logical method of attacking safety time understanding that System Safety engt-
problems, Instead of waiting until a prob- neerlng extends beyond the safety considera-
lem jumps out of the bushes, tions of design, reliability, maintainability, and
MIL-STD-882 creates more problems. The human factors engineers, And very frequently
use of the four hazard categories is a case in It requires a redirection of their thinking when
point. Those categories genorate more prob- we indicate that System Safety includes mini-
lems than they are worth. First of all, they mtzing damage of hardware, which was for-
require clarification If they are to be used for merly a responsibility of reliability.
any purpose. What is meant by "major system Often, this results in a failure to support
damage" or "severe injury"7 If the various the System Safety program properly. Another
categories are defined well enough by each management solution is to appoint one or two
procuring activity to Indicate clearly what men as a System Safety organization, and to
they want them to mean, you will have a direct that representatives in various design
Preliminary Hazard Analysis. groups, systems engineering, test, reliability,
The second problem with the four hazard maintainability, and other functional areas
categories is that too much time is spent try- will perf,, ,_ the necessary System Safety
ing to decide into which category eachFroblem tasks for their organizations. From what I
falls; and then to justify the choice. There are have seen, it doesn*t work. Everyone may be
other reasons for which the categories should very conscientious about It, but such an ar-
be eliminated (they overlap, detract from the rangement does not work.
effort of minimizing and controlling hazards, The last problem I have encountered with
etc.) which will not be dlscussedhere, managers Is thot many believe that any re-
MIL-STD-882 applies to System Safety qutrement involving probabilities, such as a
programs; It Its no technical safety require- quantitative safety analysis to determine
ments, such as MIL-STD-454. If the technical whether a specified level is being met, should
requirements are not included in the Statement be handled by the r'_liabtlity epgineers. Per-
of Work, or by the contractor himself (watch haps they believe System Safety is an exten-
out for Axiom #2), they will not become ston of the hard hat-hard shoe school 9fsafety
criteria to be observed. A solution is to re- and that System Safety engineers know nothing
quire the System Safety Program Plan to be about the more theoretical aspects of engi-
', *,bmltted as part of the contractor's proposal, neerlng.
_,¢e_ better, this proposal should be submitted Some of these problems with management
as a separate line Item. may actually be due to the System Safety
One more point about MIL-STB-882 and engineer:
the Plan: AFSC Form 1664 for Contract Data a. Many have not gotten beyond the 1963
Requirements states that the Appendix to stage when talks were common on "Why
MIL-STD-882 "shall be used" when preparing System Safety Is Needed." (If there is no Sys-
the Plan. Since the Appendix and the text of tern Safety requirement in the Statetnent of
the standard do not Jibe, It generates probo Work for a contract, there is no potntln bring-
lems. Contractors observe the four axioms ing up "Why System Safety Is Needed." Begin
I have presented; but when a requirement is looking for work elsewhere.) System Safety ;
presented, they are very conscientious about engineers have done little tc advance this
its observance. So when a requirement _ays discipline to a point where ltcanberecogntzed
"shall" they want It that way, even if we Sys- as something different from reliability and
tern Safety engineers say taat MIL-STD-882 human factors. (Perhaps like Moses In the
cites it as a sample, and that it Is not very desert alter the Exodus from Egypt, we need ;
good, they still want it that way because the a new more energetic generation to take over,
116,t says "shall." to forget the past, and accomplish new things.)
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qb. Many System Safety engineers don't know has been agreed uIx_n and frequently accom-
where to start a program or analysis. They plished; often they are too general (DH t - 6
then do either of two things: wait for some- is in this category); and lastly, if they are not
thing to rise up out of the bushes with which based on firm requirements (Axiom #1), It
they can struggle; or they get onto the paper- is generally difficult to have the designs
work and meeting treadmill. They attend changed.
meetings and then write memoranda 3n the This paper has gotten rather long. In sum-
safety aspects. In between, they review the marion, I will say that if there is one thing
masses of papers which deluge them if they which can make a System Safety program fail,
on the paper route. To these people, the ap- it is lack of clarity:
proach I have indicated may be helpful in *Lack of clear requirements by the pro-
trying to figure out which way to go. curing activity.
c. Some System Safety engineers arc at- *Lack of clear understanding of System
dent proponents of checklists (I used to be one). Safety by other managers.
Actually, checklists are ineffective for many *Lack of a clear methodology to be era-
reasons. Generally they are too late: the design ployed by System Safety engineers.
J
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The system safety discipline has existed The command or management influence
for several years now as a rather well defined existing in an operation may play a significant
concept. There has been very little argument role. S,_me casual remark by the commander
as to the desirability of the system safety at a mor,',ing briefing may quite innocently
objectives. In fact, among many of those who start a chain of events leading to catastrophe.
know what these objectives are, there even Such influence most likely will concern the
has been generated a fair amount of what can urgency of the mission to be performed, the
only be described as "religious fervor" at the quality of r_ _ults desired or the belittling of
prospect of achieving the goals of system problems, obstacles and risks. The result
safety. But, with its well-organized, logical may be that the _mpression of "accomplish
and comprehensive approach to accident pre- the mission whatever the cost" is conveyed
vention, the application of the system safety which is tantamount to indorsing recklessness.
concept in practice has not been as rapid and The condition of the people involved is
effective as its attributes would warrant, perhaps the most complex factor present. The
The United States Army Board for Aviation physical condition, state of mind, moraL-,
Accident Research (USABA_R) isvitallycon- proficiencyand a wide va:'ietyof physiologi-
cerned with the applicationof system safety, cal and psychologicalfactorsallinterrelate
particularly with respect to new developmental in a complex way to affect the potent lal human
_ Army aircraft programs. USABAAR serves involvement in an accident, Change one small
as the central agency for the Army Aviation item and an accident could be averted.
_ Accident Prevention Program which includes The condition of tho machine also involves
the receipt, processing and analysis of all a highly complex functional relationship of
data and it.formation related tu Army aircraft hardware which must exist in just the right
accident experience. This paper discusses way before an accident can occur• This rela-
the means by which OSABAAR now utilizes tionship includes maintenance practices, worn
this vast store of historical accident data in pieces/parts, age of the equipment, dectgu
the _rJplication of the system safety concept deficiencies, operating limitations ant others,
for developmental aircraft. While the methods the complexity with newer sophisticated air-
described here admittedly fall short ofrealiz- craft.
ing the full potential benefits of using our past Environmental conditions cover an ex-
accident experience, we feel that significant tremely broad range of phenomena including
steps have been made in that direction° As weather, terrain, operational situation, air
more exper:._nce is gained in the application traffic control airfield facilities a_'_d many
of these methods, certainly many refinements more. The true influence these conditions on
and improvements will follow• accidents is most often either not known or
" The hi_tory of an acclder.t can be gen- ignored,
eralizedand simplifiedas shown inFigure I.
This depictionwillbe used throughoutthere- MANIFESTATION OF HAZARDS
.o
mainder of the paper as methods are discussed "he worst possible combination of all the
which pertain to each segment of the diagram, conditions listed above could conceivably exist _ :
and no accident would resul_ unless some
REQUISITE CLIMATE hazazd manifested i_elf.Given the requisite
climate the manifesr.at_on of the proper hazard i
Requisite climate, or "hazardous condi- initiates the accident sequence. This sequence i
tions" as it might be called, indicate_ that the can usually De divlde_i into two or too; • main ,
stage for an accident must be properly set. occurrences, precipitating and sustakning I
If the proper conditions are not present, r,o events.
accident will occur. These conditions involve The sequence will start with some trigger i
the familiar triad of accident factoxe, man, event ,-_hlch can be produced by a staggering !
machine and en%dronment_ plus the overall variety of canses_ again /nvolving man, ms-
factors of command, ,nanagement and super- chine, environment and manspment or any !
vision, combination of the four. Until th.. time, the
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factors present in the requisite climate have are the immediate c_nsequeaces of an acci-
played a passive role in the accident where dent. Accidents are classified as to thedegree
the cause-effect relationshlp is usually not of sewrity of these immedlaL,.;y observable
very precise. With the occurrence of the effects. MIL-STD-882, the system safety
trigger event, however, the sequence of events standard, categorizes hazaros in terms of
which ._ollow i_ usually quite predictable. What their potential effects on materiel and per-
w0s a potentially hazardous condltton before sonnel s. ou16 an accident result from the
will now manifest itself through some event hazard. But ruth categorization is not the end
which, in itself, may never be considered event; in a sense, it sho-ld be only the be-
hazardous. For example, shutting down one ginning of the analytical pr,,r:ess to determine
engine in a twin engine aircraft at altitude effects of accidents.
may present no hazard _hatsoever. Shutting The second grouping of cor, sequpnces flora
down "hat same engine while cn sl, ort final accidents includes the long ran_"effect%those
approach during an emergency landing be- perhaps not immediately o_._erv_ble zndwhich
cause the oth_.r one failed earlier could--- have an impact far beyond the time and geo-
and did---have catastrophic consequences, graphical location of the acciaent itself. To
Rarely does an accident occur as a result the Army, these eff._cts a0d up to a to_al cost
: of one single event. There is usually a series in terms of lost or degraded mission ef-
: of several events which follow the trigger fectlveness or capab'llty. It is not _. aU far-
event in sequence up to the accident itself, fetche_ to say that each _ircraft accident, no
These can be called "sustaining events", _f matter how Ins_gnlflcant in tea-ms of imme_1-
they do not occur, the accident sequence is late consequences, has some adverse effect
; bz'oken, on the capability of the Army to _tccompllsh
Thus, given a requisite cl:n xte or poten- its mission. I_ logically follows, then, that if
tially hazardous conditions, _he accident se- the total number 0-."aircraft accidents is sul_.
quence begins with a ..t,','=.,-_.o_,.. event, is carried stantial, then the impact or4mission effective..
forward through sustaining _vents and an ness also wih be sub_tantial.
accident occurs. At any g/yen l_,'_ in _Ime _ne a, _:_plish-
merit of the Army mission requires that cer-
UNDESIRABLE EFFECTS te.in aviation resources, people and materiel,
'_e availabJe. The degree o; non-avai_bilit_
If all th:s Just described did not produce of these resources logical:y has a trisect
consequences which we wish to avoid, there bea_ing on the abiilty _e accomplish the
would be no safety effort at all. Itls really the mission .... re:salon effectiveness. Sinc( we
undeslrab._e effects of accidents _hernse}ves obviously cannot _cquire these resources h_- :
which justify our attempts at accident pre- stsntsneously, we must not only project wh.at
vention. If thi_ ststemeat seems _ trifle too our mL_sions will be in tnc future, but also
basic and should have gone without saying, es_mate what total avl_tion resources will
" c::_slder the possibi!/t _ that we as safet_, be requl_ed in light of that future mission.
specia'Ists may hav.; tended to lose sight of Such estimates and p_ojections are made for
these undesirable effects of accidents _s our as far into the f'_tu_ as practicable and are
basic motive force. Perhaps we have not con- then refined as time _oes on. It ts an ex-
centrated sufficient attention ona11_headverae tremely complex process, re" _e least part
consequences we are trying _o p.--ecluae. We of which involves proJecth_g t;_e status of the
.41ow ourselves to become completely ab. current a/rcr_ft invenwry, aviation personnel
so_bed and obsessed with safety techn/ques, and fscilitlcs situation. Any _hor_fal] of quan-
me_odolo_y snd philoso_y f-_r theft own _l_y, quaU_y or capability i_ our prcJected
sakes witho_ maintainin_ a clear view of our Inven_or_, pereonnel or fac_lities compared
ultimate objective- m/nlmlzin_ these efforts, wi_ our estimated requirements _Ives the
The effects of acclden_ can be IrOUlXd basts for plannln_ vo _cqu/re these resources,
" Inw two genera! areas with _e respect to If _e err, and underes_ma_e our losses In
the abs'ulX dama_eandd_a_-uc_on aircraft and personnel, for instance: or do nottime. Filet,
_o materiel plus injury and death to personnel adequately provide for quality _n new a/rcraf_,
!
I
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an adverse impact on mission effectiveness general accident information. The key param-
is the result, eter for safety has been the periodic acci-
The main thrust of USABAAR's use of dent rate, the number of accidents divided by
accident data for future aircraft programs the number of hours flown. Accident "costs"
is to estimate the long range impact on mis- have been reported by totalling acquisition
sion effectiveness through the proper analysi_ "book value" for destroyed aircraft andrepair
of this data. Unless we fully consider the far- costs for damaged machines. Fatalities have
reaching effects of accidents on people and been totalled as have injuries, but with vari-
materiel, we are not fulfilling the objectives ous criteria being used to describe severity
of the system safety discipline, of injuries. Cause factors have been lumped
into a very few categories which then have
ACCIDENT DATA been totalled. Among the most usually cited
factors are crew error, materiel failure or
Accident prevention programs have tradi- malP'nction, weather and maintenance error.
tionally operated on the basic premise that if Degrees of severity of accidents have been
the causes of accidents could be determined, classified from "total loss" to "incident"
preventive measures could then be developed depending on the extent of damage and injury.
to eliminate the causes. Following thi_ prem- Certainly, this most general treatment of
ise, the primary task has been the acquisition accident data had a significant in..'act several
_- of data and information through an accident years ago when compared with the even earlier
_-= investigation and reporting system. This task situation when nobody even knew how many
is performed exceptionally well today. Several accidents they had been having. Initially, the ,
years of diligent sleuthing, exhaustive inter- concentration of attention on safety supported
viewing ot witnesses, and even p.-'_ctse labors- by only the most superficial analysis of acci-
"- tory analysis by both highly skilled and area- dent data produced dramatic improvements.
teur investigators have produced an immense The magic "accident rate" began to drop
= store of data and information on the causes of rapidly as if to prove conclusively that such
aircraft accidents. A significant portion of the measurement of the problem was all that was
safety effort of all military services, the Fed- necessary to solve it.
eral Aviation Agency, the National Transporta-
tion Safety Board and civilian aircraft manu- IMPROVED DATA SYSTEM
facturers and operators is devoted to merely
processing this wealth of data and infor- These methods which served the cause of
mation, accident prevention so well in the past are no
The results of accident investigations have longer adequate. There are widespread efforts
usually been recorded in the form of a de- underway for the development of more sophis-
scrlptton of the accident sequence of events: ticated data systems for safety. These efforts
the confirmed or suspected cause factors; show that traditional parameters used to
recommendations to prevent recurrence and measure mishap experience cannot be used _
general factual data such as date, time, place, directly to solve many accident prevention
type aircraft, crews members, injuries, fa- problems today. Only a few deficiencies which
taltties, etc. In general, the immediate con- have caused accidents in existing aircraft
, sequences of the accident are recorded along can be pinpointed sufficiently to correct the i
with the events which led up to the accident, problem. For the rest of the problems in ]
Quite often, but not always, it is possible for existing aircraft and for all of the potential Ja thorough investigator to delve far enough hazards in a developmental aircraft, the lden- ,into the past to well define the hazardous con- tification of these old, generalized parameters
ditiona which existed some time prior to the does little but indicate a broad area of inter-
accident thereby enabling the accident to eat in which detailed analysis and specific ]occur, evaluation is required. The detailed effects
Until fairly recently, the primary use of on mission capability must be identified to
all this data was to provide a source for vari- justify corrective action and the cost of such
i ous totals and rates reflecting only the most action.
68
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To enable USABAAR to respond in this parameters used to measure mishap experi-
manner, completely revised accident report- ence cannot be used directly to solve many
ing forms have been developed and put into accident prevention problems. Only a few ae-
use recently which greatly expand the r:ope ficiencles which have caused accidents may
and detail of information provided as a result be able to be pinpointed sufficiently to correct
of investigation of the accident are recorded the problem. For the rest of the problems in
along witb the events which led up to the existing aircraft and for all of the potential
accident. Quite oftea, but not always, it is hazards in a developmental aircraft, the iden-
possible for a thorough investigator to delve tiflcation of these old, generalized parameters
far enough into the past to well define the does little but indicate a broad area of in-
hazardous conditions which existed some time terest in which detailed analysis and specific
prior to the accident thereby enabling the evaluation is required. The detailed effects
accident to occur, on mission capability much be identified to
Until fairly recently, the primary use of justify coorective action and cost of such
all this data was to provide a source for action.
- various totals and rates reflecting only the To enable USABAAR to respond in this
most general accident information. The key manner, completely revised accident report-
parameter for safety has been the periodic ing forms have been developed and put into
• accident rate, the number of accidents divided use recently which greatly expand the scope
by the number of hours flown. Accident "costs" and detail of information provided as a result
have been reported by totalling acquisition of investigation. The new forms were designed
2,_ "book value" for destroyed aircraft andrepatr to take marJmum advantage of a vastly tm-
costs for damaged machines. Fatalities have proved data processing capability at USABAAR
been totalled as have injuries, lmtwlthvarlous using a large digital computer. A completely
criteria being used to describe severity of new management information system has been
injuries. Cauze f,zctorz h3ve been lumped into constructed around thL, computer and is now
_ a very few categories which then have been in use.
_ totalled. Among the most usually cited factors It was realized early in the planning stages
are crew error, materiel failure or malfunc- of the new USABAAR data system that ltwould
tlon, weather and maintenance error. Degrees not be good enough If all the computer could
of severity of accidents have been classified eventually do was produce the same sort of
E from "total loss" to "incident" depending on totals and rates produced previously. One _t
_ the extent of damage and Injury. skeptic, early tn this planning stage remarked, _,
Certainly, this most general treatment of "We're going to be able to arrive at the same,
accident data had a significant impact several old general conclusions . . . only faster:" It _
i years ago when compared with the even has not worked out that way for one basic
earlier situation when nobody even knew how reason. The speed of the computer has enabled
many accidents they had been hzving. Initially, the efficient processing of timely data in far
the concentration of attention on safety sup- greater detail than ever before. This is the :_
ported by only the most superficial analysis key to the success of a modern accident data
of accident data produced dramatic improve- system.
ments. The magic "accident rate" began to The production of this much more deflnl- |drop rapidly as if to prove conclusively that rive data already has significantly improved
i such measurement of the problem was all that our c_pablllty to do the following: _was necessary to solve it. a. Conduct in-depth studies and analyses
to determine the long-range effects of accl-
i IMPROVED DATA SYSTEM dents.
b. Clearly define the sequence of events
These methods which served the cause of and the mechanism by which hazards manifest
accident prevention so well in the past are no themselves.
longer adequate as evidenced by the compara- c. Comprehensively define the hazardous
tively recent development of more sophtsti- conditions which must exist prior to Initiation
cared data systems for safety. The traditional of an accident sequence.
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Pinpoint areas for specific corrective growth versions of previous aircraft with ira-
action, specify the action required and estab- provements being made where practical and
: lish priorities for action, high technical risk features being held to a
e. Forecast measures to limit the requt- minimum consistent with performance re-
site climate and inhibit hazard manifestation quirements. The point is, in dealing with new
while at the same time placing such actions in systems, there is usually not that much really
context with their influence on the long-range "new" about them. Those features of a de-
undesirable effects of accidents, velopmental aircraft which are not new pro-
vide the place where accident data on previous
DEVELOPMENTAL AIRCRAFT systems is most directly applicable.
It is logical to expect that previous acci-
We have recently developed methods by oent experience will be used in the design and
which this expanded capability can be applied operation of new aircraft so that cause factors
"before-the-fact" to developmental aircraft noted in the past will not recur. To a disturb..
systems. It is here that the most fertile ap- ing degrde, this has not been the case. There
plication of our management information sys- are several instances of the same feature
tern is to be realized. These methods have which caused accidents in earlier aircraft J
shown that the gap can be successfully bridged being duplicated in newer models. One good
between historical accident data on a fleet of example is the use of "redundant" systems in
existing aircraft in various stages of obsoles- critical areas. Acknowledging that loss of
cence and potential hazards in future aircraft hydraulics for flight controls would be cata-
which now exist perhaps in concept only. strophic, one fairly recent design provided
The system safety discipline furnishes us for two hydraulic systems, including two
with the overall management tool by which we pumps - both driven by a single shaft of in-
can optimize the conservation of resources adequate strength. Another design approached
through the prevention of accidents before the same problem by also providing two hy-
they happen, that is, to design safety into our draulic systems, but with all , the hardware
aircraft systems. The heart of this process and plumbing co-located greatly increasing
is hazard analysts in which the system is the chance of double failure from one event.
examined ina methodical,comprehensive way Such 6_licle_cle.q_s thee,_"were not negll-
at each stage in itsdevelopment to isolate gentlydesigned intothenew system. Perhaps
hazards present.At some pointintime,how- such designs were the resultof ignorance -
ever, the moment of trutharrives when de- designers justdidn'tknow we had supposedly
clslonshave tobe made as towhat todo about alreadylearnedthatlesson.More likely,how-
hazards identifiedthrough analysls.Some- ever, itwas probablyfeltthatpreviousacci-,,
times thereIsno penaltytocorrector eUml- dent experience of one type of aircraftjust
hate a hazard. Sometlmes the hazard is so did not apply to the "new" aircrafton the
greatthatitseliminationismandatoryregard- drawing boards.
less of the penalty.But the vast majorityof This applicabilityofaccidentdataisareal
hazards which are identifiedthroughsystem problem when tryingto Justifycertainsafety
safetyanalyslsfallsomewbere lnbetween.The featuresIn'a yet unborn aircraft.USA BAAR
questionthen becomes, '_ow bad do we want came face to face with thisproblem a few
to eliminatethese hazards?" Heretofore,the years ago when we attemptedtoprove,through
system safety engineer could only fallback accident statistics,that the UtilityTactical
on the MIL STD 882 category he has assigned Transport Aircraft System (UTTAS) should
the hazard. He has not been able to relate this have two engines. Since we had no twin engine i
hazard to future adverse long range conse- utility helicopters in the inventory, we used
quences. His categorization has only addressed accident data from the CH-47 Chinook, a twin
the immediate effects, engine light cargo helicopter and compared i
History has shown that new operational that data with the single engine UH-I Iroquois
aircraft systems rarely incorporate a very data. As it turned out, one model of the UH-I
large number of advanced technological fea- actually had a better accident rate than the
her, new aircraft represent rational CH-47. Obviously, this .did our argument no
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good. Other comparisons, using available ac- made in our data system. A ur-_form method
eldent data, showed some advantage for two has been developed to translate the complex
engines, but not in the clear cu' manner we details of each mishap into data which can be
, thought it should. When the casewas presented stored and retrieved by the computer without
for decision, our arguments were unconvinc- losing the essential ability to differentiate
trig. We were told our reasoning was essen- between the details of each accident. Called
tlally faulty since a CH-47 differs so greatly "ABACUS", which stands for Aircraft Basic
from a UH-1 that they just could not be di- Accidevt Causes, U.S. Army, this method
reetly compared. They are of different size, prescribes a vocabulary and syntax for en-
have different missions, and do not even coding cause factors of aircraft accidents
appear in the Inventory in comparable quan- using a key word concept. Coding of accident
tries. In short, we had attempted to compare information used to be a matter of fitting each
"apples and oranges to justify peaches." set of circumstances to one of a limited num-
.- This setback caused us to serlouslyponder ber of rigid preconceived statements which
- the factors which would make a difference in seemed to best describe the event. Obviously,
decisions such as for the twin-engine UTTAS. this procedure did not allow for distinction
Our conclusion was that accident statistics between similar situations where the differ-
just do not speak for themselves. The develop- ences were highly significant when it came to
--- ment of improved analytical techniques for specifying corrective action. ABACUS, on the
processing accident data could not stop short other hand, allows for nearly complete free-
of assessing the long range impact of acci- dora tO record the specific circumstances
;?_ dental lossez. Whereas, for the UTTAS ques- surrounding each individual mishap.
tlon, we had compared single vs. twin engine Statements concerning accidents are con-
_j accident rates, materiel failures, injuries, structed using approximately 650 key words ..
and deaths, degrees of damage and costs; we and phrases. They are combined in a pre-
could not estimate, for example, the number scribed sequence to describe phase of op-
el single engine UTTAS aircraft that would be eration, subject, action verb, subject manner,
lost due to engine failure and how thoselosses subject position and/or condition, main object,
would affect the number we had to procure object qualifier and reason. In addition, to
initially. This kind of estimate would have had these key words and phrases, aircraft nomen-
a d!rect bearing on the decisions beingmade, clature is also included using an abbreviated
Today, USABAAR is carrying its a_ai_tlca! version of the aircraft parts catalog system.
work several steps farther than belore and While the number ot tiara elemcnm _v3i}oblo
doing It in much greater detail. While there is for use is still somewhat limited, the system
", much work yet to do, progress has been made allows for an extremely large number of .
in sever l significant areas, pos ible combinations.
_ One area much in need of improvement is Probably most important is the fact that =
I the design of future aircraft systems for the retrieval of data in a usable form is greatly
specific environment in which they are in- facilitated through the use of ABACUS. Depend-
tended to operate. This consideration is not lng on the purpose of the avalysls to be per-
_ new, in itself, but the detail to which the formed, any combination of ABACUS words, i!
operating environment must be specified is phrases or aircraft descriptors can be usednew. A major effort is haW underway to clearly as an argument with which to query the data
derive the environment ir_which Army aircraft bank. This exceptional flexibility in output
are expected to operate in the future. Given means that the entire data base can be focused
,T
• this definition, USABAAR is now in a better rapidly on virtually any conceivable accident tposition to identify the specific environmental prevention problem. We are no longer limited
conditions which favor accidents and to specify by inadequate or unusual data but only by our
detailed design criteria to counter these con- Imagination in how to use the available data.
ditlons. Using the matrix generating capability of
Besides the greater detail now reported the computer, we have greatly expanded our
from accident Investigation, there is another ability to compare the more detailed elements
! significant improvement which has been of information now acquired through accident71f
1972018311-063
investigation. From the large number of pos- developed. For developmental specifications,
sible combinations, relationship, between the in addition to the estimate of long range ira-
most significant data elements have been es- pact, we will make recommendations in terms
tablished as indexes for various areas of of alternatives expressed as functions of pro-
interest, gram costs, schedule and system performance.
One such area is fire in aircraft. A "Fire- Such estimates will be of maximum benefit to
worthiness Index" has been developed which the project manager and as such, maximize
measures all detailed factors relating to the the effectiveness of system safety efforts in
incidence of aircraft fires and the immediate a program.
and long range effects. This index is estab- This has been a very general discussion
lished for each type, model and series air- of how USABAAR has begun to solve the dif-
craft in the inventory so that rankingsbetween flcult problem of using historical accident
aircraft can be obtained. All the known ele- data in new developmental aircraft programs.
ments in Fig. l are included. Given the de- By this discussion we do not wish to minimize
tailed insight into past fire experiencespecific the importance of continuing to develop im-
operations and aircraft configurations are then proved analytical methodologies. More sophis-
evaluated to determine those conditions which ticated techniques employing better predictive •
affect the Index. The specification of fire- and quantitative procedures are sure to find
worthiness criteria for future aircraft, th_n, widespread use in the future. We feel that the
follows this evaluation directly. Furthermore, surface has only been scratched and that we
a relative priority can be attached to these have embarked on a course that will lead us
criteria based on the fireworthlness Index. eventually to the most effective attainment of
For design criteria, the "Index" approach is the system safety objectives.
being used to make recommendations in terms
of alternatives expressed as functions oi the
long term impact on mission effectiveness. REFERENCE
At present, these recommendations are mostly
! general in nature, but as our analyticalstudies Spezta, Emil, "ABACUS", U.S. Army Avis=
are completed, more specific criteria will be tion Digest, October 1970, p. 50.
J
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&SUMMARY
As the title implies this Is a discussion of which safety objectives can be derived, is
various issues and requirements which must discussed. The use of rational requirements
be considered during the actual work of Safety is considered in this context, as is the use
Assessment, and does not deal with all the of numerical methods in the exercise of
aspects of a complete programme, judgement.
rhe task and its objectives are considered It Is also emphasized in the course of this
and the importance of presentationisstressed, paper that the assessment is a discipline
so that problems and their solution are dis- which directs the appropriate skills at the
played adequately to the many disciplines in- problems as required, and must never be
volved. The definition of areas of influence to interpreted as a means of replacing these
which the requirements can be applied and for skills.
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1 INTRODUCTION 2 SAFETY ASSESSMENT TASK
Much has been said on both sides of the Tbe Safety Assessment task is to ensure
Atlantic on the subject of Safety Assessment, that the design, construction, and operation
and, in fact, It is probably right to say that of the device being investigated is sufft-
it has all been said. There is for example, ctently safe for its projected use. This re-
a lot of information published by various quires the assurance that all foreseeable
Government Agencies, which has been faults and critical situations have been ado-
written as part of their procurement ac- quately taken into account. Critical situa-
tivities, and this has been of immense Ira- tions will include any st, ch conditions which
portance with its emphasis on the orderly may arise when systems :re working in the
application of safety analysis. However, it fault free mode and mu_: take account of
is thought to be generally true that although external events.
all the material is there in advisory form, The demands of a statement such as this
its application is subject to much freedom are immense and, apart from the application
of interpretation, and assessments have of the engineering and other skills Involved,
been made within these frameworks at many have given rise to the creation of many pro-
different levels, and perhaps with varying cedures involving different logic and docu-
objectives. It seems opportune, therefore, mentation in order to assist in its satis-
to take another look at the complex path faction.
_ through the safety assessment process, as If we endeavour to state with more
:_ simply as possible, with the object of high- precision the process necessary to carry
lighting the principles involved, out the task the following requirements
_ Discussion can range from the admin- arise:-
_: tstrative structure necessary in the manu- (a) To define the safety objectives.
facturtng company down to the specific (b) To display the design, construction, and
_ statistical techniques required to deal with operation of the vehicle in such a mannerthe validity of a test programme; from the that its potential weaknesses are clearly
type of personnel required in a safety or- revealed.
_ gantsatton and the methods employed to (c) To ensure that the best judgement in the
make the biggest impact, or, perhaps, the skills relevant to the problem and its
influence of the computer cn the safety interfaces has been brought to bear.
programme. Problems of d cumentation and (d) To show to the satisfaction of all con-
format are by no means unimportant in this cerned that the safety objectives for the ,subject and have been discussed in depth, complete vehicle and its operation have
Many other aspects merit separate con- been met.
sideratlon and all can have a major influence
on the approach to safety. This rather daunt- If the Safety Assessment satisfies these ._
tng appreciation of the field emanates from requirements the detailed procedure is not ._
my work in the European aircraft industry important and depending upon the technology
and from a recent opportunity to look at involved, and the possible hazards, many "
safety assessment in a variety of American perfectly adequate methods are available.
Aerospace organisations and is given to However, because of the contributions of
empl::asise the fact fl_at the subject matter different technologies to aerospace vehicles,
of this paper is strictly in line withits title, some standardization on a given project is
Consequently, I propose to touch upon varl- obviously desirable. In particular a stand-
ous issues and requirements which must be ardised approach to safety assessment
considered during the actual work of Safety should facilitate the feed back of operating
Assessment, with the intention of ;timulat- and servicing data, as experience accumu-
ir,g discussion of the basic approach which lates, so that the aspects can be readily ._
should be made. up-dated.
77
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3 DEFINITION OF SAFETY OBJECTIVES It seems necessary to emphasise
these points to demonstrate that safety
has always depended upon the extra-
3.1 Background polatlon of experience and the use of
the designers t skills. The aim shouldWhere the overall engineering of be to provide the best framework of
aircraft components and systems is objectives, and techniques of assess-
concerned, safety objectives have been ment, so that this approach can be
defined in terms of good engineering continued into areas where _dditional
practice, and this has been implemented
system dependence, interaction prob-
by ensuring compliance with arbitrary lems, etc., are making the task more
design rul,m developed in each suc- difficult.
ceeding generation of aircraft on which
experience has been obtained. Where 3.2 Rational Requirements and Major Ob-
successive designs have produced rela- jectives
tively small increases in weight and
speed it has not been too difficult to We can now say that to glve more
continue safety assessment processes precision to ".he statement of objectives "
which require e3tablishing that good and the classification of hazards we
engineering practice is being followed, will specify a rational system of re-
and the satisfaction of certain arbitrary quirements which we will use in the
rules stated in the airworthiness re- more advanced applications, and which
, quirements. However, when the de- can be related statistically to the level
signer is asked to produce spectacular of airworthiness required when the air-
increases in speed, weight _r airfield craft enters service.
performance, an entirely new depend- For example we can consider the
,_ ence on particular systems may arise airworthiness standard TSS 1-1 which
i which may have considerable complex- is applicable to Concorde.ity and require a more detailed under- The object of this sort of require-
standing of the interfaces for safety ment is to erect a framework which
! reasons. In these cases, it becomes allows a more explicit statement of the
progressively more difficult to carry objectives, hazards and their ?robabil-
out safety assessments on a subjective ities than has been usual hitherto. This
• basis, related to arbitrary design rules, is not to say that adequate assessments
i The fundament_,l assumptions which have not been performed, but it is being", have been made in most approaches suggested the t. it is advantageous to in-
during the last decade are:- dicate more clearly than in some past
(a) System engineering can be a_e- assessments why the decisions affecting
quately assessed against the testing Safety have been taken.
and experience gained with previous An important aspect of this, to which
systems, reference has already been made, is
(b) Adequate safety criteria can be given that service experience can be more i
in terms of formalised experience readily referred back to the basic de- i
and arbitrary statements of good sign assessment particularly where re-
engineering practice, dundancy has permitted low MTBF.
(c) By complying with these criteria, Very considerable care has been
and using the developing skills of taken with the requirement to allow the
the assessor th_. aircraft can be various frequency levels to be defined
made to demonstrate in service a where necessary by analogy or in broad
safety record expressed on a basis terms, but a numerical scale of probe-
of fatal accidents per flight or per bilicten is unavoidable, at least, by im-
i hour etc. which will be an improve- plication. Some people have dffficuky
!I ment on previous experience. 78 in accepting this numerical concept, and _i°-
I "
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I shall return to this subject later when manageable parts on the basis of tht.
the exercise of judgement is discussed, significant airworthiness functions, and
the zones or compartments in which
4 THE ORGANISATION OF THE ASSESSMENT systems, parts of systems and equip-
ment are Installed.
4.1 General Approach There is of course, a considerable
Iteration and feedback in this part of
The design, construction, andopera- the work since many factors are tn-
tlon of the vehicle should be displayed volved. Slgnlflcar_t airworthiness rune-
in such a manner that itspotentialweak- tions wiU be influenced by the impact
nesses are clearly revealed and it is of the airwolthil, ess requirements on
suggested that this should be dealt with the required operational characteria-
ia the following manner:- tics. Zones may l:e determined not only
, _a) Consider the Significant Atrwortht- t _ the structure arrangement but also
ness Functions which are required by disposition of the systems and equip-
of the complex of systems which to- ment, and the hazards arising from real-
gerber make up the aircraft, function and interaction. These aspects
-- 0
(b) Designate the system boundaries will be further discussed. In real cases
. which allow the best logical separa- some compromise v,._h factors outside
tion of these functions. Safety aspects may be necessary, In-
(c) Designate the Zones, or physical volving, for example, the extent of sub-
_- boundaries, in which systems, parts contract work and particular respon_
of systems, and components are slhilities when the project is _elng
installed, carried out by more than one major
NOTE: The terms tSlgnlftcant Air- contractor. It may well be that ability to
worthiness Function t and define and deal with the interface prob-
tZones' will be discussed In lems may be a powerful factor in the
more detail later, determination of the sub.divisions of
(d) Carry out a system analysis for systems and zones.
each cf these arbitrarily generated For example, if one considered a
groups by piece part count, for ex- supersonic alr'raft having variable in-
ample, or any other desirable ap- take geometry it would be difficult to
proach, in order to validate the sig- disassociate the behaviour of the intake,
niflcant a_,rworthlness functions, engine and perhaps its variable exhaust ,
(e) Ensure that the interfaces are ade- nozzles. It is clearly desirable to per-
quately taken into account. This in- form safety assessment on a unit which
eludes interfaces between System, includes each of these parts and to ca-
. between System and the Zones in sure that this is carried out by an lnte-
which they are contained, alrcrew grated propulsion unit team.
and system interfaces, etc.
As stated earlier, the Certification 4.2 Discussion of the Significant Atrworthi- *
Authoritiesmust assistthisprocess of n-essFunctionlogical partition for analytical reasons,
by stating requirements which take ac-
count of system dependency in a re- In the context of this primary activ-
tlonal manner without unduly restricting ity, the Significant Airworthiness Func-
the design. In addition, It is necessary tlon has cons:derable significance when
"_ because of the great background of ex- the Safety Assessment is bein_ or-
t
perience to retain many features of the ganised. It is Important to recognise
existing requirements of BCAR and FAR that there are many functions which do
where their application is practicable not have airworthiness significance.
for the specific type under consid_ra- These could have powerful commercial
tlon. So the aircraft is subdivided into implication in the way of effects on
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despatch capability, achievement of de- These analyses are now developed
sired flight profile, maintenance costs, through the following stages, which are
etc., and these fur,ctions will also be pxobably sufficiently self explanatory
submitted to exhaustive system investl- in the context of this paper:-
gation which m,lst be separate from the (a) The system single failure analysis.
analysis required for Safety reasons. (b) The system safety assessment.
F_r example if a feature of the aircraft (c) The aircraft safety assessment.
to be Investigated is a droop nose nec- These stages facilitate the grouping
essary to provide the vision required of piece part failures, the combination
for operation in various flight phases, of these falIures as they affect systems,
we could consider two of its possible and the total effect of these failures and
fum.ttons. In one case, the system could the interactions which arise, on the air-
fail in a mode which prevented the nose craft as a whole. In a pr'.sentatton of
being raised to the supersonic position, this sort it is difficult to describe the ,
The result might he to pix_hibtt flight In complete procedure with greater depth
the supersonic mode and airworthiness but tt is not difficult to see a direct
would Gnly be affected by any contribu- parallel with the Failure Mode and F_.f- .
tlon which might result from a diversion, fects Analysis combined with Critical-
A significant function would be the lty Analyses which are performed in
requirement for lowering the nose dur- the US industry.
ing the approach, and failure to achieve In a previous paper on the subjectof
this would result in an increased load safety assessment dealing specifically "
on the pilot and therefore represent an with Concorde (Ref: 1) the way in which
airworthiness hazard. Consequently, the these middle level assessments are
system ability to perform this task is combined was discussed. EssentiaLly,
included in the safety assessment and we have designated a basic system
its integrity, matched to the importance element (Figure 1) which has an input
of this hazard (however lh passlngthere of system control signals, stimuli from -"
Is also an absolute requirement in the other systems, system Internal failures .
case of Concorde that it should be cap- and, of course, the system output func-
able of being landed safely after mal- tlons. Within this concept it is endeav- _
function of the droop nose), oured to have discrete analysis but the
This discussion emphasises the need output of the analysis will be groupedin
in all safety assessment work for pre- so far as their effects on the whole air- _
clslon in the identification of the func- craft are concerned. _ feature of each
ttons which are associated with safety, of these analyses Is the use of depend= _
It has already been said that safety ence diagrams which make verylmpor- _:
assessment should provided the best rantcontributionstothe achievementof .
display of the weaknesses of a project total visualisation of system vuinera-
and this requirement will not be satts- btllty.
fledby an approach which endeavours The problem of displayand total
to takeaccountof every failurewhen comprehension ofthesafetyassessment
many ofthesedo notaffectsafety, introducesus to thequestionof choice
between fault tree, logic tree, success
4.3 Integration of the Safety Assessment pg:h, dependence diagram, etc. I have
had many dlscussiuna In the American
At this point we have discussed the and European industries where thls has
requirements and defined the systems arisen and it is clear that there are ap-
and zones necessary for their logical plicatlons and objectives which are
application. The systems will then be suited to each approach. Bearing In
analysed on the basis of single failures mind the need _o ensure that every
and the zones on the basis of detailed section of the design/manufacturing/
checks against installation rules, operating team ahould have the widest ,
8O
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understanding of the safety problem, it is considered to be a volume or corn-
is suggested that some care should be partment of the aircraft which is strue-
taken over this choice. If the fault tree rurally or even arbitrarily bounded and
is considered it is thought that some in which equipment and systems are
variant, such as the logic tree, is very installed. Convenient means of identi-
suitable as a high level linking dis- fication could be by the use of the ATA
cipline. It could link, for example, the I00 coding suitably modified according
outputs from the discrete system anal- to the specific structural requirements
ysis referred to above and its use of the aircraft.
should be limited to the integration of Zonal analysis could be considered
these effects at the total aircraft level, to be primarily concerned with problems
It is suggested therefore that the roots which arise as a function of position
of the fault tree should culminate in whereas the system analysis discussed
events which are described in depend- elsewhere in this paper is primarily
ence diagrams, directed at failure to achieve Significant
It is undeniable that pure fault tree Airworthiness Functions. 'Primarily'
analyses carried out with a view to is a key word in this context since there
automation are ideally suited to pro j- is an essential overlap and the dual
ects where development and operational approach is important. Zonal analysis
time in a fully assembled mode is would therefore be primarily directed
minimal. The fault tree programme in at problems of containment, jamming,
this case has some relationship to the fire, leakage, radio interference, etc.
flight development programme on air- These are essentially areas which re-
craft but it is thought that from the quire an adherence to design rules in
= point of view of original safety assess- respect of environment and segregation
ment on aircraft projects it is ex- which can often be enshrined in arbi-
tremely difficult to highlight the safety trary alrworthlners requirements, and
_ problem, when a fault tree perhaps of which have been developed with con-
_, many thousand events may be needed to tinuing experience over the years.
go from a part failure to, for example, A systematic approach is required
:_ a n'_inlmum safe pitch capability over a when the assessment is being made in
limited Math range. It is realised that the context of the rational requirement ;
statistical analysis will produce domi- but the task of quantifying segregation
::: nant paths, critical modes, etc. but it for example is clearly a difficult one,
_: is possible that the complexity of the The following method has beenproposed "
) process could swamp the safety effort, for the use on current projects. The
The dependence diagram is ideally chosen zone must be identified in rela- :
i suited to the examination of failure tion to the aircraft and its contents in-
modes at system level and draws par- dicated by drawing or list. Installation
t/cular attention to the need for re- rules are developed for each zonebased :_dundancy and the weight which must be on general experience, consideration of
put on the assessment. Attention is the particular equipment present, and
particularly drawn to systems which its failure modes. The objective is to
are unduly sensitive to series effects, ensure compliance with the installation
rules with reference to the hazard
4.4 The Zonal Analysis classification of the general require-
ment. If there is a case where the as-
This is an analysis which is re- sessed hazard probability is not fa-
quired to cover proximity, environ- vourably matched to Its effects then
mental and other associated effects this will appear as an output of the
which together constitute a considerable Zonal Analysis. Apart from the direct
problem in most aerospace applications, environmental effect which would re-
A zone for the purposes of this paper quire local design action this hazard
Sl
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would appear as an input to the safety the other. Where the range of systems
analyses of the functional systems which concerned extend from the purely electronic,
are present in the zone insofar as the through auto-throttles with, for example,
achievement of the associated Signifi- sensors and clutch mechanisms, to flying
cant Airworthiness Functions are con- controls where linkages, actuators, struc-
cerned, rural parts, etc. should also be included
It is worth repeating the primary then it is obvious that the mixture has
features of this analysis which are to progressively become less 'pure'.
achieve a logical arrangement of the The 'pure' approach would be severely
zones, clear identification of the con- compromised when the interface between
tents of these zones, and the presenta- electronic parts and mechanical parts oc-
tion of comprehensive installation rules, curs, where one element has been assessed
These installation rules must take ac- by proved reliability techniques and the
count not only of the best engineering other, such as a linkage or hydraulic corn- ,
practice but also consider the specific ponent, may have been assessed on engi-
failure modes and their local effects, neering experience associated with a lim-
Finally the zones must be comprehen- ited but fully understood test programme. ,
sively checked against these rules and In cases of this sort, the failure of a me-
positive conclusions reached, chanical locking device and a soldered joint
in a circuit may have similar results.
5 THE EXERCISE OF JUDGEMENT IN So how should the task be approached?
SAFETY ASSESSMENT It must be emphasised that, as was said
earlier, we are discussing only the tools of
Assessed probabilities are the essential the trade; the designers and specialists
tools of safety analysis and it is important have the desired input and it is the manage-
that this statement is fully understood. In ment of this input that is being discussed.
many cases it is possible to assemble an Where computer techniques are required
ideal structure of numerical probabilities then the skills appropriate to these tech-
on the basis of component failure rates, niques must be available but only to ensure
Particularly this is so in the case of avionics that the best use is being made of engineer-
which are specially suited to statistical ing judgement or the other relevant skills.
analysis on this basis and where substan- It is thought that a numerical approach
ttated failure rates for most of the parts is an excellent method of recording the
and techniques involved are available. How- exercise of judgement and it is emphasised
"_ ever, when safety assessment is being per- that this should not be unnecessarily in-
formed in this manner utilising component hlblted by the limitations of the data. The
: failure rates, weighting factors must be designer makes his numerical assessment i_:
applied, to take account of particular usage, implicitly by presenting his design and it _
n lr_e .,ronmental conditions, etc. Therefore, can only do good to display how hl_ thought
even in what could be postulated as an ideal processes have distributed the probabilities.
application of safety assessment where sub- The application of experience becomes more
stantiated failure rates under known con- credible if directed at the component parts _
ditions arc available, it becomes necessary rather than at the assembly as a whole, and
to introduce general, if not subjective, ex- the design can be assessed by the extent of
perlence into this numerical analysis when this dependence on unduly favourable as-
i the required operating conditions are dif- sumptions. However it must be said thatferent from those under which the reliabil- even here judgement must be exercised.
I ities were determined. The apparent dero- Unimaginative use of the numerical ap- t
!zatin_n ,_f a potentially 'pure' numerical preach has tended to bring it into disrepute
anal)_ts has been emphasized because the in some quarters and single faults estlmated
weio_,_ted analysis represents a point on the at 10-6 or less which produce dangerous
_ :t, t)etwce;l 'numerical _ti_proach' on the hazards cannot be treatcti as the corner-
one hand and 'engineering experience' on stones of safety assessment. ]_o avoid this
i ,
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pitfall, rational requirements need to be necessary as a means of directing these
backed by some safeguards stated in at- efforts at the right problems with a lower
bitrary form, as in TSS 1-1. probability of subjective error.
In more detail, I have emphasised the
6 CONCLUSIONS need to determine and set out safetyob-
jectiveswith precisionso thatthe analysis
Itisimportanttosay beforeconcluding, is not complicated,withoccurrenceswhich
that there are major omissions in this are not relevantto safety.Also itis ira-
paper, considered necessary because of portantthatthe SafetyAssessment can be
possible effectson emphasis, withinthe readily understood by a11 concerned, and
limitedtime available.For example, safety visual techniques such as the variantsof
assessments require major inputsfrom the faulttree,dependencediagrams) should
considerationof Crew Procedures; flight be used.
handlingiscloselylinkedwithsystem anal- The exercise of judgement should be
ysis and rationalrequirements have been assisted where possible by a reasonable
developed to take account of this;also no use of numerical methods, buttheseshould
mention has been made of the importance not be a11owed toobscure theobjectivesor
attached to the use of the flight simulator saturate the Safety Effort. In addition, the
and the importance of the continuing main- particular importance of a methodical anal-
tenance effort has only been mentioned in- ysis of Zonal, or environmental problems,
directly. More specifically the analysis of cannot be over-emphasised.
digital systems (including their software) To return to the final point in my intro-
if employed where sufficient authority exists duction which required the assessment to
to create serious hazards is also relevant show to the satisfaction of all concerned
to the discussion of the fundamentals of that the safety objectives have been met,
SafetyAssessment. thisis of course a problem of datadisplay
Ithinktheseexamples suggesttheextent and management. If judgement has been
of the fieldfrom which my particularob- appliedin the manner discussed so that
servationscouldhave been drawn.However simulator,development flying,and service
I have chosen to bring out some of thees- experience can rapidlyand effectivelyup-
sentialfeatures of Safety Assessment in date the assessment, thenIbelievethatwe
more fundamentalterms, which couldhave are some way along the llnetowards en-
been obscured bytheseotherconsiderations, suring that the SafetyObjectives willbe
I have endeavoured to discuss Safety achieved in service.
Assessment under four headings chosen _t
the beginningof thispaper. I have talked 7 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT !
about the definition of SafetyObjectives, i
the organisationand displayofthe Assess- I would liketoexpress my thankstothe
ment, and the exerciseof judgement.Ifind Air Regulation Board for permission to
that I have not specificallydiscussed the present thispaper and topointout thatthe
finalpointwhich was to show to thesatis- opinionsexpressedare entirelymy own.
factionof all concerned thatthesafetyob-
Jectiveshave been met, and althoughitis 8 REFEREHCE
largelyimplicitintheotherheadings,Iwill
returntoitlater. I. HAAS, J. (Aerospatiale),'An AppUcaUon
I thinkthatthe broad conclusionwhich of Modern Maintenance Concepts and
emerges from thisdiscussionisthatSafety SafetyAnalysistotheMultinationalCer-
Assessment continues to requirea disci., tificationofaSupersonicAircraft.'Preo
plined approach,which, althoughitcannot sentationto the6th AnnualInternational
displacethe specialistdesignfunctions,is MaintenanceSymposium.
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APPENDIX
NOTE ON TSS 1-1 AIRWORTHINESS OBJECTIVES AND SYSTEM ANALYSIS
TSS 1-1 introduces a probability approach The constructor's task is then to assess
to the Safety Assessment of aircraft systems, the frequency of Occurrences, singly and in
together with a framework of defined terms, combinations, and the Effects of these Occur-
To fit the requirements into a consistent fences. These results are then to be matched
framework, a number of terms needed to be against the acceptable probability of the va-
defined, rlous levels of Effect.
At root there are the things which happen, One clearly defined difficulty with this ap-
described as Occurrences. These include proach is that of proving compliance with the
Failures of parts of the aeroplane, Events requirements, particularly in cases where a '
arising from outside the aeroplane (e.g. failure or combination of failures would re-
gusts) and Errors arising from the ac- suit in catastrophe. In such cases it is nec-
ttons, or failures to act, of flight or ground essary to impose some additional arbitrary ,
personnel, criteria in addition to, or instead of the
An Occurrence has various potential numerical criteria (e.g. a double failure may
Effects. These can be classified according to only be acceptable as an Extremely Improb-
the associated level of danger, Into Minor, able failure when (a) both failures are as-
Major, Hazardous or Catastrophic. sessed to be not more probable than Remote,
The requirements must state the acceptable or (b) at least one is assessed to be Extremely
frequency of Occurrences, and according to Remote).
the magnitude of the Effect, various frequen- The requirement then states broadly that
ties can be ascribed - Frequent, Reasonably the Occurrence of faitures or errors must not
Probable, Remote, Extremely Remote, etc. produce au accident risk greater than pre-
To give technical significance to these words scribed levels, and that systems or combtna-
some Idea of the numerical probability needs tions of systems operating normally without
to be quoted (e.g. Reasonably Probable, of the failures or er:-ors must not be able to able to
order of 10 .3 to 10"_). prejudice the safe operation of the aircraft.
¢
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INTRODUCTION has been one of the objectives of the flight
research program. Generally the upper flaps
The X-24A is a manned lifting body flight
are "biased" to the open position at high speeds
vehicle, engaged in a flight research program (minus 40 degrees above 0.60 Mach number,
at Edwards Air Force Base, California. The for example) and are closed up at low speeds
aerodynamic configuration of the X-24A was
and for landing. The pilot has the capability,
developed by the Martin Marietta Corporation however, to open them up for use as speed
over a period of years in connection with in- brakes. Usually, pitch control _is accomplishedhouse studies and Air Force contracts. The
by simultaneous deflection of the lower flaps
final configuration evolving from these studies while roll control results from differential
was identified as the SV-5. The SV-5 con- deflection. When the upper flaps are "closed
figuration featured medium hypersonic lift to
up", some of the pitch and roll control func-
drag ratios, good subsonic performance, and a tions are transferred to them at which time
high volumetric efficiency, they act in concert with the lower flaps.
Three small scale SV-SD vehicles, identi- The upper and lower rudders on each sidefred as the PRIME, were fabricated by Martin
may be moved together in response to "bias"
under Air Force contract. They successfully signals and are generally toed-in 10 degrees
demonstrated flight from entry into theearthts for low speeds and toed-out 2 degrees for
atmosphere at orbital speeds down to 100,000 high speeds. The upper rudders on each side
feet altitude at a velocity of Mach 2.0. The
move together in response to the pilots corn-
unmanned PRIME vehicles were approximately mands, inputs from the stability augmentation,
one fourth the size of the X-24A and weighed and in response to commands from a rudder-
approximately 800 pounds. Recovery was by aileron interconnect system. The rudder-
"air snatch" following deployment of a ballute
aileron interconnect system deflects the
and a parachute, rudders in proportion to aileron deflection to
counteract the adverse yaw which results fromDESIGN AND OPERATIONAL CHARACTER-
aileron deflection. Aileron action is, of course,
ISTICS obtained by differential deflection of the flaps
The X-24A !.s approximately 24 feet long, as explained above.
weighs apvroximately 5500 pounds empty, and The normal m6de of operation oftheX-24A
has an internal tankage capacity for approxt- is to launch the vehicle from a B-52 mother
mately 5500 pounds of propellants and gases, ship at approximately 45,000 feet and a Mach
It is of conventional aluminum alloy construe- number of 0.69. Early flights were made in a
,ion and Is powered by the XLR-II rocket strictly glide mode. Later, the XLR-II rocket
,, engine developed over twenty years ago. The engine was started after launch and the X-24A
main propellants are liquid oxygenandalcohol, was climbed to altitudes in excess of 70,000
Hydrogen peroxide is used to power the feet and accelerated to velocities in excess of
turbopump and helium is used to pressurize the Mach 1.60. In all cases, however, the final
i tanks and actuate the valves. The vacuum portion of the flight consists of an unpowered
i thrust of the engine is approximately 8500 glide to a conventional airplane type landing
! pounds and the maximum burn time at full on the dry lake at Edwards Air Force Base.
! thrust is nominally 140 seconds. 500 pound
i thrust hydrogen peroxide fueled rocket en- SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS FOR VEHICLE
gines are also provided for use as "landing DESIGN
engines".
Cor_trol of the X-24A is by means of 8 The "one of a kind" research mission of
movable aerodynarrdc surfaces. These sur- the X-24A dictated that great emphasis be
faces are powered by a duel redundant hy- placed on safety during the design of the X-24A.
draulic system and respond to either pilot Initial criteris were developed on the basis of
commands or the inputs from a triple re- experience with other resesrr flight _eh/cles
dundant stability augmentation system. Vari- such as the X-15 and on the-_is of Che pre-
ous modes of control are possible with the dieted flight c h a r a c t • r i s ti c s of the
X-24A and the development of a "control law" X-24A.
.., i $8
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The inherently high drag of the lifting body Redundancy techniques were used in the
configuration together with its relatively low flight control system to eliminate single point
lift/drag ratio (typically 2.0 to 4.4), gen- catastrophic failure modes. Two independent
erated considerable concern with respect to hydraulic systems are used. Each system is
the pilot's abillty to perform safe landings powered by two electric motor driven hydraulic
from gliding flight. Accordingly, the "landing pumps, and each pair of pumps is powered by
engines" were incorporated into the design to its own independent battery. In the event of a
provide an increase in the apparent lift/drag failure of either of the batteries powering the
ratio during flare and landing. Experience with hydraulic pumps, power is switched to the
the X-24A has since shown that this concern flight test instrumentation battery, thus pro-
was not warranted. The landing rockets were riding an additional backup for this mode.
used on the first three flights, but have not The stability augmentation system was made
been used on the following twenty-two flights, triple redundant to insure that it would always
In the early stages of design, all systems be available to provide its augmentation func-
were reviewed for critical areas. A failure tton, but could not command a "hard-over" or
mode and effects analysis was performed, other erroneous control signal. Each axis of
Redundancy and other techniques were used to the system has three parallel rate gyros, as-
insure safe operation to touchdown and roll sociated electronics, and a logic circuit which
_ out after one or more component failures insures that a malfunction in one of the three
occurred, parallel channels will not cause a hardover
_ Start failure of the XLR-II engine would or disable the system.
require immediate jettisoning of the main The X-24A flight control system consists
propellant. Therefore, a bypass system was of a relatively complex mechanical linkage
I designed which would route helium directly which accomplishes the required mixing and
from the storage tank to the main propellant crossover functions in order to transfer the
tanks. An interlock with the Jettison valves command signals from the pilot and the
prevented opening of the bypass system unless stability augmentation system tc_the flaps and
the Jettison valves were open. Thus, a failure rudders.
of the normal pressure regulating system in In order to thoroughly evaluate the opera-
the closed mode would not preclude Jettisoning tion of the flight control system under normal
of the main propellants, and malfunction conditions and to accomplish
The hydrogen peroxide tank is pressurized the necessary development work in an orderly
with helium to 475 psia. The helium is stored and expeditious manner, the entire system
at 4200 psla and routed through a pressure was assembled on a structural steel mockup
\ regulator to achieve the desired pressure drop. for fixed-base closed loop simulation. All
An open failure of the regulator would over attachment points to the basic X-24A structure
pressurize the peroxide tank and cause a were dupllcate_ by the structurrl steel frame
catastrophic failure. This single point failure work. The hydraulic power actuators moved
Was eliminated by incorporation of a dual dummy control s u rf a c • s which were
redundant relief valve in the peroxide tank. loaded in a manner to simulate airloads. This
Depletion of the helium source through the was accomplished with air cylinders pres-
vent is prevented by installation of a normally suzlzed from a regulated source of corn-
open solenoid valve in series with the regu- pressed gas. Control surfaces position was
lator. This valve is controlled by a pressure measured with potent/ometers and the elec-
switch, set to a higher pressure than the trical signal was fed into an analog computer.
regulator pressure, l_t a lower value than the A complete set of pilot flight controls was
settings on the peroxide tank tel/e! valves. A provided and the position of these controls was
cockpit switch allows the pilot to close this also fed into the computer. The motions of
valve manually if his pressure indications the X-24A which would have resulted from
should show a trend to oyez pressure, or to the var!ous control positions was calcula._d
de-energlze the valve if a pressure switch by the computer and displayed on the pilot's
malfunction should cause it to close ,mnsces- flight instruments (attitude indicator, Mach-
sarily, meter, altimeter, etc) and also recorded
S9
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on strip charts for en gt ne ertng anal- The simulator Is used as a tool for planning
ysis. the nominal trajectory as well as all malfunc-
Experienced pilots "flew" numerous mis- tlon situations. In addition, it is used as a
stons in both normal and malfunction modes, means of evaluating changes to the flight
These tests provided functional verification of control system or other ships systems relative
overall system operation and permitted an to their effect on stability and control and
assessment of the ptlot's ability to use the performance.
manual backul_ controls to correct system Once a satisfactory flight plan has been
malfunctions. A typical example would be _ developed, the simulator is used for crew
failure in the automatic flap bias syste,; training. The general procedure used in the
tending to drive the upper flaps to an extreme lifting body flight test program has been to
position. The pilot was able to switch to the have at least two pilots specifically assigned
manual mode and "beep" the flap to the de- to one of the flight vehicles and at least three
sired position before the development of a pilots active in the program. One of theX-24A
serious situation, pilots is assigned to fly the mission and the
After delivery of the X-24A to the govern- other pilot is assigned as the controller
merit, gull scale wind tunnel tests were run in (NASA One). Usually, the third pilot, although
the large low speed tunnel at the Ames Re- not specifically assigned to the X-24A, will
search Center. Additional small scale tests fly chase. The flight planner, the ¢or,troller
were run, and this data together with the (NASA One), and the mission pilot use the
measured characteristics of the actual X-24A simulator to train for the mission as a team.
flight control system were used to develop an As a further training a!d, F-i04 aircraft
accurate simulation program. This simulation are used as airborne sim,_lators for the ap-
did not include the actual flight control sys- proach and landing phases of the mission.
tems hardware as in the flight controls test Aerodynamic data for the X-24A and for the
stand described above. Instead the measured F-104 are utilized to establish an F-t04 con-
characteristics of the flight control system figuration which will give it lift/drag ratios
were programmed into the computer. This comparable to that anticipated for the X-24A
simulator provided an accurate dupUcatton of in the upcoming mission. Typically, the F-I04
the cockpit controls and displays and the ts flown with gear and flaps down, speed
computer output drove both the pilot's displays brakes extended, and engine at minimal power
and an X-Y plotter similar to the one used to settings to duplicate the low lift/drag ratio of
control actual flights, the llRlng body. Practice approaches are flown
for the normal mission and for all of the
OPERATIONAL SAFETY malfunction cases. On the morning before the
Flight planning for the X-24A starts with a flight, a final set of practice approaches are
review of all available data from preceding flown, usually with the chase pilot ac-
flights and a comparison of this data withwind companylng. Thus, when the mission pilot
tunnel results. A configuration (control embarks on the actual X-24A mission, all
settings, gains, etc) is established for the normal and emergency aspects of the mission
flight together with a set of flight objectives, have been experienced and he is thoroughly
In general, the flight objectives are to obtain prepared for any foreseeable situation which
specific data under certain flight conditions might develop.
(Mach number, angle of attack, etc). Flight A further safety procedure followed in the
planning for a vehicle such as the X-24A must development of an X-24A mission involves
consider many factors in attempting to ac- preparation of the formal written flight plan,
complish the desired flight objectives. Energy and the technical and crew briefings. The
must be programmed to insure that the prl- flight plan spells out In d.etafl all aspects of
mary landing site will be reached with suffi- the flight. Each event In the flight is detailed
cient speed and altitude to insure a Jafe landing, In terms of Mach number, altitude, angle of
but provisions must also bemade _rabnormal attack, elapsed time, and maneuver to be ac-
situations such as an early .engine shutdown, complished. A set of ground rul_8 for "no
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launch" and a set of alternate situations after in excess of 50,000 feet, the pilot wears a
launch are defined in detail, full pressure suit as a backup in the event of
: Several days before the sehedaled day, a cabin pressurization failure. In order toobtain
technical briefing is held. This briefing is biomedical data, the pilot is instrumented with
attended by all cognizant personnel from both special sensors, the output of which are re-
NASA Flight Research Center and the Air corded on a small tape recorder. A flight
Force Flight Test Center. Data from the surgeon is present during all preparation of
preceding flight are reviewed and thetechnlcal the pilot for flight to provide medical aid in
aspects of the upcoming flight are discussed the event of an accident, and to observe the
in detail. Finally, the written flight plan is pilot for any signs of distress. This procedure
reviewed. A_I questions raised at this briefing was instituted when a lilting body pilot suf-
are answered satisfactorily as a prerequisite fered severe dehydration due to the high
of the flight, ambient temperatures (Edwards Air Force
The crew briefing is accomplished during Base in the summer) encountered during a
" the afternoon preceding the scheduled flight hold which occurred after cockpit entry.
day. This briefing is attended by all personnel After pilot entry into the cockpit, the X-24A
who will participate In the actual accomplish- crew chief and the chief Inspector go over the
: ment of the flight. All operational aspects are "pilot entry checklist" with the pilot to verify
reviewed and the personnel assigned to ac- the position of all cockpit controls and the
complish speclfte tasks are Identified. Any reading of the appropriate displays. The entire
' special operating procedures are discussed captive portion of the flight Is also conducted?
and the chase pilots, B-52 mother ohlp pilots, tn accordance with a carefully prepared check°4,
_ airborne photographers, and mission pilot list i.e. countdown.
I coordinate their activities at this time. Timing of the checklist during captive flight
Servicing of the X-24A begins approxi- Is a function of B-52 position and is arranged
mately two hours prior to pilot entry Into the so that completion of the checklist occurs Just
cockpit. A complete controls system check is as the B-52 approaches the launch polnt. During
accomplished during thIs time period. "Throw- the capttve portion of the flight, another cora-
l boards" are attached to the X-24A tomeasure plete controls system check is accomplishe<l.
control surface deflections. An observer Is This check verifies proper operation of the
stationed in a position to make the desired system In the actual flight environment. In '
readings. The crew chlef operates the controls addition, pitch and yaw pulses of the B-52
in the X-24A cockpit and a controls engineer permit an operational check of the stability
directs the test from the control room. The augmentation system. Air for cabin prea-
, X-24A telemetry system Is operative and surlzation, breathing oxygen, and electric
driving the strip recorders which display power for the X-24A are provided from the
i control positions in the control room. All B-52 until approximately five minutes before
personnel participating in the test are in launch. At that time a switchover is made to
radio and/or telephone communication. The internal systems and a check is made to de-
test verifies that the control surfaces are in termine that operation is satisfactory.
fact properly responding to the pilots cockpit Upon reaching the launch point, the pilot
control motions and that the control room re- launches himself and proceeds with the flight
corders are displaying _he actual positions of according to plan. The flight is monitored
the control surfaces. Thls check also verifies from the ground and all communications with ;
proper operation of the stability augmentation the pilot are filtered through the controller
system and the automatic bias system. (NASA One). The pilot is advised al any real-
Approximately 30 minutes prior to pilot function or abnormality ._,a provided with i
cockpit entry, the pilot Is prepared for flight, reeommende_ eor_ectlve action. His trajectory
A special van located near the X-24A is is monitored from the radar driven X-Y plot
utlliz_._i to Instrument the pilot and fit him into and heading and climb angle corrections are :
his full pressure suit. Since powered flights provided as required. During the approach, the i
of the X-24A are normally made t_ altitudes chase pilot flies in close proximity to the {j
9t t
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X-24A and provides airspeed, altitude, and CONCLUSION
turbulence _ ,_ormation, In addition, the chase
pilot verifies satisfactory extension of the The lifting body flight test program has
landlngea_andadvisesthepilotofhisheight beenconductedon an extremelyausterebasis.
above the runway during the last 100 feet of The ent_.re cost to the government of the X-24A
descent. Normally, the chase aircraft touches prog.ramo including vehicle acquisition, has
down in formation with the X-24A. The entire been less than the cost of ma,2 paper studies.
operation is one in which teamwork and Yet, there has been no compromise with
thorough training play a very important part. safety. Safe operation of such a radical flight
By means of these procedures, flight testing vehicle has required careful attention to safety
of advanced, radically configured experimental considerations from the beginning of the design
flightvehiclesIs conductedin a very safe process,and with continuedemphasisright
manner on an almostroutinebasis, throughtheflightprogram.
J,
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SESSION II
QUESTIONS AND ANSWE RS
QUESTION: John, where do we go from dividual responsibility, people who hadworked
here in manned lifting bodies7 Is the space in the area and who were very aware of it. I
shuttle next or is there something in between7 don't know ff that answers your questions.
MR. GORDON SMiTH/A.F. SYSTEMS COM-MR. COCHRANE: The present plan is to MAND: Mr. Hammer -- Willie, I know you
modify the X-24A to a new configuration known made a number of comments about changes
as the X-24B which has higher hypersonic that are needed in MIL-STD-882o I was won-
performance. It will be a sort of long skinny
. vehicle instead of a short fat one but it is the dering whether you have already submitted
these officially for consideration or whether
_, same basic core. We will actuallyadd the
structure to this vehicle and retain the systems, you are going to submit them?
that is anticipated to be done sometime late MR. HAMMER: No I haven't submitted
• thisyear.Then, a lotof usatNASA are hoping them officiallyat all.As a matteroffact,it
that we will have a similar type vehicle to was only Thursday or Friday that I heard the
¢ represent one of the space shuttle orbiters or Air Force was actually thinking of revising
_.. boosters perhaps. I think the booster is the MIL-STD-882. Lets say I presented a few
one that they are thinki_lg of presently, comments, I even have a few that I did not
_ put up here because I didn't think that they
QUESTION: What is the thrust in the "B"7 were that Important. If you want Gordon, I can
just get you a copy and hand them to you.
MR. COCHRANE: It will be the same
thrust. The engine will be the same and the MR. SMITH: The best thing Willie ts to
submit them on that form that is in the back
engine does develop 8500 lbs. of vacuum thrust.
of the MIL-STD. When we went through the
COMMENT: You mean the engine t_ still last exercise we got recommended changes
good, we are going to use it many more years, on wrapping paper and everything else and we
right John7 h_d one heck of a time. We are hoping in this
current revision of 882 to stick to the format
MR. COCHRANE: Yes sir, I might corn-
of the form that is in the back of each copy of
ment that the present thinking is to use two of
them. This would give us eight chambers in the MIL-STD, then we have them in apple-pie
' the drop vehicles, that is the shuttle vehicle-- order and we can give them due consideration.
There Is one other advantage of using that
space scale shuttle, and I shutter to think of
getting eight of them going. Yesterday we sure form, with the high postage rates, the way
had a lot of trouble getting four going, they are, we pay the postage on that form.
QUESTION: Mr. Hammer you made a
QUESTION: Did you use any techniques of couple of statements on MIL-STD-882. One
system safety discipline on the X-24A or did that you would prefer not to see a categorlza-
you Just design in good safety features, tlon. As a nuclear system analyst, Pd like to _
know, when we do analysis wb_at could we use
MR. COCHRANE: I would say yes, but I to categorize7
have to qualify it. I deliberately did not get
into a discussion of it because I didn't have MR. HAMMER: Why do we need care-
time. I think what it was, the technical director gorlzation. This is what I want to point out,
on our program had been a reliability engineer that If the procuring activity or the agency
previously and the techniques were not the that is interested in getting a system de-
!formal techniques that have been discussed veloped actually indicates where the lnvesti- ,
here earlier, that is with charts and pro- gatiorm, which way the satety activities should ,_
cedures, etc., b_c it was a case of, I think in- go, you really don't need these safety _,
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categories. Actually, the old idea about the ment youql have a Level I review board, Level
categories was the fact that if they said. well II Board, Level III - and when you assign a
if you have a Category IV then you know it is design change it establishes the level which
more important than Category III, II, or I. reviev, and decision can be made. I think
This was the benefit of the four categories, there was an implication that Category IV
As I say, I think that we have advanced so far would have to be reviewed as a high level of
now that we really don't need the categories, management; Category III as a low level of man-
that whoever is responsible for obtaining a agement, etc. Unless the management system
new system couid actually stipulate the various goes on and says that unless the management
problems that they want Investigated. In some system identifies some correlation between the
of the work that I have done with various responsibility andauthorityfordisposingofthe
organization, I found it is a great deal of hazard, then the Category itself is meaningless.
trouble trying to decide which of the categories MR. HAMMER: Categories have this one
these things go into. For example, lets point basic advantage, the fact that supposedly you
out this deal about injuries. You have two look at the Category IV and you say, we want
categories for injury, Category 11I and Care- to pay more attention to that, but we get in=
gory IV and it is quite a problem trying to volved with another problem in determining
determine, if the person who is going to over the categories. For example, taking a missile "
here going to be subjected to a Category III that we are trying to establish categories on.
hazard or is he liable to be killed and be in a Say this is an air launch missile. We know
Category IV hazard. So as I say then, other that if the electrical system fails on a missile
things are these delineations between the that has o_en launched that you have system -
categories. For example, Category IV talks loss. System loss is Category IV. Now, you
about system loss; Category Ill talks about can have an electrical system failure for a
the fact that you might lose the system unless number of reasons. One of the reasons is that
immediate corrective action is taken. Which you lose the battery which means that if the
means thatyouhaveapotentialforsystemloss battery fails then you have a Category IV
in the Category II,t hazard, so which do you hazard. As you go down you begin to analyze
put it under, Category III and IV. The other what could cause the problems within the
point is that we sometimes get the question do batteries and you can have sixteen different
you put somethings in Category I, II, III or IV items such as touching plates, a poor connec-
depending on something like the probabilities tion, poor soddering, each one of these things.
that Mr. Allison had. Whether it is highly Does that mean that poor soddering within the
improbable, very low probability of hazard, or battery is a Category IV hazard because you
do you take anything of any probability and put are ultimately going to lose the system. Now
it in a category and just leave it there? you have to have a Philadelphia lawyer to
VOICE: I understand your point but the begin to figure out where do you stop care-
other one I think we are all interested in, is gorizing these things as Category IV or :
why is it 180° out of phase with the reliability Category III. This is not well-defined In
category, MIL-STD 882.
MR. HAMMER: I hate to say this but I "_
believe that when 38.30 was developed the QUESTION: Again for Mr. Hammer, the
military specification at that time had four point of categorization. The categorizing sys-
reliability categories. I think they figured if tern sure is simply a means of shorthand, I '
reliability had categories, safety ought to have agree that It has serious problems. Perhaps
categories and just to differentlatethet_othey it needs expansion rather than eradication.
ran them tn opposite directions. For example one serious injury or a thousand _
VOICE: .Sincethespeaker askedaquestion deaths would both be a Category IV hazard
why categories, I guess some of the audience when you can hardly compare the two In any
can answer the question. I think thecategorles system safety program. That is simply an
were Just a stepping stone to management aside. My question really Is that MIL-STD-882
action.For instanceInconfigurationmanage- says Inabout5900 words exactlywhat38-130A
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said m 2500 words. Is it your opinion that with, they are not very much interested in
882 is a step forward? a step backward? using NASA and Aerospace techniques in their
or a step sideways in comparison to current dilemma with the environment.
38..130? MR. HAMMER: I point out the fact that
one of the biggest problems we actually have
MR. HAMMER. I think the chief advantage in management is trying to understand some
in MIL-STD-882 was in the delineation of the of this differentiation between reliability and
tasks and the various phases. Here again, I system safety. I have seen statements of work
think certain of these items should be ira- that say "failure mode analysis will be con-
proved. For example this des! about the sys- ducted." Now safety goes beyond that.
tern safety pregram plan, both in 38-139 and It is not only failures, you have the en-
MIL-STD-882. In the conceptual phase they vironment effect, you have personnel errors,
have no requirement for the system safety you have a lot of other things ti_at a_lally
program plan. The system safety program plan the reliability people did not consider and so
actually comes into being in the Phase A in writing the statement ot work, w_ic_c it is
definition. I know that lately they started the statement of work again it is necessary
changing the various pham,s, but it comes into that they be clear in making sure this is a
.. the Phase A definition and it is actually pre- safety effort and not a part of a reliability
.- pared at that time for use during the Phase B effort. I might say that June 10th, Machine
: and for the engineering pha_.e which means _is going to have another article and it is
that the system safety program plan according going to be on reliability versus safety as
to 882 is not prepared for ase during the related to liability. In this we point out the
current work being done on a system. In ac- fact that indicating in warranties that an ex-
_" tuality most of the procuring activities re- press warranty, where you say a thing will
quire that a system program plan be prepared last a certain length of time, 50,000 miles or
_ and that is actually used during the current 5 years, is actually a warranty that relates to
i phase but it isn't what this says in reliability. The implied warranty that a product
MIL-STD-882. As I say the big advantage, to must be safe if it has no time limit actually
answer your question of 882 over 38-130 was on the thing is really the system safety aspect
the delineation of the safety tasks, of a liability suit. In addition to that I try to
MR. RUSSELL (GE): I have been spending point out, the article was cut down, was the
about the last two years working with a fact that if you have an accident and a liability
I chemical and petroleum and suit it doesn't matter what the test
industry applying arises,
some of these techniques and I would just like reliability or the operational reliability or the
to pass on for the benefit of this conference design reliability was, you can be sued for
that they continually remind me that a lot of negligence in design and a lot of other things
industries are not like NASA and aerospace unless you have taken suitable safety action.
in terms of dollar resources. Unless I can There is a great difference between the re-
show them a series of category definitions by liability and the system safety but frequently,
which they can decide who can work on these as I stated before, the expressions in the i
I problems and how dollars that the line of work do We thenhavemany statement not reflect.
manager, as Mr. Pepe so adequately pointed trouble with management in trying to Indicate I
out, can be allowed to address this problem that there is a difference.
!1'
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Opening Remarks for Session III
SYSTEM SAFETY EDUCATION
Vernon L. Grose, Session Chairman
Vice President
Tustin Institute of Technology
Santa Barbara, California
When I was a boy, our daily newspaper The first paper discusses system safety
regularly carried a cartoon with the caption, education as it emanated from a world-
"Heroes are bor__,n-- not made." Those of us in renowned base of aviation safety at the Uni-
the field of system safety today have arrived versity of Southern California. The Institute
there from an amazingly diverse set of back- of Aerospace Safety, which dates to 1952,
grounds. As so-called "charter members" of provided a unique foundation for system safety
this discipline, we could be considered the education.
"heroes" of system safety. Many of these The second paper depicts system safety
heroes are convinced that they know all there education spontaneously arising in the In-
is to know about the subject. In fact, some dustrial Engineering Department at Texas
may feel that they invented system safety. _ A&M University where simitar courses in
To those not quite so self-assured or those maintainability engineering and production de-
yet possessing some humility regarding their sign engineering had been also offered for
i
mastery of the subject, this session on Sys- several years.
tern Safety is dedicated. We believe that The third and final paper provides yet
education of a formal variety Is not only a another phylogenesis for system safety edu-
nice idea but a vital necessity if system safety cation-- the field of system management. The
is to become and remain a truly professional George Washington University School of En-
activity, gineering and Applied Science conceived their
So if you were not bor____n.na hero of system system safety course as a natural outgrowth
: safety, we propose that you can be made a of the systems approach to management.
r
I hero-- even at this late date-- through educa- We had intended to have a fourth university
L tion. represented on the program today-- the Uni-
i 'Every great idea is said to have its own versity of Washington. To that end, I had re-
"i time of arrival on the scene of history, quested that Professor Berl W. Owens, UW's
Breakthroughs in medicine, aeronautics, eco- System Safety Course Coordinator, prepare a
nomics and other fields are often achieved paper entitled, "System Safety Education Fo- !
simultaneously in widely-separated areas of cused on Quantitative Techniques. His course,
the world without collaboration. A current dating from 1965, is well-known for its
example of this precept is the marked simi- specialization on Fault Tree Analysis and has i
larity in appearance, size, and performance been attended by perhaps more personnel than j
between the Soviet Union's TU-144 and the any of the three courses being discussed in !
Anglo-French "Concorde" SST. this session today. In a letter dated 9 March
The speakers in this session will illustrate 1971, Professor Owens wrote to me:
the thesis that "system safety's time has now "... Thank you very much for the oppor-
arrived." To further reinforce this thesis, tunity to present a short paper and pre_ent
q
you will note that the subjects discussed in it before the Government-lndustry System
this session all have a different root or Safety Conference on 25-28 May 1971. It is
source for system safety education, and the indeed a top levelconference and I am sorry
educational Institutlor_ represented are sep- I mu_t decline. I am in poor health at the
arated by at least 1000 miles, t moment and cannot get away from home..."
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4I am grieved to report to this Conference tlon of system safety into many areas outside
, that approximately two weeks ago, Professor aerospace," consider the breadth of education
Owens passed away in Seattle. In his honor, I to be discussed today:
request that we stand for a moment of silence. 1. All three courses discussed are of
(The Conference thereby honored Professor different length or duration.
Owen's memory,) 2. Some of the courses are offered for
The contrast between origins for system college credit, others are not.
safety education Is most interesting. Because 3. The courses are offered on the East
this session is designed to reinforce the Coast, West Coast, and the Great South-
Conference theme-- "to broaden the applies- west.
7,
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INTRODUCTION The faculty and f.taff of the Institute of
Aerospace Safety and Management, University
General John D. Ryan, Chlef of Staff, United of Southern California, are dedicated to the
States Air Force, in his keynote address at proposition that basic safety education is of
the 1969 Air Force Industry System Safety fundamental importance to the success of
Conference, made a significant statement con- accident prevention programs. The Institute,
cerning System Safety. General Ryan stated, presently in its nineteenth year of operation,
"We have encouragement by our competence in consists of two divisions and a Research
the engineering disciplines, but...many of Center. The Safety Division, founded in 1952,
our deficiencies In safety can be traced to a offers a variety of safety education programs
prevalent flaw, not in the area of competence, designed as short courses which vary from
but in attitude." The problem identified by one to twelve weeks in length. More than
General Ryan lg of particular significance in 9,000 students have attended Safety Division
the field of System Safety. Many of our de- safety courses Including personnel from the
ficteneles in system design could be eliminated aerospace industry, commercial aviation, gen-
with proper attention and early attention to era1 aviation, the United States Armed Forces,
the "demands" of safety. However, the "de- and students from foreign countries. Notable
mands" of safety in many cases are not alumni include astronauts Alan Bean, James
adequately considered as a result of a nega- LoveU, Jr., and Walter Schlrra and the 1969
tire safety attitude held by non-safety per- Harmon Trophy winner Major Jerry Gentry.
sonnel in decision-making positions. This The Graduate Division, founded in 1963, offers
basic attitude toward safety results in the a graduate degree program, Master of Science
! feeling that safety in general and safety pro- in Systems Management. Operating from 26
I grams in particular will inhibit or restrict or graduate study centers located around theotherwise limit operations. The esultant at- world, more than 1,775 master's degrees
mosphere finds the system safety engineer have been conferred. The recently established
in a defensive posttio,_ attempting _o convince Research Center concentrates on research and
personnel who, in the first place, are probably development in flight safety, highway safety,
not technically qualified, and secondly, do not transportation systems, and human factors.
understand the system safety concept; in short,
ultimately making the '_ard sell" to a person SYSTEM SAFETY EDUCATION
who Is not buying. Objectivity dictates that
these management and non-safety personnel The Institute of Aerospace Safety and
are norma'.iy influenced by the pressure of Management has developed and conducted many
Schedule constraints, budget limitations, and different types of safety courses. In fact
" performance-oriented design groups. The during the last fiscal year, 45 separate courses
realization that these personnel are also in- representing different programs were pre-
fluenced by a sometimes unconscious bias or sented. These courses include Aerospace En-
negative attitude in reference to the general gineerlng, Missile Propulsion Systems, Air-
subject of safety, let alone the lesser under- craft Accident Investigation and Prevention,
stood discipline of System Safety, should serve Communicative Skills in Safety Education,
as a cause for great concern among safety Aviation Psychology, Aerospace Physiology,
educators. For as we ponder this situation Aerospace Safety Management, etc. Although
and begin to evaluate proposed solutions to the the major emphasis in all of the courses is
problem, which incidentally is no unlqueprob- safety, four of the courses deserve special
lem and does not have a unique solution, the attention in this paper due to their relevance
answer continues to come upSYSTEMSAFETY to the subjects of Flight Safety and System
EDUCATION. We must educate until manage- Safety. These courses are:
ment andnon=safetypersonnel recognize where I. Flying SafeLy Officer Course
and how utilization of the oystem safety process II. Advanced Safety Program Management
can best serve their needs. Course
I02
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fIII. Fundamentals of System Safety 20 courses involving more than 500 students
_ IV. Quantitative Methods of Safety Analysis have been completed. The ASPM course is
designed to develop in the student an under-
_ -- -- m .
standing of the principles of management and
I. The Flying Safety Officer (FSO) Course is the relationship of these principles to the
presented to rated pilots of the United States management of effective safety programs, thebasic principles of safety required for theAir t .rce and Air National Guard who are as-
signed to Flight Safety or Safety Staff Officer development of a philosophy of safety, the
duties.The initialFSO coursebegan 16March collection,preparationand analysisof source
accident data,the basic principlesof motor1953 and sincethattime 90 courses involving
some 2,300studentshave been completed.The vehiclesafety,and an understandingof corn-
' FSO course is designed to develop in the student munications and industrial relations in safety
an understanding of the principles of accident management. The instructional material on
prevention and how to incorporate these prin- the collection and analysis of accident datahas recently been expanded to include not only
ciples in an accident prevention program, an the traditional methods of post-accident data
understanding of current flight safety educa- analysis but also what has been termed pre-
tional methods in the Air Force, the ability accident investigation. The instructional sec-
to recognize hazards involving human per-
tion begins with the graphical presentation of
, formance, equipment performance, physical accident data, the derivation of accident rates,
• environment, and the interrelationshipofthese basic probability theory, statistical safety
hazards,knowledgeand skillinthesupervision
measures, confidenceand risk,and the utili-
of aircraft accident investigatioa, an under- zation of accident data in safety decision-
standing of accepted principleF, of learning
i and the ability to apply them to instructional
making. System safety education has thus been
introducedas a fundamentalapproach toaccl-
situations, etc. No specific reference to th_
subject of System Safety l_as been made; in dent prevention which is more effective, en-
sures greater leverage in design analysis and
fact,only recentlyhave system safetyen- declsion-making,and also affordsthe most
gineeringtechniquesand a generaldiscussion
of the System Safetyconcept been formally economical approach :opreventingaccidents.
introduced into the FSO course curriculum. Graduates of the ASPM course, who receive
seven unitsofgraduatecredit,usuallyhave a
Rather the FSO course has been singledout basic understand4ngof and practicalexperl-
l_erebecause of itsfuncamentalimportance
ence in flightsafety.Inclusionof system
and great traditionin safetyeducationatthe
safetyedvcatio_int.__curriculumhas_llowed
University of Southern Cailfornia. System these students' basic understanding and
,, safety education at USC has its very roots in
flight safety. Flying safety is concerned with philosophy of safety to evolve and expandtoward more of a total safety concept, in-
the recognition, prevention, and elim- eluding system safety and operational safety
i , inatton of all ha za rds to flight and the as an integrated approach to accident preven-
flying safety officer's Job is primarily educa- tion.
I tional. He that hazards knownmust assure are
i and understood with an awareness of required
corrective actions.Comparable course are Ill.,The course, Fundamentals of System
also presented to U.S. Air Force Missile Safety,presentsa curriculumofsystemsafety
Safety Officers and U.S. Army Aviation Safety _ducation in its truest sense. The initial Sys-
Officers. terr;Safety course began in October. 1963,
and since that time 18 courses involving over
II. The Advanced Safety Program Manage- 400 students have been completed. Prerequl-
ment (ASPM) Course provides specialized site for this course is a bachelor's degree,
safety education for officers of the U.S. Air preferably in an engineering ortechnlcalfleld,
Force and civilians, GSmll or higher, inorder or three years of safety, system engineering,
to assist in their further qualification as or maintenance experience. Three units of
Safety Staff Officers. 1_e initial ASPM Course graduate level credit are given for satisfactory
began in November, 1964. and since that time completion of the three week course.
i0S
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%System Safety as a fun0amental approach During the development and presentation
to accident prevention has been and Is con- of the Instructional material of the course,
tinulng to be a rapidly expanding field which the U.S.C. faculty have reviewed current in-
requires the best managerial and technical dustry and government system safety tech-
talents available. System safety educational nology, adapted basic principles and specific
programs have consequently been required to methodology to Individual aerospace applies-
remain flexible in meeting the challenges of ttons, and genuinely pursued a course which
this expanding new discipline of System Safety. is more than another theoretical discourse.
At the University of Southern California minor Selected guest lecturers from industry enrich
System Safety Course modifications have been course content with "real world" experience.
made with almost every class. In fact, sever,_l An extremely effective class group project,
major curriculum changes have been required recently Instituted, has proven successful In
during the past five years. It Is believed that preparing the, students for n==essary System
the experience gained through such a course Safety program plan:,tng, organizing, job de-
evolution will prove critically important to scriptlons, and costing. Aunlqueandbeneflclal
the future success of system safety education aspect of the class group project is the coordl-
at U.S.C. nation required of military and civilian students
The primary mission of the present System as team members. Working together on a team
Safety Course is to develop within the student a common goal promotes a better understand-
a basic understanding of the total system lng of the p, oblems that eaci_ must face re-
safety concept. The course is designed to spectlvely.
address both the management and the engl- A similar course is presented to Depart-
neertng aspects of System Safety. The pres- ment of the Navy safety personnel In the
• entation of management and engineering ma- Washington, D.C. area, except that separate
tertal In a proper balance is both delicate and system safety management and system safety
critical. Further, while the term System engineering courses are presented, each two
Safety properly defines a program to cover weeks in length.
the entire life cycle of a system, the primary
Interest should be directed to the concept,
definition, and development or so-called "de- IV. The course, Quantitative Methods of
sign" phase of the system's life. System Safety Analysis, is a recent addition to the
Safety will thus complement the established graduate courses presented by the Institute
traditional safety efforts during the opera- Safety Division. The lx_slc premise of this
tlonal phases of a system. A system safety course Is that system safety analysis should
educational program should, therefore, be be a process which is fully capable of as-
', directed primarily to the earlier design phases sumlng a leading role in design analysis. The
basic purpose of system safety analysis shouldof system llfe, devoting enough attention to
the later operational phases to allow the be, therefore to identify hazards in thesystem
student to understand the total scope of the as it Is proposed to be designed and operated, '
evaluate the risk associated with the identified
system safety effort. The system safety en-
gineering methods which may be applied during hazards, and eventually to prevent or control
the design phase to evaluate the relative the hazards which are considered to be un-
safety of proposed system designs are not acceptable. This course provides technical
only more technical and penetrating, but more knowledge in the system safety analytical
quantitative also. The system safety en- technology and associated quantitative risk
assessment methods. Most importantly, effec-glneerlng portion of the course should pre-
pare the student to both perform and evaluate tlve utilization of the output of the safety
, the vital safety analytical function; namely, analytical program is emphasized In the in-
structional material. The student/s Introducedthe identification and control of system
hazards. The system safety management por- to the philosophy of r/sk acceptance, the
tlon of the course should familiarize the derivation and allocation of risk require-
student with the plannlng, organlztng, dlrecting, merits, and the quantitative risk evaluation
and controlling aspects of management, methods.
104
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SYSTEM SAFETY IN OPtRATIONS consistently applied to actual accident situa-
tions. However, for the purposes of accident
The conventional application of the system investigation, certain modifications to the
safety engineering process to the earlier basic logic diagramming system are required.
design phases of the system life cycle has Since the undesired event in question has
sometimes led to a lack of awareness of the already occurred, ,:hen the matter of event
technical safety aspects during operations, probabilities and quantitative risk evaluation
Utilization of the modern system safety ana- is not necessary. Accident Logic Diagramming
lyrical technology is being restricted almos: is strictly a qualitative assessment. As a
entirely to the design phases as previously result all possible causative conditions can
noted. Furthermore, system safety educa- be logically diagrammed, regardless of the
tional programs normally do not include Sys- availability of numerical failure data. The
tem Safety as a formal, disciplined approach man, the machine, and the environment can be
in the operational phase. Recent developments logically combined as an interacting system.
have been made at U.S.C. which should ira- Several obvious advantages are realized
prove safety decision-making during the op- with Accident Logic Diagramming. First. the
erational phase. These developments repre- 19gical thought processes are presented in a
sent new and improved analytical methods for visible, logical, easily understood diagram
use during operations which were derived for others to see and comment upon. This
from the system safety technology. Accident facto: alone increases the likelihood that ideas
; Logic Diagramming is a good example of the will be shared and investigative methods will
: adaptation of a system safety analytical method be questioned. Second, a documented, graphical
to assist the accident investigator in identi- checklist of areas to investigate logically de-
fying accident cause factors. The field of velops with the diagram, minimizing the possi-
i accident investigation has developed into a bility important over-
that evidence will be
highly specialized body of technical knowledge, looked early in the accident investigation.
I There are files which are literally full of Finally, the Accident Logic Diagram becomesaccidentcause data, hoping that through knowl- a flow chart and a realistic indicator of in-
| edge of the cause of accidentswe can take vestigativeprogress.Notes on evidence can
actionto preventfutureaccidents.Itispossi- be made next to the diagram eventstowhich
i ble that rather than logically identifying real they apply, indicating whether the events did
causes of accidents, the accident investigator or did not occur. It is recommended that the
is doing nothing more than confirming his Accident Logic Diagram be prepared as early
preconceived conclusions. In order to mini- as possible in the investigation cycle, and that
: maze this possibility, the investigator should it be continually expanded. Eventually as the
utl'izea logical,_ystematic,and thorough actual accident cause factor(s)is isolated
approach which is more analyticalin nature and identified,necessary correctiveaction_
, inorder toisolateandidentifyaccidentcauses, can be taken,thusreducingor eliminatingthe
A method of system safety analysis which has possibility of future accidents due to similar
been developed over the past ten years termed cause factors.
Logic Diagram Analysis or Fault Tree Analy-
sis, is ideally suited to this ta_k. The logical CONCLUSION
processes of fault tree development are in
fact identical to the logical pro_+esses of acci- General John D. Ryan stated, "The appli-dent investigation. The Invet, tlgator and the cation of measures to achieve higher levels of
analyst deduce from available evidence, be- System Safety is recognized today as a vital
ginning with the fact of the accident or i.re- concern for the entire engineering community
accident Itself until the probable cause can be as well as for our manalzers and operators.
identified and substsntlsted. Utilization of this This goal is clearly eseent/al, because it rep-
analytical tool by the investigator to organize resents the principal means of preserving the
his thinking L_ termed Accident Logic Dis- combat capability of the Air Force. We,
grsmmlng. Standard event and logic gate therefore, must consciously :ocus our effort,
symbology have been developed and may be on reaching that goal..." System Safety is a
10_
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vital concern in the achievement of accident grees of automation fox use by and around a
prevention. The application of the System public which is aroused and more lnt_'!_.ge_,
Safety concept in design and in operations System Safety becomeslncreaginglytmportant.
should be a principal means of avoiding all As a result, System Safety education is also
conceivable situations which can place our becoming Increasingly important. At the Uni-
n_ztion, its resources, or its population in versity of Southern California, as safety edu-
jeopardy. As our na.*lon continues to design cators ":;e are confident and optimistic that
and manufacture equipment which te more the challenges of System Safety education will
expensive, more complex, with greater de- be met.
l
!
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No field of engineering enjoys closer rela- knowledge of system safety and its related
tionship to public and political concern today principles = personnel who can both influence
than safety engineering; and probably no other design and revitalize the safety workforce)
engineering field is so ill prepared to exploit moving it into its proper realm of responsi-
this relationship. Why' Because the demands bility. To accomplish this would require hir-
on the safety engineer today require thorough ing younger engineers with good safety engi-
understanding of systems analysis and sys- neering background or training. Unfortunately,
terns engineering principles, human factors) this kind of engineer is difficult to find and
and the safety implications of hardware de= even more difficult to hire. The best alterna-
sign. Unfortunately, most safety engineers tire was for AMC to train their own personnel
developed from other specialities and are and a training program was established to ac-
primarily experienced in industrial safety, complish the following objectives.
The rapidly expanding technology of today's I. Recruit into the AMC workforce young,
world requires solution of potential safety qualified engineers with demonstrated capa- r
hazards by recognizing the hazards and ap- btllty.
propriately influencing the design of hardware 2. Educate these engineers in the field of
to eliminate or reduce them. safety engineering. Also, educate them in the
Nowhere has the short supply of safety specifics of Army peculiar safety hazards in-
engineers, wtth the necessary background, cumbent with the development and handling of
been more sharply felt than in the Army explosives, nuclear weapons, and the chemical/
Materiel Command. The primary mission of biological agents.
this command is the research and develop- Since a good background tn hardware design
ment, procurement, and supply of Army mllt- Is essential to the functions of system safety,
tary hardware. The bull: of the system safety engineers with specialization in Mechanical,
responsibility for this hardware rests with Electrical, Civil, Aeronautical, or Chemical
the Army Materiel Command Salety Office engineering are desired. To obtain the very
and similar offices at the subcommands (called best engineering graduates AMC in conjunction
commodity commands because of their corn- with Texas A&M University, established a
modlty orientation}. This safety organization graduate level training program giving the
has, until recently, been primarily concerned student the opportunity to obtain a Master of
with industrial safety at production activities Engineering Degree. To provide the necessary
within the Army Materiel Command (AMC). theoretical background, as well as the prac-
There is increasing recognition by both the ileal background, in hazardous materials re-
general public and development personnel that quires two years of classroom study. The
most accidents resulting in property damage, engineers upon graduation are placed in safety
injury, and loss of life are casued by and/or positions at all AMC activities. Since they are
compounded by hardware not designed for the trained by the AMC Intern Training Center,
human environment. The natural outcome of the graduates have broad knowledge of AMC ,
the recognition has been to place greater re- safety functions with no built In loyalties to
sponslbllity for hardware design on the AMC specific commodity areas. They provide AMC
safety organization, with a highly capable, flexible, and mobile
Having been staffed primarily by non- safety engineering expertise. A description
engineering safety personnel during World of the curricula for the Safety Engineering
War II, AMC faced a critical shortage of the Program follows.
necessary skills. A large portion of its exist-
Ing safety staff will be retiring in the next CURRICULA
five years. AMC and especially Mr. Landon !
FeazeU, the present Chief of the AMC Safety This Jointly sponsored Safety Engineering
Office, recognized the Impending safety per- Program consists of twenty-four months of i
sonnel shortage and made provisions to tm- graduate level study divided into three see-
prove the outlook, ttons: (1) the first six months of the program
Basically, the AMC requires the input of are taught by the USAI_iC Intern TraintngCen- ,.
20 t,) 30 engineers per year with thorough ter at the Red River Army Depo h Texarkana, _ '
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Texas; (2) the next 12 months are taught by This set of courses is designed to provide
Texas A&M University - with the first eight the graduates with a working knowledge of
months taught at the Red River Army Depot Human Factors Engineering, Maintainability
Extension, while the last four months are Engineering, Reliability, Industrial Hygiene,
taught on the main campus at College Station, and the System Acquisition Process. All of
Texas; and (3)the final six months are taught these as you well know are very closely re-
by the US Army Field Safety Agency at lated and are important inputs when the total
Charlestown, Indiana. safety of the system is under consideration.
During the first two phases (first 18 months)
aU of the courses are graduate level and are INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING COURSES (30
presented in a university environment. A Credit Hours)
breakdown of the program of instruction by
major topic area is shown below: *Introduction to Operations Research
- *Mathematical Statistics
SYSTEM SAFI_TY RELATED COURSES *Applied Mathematlcs
(21 Credit Hours) *Engineering Management
• Statistical Quality Control
• Introduction to Safety Engineering Analysis and Prediction
System Safety Engineering Principles of Operations Analysis
System Safety Engineering in the Design Advanced Quality Control
of Equipment
Safety Engineering in Facilities Design *Non Graduate Credit
Safety Engineering in Transportation
Systems
System Safety Seminar These courses serve three purposes. First
of all they serve as pre-requtstte type courses
Safety Engineering Research
: in order to bring all the different type engi-
i *Non Graduate Credit neerlng graduates tc a common plane for the
more advanced cour_:es which follow. Secondly,
These courses are designed to provide the the courses strengthen the student's mathe-
students with material matical abilities which inspecific background are important apply-
which will allow him to serve as a system lng system safety and reliability analysis.
safety specialist on a design team. Discussion Finally, since a Master's Degree is offered
concentrates on the application, selection, and through the Industrial Engineering Department,
utilization of various system safety analytical certain "core" course are required by the
, _ approaches. Emphasis is also placed on the Graduate College of Texas A&M University in
management of a sys/_em safety program, its order to award this degree.
i relationship with other disciplines, and new The last phase of the program is conductedd vel pments and application of s_ stem safety at the US Army Field Safety Agency and is
! ' techniques, designed to provide practical '_ands on" type
i of training. The formal training includes both
SYSTEN! SAFETY Ib TERFACE COURSES Army and AMC procedures, safety regulations,
(22 CreditHours) and relatedexerclnesin practicalapphcationa
_ of safety principles. A portion of the program! *Statistical Methods in Reliability and
/ Maintainability is devoted to "on-the-job" type training.
The major topics that are covered in thisi *Weapon System Acquisition
phase are:
• Engineering Application of Computers
Theory of Human Factors Engineering FIELD SAFETY AGENCY TOPICS
Engineering of the Man-Machine Sys-
tems On-Jo]D Orientation
Evaluation and Control of the Occupa- Munitions Safety
ttonal Environment Aviation Safety
• Non Graduate Credit Industrial Safety ,
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System Safety , ._ST CLASS
Radiological Safety
Safety Management The first class of safety engineers began
their study in June 1969. Their average under-
As you can readily see from the curricula graduate grade-point was 3.1 on a 4.0 system
eve, these engineers are being trained for and they represented 15 different universities
_uch more than just "system safety engl° from across the United States. All 20 students
mering" as we have come to think of it during received Master's Degree from Texas A&M
"ecent years. By taking the total engineering University in August 1970 and have just thi_.
Lpproach to system safety education, these month completed the 24-month program and
•-raduates will have more capability in a much have been given permanent duty assignments
0reader area of responsibility. A majority of at various AMC installations.
:he AMC installations at which these graduates The second class has just completed the
will be assigned have no formal "system first 12 months of the program and the third
safety" organization. At many of these corn- class has been recruited and will report June 1
mands it will he a part of their duties to help to begin training.
initiate system safety activities. At still others
:he individuals may have to input system safety CONCLUSION
through such organizations as Research $ Since one of the objectives of this confer-Development, Quality Assurance. etc. After
enee is "applications" and "transfer of in-
gaining invaluable experience on the job we formation" it should be pointed out that whilefeel these graduates will be capable of inte-
the program described in this paper is a
grating into any system development team, specific program for AMC, a similar program "
and will be able to improve design through is available on an individual basis at Texas
appli, _tion of system safety engineering prin- A&M. Here the individual would choose his
ciples, own degree program and would usually re-
quire 12 months to attain a Master's Degree
ENTRANCE REQUIREMENTS in Industrial Engineering, assuming he has a
Bachelor's Degree in any field of engineering.
The requirements for the engineering grad- Individual students are encouraged to adapt
uate input to this program are the same as the the techniques and philosophy of "system
requirements for the other two intern pro- safety" to "product safety" as it is commonly
grams (Production Design Engineering and referred to by private and consumer industry.
Maintainability Engineering) which theUSAMC Indeed, it has been said that one of the more
Intern Training Center administers. Graduate important spin-oils from the aerospace tech-
engineers are recruited from universities nology may be the system safety concept and
across the nation, representing different en- its application to product safety.
gineering disciplines, from the upper one- The USAMC-Texas A&M program in Safety '
third of their graduating class. With this Engineering is an effective method for edu-
academic ranking the students enter Federal eating and training engineers in the unique and
Service as GS-7 Quality Students. After saris- demanding technology of system safety engi°
factorlly completing the first 12 months of neering. AL these graduates progress through
the program they are promoted to GS-9 AMC assuming positions of responsibility,
grades, and after successful completion of the they will make their presence felt and will
24-month program they are promoted to the have a tremendous impact on not only AMC,
grade of GS-II. At the end of the 24-month but the US Army as well, the principal cus- I
program each graduate assumes a three year tomer of AMC commodities. Improved safety
continued service agreement with monetary performancep monetary reward from reduced
repayment ff they leave the Federal Govern- costs, and upgrading the overall capabilities
ment prior to the expiration of the three of the AMC safety worlfforce are the expected
years, results from this program. _
II0
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The first class of the "System Safety" following fields: urban planning, environmental
course at The George Washington University control, mass transit, automotive safety, hos-
was held in March 1969. This two-week, non- pital administration, accident investigation,
credit course was offered twice in 1969, three insurance underwriting and campus safety.
times in 1970, and it is scheduled at least four Three Titles - The GWU course is not as
times in 1971. So the course is in an expand- directly related to the military services as
ing mode. other system safety courses offered through-
The course was initiated with the support out the country. Both the University of South-
and guidance of the Electronics Industries ern California course and the one presented
Association G-48 "System Safety Committee," by the University of Washington are sponsored
chaired by George Mumma of the Martin by the United States Air Force. The course
Marietta Corporation. Mr. Mumma also serves taught at Texas A&M University is under the
as a guest lecturer in the course. Numerous direction of the United States Army Material
- notable3 in the field of system safety con- Command. Nonetheless, students from all the
tribute as guest lecturers in the course in- military services have been and continue to
eluding the Chairman of this Conference, be enrolled in the GWU course.
. Phil Bolger, and Jerry Lederer, NASA Direc- Carrying out the theme of this Conference--
tot of Safety. In addition to Messrs. Bolger "to expand the application of system safety
and Lederer, the following men listed in the principles into the general and consumer in-
program for this Conference have served as dustries"--GWU advertises its course under
lecturers in this course: C. O. (Chuck)Miller, three titles. The purpose of multiple titles is
Dr. Carl C. Clark, Haggai (Guy) Cohen, and not to confuse anyone but rather, to hopefully
; Dr. Raymond M. Wtlmotte. match impedances with other industries beside
aerospace.
COURSE RATIONALE Obviously, the course is advertised as a
"System Safety" course because this term is
Course Scope commonly understood in the aerospace in-
dustry, the military establishment, and in
At GWU, system safety covers the total NASA.
spectrum of risk management. While starting Attempting to communicate with a corn-
with the dynamic system element (vehicle, pletely foreign segment of the economy, GWU
machine, or process), the course examines offers the course as one in '_azard Control."
the influence on system safety of attitudes and Those who would understand this term much
motivations of design, production, test and easier than they would the term, "system
• operations personnel, employee/management safety," include insurance underwriters, hos-
i rapport, the relation of industrial and labor pital administrators, or perhaps those asso-
associations among themselves and with the elated with the mining industry.
0 Government, human factors in supervision, Still another portion of industry is intro-
1 the interfaces of industrial and public safety duced to the course under the title, "Risk
i with and the interest and This could include urbandesign operations, Management," groupi
t attitudes of top management, the effects of the planners, campus safety managers, and even
legal system on accident investigations and professional football team owners!
I exchange of information, the certification of ASSE Sponsorship - The breadth of scope,
: critical operating personnel, political con- titles and application described above was a
I siderations, public sentiment and many other prime factor in the decision of the Americannon-technical ut vital influences on the at- Society of Safety Engineers, repres nting ap-
i tainment of an acceptable level of risk control, proximately 10,000 safety professiunals, in
Not only does the course cover a wide January 1971 to co-sponsor the GWU course.
range of subject matter. It is designed to intro- This action by ASSE was unique as it marked
duce the principles, requirements,techniques, the first and only official endorsement of any
and limitations of system safety to those university educational activity by that organi-
I charged with hazard or risk control in the zation.
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Student Contribution Furthermore, we will never understand that
which we must do well. Dr. Raymond M.
The GWU course is purposely deslg, ed to Wilmotte reaffirms this statement in different
utilize and integrate the diversity of experi- language:l 'The uncertainties that remain (in
ence represented by the students attending the any complex decision) are never zero."
course. This position is in contrast to courses The reason for this pessimistic outlook is
where the instructors supposedly have all quite simple. The complexity of most situations
knowledge on the subject "wrapped up in a box faced by decision-makers today is far beyond
with a blue ribbon around it." Rather than any single individual's capability to compre-
"pipe knowledge in a straw to naive students," hend them f'J depth. Yet we are precluded the
the instructors view classroom discussion as luxury of simply wringing our hands in
a learning experience every bit as valid as despair--we must still press forward and
formal lecturing make decisions.
The diversity of backgrounds possessed b_
graduates of previous classes makes this poi_ t "Systems" Characteristics
obvious. Students from at least seven cat
gories have completed the course: The systems approach, regardless of its
applicati_n has at least eight characteristics
Commercial Industries - American Mutual as .;l., .l, Figure 2. Since system safety
Liability Insurance Company, EbascoServ- can be described as "the systems approach
ices, Incorporated (major contractor), applied to safety," theooe eight traits apply
De Leuw, Cather & Company (engineering directly to system safety. Further, these
contractor for the Washington Mass Tran- character_stics differentiate system safety
stt), and Western Electric. from other safety activities.
A description of each characteristic isAerospace Industries - General Dynamics,
Llng-Temco-Vought, Martin Marietta, repeated from an earlier publication: 2
McDonnell Douglas, and Vitro Labora- Methodical - The systems approach in-
volves a definite method. This method consists
tories, of an orderly procedure or way of solving
Federal Government - Federal Highway Ad. complex problems. All the steps involved in
ministration, Atomic Energy Commission, problem-solving are arranged in a consistent
Bureau of Mines, Federal Aviation Agency, and orderly manner.
National Transportation Safety Board, Na- Objective - The systems approach is also
tional Bureau of Standards, and National objective; i.e., the steps in the problem-
Aeronautics and Space Administration. solving method are free from personal bias
,_ to the greatest extent possible. Personalopin-
i Foreign Governments - Department of Social ton must be identified as such. By maintainingi Action (Mexico) and British A rcraft Cor-
_' potation, this discipline, the results of each step in the . "problem-solving process can be verified or
City/County Governments - Chicago Transit confirmed by someone other than the person
Authority, New York City Transit System, who performed the step.
and Montgomery County (Maryland). Quantitative or Measurable - Almost with-
out exception, each element in the problem-Military Services - Numerous branches within
solving process results in a quantitative ex-
the Army, Navy and Air Force pression. At the very least, there must be
Universities- Johns Hopkins University and some measurement possible to weigh the
The George Washington University. validity of the conclusion reached. Because i
any end product produced by the systems ap- it
APPROACH TO SYSTEM SAFETY proach is obviously a compromise, it is nec-
essary to weigh the relative merits of each
The GWU course starts off by defining the element in the system by some means other
i problem. As Figure 1 states, "We are trying than per,,_onal opinion. This need to compare
'i to do well that which we do not understand." alternatives dictates that measurability be tt 114
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one of the characteristics of the systems Into desired outputs." Therefore, a system
approach, has no meaning unless both inputs and outputs
Analytical - The systems approach era- have clear and universal understanding.
ploys a rational dtwqton of the whole system Self-Containment/Closed Loop - Since a
into its constituent parts to find out the natare, system has been defined as a "complete en-
proportion, function, and tnterrelatlonsl'.lp of tity," this means that a system has Individual
these parts as they contribute to system oh- existence and that It lacks none of its requi-
jecttves. This analytical function frequently site parts. It is complete in Itself. Acorollary
leads to solving system problems by means is that the system must be free from any iso-
of mathematical models or equations. There- lated or "orphan" elements which do not con-
by, the elemental variables can be related and tribute to system objectives. Outputs of every
traded off with respect to each other, element or subsystem must ultimately become
Subsystem Interdependence-Another char- part of the s_ _tem output rather than inde-
acteristic of the systems approach is a con- pendent of it. In a sense, this is a restatement
stant recognition that any given element or of the fact that everything within the system
subsystem is dependent on all the other ele- is interdependent.
merits in the system. Should the function, di-
_, menston, or description of a subsystem be The Role of the Human
' revised, such a revision will affect every
other element to varying degrees. This inter- One difficult that must be acknowledged in
dependence must not only be acknowledged the field of safety is the high pe -enrage of
but must be accounted for In the systems social behavior involved In hazard analysis
k approach, and prevention. Therefore, the emphasis on
i Parallel Analysis of Elements- Somewhat human behavior is quite pronounced in the
related to the interdependence of all elements GWU System Safety course. Whether it be -
, and subsystems in the systems approach is called human factors, human engineering, or
the concept of treating all elements in parallel just plain human awareness, the role of the
rather than in series. In contradistinction to human is accented heavily.
the Western civilization concept of time as Figure 3 illustrates the interface that
being a chronological series of events, each exists between physical and social sciences.
one of which must be complete before the next Skirting the traditional battle over whether :o
can take place, the systems approach demands social sciences are "scientlfic,"predictabllity
that the end event be considered at the same (which is a cornerstone of scientific endeavor)
time as the initiating event in order to prop- Is an elusive characteristic, at best, in the
,, erly balance the allocation of resources to- social sciences. To illustrate this difference
ward solution of the problem. This Is corn- between physical and social sciences, the
monly known as "womb-to-tomb" thinking, specific gravity of sulfuric acid (H2SO 4) has
Inputs and Outputs in Clear Language - been, ts, and will continue to be 1.834, where-
Another Important characteristic of the sys- as you and I had not been, are not, and never :
terns approach Is the requirement that both again will be the same persons we were when
, inputs and outputs, at all levels in the system, we awoke this mornlng_
be described In unamblquous language. The There wilt always be a mixture of physical
key to this requirement Is that it removes and social forces in any system. However, the '
subjective Judgment both as to what is ex- mixture ratio will influence the applicability
peered in the way of outputs and what is avail.- of the systems approach. The higher the per-
able in terms of inputs to the system. One of centage of systems effort which Involves the
the reasons for Insisting on the quantitative physical sciences, the greater the applica-
indices discussed earlier is that numbers do blllty.
reduce ambiguity. The spectrum of system problems in Figure
In simplest terms, a "system" can be de- 3 runs from greatest applicability on the left
fined as "any complete entity consisting of end to least on the right. System safety, as an
hardware, software, personnel, data, services activity, would probably fall about where "auto
and facilities which transforms known inputs safety" is shown. We can do much to make
115
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cars safer--crash helmets, harnesses, in.. an "englneer,""analyst,"or"lnvestigator,"
flatable bags for crashworthtness. But in the he cannot hope to accomplish his mission
i end, can the automobile be made totally safe because these "doing" roles are only par-
if the human is ignored7 Obviously not. We rials of a whole picture.
can never make people wear seatbelts, hel- 2. A corollary to the first reason is
mets or chest protectors. Further, we cannot that since system safety personnel"assure
stop them from driving after they have been that a system 2s safe" rather than per-
drinking' My good friend and colleague, Chuck sonally "make the system safe," they must
Miller, has said that we probably should start have a 1:1 communication link with man-
to design cars to be driven by drunk drivers agement. How can they hope to communi-
because there is no way to stop people from cate with top management if they take less
driving while drunk, than a system management viewpoint? How
This pragmatic outlook of accepting the will they know the system management
world as it is, rather than idealistically teach- viewpoint if they have not studied it?
lng "what ought to be" distinguishes the GWU 3. One of the major advances of MIL-
course from some others. STD-882 over earlier system safety speci-
fications was in pioneering the concept thatSystem Management Foundation,
system safety was far larger in scope than
System safoty may be the foremost among just "engineering." To state this idea
those activities where moral arguments must another way, you could be the best safety
be translated or converted into specific tasks, engineer, analyst or investigator in all the
Furthermore, this "conversion into tasks" world and still be no more effective in
must ultimately result in specific safety tasks achieving system safety than if you were
which are described in the language of man.. in Tibet, if you fail to comprehend system
agement--yes, that dirty but real world of management.
cost, performance and schedule' 4. A primary precept of system safety
In a letter dated 14 January 1971, General is that no area or activity in the system
George S. Brown, Commander of the Air development process is free from creating
Force Systems Command, said in part: hazards. Therefore, since system safety
"Reports of the USAF Inspector General personnel must be sensitive to al._.llsources
continue to reflect that systems safety of hazards (and management is a hazard
within AFSC is unsatisfactory. There are source as shown in the Venn diagram of
several underlying problems in this area, Figure 4), it is imperative to stag the
; including the need to train systems safety study of system safety on the base of sys-
engineers. To overcome these problems tern management, the most pervasive ac-
we must have added management emphasis ttvity in system development.
on systems safety at all levels." (Italics It is no accident that management is Usted
added) prior to science and engineering in this defJ.rd-
The System Safety course at the George tlon used in the GWU course:
Washington University is based ftrmly on a "System safety is the optimum degree
SYSTEM MANAGEMENT foundation for a hum- of hazard elimination and/or control within
ber of compelling reasons: the constraints or opezat/onal effect/ve-
t. Management and professional sys- ness, time and cost, attained through the
tern safety personnel both have one basic specific application of management, sclen-
modus operandi-- "accomplishing through ttflc and engineering principles throughout
others." While they both may occasionally all phases of a system life cycle."
get in, roll up their sleeves, and "do" The interrelationship of man, machine,
something, this is a rare exception. Learn- media, and management in Figure 4 contains
Ins how to step back from the daily rush of 15 different categories; e.g., man/m_lla,
detail activity to view the "big picture" of machine/managen" ont, media/man/ma'ddne/
the systems approach is vital to effective management, etc. Each one of those categorles
system safety work. Further, if thesystem is a source for system hazards which must be
safety professional accepts a role as simply either eliminated or controlled.
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Using rapid rail transit as an example in management decision: (1) the system under
Figure 5, management is prominent as a fac- consideration is safe enough, or (2)the system
tor in contributing to hazards. As a warning, under consideration still has the following
it should be obvious that Figure 5 ignores the identified hazards which are neither eltmi-
interaction between the factors listed; e.g., nated nor controlled satisfactorily to meet the
possible interaction between passenger ve- system objectives.
hlcle seat versus stand ratio and accident As stated earlier, safety is basically a
investigation procedures, moral ar_; i.e., "No one should get killed
Likewise, most of the Individual events or injured and there should be no property
shown in the Fault Tree Illustration in Figure Ions as _ result of operating this system."
6 have resulted from management decisions; Unfortunately, there are literally millions of
e.g., policies, procedures, design selections moral arguments of equal conviction. Manage-
or accepted risks. Note also the high per- ment has no way to handle moral arguments.
centage of events in the Tree that are social They do not ,_ttnicely Into equations, calcula-
rather than physical in content, tlons, or profit/loss ledgers. They must be
Figures 4, 5, and 6 are not meant to be converted into a new language.
exhaustive and complete but to simply trigger How can s_fety then be translated into
further thought and expand the analyst's think- management language7 What is the language of
ing regarding hazard sources. In fact, the management? Management language Is three-
GWU course is often deqcrtbed as a "mind dimensional-- cost, performance and schedule.
expander." An attempt is made to open up new To bridge the gap then between a moral argu-
_ ways of thinking about hazards, followed by ment and the world of cost, pe:formance and
t devising methods to either eliminate or con- schedule, there must be a methodology.
trol the identified hazards. In a nutshell, the methodology required has
five basic steps:
._ Integrative Aspect 1. All possible hazards must be/den__._:
A prime thesis of the GWU course is that tifi_.._.2. These Identifies hazards must be
system safety is not another "specialty" but
an integrative activity among the already- ranked first for their severity,
" 3. These identified hazards must be
too-many specialties. Figure 7 depicts system
safety as the, "mortar between the bricks" ranked secondly for their likelihood of
that makes possible a strong wall (system). occurrence.4. These identified hazards must beIn other words, the philosophy of the course
is that system safety personnel should not be ranked thirdly for the cost, in resources,
' of either eliminating or controlling them
"out-designing the designer." Rather, they
should be concentrating their attention on the in the system.
many interfaces created between functions 5. The rank/ngs of steps 2, 3, and 4
must be comb/ned into a single ranking
whenever a large _nd complex system is
divided up into smaller units, of mana[[ement consequence; i.e., wherethe most severe which will occur most
As Figure 7 shows, "design" is separated frequently and can be eliminated for thefrom "testing," and when this division occurs
least resource expenditure are on top.
(necessary as it may be), there are inevitable Each of the five basic steps required to
problems often overlooked by both designers translate the moral argument for safety into
and test engineers. This interface is tTpical language that any manager can ,mderstand is
of those areas where system safety personnel
will realize the greatest payoff in terms of discussed briefly.
hazard potential. Step I - Identi_ Hazards
FOCUSING FOR MANAGEMENTDECISION
This is the function of the various analyti-
The system safety professional has only cal techniques such as Hazard Mode and Effect
one ultimate "reason for being"-- to provide Analysis (HMEA), Gross Hazard Analysis, and
top management with one of two inputs for Fault Tree Analysl_. Equally essential with
I17
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these techniques are analysts with inquisitive, management consequence is achieved by com-
imaginative, and indefatigable minds. Ironi- bining the three individual code letters into
cally, some system safety courses cover only one overall index of significance. The Hazard
this first analytical step. Totem Pole shown in Figure l l lists these
code combinations in order of consequence fGr
Step 2 o Rank Hazards for Severity management decision.
Obviously, there are never enough re°Continuing to us_ rapid rail transit as an
sources to completely eliminate every possible
example, Figure 8 is a conversion of the four hazard. For this reason, manageme,tt must sethazard levels of MIL-STD-882 into rail tran-
sit effects. Rather than having everyone decide a "decision point" or cutoff level in the HazardTotem Pole. This decision point is drawn at
what a "critical" hazard is, the translation that significance ranking cot _'below which allhas been ma'le so that there is universal
remaining hazards will be :gnored. The deci-
understanding of this level. If there were 478 sion point may be established by either (1) the
hazards identified in Step 1, then every one reduction of hazard siguific,_nce to a level
of the 478 should have either an A, B, C, or which management considers adequate or (2)
D assigned to it. the depletion of resources available for ap-
plication to hazard elimination or control.
Step 3 - Rank Hazards for Likelihood To illustrate this decision point, manage-
Afar all 478 identified hazards have been ment could decide that it will eliminate and/or
categorized for severity, they must be ranked control all hazards in the first 7 levels or
for probability of occurrence. One example of categories in the Hazard Totem Pole; i.e., all
how thismight be accomplished is shown in the AJP, AJQ, AKP, BJP, AJR, AKQ, and
Figure 9. The reason thatthe four levelsof ALP hazards. This would mean that 31 of
probabilityare in a logarlthmlcscaleis be- the 478 identifiedhazards willrequire re-
cause thehuman response tosensory stimuli, sources to be allocatedby wanagement for
according to Fechner's Law, is logarithmic, purposes of eliminatingor controlllngthe
Perception of probabilities ls prohablyslmllar hazards. (Note that there were no AJQ or
to sensory perception. When this step is corn- AKQ hazards.)
: plete, all 478 identified .,_zards should have It is important to also note that while man-
two letters assigned-- one for severity and agement will be committing resources for the
one for probability, first 7 levels in the Hazard Totem Pole, they
will, by this very action, be deliberately
Step 4 - Rank Hazards for Elimlnation/Control ignoring all remaining 87 levels in the Hazard
Resources Totem Pole (wMch contain the remaining 447
hazards;). Therefore, the decision point be-
The thirdlette_"tcbe assignedeach ofthe
478 hazards should be from a table such as comes that point wMch separates action from
shown in Figure I0. This step requires an inaction regarding hazards.
intermediate conversion of various r_ources RESOLUTION OF HAZARDS
(e.g., policy, procedures, manpower, tech-
nology, faciUti_s, materials, and schedule) MIL-STD-882 describes a serles of actions " :
into a dollar equivalence prior to selecting for satisfying safety requirements of a system
code letter. Nevertheless, this e_r_mate of design. The series is known as "system safety :
the amount of resources is essential in order !precedence." This precedence is shown in
to speak management's language. Now all 478 logic diagram format in Figure 12. ihazards have three letters assigned. Continuing the rapid ra/l transit example
where management has now decided to el/ml-
Step 8 - Rank Hazards for Management Con- nste or control 31 of the 478ident/fied hazards
sequence in tthe Hazard Totem Pole, a decision must be
Once three code letters {one each from made on HOW to eliminate or control them.
Steps 2, 3, and 4) have been assigned to all Figure 12 shows four alternsraves {numbered
478 identified hazards, the focusing for I through 4) for this decision.
IIS
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With the exception of those hazards which as "accepted risks." Those risks are the ones
can be eliminated very economically early in for which insurance iL"purcfiased.
th_ design stage, the four alternatives of Fig-
ure 12 are numbered in a hierarchy of de- REFERENCES
creasing effectivenessas well as decreasing
cos___.,.Therefore,the lower the number inthe
hierarchy,the more effectivethe choicewill I. Wilmotte, Raymond M., "Communica..
be in satisfying system safety requirements tlon of Risk," "Proceeding-, of the Second
even though there may be higher cost asso- Government/Indust,'y System Safety Confcr-
ciated with the actio_L. (A more detailed dls- en_._ce Goddard Space Flight Center, 26-28
cussion of this conc_'pt appears in R_ference May 1971.
3.) 2. Gro_e, Vernon L., "Constraints on Ap-
The dotted lines in Figure 12 illustrate pllcation of Sys',_ms Methodology to Socio-
something not discussed in MIL-STD-882. Economic Need_ Proceedin_a c.( the Firat
Two conditions, both of which are undesirable, Western Space Co,gress, 27-29 O_;ober 1970,
are shown In dotted lines. First, a system Santa Maria, California.
can be tolerant to identified hazards withc,_t 3. Grose, '_er;_or, L,, "_yst_-m c. • ....,oa,_ T IF,
the knowledge of either designers Rapid Raili'._._r__n_"-_.._,:'as pres_.oted to the Rall
- era,ors. Secondly, the system can be Inw_er- Transit Confezence, sponsored by the Ameri-
_. ant to identified hazards, elth_.r unknowingly can Translt As_oclatlon and _he Institute for
(most serious) or knowingly. Hazards which Rapid T_,nslt, San Franclsco, California,
are knowlngl x intolerable are often described 13-16 A_;rll 1971.
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SECTION III
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
QUESTION: I would like to ask the p,,nel on it. If it comes it is going to be by societies
if there is any concerted effort in the educa- or conferences or things making recomme_-
tional field to incorporate a sy,3tem safety dations and putting a little pressure on uni-
engineering course in all undergraduate engi- versities to get something like this as a part
neering programs -- aeronautical, industrial, of some undergraduate course. I dontt think a
electrical, etc. complete course itself would be of value be-
cause it would be an elective almost certainly
DR. JOHNS'ION: We can only speak for and would not cover a great many people.
the industrial engineering department. As far A portion of a few hours of this type of thing
as I know Texas A&M has none. Actually what in some other undergraduate course would be
we are looking at in a system safety engineer- an effective thing at least as a beginning and
ing course as far as for a person working on as I say it is going tohaveto come from pres-
s degree in mechanical engineering or some- sure outside.
thing at the dndergraduate level, this would GEORGE CRANSTON: I have a question
L have to be an elective. What we are doing at that is related to the one that was just asked.
Texas A&M is trying to make people in all I want to put it In a little different way I think.
the engineering disciplines aware, probably We have been told by the educators this morn- "
more so toward product safety and product ing that we do not have a philosophy of system
_ liability. We are getting more and more people safety or asking us if we have a philosophy of
- to come in and take the courses as electives, system safety - that is a legitimate question,
=, but as far as a requirement, I would say there but I want to turn the question around after
is no attempt to put it into the undergraduate what I have heard and ask them if they have a
discipline across the board. Most all of the philosophy of education in our university sys-
people that take or get a B.S. in industrial tern and the reason I askthis, fromwhat I have
engineering will take a course in system heard it appears that every course isa,-_ectal
_ safety engineering as it is offered, course started to meet some special need of
: MR. GROSE: Gene I dontt know if you care some special organization. What we have
: to respond to this or not, are. you aware of heard today is the philosophy of that particular
any activities at USC where they have trted to course to meet that need, but we have not
introduce this? heard a philosophy about how do we educate
EUGENE HOLT: I dontt think that is nec- people generally in this field.
essarily a good idea. Outside of a system
safety curriculum or a safety program, the ANSWER: I think to the :ommon layman it
only way to incorporate system safety engi- would seem an easier task than it really is to ;
neertng into EE or ME courses, I think would break through the structures at universities.
be in each basic course and that would bc You have to understand the curriculum corn- i
rather hard to do. I think because of the basi: mittees to start with. University curriculum i
structure of universities and the way curricu- committees are a very strange kind of _hing. I
lums are established, etc. it would be hard to You approach them with a new idea, no matter
do that. It is a good idea but at present it is how firmly and strongly you believe in it you
not Workable I am afraid, have to convince them and sometimes they
JACK MANSFIELD (GWU): It is about the are very hard to convince. It is very true,
same answer you Just got from Gene Holt. Mr. Cranston, that these are special interest
This was discussed very recently at a system kind of courses that we have discussed this
safety society meeting here in Washington. As mor,_ing and unfortunately, that is the level
a matter of how to get this into an undergrad- we are at right now. l agree with )_u, we need
uate, should something be put in. I think it will to do something about that and to motivate.
not come by the university taking thelnitiative I think maybe an aroused and tntelllgen:public
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will do that. Societies will do that if we will and separating it to specialties when in ac-
continue to motivate people, it might happen, tualtty I'm sure we need an Integrated type of
teaching in the universities.
MR. GROSE: I think you can leave that
one open, George, as a rhetorical question. JERRY LEDERER: I have three different
DR. BALL: This is a comment related to comments. First of all, about ten years ago
the last question and then a direct question. I got the Deans of some of the countries fore-
A couple of weeks ago the National Academy most engineering schools together to discuss
of Engineering held a two day conference on putting into the curriculars some safety and
consumer products. Dr. Carl Clark will be especially human factors and I was told that
speaking on this subject tomorrow and this there just isn't time. Some universities such
first workshop was on safety. One of the rec- as Cornell had increased their engineering
&
ommendations that came out of that workshop course to 5 years to put in humanities as they
had to do with the education of the people who thought the students should have something on
= are designing and will be designing consumer humanities. They had gotten to the point where
products such as mowing machines, bicycles, they are giving them almost entirely engineer-
etc. It seems to me that the essence Is to lng. There Isn't time, they said, to do this.
teach the design decision-making process. I would think that at least they could give a
I think It is quite Impractical for every aspect couple of electives per semester to get the
of design decision-making to be taught In a students thinking about this. The second thing
L separate course so my comment would be that is that we have heard all through this confer-
there is a tremendous need In the consumer ence that it Is the executive who makes the
: products area, that the essence is to teach the decisions, the businessman. How many unt-
design Recision process, to teach the design versltles, If any, have a lecture or two lec-
and to take Into account all aspects of design turers in their schools of business admtnts-
decision-making including the safety. My ques- tratton so that you can get the men who become
tton would be to what extent are you teaching the administrators to recognize there is such
the design dectston process, have you In- a problem. I wouldn't call it safety, I'd call it
eluded safety tn this area, not as a speetal risk management, part of the management
course, not as an option, but simply as an picture. The third item is in connection with
inherent and integral part in the design deel- the use of system safety for accident lnvestl-
slon process? gatlon. The Idea was advanced that you could
use those same logic diagrams to conduct the
ANSWER: In fairness I think to that ques- investigation. Also you can use the logic dia-
tton, those present here today are not in the grams that were involved in the design to help
decision making position in the university in with the investigation. If you can go back to
order to do that. I think It is one of those those logic diagrams, I would think it would
things that we rare obliged to do though from a facilitate the Investigation of an accident
professional point of view, to urge that this be enormously In many eases, where structural
done Inside university structures. It suffers problems are concerned or systems problems
from all the ills of any bureaucracy I'm sure come up, failure of systems and things like
and it only responds very lethargically to any that.
Impulse that comes from society, and I think
it is one of those things that conferences like QUESTION. I'm not sure that there Is
this are essential in proposing as well as such a thing as a non-Government-related
professional socletles and other people like industry any more, but ff there is such a thing,
Ralph Nader. Mr. Nader even has his own way Is there any indication that this side of in-
of making himself known but the point is that dustry is accepting the concept of system
I agree with what you say, Les, that the safety as well as the educational side and ¢
decision-making process is sufficiently broad providing opportunities in form of jobs and
that we cannot afford specialized courses, salaries that would lure the people from engl-
We do need to focus one more time because neerlng into the system safety side of the _
the university process has been oneof division house? ,_
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ANSWER: I'll respond r,nd I don't know of and I would offer a challenge tO not only you
any. I would just simply 'Jay this. I an rea- on the stage but the people in the audience, I
sonably certain that the recent emphasis on wonder why we don't go back in our memories
product reliability is Causing the civil sector to our undergraduate days and say _or example
of the economy to respond to .no idea that in aeronautical or say an aerodynamics course,
there are risks that must be addres3ed and how would we go back to our professor and
our experience in our particular course is say, where could you in this course, within its
that the students attending from other than existing framework, introduce some thoughts
aerospace or milJ_ary part of the economy say about system safety?
that there is a ground swell. It may not be I submit that I could do this. I could go
great yet, but ,t is perceptible and I think we back in and talk to them about stall spin acci-
are going to see increasing interest in that dents and where in his course, just as he
area. teaches it today, in an analytical sense or any
of a number of other ways, he could come up
and engender a feeling in this undergraduateCOMMENT: I have an observation, I re-
that you ought to look at the hazards. I believe
cently rf_ad a report that the President of
every single one of us, if we chose to, could
Honda Motor Company that makes the auto- go back into our own undergraduate field and
mobiles in Japan has been accused of murder introduce ideas like this but it is a monu-
due to reported 16 or 17 deaths which sup- mental task.posedly are due to a design deficiency in the
MR. GROSE: Do you have a practical way,
automobile. They are accusing the President
of that Company of murder. Obviously, Japan Chuck, to suggest how this might be done.Should we all go back to our own schools as
has kind of a strange legal system but those alumni?
kinds of activities might motivate the con- MR. MILLER: I think it would be a tre-
sumer product people to respond.
mendous challenge to tPe system safety society
to do just this on a local basis.
3OHN FRENCH/MSC: I'd like to make one MR. SHAW/TRW: One of the means oh-
comment. In keeping abreast of system safety vtously of broad education is availability of the
activities it would appear appropriate that you literature. Most everyone in the engineering
visit some of the NASA Centers. I'll speak for game recognizes it gem obsolete pretty quick
Manned Spacecraft Center specifically because and it is a habit of most of the brotherhood to
we have been involved in system safety from read widely. Coupling that with the idea of the
a management and engineering technique old academic principle of publish or perish,
standpoint. I would dke to welcome any of you I'd like to raise the question, do -my of yo,t
gentlemen to come down and discuss these gentlemen know of texts a-,atlab , o: being
things with us. prepared at this time on the general aubject
C.O. MILLER: Vern, addressing the last of system safety7
two questions, I might mention a vtsttc, r we MR. GROSE: Willie Hammer who spoke
had a_ the Board a couple of weeks ago. He ,_sterday morning is writing a book about it,
was a Professor of Engineering from a Mid- WlllteVs book, he tells me, is within 9 months
west University. He had never heard of the of publication. I have reason to believe there
I term "System Safety" frankly are other tn the I have
and 1 don't books mill but don't
really know what prompted his visit other dates.
than he said, "I've been worried that our MR. HOLT: I would like to get a plug out
people have been coming out of the engineer- of this. In collaboration with Mr. Richard L.
lng schools without an appreciation for ',he Reeb, who Is system safety manager of
"_ hazards that can be designed into a program." McDonnell-Douglas Astronautics tnHuntington
I then broke into my standard three-hour lec- Beach, California, he and I, he is writing a
ture on 3ystem safety. The point is, I think management section and I am writing an engi-
there is an awareness, well outside the DoD nesting section, we're trying to write a book.
environment on this particular problem as We don't have any dates but we've got quite a
typified by this man. What I gained from it, few pages together now -- it's looking good.
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COMMENT: I might add one thing too, Bill then of course the insurance companies would
Rogers at TRW has one in preparation. I have come in and assign a dollar value to the man-
no Idea of the date there either, lives and premiums that they have to put out
and Industries could perhaps be faced with law
R. ALTGELT/EATON CORPORATION: I sutt_, which could be assigned a dollar value.
would like to know whether there is a science
we might call safety economics that would say, I'm wondering if there is a science that ap-proaches safety in this way, dollars loss
to put it into example form, that one accident
versus dollars spent to prevent, or lives
would take on the average one-man life and lost versus lives spent t_ prevent?
we could show that in the course of a year say
X men's lives are taken by this typical acci-
dent occurring, and we co,:-,i show that it would ANSWER: I would think that all of our
take Y-men's lives of people who are working courses try to take this approach. Basically,
in factories to eliminate this or eliminate a we try to show the economics whether we are
percentage of this. So far I have l, een dodging talking about designing a system or probably
, the dollar aspects of it and I recognize a the specific course would be in our industrial
man's life snuffed out isntt the same as the safety-type courses where we talk about cost
man-life consumer in the shop to add another of accidents, accident elimination and budget.-
aspect, conceivably there would be someman- ing for safety. I think this is our philosophy
lives that wc_Id be lost in industrial accidents inherent in all of our courses. It's the name
producing this apparatus; but I'm wondering, of the game, really.
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INTRODUCTION The term "Tangible Characteristic_" will
be used for those product characteristics that
This paper is concerned with those re- meet the first two conditions shownin Figure I.
quirements for safety that are, or should be, For example, in the case of an automobile,
part of the hierarchy of contractual relation- top speed, miles per gallon, turning radius,
ships between government and prime con- and trunk capacity are tanglblecharacteristics
tractors, prime ana subcontractors, and sub- because they can be specified quantitatively and
contractors and vendors, they can be demonstrated by quantitative test.
Each of these interfaces involves the con- The term "Intangible Characteristics" will
tractual sequence of be used for those product characteristics that
I. Request for proposal (RFP's) either cannot be specified quantitatively or,
2. Proposal documents if specified, cannot be measured within ac-
3. Contractor selection ceptable cost and schedule constraints. In the
4. Contractor performance measure- case of an au'omoblle, the intangible charac-
ment teristtcs include safety and to some extent the
5. Fee adjudication characteristics of operational reliability and
Safety requirements are, or should be, a stg- quality. In the case of a complex aerospace .
ntficant factor in all five o_ these aspects of system, the intangible characteristics may
the buyer-seller relationship, include many other characteristics, such as
The National Aeronautics and Space Agency, electromagnetic compatibility or storage reli-
the Department of Defense, and most aero- ability.
space prime contractors have alread:/a surfeit When all the essential characteristics of
of policy statements and general specifications a product are tangible, output contracting is
that require that safety should be a significant the prefered method of contracting from the
factor in their contracting practices. The pur- point of view of both the buyer and the seller.
pose of this paper is neither to add to nor to Obviously this is so, because it minimizes
summarize these policy and specification re- the time and effort required by both parties to
quirements. Rather, our purpose is to invite negotiate and to monitor the fulfillment of
attention to some of the ways in which tradI- the contract. Hoeever, even when all essen-
ttonal contracting methods fail to give confi- rtal characteristics are tangible, development
dence in the achievement of safety and then to risks may make the seller unwilling to forego
show how modern system engineering and payment until he has developed the new prod-
system management techniques have pro- uct and demonstrated that it meets all the
vided us with the means to overcome these specified characteristic requirement;. For
shortcomings in our traditional contracting example, in the case of most missile and
" ' practices, space systems, United States aerospace corn-
' panies are neither willing nor able to forego
OUTPUT CONTRACTING payment until they have developed a new sys-
tem, even if all the essential characterl._tics
Let us tatsrt our dlscusst',n by recognizing can be spect;ted ahd demonstrated by test.
two very popular sayings, l i_ese sayings have Quite often in the aert _pace industry, the
, typified supplier attitudes ever since the birth customer is unable to meet the fourth con-
of aerospace industry. They are "Tell me what ditlon shown in Figure I. For example, in the
you want, don't tel! me what to Co" a_d "Once case of the atomic bomb, the intercontinental
the contract is signed, leave me alone until ballistic mlssilcs, or the Apollo space pro-
I am ready to dellvcr the product." Covern- gram, failure to meet all the essentir, i pr,_u_._
merit documents use the term "disengagement characteristics within ,;he defined develov, ,::it
policy" to describe this seller attitude to the time would have m._ant a nationsl disaster.
buyer-seller relationship. Figure I "Condl- In summary, we may say that pure output
tions For Output Contracting" sets forth four contracting often is unacct, vtable either because
conditions that mu_t exist if this type of rela- certain characteristics of a product are tntsn-
taonshtp is to be acceptable to the buyer, gible or because eithex the seller or the buyer
ISO
2
1972018311-116
cannot tolerate some of the risks that are three in Figure I was unacceptable to aero-
inherent in developing a complex new product, space industry and that condition four was
utterly unacceptable to the government ag_n-
INPUT CONTRACTING cteb. Consequently, input contracting in the
form of requirements for the negotiation,
l.et us ask, if it is not possible for a buyer execution, and auditing of reliability program
and a seller to contract solely on the basis of plans developed as a supplement to specifi-
cation and demonstration of quantitative reli-defining and demc.nstrating thecharacterl_tlcs
of the product, what then can be done. The only ability _slues.
In the case of safety, there were some
choice is for the buyer and the seller to sup-
initial effor ; to apply output contracting byplement output contracting by aefintng the work
specifying accident probabilities and requiringthat the seller will do and paying for the ac-
_ complishment of this work. We will call this demonstration of these probabfllti_sbyquanti-
tative analysis. However, the limitations oftype of arrangement "input contracting."
_ A precedent for input contracting was this approach soon were recognized and during
established long ago when the government the 1960's, contracting for safety wab domio
contracted with universities for research, nated by requireme_,ts for safety program
It is inherent in the nature of research that plans. These requirements did lead to the
the product cannot be definedand certainly growth of a substg.ntialsyste,_asafetyengi-
cannotbe guaranteed.Consequently,theagree- neering profession.In thisauthor'sopinion,
L _ ment between the buyer and the seller is for many of the members of this profession
• -_ a deftped effort which the seller will make in together with the program plans that tLey
fulfillment of the contrac', wrote and executed did achieve substantial
An oversimplificationof inputcontracting good. However, a realisticassessment ofthe
current situationmust includer.hecriticisms
would be tosay thatitconsistedofnegotiating
setforthinFigure 2 "CriticismsofSpecialist
program plansand monitoringthecompliance
withtheexecwion oftheseplansasaconditio,_ Program Plans."
Ingeneral,safetyprogram plansarewrittenfor payment ofthecontractcosts.
by system safetyspecialistengineers in the
contractor'sorganizationtosatisfytheirpro-
CONTRACTING FOR SAFETY IN THE 1960tS fessi¢,nalcolleaguesinthegovernmentagencyts ,
organization.In theopinionofmany designers,
During the 1960's,severalre!ativelyin- the writing and executionof these program
tangib'_characteristicsbecame of vitalira- planshas no realimpact on theirdesigndecl-
porzance to the customer. Some of the most slons, and in the opinionof many program
,, important of these characteristics were tell- managers, these plans have no real impact on
ability,maintainability,safety, electromag., theirprogram management decisions.
netic compatibi|hy, and security. In the present atmosphere of severecost
For each of these characteristics, an effort re_uctlon throughout the aerospace industry,
was made to apply the principlesof output allspecialistenglneeringstaffsarevulnerable. ;
contracting. For example, several of _s were In particular, system safety staffs are being
involved In helping develop the first Depart- and must be reduced from, the levels that
ment of Defens_ policyon reliability.This e.x.lstedinthel_te1960's.
policy overs!mpl/fied the problem of con- A relatively new factor has been brought i
tracting for reliability by stating bluntly that out w_thln the National Aeronautics and Space
quantitative values would be specified in all Agency by the delLberations of the McCurdy
procurement contracts and that they would be Committee on procurement practices. Some ._
demonstrated before the product was accepted members of this commimm have pointed out
by thegovernment.By thetime thatcontract- that governmeat specialistengineers, such
ing for the ir_tercontinental ball_sdc missiles as system safety eng/neers, tend to tell the
came along, it was recognized theft output con- competing con_racwrs so ex_fly what they
n'scting was inadequate because condiO.on rec:_/re in a program plan @at the resulting
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proposal documents are essentially identical. Items 2, 3, and 4 correspond with the fi:,e
Consequently, a source evaluation board isnot Basic Program Plans columns shown in Fig-
able to establish discriminators between corn- ure 4.
peting contractors on the basis of their safety Safety Inputs to the product specification
or other :peclallst engineering program plans, inevitably tncl:ide a motherhood type statement
that safety must be a primary consideration lit
CONTRACTING FOK SAFETY IN THE 1970. design. However, these Inputs can Include qutze
specific requirements such as control of mate-
During the first sixteen months of the rials ,",an.inability, or _e use of redundancy
1970's, there has been a marked trend away to control .-,Ingle pointfa!luresforcatastrophlc
from a multiplicity of specialist engineering hazards. Design practtce_ criteria, in the_orm
progrant ptans and toward the five basic func- of checklists baaed on e:.pzrience retention,
tton program plans _hown in Figure 3.Contir,- are appllcabl6 to a_qurlng the adequacy of
uance of this trend will result in contracting safety e_.[nee:c_ug inputs Into the Product
for safety and other intangible characteristics Specification segment of the reques: for pro-
being performed in a manner represented by posal.
Figure 4 "Safety Inputs To Contracting." Let 'The Program Mar, agement Plat' should b_
us now use Figure 4 as a basis for discussing written by the contractor's program manager.
safety inputs into the five steps In contracting It stould be a first 2_rson descrlptlon of how
!- shown in the le_" h_nd column, he will use his autlaortty :,nd his program
management :echntques to assure achieve-
STEP I - REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL merit of all the product characteristics set
forth in the ProductSpectflcatl.3n.Spectflcally,
From the po,nt of view of the system safety it shot:?_d _escribe how he _tll make use of
engineer, the essential elements of even the ,¢yeel_list engine_.rs to help assure thatdestgn
most voluminous request for proposal ._re decis|,_ns are rlg,t _e fl:st time and also to
as follows: assure that design errors are detected and
1. Product Speetfication_ which define c_,crected az the :,_:;_est possible time. For
quant,.:ative requirements for the example, It snoald discuss the rt4e of safety
tangible characteristics and qualt- analysis in guiding design decis_,t,,ts and par-
tative requirements for the i_,tangt- tlcipation o_ safety engineer_ In design revle
ble char2eterlstics of the product and development fa_iure ?.'..aly_es,
which Is to ue developed. ':h: _Aanufacturlng Plan should be written
2. A Statement of Work delineating the by the conraactc-:'s manufacturing manager.
; development activities that the buyer It shuuld include clescrlpttons of bow he will
considers mu_,t te pezformed by assure achleven,ent of ooeratlonal safety in
_e sel!c;r to _,lve confidence in the the facto:y and how he will use pe ;.,_le such as
achievement of both the required manufacturing pla:,ners and quality engineers
tangibles and the required intangiLle to support hazard _dentfficat/on and hazard
, character:sties, control.
3. Proposal Data List delineating the The Support and Use Plan should be simt,-
,development program planning data far to the Manufacturing Plan in that it also
that all the sellers must submit to si_ould dese "Ibe how the suppozt manager will
support the sour_.*_ evaluation and astmre operational safety an(i how lalr quality
contractor select_ , processes, assurance engineer_ will contrlDute to hazard
4. Performance Measurement Data Lls: control.
i delL_eattng the development program The Integrated Test r)lan should bringcontrol dat_ that the successfulcon- together Ir one documevt an acccunt of devel-
- !. tractor must submit during the ext,- opment testing, design verification test_g,
cution of the contract, receiving Inspection testL_g, manufacturing
Item I in this list corresponds, with the check tes0.,_g, quality acceptance testing, and
Produe:: Specifier, finn cetumr, in Figure 4. so on through operational checkout testing.
.- ,, , 132
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It should include descriptions of how appro- In the other extreme case, the buyer has
: pri.ate _uperviaor_ will assure both the safety not told the seller what critical activities
of the personnel conducting the test and pro- he wants to be performed; however, he has
tection of the operation equipment from the asked the seller to propose such activities.
stresses that may be imposed during testing. For example, he may ask the seller copropose
such activities. For example, he may ask the
STEP 2-PROPOSAL DOCUMENTS seller "What has bccn your experience in
The same safety criteria, set forth in regard to the achievement of system safety?
What activities do you propose to perform7"j checklist form, which the buyer requires for
writing the request for proposal, are needed In this case, the source evaluation process
by the seller for responding to these require- must give credit to the sellerts identification
of appropriate critical activities as well as to
- i.aents with his Proposal Documents. The
the resources that he proposes to put to work
specification segments of his proposal should
to accomplish these activities.
show how the design that he intends to develop
will be capable of achieving all the require- STEP 4- PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
ments including the safety requirements.
• The program plan segments of the sellerWs
For the tangible characteristics, perform-proposal should first describe the resources
that he has available for performance of those ance measurement is dominated by qualifi-
: _ cation testing and system testing. These tests
., .:-ritical activities that are either set forth in
' the request for proposal or proposed by the demonstrate that the quantitative values re-
- quired by the product specification have been
seller himself. In this context, the term
_ achieved by the sellerts design.
"resources" includes the procedures, such as
• ! safety analyzis procedures, the supporting In the case of safety and other intangibledata, and the available qualified people, such characteristics, quanti ative performance
measurement is almost meaningless. Conse-
I as professional safety engineers. The seller'sProgram M nagement Pla should show how quentiy, crimria must be established for eval-
his development program organization will uating the performance of the critical activi-
ties set forth in the five basic program plans.facilitate communication between specialist
The key to accomplishing this objective is
engineers, such as safety engineers, and the illustrated by Figure 5. Modern system man-design and program decision makers. Each of
the other program plans should deal with haz- agement requires that all the work to be ac-
ard identification and control activities that complished during a development contract be
related to a single Work Breakdown Structure.
are appropriate to the basic function covered
•, by the plan. Cost Accounts are formed by matrixing thework breakdown structure with the conucac-
STEP 3 - CONTRACTOR SELECTION tot's organization units. Work Packages may
be formed in several logical manners. This
' Let us distinguish between two extreme chart illustrates the formation of work pack-
cases. In the first case, the buyer has told ages by dividing the work to be done by a par-
the seller in the request for proposal pr_._ ticular organization on a particular work ;
• cisely what he wants done in each area, such breakdown structure item into short duration
as the system safety area. This means that packages.
the buyer has identified all the critical acrlv- The vital management requirement illus.. !
irlesthathe wants tobe pet"formed_urint_thu t_,=t_by Fib_zc 5 i_ t_atcriticalactivities,
development program. In thiscase, the only such as safetyanalyses,must be specifically
basisfor contractorselectionis to evaluate requiredand scheduledand fundedby theirin= i
the potentialeffectivenessof the resources clusioninthe Work Package Work Description. i
that the selleris offeringrelarlveto each Also, satisfactorycompletion of the critical
criticalactivity.This typeofrequestfor pro= activitiesmust be providedfor by inclusionof
posal has been a major cause of the fifth tangile criteria in the _/ork Package Closeout
criticismshown in Figure2. Criteria.For example, such criteriamust be
I
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establishedfor the accomplishment of each knowledge, and techniquesoftheprofessional
type of hazard identificationa alysisand for system safety engineeringduring the 1970
: each typeoihazardcontrolactivity, decade.
STEP 5- FEE ADJUDICATION SUMMARY
In summary, the safetycontractingmeth-
From the pointof view ofthecustomer's odology of the 1960'swas dominatedby indi=
system safetymanager, theaward feetypeof vidual safety program plans together with
contractisby farthemost attractive.Thistype a need for largeand expersivesystem safety
of contractprovides incentivefor the buyer staffsto prepare, execute,and audittheexe-
and thesellertoagree on what shouldbe done cur.ionoftheseplans.During the 1970's,there
during each award fee period of, say, six is a rapidtrendtoward theabsorptionof sys--
months. Ifthe totalaward fee istobe inthe ternsafetydisciplinesintothefivebasicfunc-
range from two to fifteenpercent,itisrea- tionprogram plans.The contractingpractices
sortabletoassign,say,one-halfofone percent of boththebuyer and the sellershouldreflect
to the accomplishmentof thesafew program, and encourage thistrend.In particular,the
It is this tie-in between the performance of award fee principle should be used to provide
safety activities and award fees that provides confidence that system safety technology will
the best hope for full exploitation of the skills, be fully exploited during the 1970's.
: "_I 134
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FOREWORD
\
:_s part of the Second NASA Government-Industry System Safety Con-
ference, this paper was prepared to inventory the development and fea-
tures of the currently best known system safety requirements document,
MtL-STD=882, "System Safety Program tot Systems and Associated Sub-
systems and Equipment .... " dated July i5, 1969. NASA officials requested
hie to prepare it and, although I have not been in mainstream Department
of Defense (DOD) efforts to implement the standard recently, I was in
in active advisory capacity to DOD during the Standard's formulation and,
indeed, its predecessors, the MIL-S-38130 series. Presumably, this would
provide a degree of objectivity at least in assessing the successes- and
failures = of the Standard thus far.
Unfortunately, this is not necessarily the case. I remain biased! I firmly
believe there is a need within the management work structure of any rea-
sonably complex system for a defined and implemented system safety
program. The "whys" of this need have been chronicled elsewhere by
others as well as myself. In any case, some implementing process is
required.
As a result, this paper merely reiterates certain development history
of MIL-STD-882 and attempts to spell out the role of the Standard through,
among other ways, identifying its norms,its strengths, and its weaknesses.
* Further, of course, there are some considerations for the future.
This paper is not to be construed as representing an official position of
the National Transportation Safety Board although the record has clearly
shown the Boardts endorsement of the system safety concept.
f
C. O. Miller
i
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REQUIREMENTS FOR SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAMS AS DELINEATED
BY MIL-STD-882
EVOLUTION OF SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM craft manufacturers established flight safety
REQUIREMENTS engineering groups (and without government
requirements:). The aircraft complexity bar-
In January 1946, Amos L. Wood of the tier was being faced and a number of tlity
Boeing Company presented an Institute of functions were being called upon to supplement
Aeronautical Sciences (IAS) paper regarding heretofore normal management division of
a recommended air safety program for air- work to provide a functional, economical,
craft manufacturers. He emphasis "continuous reliable, maintainable, available and suffi-
focus of safety in design.., advance analysis ciently safe system so that a mission could
and post accident analysis.., accident preven- indeed be performed.
tire design to minimize personnel error... Then, in oozed systems management. This
safety work, r.aost effective when it is not not only called for a life cycle look and a
fettered by administrative organizational better description of what comprised a_
pitfalls." (1)* hut it produced a plethora of contractural
" In February 1948, William I. Stieglitz documents.** Missile and space vehicle devel-
wrote: . opment in the late 1950's required this ap-
"Safety must be designed and built into proach not only because of the _forementioned
airp.anes, just as areperlormance, sta- complexity problem being carried over and
bility and structural integrity... Every amplified from aircraft development, but also
engineer cannot be expected t_ be as the lose of a 'single vehicle became an eco-
thoroughly familiar with all the devel- nomic and mission degradation that simply
opments in the field of safety anymore would not tolerate less than an all out accident
than he can be expected to be an expert prevention effort. And the mood of the times
aerodynandcist... (thus) A safety group dictated more clearly defined documentation
must be just as important a part of a during the engineering phases, including safety
manufacturer's organizatlon as a stress, programming, as it ' had been implemented
aerodynamics, or weights group.., a decase earlier in the aviation operational
(although) A safety program can be or- world.***
ganized in numerous ways and there is Highlights of such specification predeces-
probably no one best way." (2) sors to MIL-STD-882 are summarized below:
While the obscurations inherent in history MIL-S-23069 (WEP) "Safety Requirements,
preclude totally accurate revelation of who Minimum, for Air Launched Guided Missiles"
said what to whom first, these quotations October 31, 1961
represent the two earliest statements of what This oft forgotten document broadly
can be considered the cornerstone system identified life cycle requirements for
safety principle. Namely, that at some level a system safety program. Its imple-
of system complexity, management is most mentatton, however, was minimal, at
effective and efficient if it were to require
a specialized approach to safety as well as **An interesting mmlol_IspoHlblehereo"Plethora"
safety being simply everyone's Job. ls defined in the medical sense all "a disease causad by
an excess cg rld corpuscles in tim blood or an lncruseThat this has come to pass is not a matter in the quantity el blood in the body." Tide lid one wrlwr
of argument, it is a matter of record. (3) The to observe" ... a person in plethora (is) d_ng from too
military services Implemented this philosophy much health" (,_herldanas quoted In the World Booit
in their operational segments in the early BncyclopedlaD/ctlonary. 1963).Conslderthe"health"ef
t950's. In this same _me frame, many air- the aerospace Industry today.., too much docmnen-
tatinn???
***it has alsob_n argued, perlmps nottoo fa_tlotmlyo
that in missiles, you no lonpr have a pilot to blame for
*Numberin parenthensen rMer to ref_nces notedat the vuhlcla's ices. so why not gofurther upsn-oom to the
end _ paper, system's design? ,
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least at its beginning. The Navy organi- This Army specification was a virtual
zation then, as now, was not conducive verbatim issuance of MIL-S-38130.
to life cycle system safety implemen- Interestingly enough, the Army was the
tatton efforts, first service to apply its specification
BSD Exhibit 62-41 "System Safety Engi- to a new aircraft program, the Armed
nesting: Military Specification for the Devel- Aerial Fire Support 3ystem (AAFSS).
opment of Air Force Ballistic Missiles" t6)
June 1962 MIL-S-38130A (DOD) "System Safety Engi-
This USAF Ballistic Systems Division neering of Systems and Associated Subsys-
document was noteworthy on several terns, and Equipment, General Requirements"
counts. First, it was the initial deftni- June 6, 1966
tive system safety specification that In the 1964-5 time period the Air Force
was implemented in major aerospace Systems Command (AFSC) continued
programs. Almost of equal significance, leadership in system safety by not only •
it was the first time such an engineer- requesting an updating of MIL-S-38130,
ing effort received the unqualified sup- but also developing a System Safety
port of the head of the procuring agency management guide and a System Safety -
who literally directed BSD contractor design handbook (ultimately puLlished
management personnel to get with the as References 7 & 8). Concurrently,
program, so to speak, or forget doing a decision was made to implement the
business with BSD. (4) system safety approach DOD-wide as
MIL-S-38130 (USAF) "General Require- part of a continuing program of inter-
ments for Safety Engineering of Systems and service standardization of requirements
Equipment" September 1963 documentation.(9) AFSC was named
Actually, Commander Donald Layton Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR)
USN made major attempts to translate fox the ta_k. The result was MIL-S-
BSD Exhibit 62-41 Into a broader based 38130A (DOD). It subsequently was intro.
system safety engineering specification duced Into many programs both new and
applicable to all DOD aerospace sys- underway.
terns. However, he encountered in-house At this point the reader might ask "why
reststancebytheBuWepslndustryMate- aU this discussion on the history of system
rlal Reliability Board which preferred safety and particularly the specification and
to wait for a broader program that current standard development?" The answer
would encompass safety, reliability, is so simple as to often be overlooked by the
\ maintainability and other similar re- newcomer to system safety and MIL-STD=882.
qulrements under one heading. {5) Con- There is a decade or two of specific tech-
currently, Lt. Col. James McConnel of nologlcal and mana[[erlal experience that has
the USAF Systems Command Headquar- shaped MIL-STI_-882, time which has demon-
ters aggressively shepherded the docu- strated the need for such a programmed
ment through Air Force channels as approach, 72me which has seensenselesswaste
a cleaned=up version of BSD 62-41. of men and other resources that could have
What it contained waq basically four been avoided by an lmproved systems approach
requirements: to safety.
(I) A safety management program Does this mean MIL-STI>.882 is a model
(2) Criteria to produce a reasonable document? Far from it as will be discussed
level of safety subsequently. It simply means some very
(3) Hazard analysis astute and high ranking management tyl_S,
(4) Program milestone reporting both Inside at_d outside the government, had
MIL-S-58077 (MS) "Safety EngineerIng of fully adopted the system safety principle by
Aircraft Systems, Associated Subsystems and the time the decision was made to go to a
Equipment; General Requirements for" June 30_ "standard." Indeed, the combined talents of
1964 malay people offered a check and balance Into
t
140
I
1972018311-129
what had preceded the standard and what got Accordingly, MIL-STD-882 is more aguide
into the standard itself.* than a directive at least until program man-
agement decides to follow it. Then it becomes
MIL-STD-882... ITS CHARACTERISTICS a matter of further delineation, through speci-
fications or otherwise, to implement a specific
Like any Military Standard, MIL-STD-882 program tailored to the system under con-
must be considered as the uniquely defined sideration including where that system is in
type of document that it is, For example, a its life cycle,
Military Standard does notconnote the precise- To he more precise in what MIL-STD-882
ness of every yardstick being 36 inches long, comprises, consider it in two w,_.s: first,
Nor does it connote some minimum acceptable the problems inherent in MIL-S-381:,,_A which
level of performance as is generally the case were corrected and, second, what are the
with "standards" issued by the Federal Aviation Standard's basic features.**
Administration. A standard is, by DOD defi- During its application, MIL-S-38130A was
; nttion, as follows: revealed to be limited if not dificient in that it:
"A document that establishes engineer- (1) Did not adequately define terms neces-
ing and technical limitations and appli- sary for its understanding.
; cations for items, materials, processes, (2) Was limited to the engineering phaqe of
!: methods, designs, and engineering prac- the life cycle only thus negating optimum
rices. (10) effectiveness of total system safety
Engineering standards, further, are"docu- management practices.
t ments created primarily to serve the needs (3) Entailed excessive emphasis on the
i of designers and to control variety.., define analytic process to the exclusion of
terms, establish codes and document prac- other tasks.
t
tices, procedures and items selected as stand- (4) Produced further confusion between
,_ ard for design, engineering, and supply man- safety and reliability engineering efforts
agementoperations." (11) particularly because of a failure to
i Military standards are not to be used as delineate between the two in the analytic
the direct medium for imposing administrative process.
requirements on contractors. Rather, stand- (5) Failed to acknowledge the role of train-
i ards function in ._rocurement through the ing in the accident prevention process.
medium of specifications. (12) Specifications (6) Failed to provide for safety data com-
I are in turn defined as: munlcatton and interchange between the I
' "A document intended primarily for use customer and contractor and within i
i in procurement, which clearly and ac- the customer's own organizational seg- ;
! curately describes the essential tech- ments.
1 nicalrequlrementsforltems, materials, (7) Failed to provide for a safe and ac-
i . and services including the procedures ceptable disposal of equipment and mate-
i by which It will be determined that the rlal at the completion of their use- ;
i requirements have been met." (10) fulness.
i
i =Not to be forgotten in this entire discussion are other
events in the evolution of system safety such as the
directionof theconceptIntothe$STprogrambythe FAA
In 1965, the Ap llo 204 fire that launched NASAinto =eli ¢enheargundthet MII.-S-38130A wunMtherspe-
i system safety, the National Transportation Safety Board's ¢ific enough as a specification nor sufficiently qmcom-
recommendations regarding system safety in surface passing as s standard. Another rmmonfor establishing
modes of transportation= ¢tc. Whilenot directly bearing the standard was the desirability to place In the dcct_
on MIL-STD=882, thesenon-DODdevelopmentsin lye- mentsttonhierarchy.• top documentunderwhichvat-i-
tem safety are further testimony of the acceptanceo( ous detail system safety speclficetionecoulddevelop
_em saf_/principles, lot,/cally.
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gAs will become apparent in a moment, (4) It provides, albeit brief, a relationship
these shortcomings were corrected for the to associated disciplines, particularly
most part in the published MIL-STD-882. to system engineering.
Like all military standards, of course, In addition, the sample System Safety Pro-.
MIL-STD-882 is couched in governmentese gram Outline (Appendix A to the Standard)
language. However. when all the confusion infers other tasks that might be expected
factors are eliminated, what the document within the scope of an SSPP, e.g., accident
really says is this: investigation planning and procedures, audit
(I) It tells why the standard is in existence, programs, establishment of system safety
i.e., to provide for a system life cycle groups, etc.
program for safety with the planning In summary, MIL-STD-882 is a document
function being used as the overview which says "You ought to consider a systera
control document. Observe this goes safety program, plan for it, and here are some
well beyond engineering per se... a fact of the prime considerations when you do." "
often not recognized by the casual It is the basis for good dialogue with manage-
student in the field, ment when they face their difficult decisions
(2) It defines terms which, in their finality, about safety. It As the system safety practi- "
look simple. In actual fact, however, tioner in his relationship to management what
they bear careful stuc_y. The nuances the blueprint is to the designer in his relation
existent in the use of the word system with his management or with the manufacturing
(rather then systems_) or the need to department.
distinguish between different levels of A long-time co!league, Vernt_n L. Grose,
contractors are but examples of where also put it succinct1_ mls way.
meanings must be fully appreciated "A System Safety Program Plan is amech-
before many other parts of the standard anism to translate a generalized standard
fail into place, into a language that management under-
(3) It provides requirements within con- stands in terms of cost, performance, and
_,_aints present in any "standard" type schedule." (13)
document as discussed earlier. These Enough said for the objectives and good
include: points. What about the problems with MIL-
a. A System Safety Progr am Plan STD-882? And it does have some, or at least
(SSPP). the system trying to use It does!
b. Specific tasks in different phases of
the life cycle. MIL.-STD-882... ITS PROBLEMS
•, c. An explanation of what safety organl- Without attempting any rank order listing,
zation is present to implement the let us consider various adverse commcms -
program, involving MIL-STD.-882 derived from a number ¢
d. Milestone and p r o g r a m review of personal interviews and a review of a par- 4
points, tlcularly critical analysis of the standard
e. Detail consideration of hazards and appearing in the Journal of Quality Technology, _
the analysis therpof, to include cot- October 1970. (14) Before proceeding, however,
rectlve action or control processes it is of interest to note that as of May l, 1971,
available, the OPR for the Standard,AFSC Hdq (IGFS)
f. Safety data production and inter- bad not received a single written criticism
change, as requested routinely in all standard docu-
g. Testing considerations, both in verl- ments and appended to each release (DD Form
ficatlon of given safety performance 1426). This followed, among other communi-
and insuring test programs being cations, s specific request for such corn-
performed safely, ments at the USAF-sponsored System Safety
h. Training program inputs. Conference in Las Vegas, February 1969.
i. Special consideration of ground stor- Nevertheless, listed below are the problems
age and handlh_g problems including encountered and personal editorial-type views
system close-out requirements, of this author noted under "Comment."
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I. The Standard is too confusing.., is not In any case, the distinctions have been
easily understood, made in various contributions to the
Comment: Perhaps t,'ue; however, a technical literature.
standard in sMety cannot be expected 5. Duplication of efforts "ilities" or be-
to be understood or appreciated by per- tweeu system safety efforts and design-
sons not well versed in the field any ers is encouraged by MIL-STD-G82.
more than a powerplants engineer could Comment: Even discounting the fact
be expected to fully comprehend a tbct planned duplication of some effo: t
standard in electromagnetic radiation. (e.g. critical hazard analyses)may often
In other words_ one should know the be a wise management technique, the
business befor;, trying to criticize it! problem suggested here has arisen.
Still, the challenge remains tr. put the It does so because contractor and/or
Standard in words a broader-based customer organizational segments have
, poptdati,.n can grasp, parochial iL:erests which preclude co-
2. There are minimal numbers of trained operation between different organtza-
and/or experienced personnel in the tional segments. Or, as covered more
. system safety field and unfortunately in the next item, the documentation
non-qualified engineers are often as- requirements are conducive tP'._.parate
. signed to system safety tasks both at reporting.
the contractor or at the procuring 6. Information is developed for contract
agency, satisfaction rather than for use at the
Commert: A very valid point and one time of Its inception or downstream.
closely allied with the previous item. Comment: This may well tie In with
The solutl,_n rests not only with more the people experience problem described
and better system safety literature and ea_ _ier but In any case is considered by
training, bt_.t also wi_h continued pro- many to be the principal problem asso-
fesstonaltsm by those in the field, clawed wlthMIL-STD-882. For example,
Further, the pseudo safety expert,(who) if timing of hazard analyses are _ot
got that way because his boss merely predicated upon their contributing to
told him to put on a system safety hat_ the design or their output does not tell
must be recognized and exposed fox' a usable story todowns'.,*ampersonnel,
what he t_,. what really has been accomplished?
3. Each program must have a safe ;y effort Answer: A paper exercise.., and it has
deltneate_ for its own peculiar '_eeds. happened.
Comment: That's correct _nd as It 7. In contractural arrangements withsome
should be, a_beit more ingenuity and parts of DOD a single lntet_rattng con-
hard work may be irvolved than to tractor Is not designated thus, making
_imply follow MIL-STD-882 in check- system safety integration a bureau-
" list fashion. But, since when do we cratic nightmare.
accomplish progress in our aerospace Comment: ' serious problem: As to
field "by the numbers" or, even more Just how serious, the DOD agencies c_n
importantly these days, do it within only answer for themselves.
reasonable economic limits without 8. Implementation of a total life cycle
ingenuity and hard work? systc,n safety pr_ram within most
4. The Standard or other documents do not military organizational structures is
relate syrtem safety to other disciplines, difficult because of excessive admin-
Corrn_e.a: Another valid point, although istratlve barriers between development
the place for such delineation probably and using commands. The arsenal ap-
doe_ not belong in MIL-STD-882 but proach simply does not provide for
rather In something like MIL-STI)-499, a life cycle approach to anything lnclud-
"_._Jltary Standard, System Engineering lng safety.
_iat, ag,:-ment." (MIL-STD-499 Is only Comme_at: This has been a long stand-
•m(_er _rlal use today by the USAF.) trig problem which can be overcome to
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some degree by formation of a strong are not uniquely those associated with
system safety group early in the pro- design, and the total collection of such
gram and not !erting it become dcgraded material in text form ic still on the
with time. This would seem to be distant horizon.
dependent upon the ir:tiaqve of oper- 12. The feedback loop to system safety of
atinb command pcrsonnel even more a given system via the accident/incident
than those at the development end of investigation process does not seem
the spectrum, to be well established.
9. System safety cannot be quantified and, Comment: As noted earlier, the outline
therefc-'e, the hazard analyses can never SSPP acknowledges accident/incident
become a part of managemenUs prime investigation as a part of the program.
effort in maintaining a high benefit to But what about an effectl_ closing of
cost ratio for its efforts, the loop back tc the designer, the pro-
Comment: This myth continues to sur- duction man, the manager, etc., of the •
face periodically but fortunately aero- specific results of the investigation con-
space technology has seemed to come ducted by either the manufacturer or
around to the real world pleaded for on the customer? Is it really being done? •
this subject by system safety types for Answer: No!
many years. Witness DOD Instruction 13. The fear of litigation has not only re-
7041.3, "Economic Analysis of Depart- stricted information interchange con-
ment of Defen6e Investments," which cerning accident/incident investigations
states "An economic analysis is not (applies to 12 above) but also has in-
required.., when it can be shown that hibited accomplishment and dissemina-
an analysis would not.., result in in- tion of information associated with haz-
creased de c i s l o n effectiveness." (15) ard analyses.
1 Actually, the principal cont,'tbution of Comment: Sooner or later allfirmsand
hazard analysis is to make people think agencies will realize that a far greater
before the accident instead of after- risk is incurred concerning theirpossl-
wards.., not the paper result, ble culpability if it can be shown they
, 10. System c.afety costing difftcuir_tes are did not use state-of-the-art analytical
i continuing. No one seems to have found techniques at their disposal when the
an adequate formula for what should be product was designed, tested, or turned
a direct charge, _is avts an overhead over to the operator. And such tech-
charge, for system safety. Further, all nlqaes can be described ;n courtrooms .
i too often, unqualified people at the today by any number of qualified con-negotiating table are discussing safety- sultants. Whatexlsts today in thlsregardgenerated work items, is the psychological roadblock in the i
Comment: Once aga_.n, an old problem minds of most technologists concerning _
but one that is faced by anyone oper- anything related to legal proceedings, i
ating at the marketplace today. Resolu- 14. Several questions about the logic used i
tion would seem best achieved when involving the term "hazard":
solution to the next Item _isted is a. Why a "system safety hazard?" t
fox'_com!ng. (Section 4.2.4 of MIL-STD-882)
11, Safety tasks suggested byMIL-STD-882 Comment: Does it mean a hazard
are not definitive enough, to safety? 1
Comment: This would seem to be a b. A Category I hazard is called
valid criticism and will remain so until "Negligible," that is, it will not |
more ,,how-to-do-it" technology Is doc- result in personal Injury or damage. |
umentea and understood by all. The Comment: The question remains If
design safety handbooks on hand and/or it wontt cause injury or damage,
underway by some of the services are how can it be called a hazard?
a major step in this direction. However, c. The Category IV hazard is cf most
as indicated earlier system safety tasks concern.
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JComment: Number four out of how illuminated was the lack of appropriate people
many? (Besides, it is the exact oppo- at the decision points where system safety
site numbering logic than that used was needed or used. This is not just a matter
by NASA, although at one time during of education in the sense of people having a
discussion regarding the Standard, general association with the principles of
NASA's logic was the same. system safety. It is also a matter of a better
These comments regarding "hazard" understanding of the "how-to's- of system
approach the nit-picking category but safety.., the specific safety tasks that mustbe
are troublesome questions that could delineated for a given program, man-loadedin
stand some editorial correction, the work allocation process, scheduled with
Observe that some if not most of the basic the other work, and assessed as tc their effec-
problems described could be dismissed as tiveness by measures valid for the tasks that
being non-relevant to the Standard itself, and, have been performed.
• in fact, simply described as faults of the Whoever said "Safety is a responsibility,
system in which the Standard operates. But not a task" was living in aphilosophicaldream
let us take a lesson from our own system world.(17) You do not achieve accident pre-
. safety methodology. If something has prob.- vention by just appealing to people's ethical
lems, you do not just look at any single piece values, you get out and work using proven
of the action to effect corrective measures, accident prevention techniques. In this regard,
You also look at the interrelationships wher- most of the educational programs in existence
ever they exist and try to make corrections concerning system safety are just that, edu-
wherever possible within existing fiscal and cation rather than training. The sponsors .
time constraints. In the en't, then, your indi- cannot seem to afford to pay for or allocate
vidual components start looking better as well the time of their people to have each task
as the total system performance, subject covered in depth. An exception to this
SUMMARY AND REMARKS might be thought of in terms of the Fault Tree
analysis cour3e at the University of Wash-
System safety in general and MIL-STD-882 ington. However, Fault Tree is just one analy-
in particular will not remain static since the sis technique among dozens that might be used.
overall aerospace business will not remain There are many tasks besides analysis, and
static. The emphasis placed on the evaluation recognizing this, one begins to appreciate the
: phase of system procurement by DOD is one magnitude of the job of training people in the
example of change being felt now. (16) Another system safety discipline, let alone educating
is a programmed detailed review of MIL-STD- those on the periphery. !,
882 to be performed in the next few months by Appreciating the above problem, there
a committee representing the military services becomes a need for more manuals and, yes,
safety centers, specifications, when the techniques are tea- _
. It would seem that during these dynamics, sonably solidified. Another possibility would
it is encumbent upon the workers in system be a series of Aeronautical Recommended
safety to continue their professionalism and Practices (ARP's) by the Society of Auto-
dedication to the accident prevention task. motive Engineers (SAE) or similar publi-
Then, too, the system managers should try cations by the EIA G-48 Committee.* In any
to be open-minded enough to try to under- case, the discipline must be documented in
stand the contribution that can be made by every expanding fashion with constantly ira-
utilization of the principles outlined in MIL- proving professionalism if it is to compete in
STD-882 albeit they should not be satisfied the marketplace for management's dollars.
unless they are convinced a system safety One thing is to have a MIL-STD, andeven a
approach contributes positively to their mis- series of explanatory directives such as AFSCM
_ sion. This is something that can only be 127-1, (7) or the Army's AMCP 385-23. (18)
accomplished by their association with quali- |
_: fled people in the field. _
i_i Of all the problems encountered in re- *Electronics Industries Association. System Safety
search for this paper, the !tern mostfrequently _ngineering Committ_, CA8.
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It is quite another thing to have something Evaluation from the Intra-BureauSys=
quite specific to implement, terns Effectiveness Policy Committee,
Finally, as a major finding of this little RAAV 02/39_ Washington, D.C., April9,
study, a question is posed. Do we want paper 1964.
or progress? All too often in the implemen= (6) Hamilton, Col. R.M., and Capt. R. W.
tation of MIL-S=38130, MIL-So38130A, and Newton, "The Army Evaluation of MIL-
even MIL-STD-882 thus far, too many people S=58077, and Those Agencies Involved
seem to think the objective was to turn in in Its Implementation." Annals ofReli-
a specified numbei of dot.ume,ts so that a box ability ,_,,,_'-_Maintainability, Vol. 4
could be checked off for contract progress (Washington, D.C.: S par tan Books,
reports. A disproportionate amount of time July 1965).
has been spent figuring out :he paper flow (7) U.S. Air Force Systems Command,
compared to expeditious resolution of the "AFSCM 127-1, Safety Management"
dirty details of what the paper contained. January 1, 1967.
Fortunately for all of us, this "easy way out" (8) U.S. Air Force, Systems Command,
has not always been the case and things are "DH-1-6, System Safety" July 25, 1967.
improving. Ask some of the aircraft manu- (9) U.S. Departmec_t of Defense, DDR and E .
factur'_rs of those weapon systems to which Memorandum, "Safety Engineering
MIL-STD-882 has been applied. Requirements for Systems and Equip..
In conclusion, the two decades or so of ment- Specification Consolidation and
effort leading up to MIL-STD-882 has not all Tri-Servtce Coordination," August 5,
been fun and games. Nor wi!] the next two 1965.
decades be such while we advance man's (10) U.S. Department of Defense, "Standardi-
ability to control those forces of destruction zation Policies, Procedures and In-
that, in increasing fashion, he himself has structions," (Glossary)
created. But we will be working at it. (11) Supra (Paragraph 2-103)
: (12)Supra (Paragraph2-I03 and 1-204)
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INTRODUCTION The government objectives in MIL-STL,
499 are: a) the efficient engineering definition
In any undertaking there is always a corn- of a complete system; and b) the efficient
petition for resources. Decisions must be planning and control of the technical program
made for each expenditure of time and money, for the design, development, test, and evalua=
Functional and specialty groups compete for tion of the system. Contractors must provide
the funds necessary to do the best possible a logical sequence of activities and decisions
jobs within their specialty, leading to the definition of the configuration,
No one gets all the money they want and usage and support of the system and technical
each element of a total system, be it man- program for acquiring a system. The defini-
agement or technically oriented, must pre- tions established by systems engineering pro-
pare the best possible argument for their vide the basis for the subfunctions to conduct
position. Dedicated specialist groups are be- their analyses and establish their r_quire-
coming more sophisticated in their approach ments on the system. This is an it.erative
and have given up on the motherhood approach process starting with the conceptual phase and
in favor of hard facts determined from de- extending through the life of the program.
tailed analyses. The subfunctions include but are not limited to
The system safety function is no different the following: Design, Test, System Safety,
from other specialist groups in its need to Reliability, Logistics, Maintainability, Quality,
compete for limited resources. Although man Human Engineering, Configuration Control,
is inherently reluctant to settle for less than Security Engineering, and Value Engineering,
the ultimate in safety, a program manager is Other subfunctions may be added for specific "
sooner or later faced with the decision as to programs.
how safe is safe enough.
The combination of all specialist groups THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCFSS
inputs into a balanced program is essential, .
The systems engineering process is a method The basic elements of the systems engi-
that defines the system and its functions, neering process are given in Figure 1. De-
integrates the requirements of all of the sub- tailed discussion of each of the systems
functions, sets priorities for funds and time engineering elements are included in MIL-
to carry out the tasks and directs the com- STD-499 and will not be covered here. This
bination of all engineering efforts to corn- paper will address itself to the information
plete the program. By definition the system that system safety requires from systems
safety effort thereby becomes a part of the engineering, and the information that system
systems engineering process, safety provides to other subfunctions of sys-
The term systems engineering has been terns engineering.
used to describe many different things. To MIL-STD-499 requires and defines the
properly respond to the title of this paper, a preparation of the systems engineering plan. ,
baseline description of systems engineering It is recognized that this is essential to the
must be established since system safety is proper planning and control of the systems
one of the subfunctions in the systems engi- engineering program. MIL-STD-882 (3)places ,
neering process, a great emphasis on the system safety plan.
Although many of the elements of systems It requires that one be prepai _ for each
engineering had been applied before, the Air Department of Defense Program. NASA NHB
Force-375(I) series of manuals in 1964 1700.1-Vol. III (5) also specifiedthat a
focused attention to combining these elements system safety plan be prepared for each pro J-
into an engineering discipline. This series ect or program. 1
has now evolvedintoMIL-STD-499 (2), "Sys- The proper preparationand integrationof :
tern Engineering Management," which is taken these two plans is of utmost importance.
as the baseline description of the systems After they are approved by management they :i
engineering process for the purpose of this become the controlling documents for systems
paper, engineering and system safety. It is in the
148 i' _
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system safetyplan thatthe necessarilygen- iteratlveprocess, improving the system as
eral requirements of a specificationor pro- more informationbecomes available.
gram guideare merged withthespecificneeds
of a particularprogram to definetasks and Informationand Data (SeeFigure 9)
responsibilitiesto make a safety program
liveand breathe. Itis obvious thatno work can startuntil
there is some kind of system description.
SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM This is the startof the systems engineering
process and one of the most important ere-
System safety has gone through many of ments. The description must be as complete
the same growing pains as systems engl- as the program phase allows; it must be pub-
neering. The need for improved product safety ltshed to all functional elements; it must be
: was recognized and the onlyway toassureit revised as necessary and all subfunctions
. was to considertheentiresystem. The prob- must be kept aware of the revisions.This
lems ofdefinition,purpose,scope,andcharter descriptionmust include the hardware, its
ofsystem safetywere pounded intoshapeuntil intendeduse and the environment inwhich it
• riaereisnow generalacceptanceofthe system isintendedtooperate.
,_ safetydiscipline.MIL-S-38130 was published The initialsystem descriptionallowssys-
_ and later revised to MIL-STD-882. That, tem safetyengineers to start to assemble
combined with the NASA SPD-I (4)and NHB eJ(perienceretentioninformationand datato
! 1700.1 series, provides all of the baseline prepare for the analyses and trade studies
and directionnecessary for a system safety that may be needed. Informationfrom past
program. Vern Grose offers a definition for and current programs can provide the basis
I system safety (6) that illustrates its per- for the initial safety criteria and guidelines
vaslveness with the systems engineering thatshouldbe provided to the systems engl-
process (seeFigure2). neers and designers.Range safetydocuments,
The successfuland cost effectiveimple- government standards and codes and docu-
I mentation of the safetyprogram requires ments such as the Air Force System Gem-
informationto be availableor developed.The mand Handb_)k DH I-6 (7)are sources for
resultsofthe safetyanalysesandotherefforts much of the initialinformationneeded. The
i must flow to other organizationsto become experience retentiondata accumulated by
useful.Figures 3-8 show a simplifiedflowof other subfunctionshouldalsobe made avail-
a typicalsystem safetyprogram. The sections able In a data center to avoid duplicationof
| thatfollowwilldiscussthisflowofInforma- materials. Reliability,maintainabilityand
, tlon,how itisused by system safetyand how human factorsexperience data must also be :
the rest of the systems engineeringsubfunc- consideredby system safety.
tionsare affected. Preliminary system safetyrequirements
The basic tasks of any system safety pro- can be established from this initial data. For ?
gram can be grouped into four basic headings: example, ordnance design requirements are
1) the assembly of information and data; well established and can often be taken
• 2) the analysis of that information and data to directly from past programs. 1he use of
determine the hazards to the system and the fuels and propellants may require lga,,rlon
probability of the hazards resulting in accl- proofIng or explosion proof equipments.
dents; 3) the establishment of preventive Nuclear power sources require specialshield-
measures through requlrementsandstsndards; Ing and handling. These and many other
and 4) a follow-up activity that assures the obvious requirements are provided to systems
requirements and standards are included in engineering to be included in the systems '_
the design and operation of the syt,_em and requirements. It is else advisable to start s
that they are adequate. Ideally, the tasks system safety requirements document thatcan
should be started at the conceptual phase and be used as a checklist during design reviews,
upgraded throughout the life cycle, through an flight readiness reviews and audits.
i "
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System Safety Analyses (See Figure I0) requirements that must be imposed on the
system to make tt safe enough.
The systems engineering Inputs given on The system description, functional flows
Figure 9 must be available to allow a ecru-
and rime line analyses provide the basis for
plete and effective safety analysis. The sys- the system safety analyst to identify the
tern description, functional flows and time hazardous elements and conditions inherent
line analysis must be current and controlled in the system. The information may be aria-
by configuration control to assure that all lyzed, using a tabular format such as the
subfunettons of systems engineering are con- Preliminary Hazard Analysis or the logic
slderlng the same system, network format of the fault tree analysis, if
The system safety analyses must: a) iden- the output required is qualitative, which is
tlfy the hazardous elements, hazardous con-
usually the ease in early program phases,
dttlons and potential accidents that could the time line data, functional flows and hard-
occur; b) determine their potential effects on
ware descriptions are adequate. If a complete
the system; c) determine the probability of risk evaluation is to be made and a numerical
their occurrence (qualitative or quantitative); requirement for safety is Imposed in the sys-
and d) provide adequate detail to direct the tern, more definitive design data is required. "
corrective action necessary to control the This Information often is provided by relta-
hazards to an acceptable level, biltty specialists. The failure mode and effect
Mission goals and objectives must be con- analysis contains most of the information
slder'ed in the emphasis given to system
i needed. Care must be taken to consider the
safety.A much higherrisk may have to be Failure Modes and EffectsAnalysis(FMEA)
takenIna weapons system witha highprlority resultsfrom a safetyviewpoint which can
• for early use than would be acceptable on a have a different criticality than the effect on
i_ manned space station.The system safety reliability.function, along with others in the systems
engineeringprocess, must identifylevelsas- Hazard Identification
soctated with trades against cost, weight,functional capabilities, and other system con- Experience retention, in the form of data
stralnts, taken from previous programs and personal
i The system requirements of other sub= experience ofquallfiedsystem safetyperson=
i functionsmust be known to system safety nel,providesthe basisfor theinitialidentifi-
engineers so they can be considered in the cationof hazardous elements and conditions.
safetyanalyses.More will be said of re= High energy levels,hazardous environments,
quirements later.The reliabllity,maintain- toxicgases,and structuralproblems aresome
ability,logistics,and functionaldesign re- of the firstconsiderations.The type of fuel
qulrements may conflict with the safety to be used dictatesthe Ignitionproofingre=
requirements.The safetyanalysesmust show qulrements thatmust be imposed. The use of
any conflictand provide enbugh detailtoan- explosives 'requiresmany well established "
ablecorrectiveactiontobe taken, requirementstobe imposed.
System safetyhas been critlzedfora great The environmentthe system Isintendedto
proliferationof analyses.As many as thirty- operate In dictatesre_Jlrement_for adequate "
fivedifferentanalyseshave been listed.Some oxygen,thermalprotection,shock or acceler-
efforthas been expended inattemptstOstand- atlonlimits,etc.Safetyfactorsfor pressure
ardlze on several specified analyses with vessels and basic structures must be estab-
little success. Standardization of an analysis ltshed with proper consideration for the func-
method is not the proper approach at this tlonal use of the equipment. For instance,
time. Specification of an output resulting from the Safety factors for pressure vessels on
a credible artalysis is appropriate. Some out- uhmarmed systems can be much less than for
puts of system safety analyses are shown on manned systt,ns. However, care must be
Figure I0. The main inputs supplied to the ' taken to be sure that such tanks are not
systems engineering process are the rafety pressurized when personnel are 'maintaining
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the system or checking it out for launch. The category, and the recommended preventive
Identification of hazards continues throughout measure to control the hazard.
the entire safety program. As more Is learned
about the system, additional hazards become Probability of Occurrence
apparent. All hazardous elements and condi-
tions should be recorded and action taken to
The amount of resources that will be ap-
control them to prevent accidents, piled in preventive measures depends not
only on the potential eff_'ct, but also on Its
Hazard Potential Effect probability of occurrence. An excellent ex-
ample of this is the potential of meteorite
The emphasis given to the control of damage to spacecraft. The effect of a mete-
hazardous elements Is dependent on thepoten- ortte hit would be catastrophic. However, the
ttal effect or accident that could occur ff con- probability of significant hits is so small thatD
trol of the hazardous element is lost. This resources have been diverted from meteorite
part of the analysis looks at all possible ways protection to more effective areas in the
an accident could occur. The probability of spacecraft.
the event occurring will be considered later. There are two methods of determining the
" There are two ways this part of the analysis probability of occurrence of accidents. The
i may be conducted. The analysis may start at qualitative approach such as probable, pos-
the part level and continue through the sub- sible or improbable can be used. This ap-
system and consider the system as a whole, proach is very subjective and must be based on
The analysis can also start as a top down empirical data, experience retention or just
analysis, such as the fault tree analysis, plain engineering Judgment. It is used on most
which starts with an undesired event, and safety programs today. The quantitative ap-
then goes down through all series of events proach uses the best failure, and statistical
that could occur to yield the undesired event, data to determine more accurate probabilities
Single thread failure analyses are helpful but of an event occurring. A method of using
multiple failures must be considered to make FMEA data in a Fault Hazard Analysis pro-
the analyses complete. A fuel leak may in- vides some degree of quantification. The
crease the hazard !*_vel but a catastrophic most thorough method is the Fault Tree
event may not occur without an ignition Analysis which is used on weapons systems
source. In the case of hypergolic fuels, two such as Minuteman and the Short Range At-
leaks may be necessary, tack Missile (SRAM) where the undesired
The potential effect may be categorized as event is so serious that a numerical limit is
" catastrophic, critical, marginal, or negligible imposed by the customer. The Fault Tree
as is required by MIL-STD-882 and NASA Analyses may be used for either qualitative
NHB 1700.1. This grouping enables increased or quanitative analyses. It has been described
• emphasis to be given tO the worst category, in numerous papers (9, I0, II) and is docu- i
However, all of the hazards and their poten- mented in D2-I13072-2, (12) "System Safety !tlal effect should be listed and provided to Analytical Technology- Fault Tree Analy- i
' systems engineering. This data is essential sis."
and must be considered during trade-off i
studies. Also, each of the items listed should Corrective Action
be closed out to show what preventive actions _have been taken to prevent an accident from The output of system safety analyses is| occurring. The hazard analysis format estsb- shown on Figure 10. Each of them are of lm-
i llshed in D2-113072-1, (8) "System Safety portance to systems engineering. Some ofAnalytical Technology- Preliminary Hazard them such as inputs to trade stt,_'es andAnalysis," provides for the tabulation and critical systems lists can be uses .rectly.
| recording of the identification of the hazard, The safety requirements that result from the
subsystems involved, the potential effect, the analysis will be covered later. The systems
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engineering approach provides the way for program. The system safety design require-
the system safety input to be integrated into merits document provides an excellent base-
the mainstream engineering effort and to line for safety review. The design can easily
cause the implementation of the corrective be reviewed against the requirements and
action that is necessary to assure a safe extra emphasis can be given to looking for
system, weak points tn the safety program. System
safety sign-off should be required at all such
Safety Requirements (See Figure 11) reviews.
The _ystems engineering process defines Drawing Reviews
the system and then establishes the require-
ments for what must be included in thesystem System safety requirements should indi-
design and operation. The system safety re- care which drawings require safety review
quirements initiated from experience reten- and sign-off. In some programs all drawt,_gs
tion data are upgraded as more information is must be signed off by safety. In less hazard-
obtained from the above analyses. As men- ous programs only those items that are
tioned earlier, they also include appropriate termed critical to safety receive such sign-
standards and guidelines developed for other off. Again the control inherent in the systems
programs. When combined into a single docu- engineering process provide the means for
ment they are readily available to all levels system safety to carry out its function.
of the contractor and customer organizations.
: The requirements document should be dividedi Configuration Control
t into design requirements and operational re-
quirements. Design requirements include the It is not enough to prove that the initial
systems requirements and more specific re- design is safe. As stated earlier, all sub..
quirements for each of the subsystems tom- functions of systems engineering must be
ponents and parts. Operating requirements aware of all changes to the system. This is
specify what must be included in procedures especially true of system safety. Some of the
to enable the as-designed system to operate worst accidents in past programs have been
safely, caused by lack of safety considerations of
changes to the system. This includes changes
System Safety Assurance (See Figure 12) to operating procedures as well as design
changes. System safety should have the same
System safety assurance is used by this
sign-off responsibility on changes as it does
, writer to include all of the safety effort ex- on design reviews. Here again the s,,stems
pended to assure that the design and operst- engineering change control provides the means
lng safety requirements are included In the for system safety to "work within the system"
system and that they are adequate. Figure 12 to carry out its functional responsibilities.
lists the activities involved. The systems
engineering process control of the technical
program includes reviews, trade studies, SUMMARY
change control, and audits. System safety
must participate in these activities to assure The primary purpose of systems engineer-
that safety is included in the design and op- Ing is to assure the optimum allocation of
eratlon of the system, resources to achieve mission objectives. Con-
sequently, the entire system safety program
Program and Design Reviews is aimed at achieving the safest system pos-
sible within program constraints and to further
_ The entire series of program and design assure that this safety level is adequate. A
reviews provide an excellent opportunity for decision of a program manager that a system
system safety to follow-up on the safety is safe enough is a difficult one at best. To
152
1972018311-141
the extent that the system safety program Rail Transit Conference, San Fran-
can contribute toward that decision withmean- cisco, California, 13-16 April 1971,
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SESSION IV
• QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
JERRY LEDERER: I don't have a ques- civil aviation business, the application of
tion, I have an observation. That is in con- system safety, including light planes.
nection with Mr. Packard's statement that he
wants to withdraw all the disciplines of safety MR. MILLER: First of all I think like any
and put them back into basic engineering. I safety program document, if you look around
have another document of his which requires when you think about applying it, you'll find
that a hazard analysis shall be made on hard- that its elements are already being applied.
ware, and I don't see how he can reconcile I think this is true if you think of 882 in a
. the two points of view. I am using that last civil aviation environment. For example, the
document within NASA to promote further FAA in recent years has undertaken what they
interest in system safety, call a Systems Worthiness Analysis Program
c DR. BALL: Could I comment on that which is another term for a form of audit.
Chuck. I think this is an important point, Certainly, these things are going on in the en-
consistent wi_.h what Mr. Lederer has been tire system, not just the FAA. The SST Pro-
pushing himself for several years. The need gram had safety work in it. John can tell you
for a risk analysis or even in the case of the that the 747 had quite a bit of effort along
Boeing Company, the Board of Directors re- this line. On the other hand, there are things
quiring a risk-study report at the beginning that are not being done. As a matter of fact,
of each prograr:, in which all the risks, risk the Safety Board had addressed two of these
of cost overrun, schedule slippage, the risks things in the past year, ff I recall, one was
.... of failure-to ._chieve a- reqtrlred technical ........ in connection-withe commuter airliner prob-
characteristic like flight speed or safety lem in which there was a control system
reliability, this I think Is very much in its failure which was one of the Board's specific
ascendancy. Now of course Mr. Packard, I recommendations to the FAA to consider in
believe, and others are looking for the main an 882-type ha=ard analysis. A similar
stream program manager and chief engineer recommendation the Board made involved the ....
to submit these risk-study reports. You then FAA's ATC system, their traffic control
have the safety engineer as one of the staff system. We looked, and this happened to be a
men helping the main stream. This is my general aviation case out in your area, Jack, ;
overall point. The need for the services of where a controller misidentified or I should
the system safety engineer are increasing but say failed to identify a certain target on his
it is as a staff to the main stream action, radar scope and proceeded to have his air-
not as an independent staff working inde- craft fly into a mountain as a result. Our
pendently of the main stream, question was, and it turned out to be a rec- :-
MR. MILLER: Yes, I would definitely like ommendation, why don't you apply hazard
to comment on that. I don't know who of re- analysis techniques to the man/machine en-
• pute in ,:hebusinesshas ever suggestedthat vironment situationexistinginan ATC Center.
safetywas otherthanwhat you Justdescribed. In other words, theseare highlyanalogousto
If such a situation was led to take place, I problems that NASA faces when they are
will point the finger at the management of looking at say a launch problem. I willsay _the organizationswho allowedthistohappen, thisthough,Ithinktheincorporationofsome-
thing like 882 in civil aviation would be an
QUESTION: My question is directed to even tougher Job than it is in DoD for this
Chuck Miller.Chuck, we have heard an awful reason,you have a very elusivebuyer-a611er-
lot today aboutMIL-STD 882 and theapplica- regulatorrelationship.Especiallywhen you go
tion of this to weapons systems, but woutd across the fullspectrum ofaircraftfrom say
I you care to forecast how thislooks in the an air carrier, which is relativelyhighly
E
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Lregulated, to a general aviation operation be done at this time on manuals and specifica-
which is in a relatively low regulatory status, tions at all levels in our organization and
So I am saying, it is a tough job. The thiDg I wgnder what you think.
that is missing to me is that when I look at DR. BALL: I'd like to express a similar
civil aviation and compare it with the DoD thought but change the emphasis a little to-
- approach to system safety, I don't see a wards check list. For example, after the
system safety program plan. I don't know who Apollo 13 experience which I think was a
you go to in a civil aviation business and magnificent tribute to pre-planning and pre-
i honestly ask a question about a new aircraft analysis in that it allowed corrective action
; being introduced or a major modification to take place, there were lessons to be
; oeing made, who really has this thing laid out learned there. The question is now, show me
in total program planning fashion. Right now how the lessons learned have been fed back.
' I think the answer is no one. I would submit Now you can say, well, we changed this
that this is the first step. I think we will paragraph of this policy or this paragraph of
: evolve into it whether it is called MIL-STD- this specification but I think we need the
882, FAR, or whatever it is, but yes I think check list as the connecting link. We should
_hes¢: principles are going to rub off, I think show the check list items for liquid oxygen
. they already have and I expect to see more of tanks; the check list items for configuration
i it. management, because there were some prob-MR. MCGUIRE: Chuck, I have a question lems there. Those check lists can then get
along that line. Wouldn't you think some of the fed into the University teaching courses we
i seller-buyer relationships that Dr. Ball dis- heard abouL this morning, they can get fed
i cussed might figure in civil aviation, corn- into the next revisions of our policies andmercial particularly, specifications. But, because it takes so long
CHUCK MCGUIRE: Definitely, as a matter to negotiate in our democratic w_y to get a
]_ of fact,_ tw___9_vears - eke_ the_re ,',ere some spec out, I think we've got to do a much
rather interesting discussions at the top levels better job of formal conversion of experience
of the Air Transport Association about the in the check 1_.st form.
possibility of them instituting the MIL-STD- CHUCK MCGUIRE: You are leading into
38-130A in some modified fashion for induv- my favorite subject and you and I both are
try, that is, between the airline/industry aware of the effort now going on in Skylab to
operators and manufacturers. I never have come up with a check list similar to the one
fully understood why this suddenly came to a you have described.
halt but at least it was explored at that time, JACK FRENCH: I would like to say that
about two years ago. at MSC for each mission safety has to stand
', GEORGE CRANSTON: I have a comment up and be counted as to whether we feel there
and then a question. I think we have had two are acceptable or unacceptable risks, etc.
very fine sessions and I want to express my We stand up along with other directorates
appzectatlon to the speakers and to the Chair- such as Flight Crew Operations, Flight Op-
man for this personally. I think probably we eratlons Directorate and various engineering
would all like to do that. I suggest we give and program offices. This requires a backup
them a hand. Second, I think one of the most of a knowledgeable assessment group to as-
significant things we have heard in this con- sess the engineering and operations aspects
ference was brought out this morning, the throughout the "life-cycle" of the operation.
fact that we need or I have felt we need more You can't Just rely, on the design engineers to
work, specificwork done by individualson give you this.You need an independentgroup
developing specificationsthat Chuck and of very knowledgeable people who have as
Dr. Ball brought out,and implementing our much knowledge abouta system designas the
l standardsand our general guidelinesthatwe system designersthemselves.I Justwant to
have now. I think we have let up on this and bring this out, that 1 feel that we do need an
are resting on the laurels of trying to go independent group. At MSC we do have a group
wJth the standard. A lot more work needs to of people, they are support contractors who
/
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support us in this effort. I might add that at processed them and provided them to our
MSC also within the safety group is the con- mechanical designers, etc., this is the op-
tinuity of experience from Mercury to Gemini portunity for the contractor to tell us, during
to Apollo and Sky]ab that you don't have in too the competitive period. Once youhave selected
many departments, a contractor, then I think we should pull out
MILTON: I _ubmit one to Dr. Bail. One all the stops in telling him everything we
of the problems I think that we are going to know. I think we should say, now look, lets sit
have to face is that we can't afford to have down together and go over the total available
anything less than absolute maximum safety knowledge and the sources of information that
in any program we've got. Just as you men- are available. The contractor may or may not
tioned, now NASA is so loaded with good pick that up and use it and through the award
experienced data with problems faced, con- fee, then I want to trace the usage of funds.
quered, and now put completely to bed hope- For instance, if I can get _ or l 7ofor safety
• fully that will not arise on something like out of a 15_o fee I want to be able to check on
the Space Shuttle. Do you think we can afford the use of those resources. Is it evident the
anything less than having all the possible data contractor's design decisions really are tap-
to give to each contractor and then do a ping all this knowledge? I think the appeal you
safety evaluation merely on the organization made, don't hold back anything you know, I
and the experience rather than in the approach agree with, but the time I wlsb to feed that in
. to it. Again, as you pointed out on the chart, is after contract award.
sometimes safety people are only talking to CHUCK OVERBEY, KSC: Itd like to
safety but as we have experienced in both amplify one point made by Mr. Miller and
DoD and NASA programs, safety usually that has to do with the commercial aviation
_: doesn't count a single solitary point when it field. First, those of us who have worked withr
comes to selection of a contractor. I don't military missiles and in the case of NASA
think simply having a_safety plan i_ with the veh|c1_,s and spacecraft, a lot of us
someplace that it is recognized because feel that we have had a free ride and in many
i everything else is tied to the speed capabtl- ways we have, from a safety viewpoint. We
i ity, the altitude capability and all of these have been the designers, we have been the
I other performance items. Therefore safety buyers, and we have been the operato,'_. As
usually only comes into being when you are such we have been able to specify safety
i finally in a negotiation and actually imple- measures from one end to the other. When
menting the program and yet it has, as I say, you get into the commercial field, in particu-
i zero weight in the selection of a contractor, lar general aviation, that is a different world.
; i Therefore, by giving every cent.rector as I was with the CAA for about 10½ years and
much of this data as you have available, even you just don't dictate beyond a certain point.
i though it is all the same, you are not really A light airplane in particular is a consumer
putting one in contention against another, product and it Is a different situation entirely.
• DR. BALL: I think that is a very fine Take the Bonanza, light airplane built by i
question. Let me be clear that my answer is Beech, it costs about $100 for a 100 hour in-per onal and do sn't r p esent a NASA post- sp ctton. Everyttme you fly the airplane for :
i tion. The answer is in two steps. During the one hour you have to devote a dollar to In-
contractor selection process I personally spectton. That is the minimum requirement
favor asking the contractor,what are you for FAA. Ifyou go on and on withrequire-
going to do to assure safety7If he tellsme ments, you willfindthatprettysoon you no
for instance,he has had the initiativeto go longerhave a consumer product.!
to MSC where Jack French and Marry Ralnes JERRY LEDERER: I would liketo rein-
i have got some very fine documents such as force that.For threeyears Iwas incharge of
i safetyhazard catalogs,and he has takenthose all civilair regulationsand we were dealing
" catalogs from MSC; he has picked up other with a very difficultsituationas Chuck has
thingsfrom fry Pinkel at LeRC and inte- Justmentioned.NASA and DoD are virtually
! grated theseintohisdesigndecisionprocess, autocracies; they can dictate.You can't _
I! is9
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dictate in civil aviation. You can do so more up in meetings within the past year and do a
with the public carriers Involved like the 180° in terms of the basle philosophy towards
airlines, but not where general aviation is safety. There was a rime not too long ago
concerned. I recall in 1940 we had a case of when some of the light plane manufacturers
a man chartering an airplane In Willtamsport would stand up and say, "We are safe, every-
to fly to Newark, getting caught in weather thing we do is for safety and besides, let's
with a commercial pilot, and getting killed not bring it out in the open because tha_ will
because he lost control of the airplane, hurt sales." I have since heard some very
I Immediately instituted procedures to require powerful people in that business stand up and
all commercial pilots who offer themselves say, "We know that we cannot survive as an
out for hire to have instrument ratings, and industry without increased effort on safety."
the hue and cry against that proposal was What I am suggesting here ts that there is
terrific. First of all we were told there were an awareness of a more difficult problem,
not enough instructors to give the necessary but there is also an increasing awareness, as ,
Instruction and they felt it would be a drag I see it in civil aviation, on the consequences
on the industry. This dragged on for a long of failure in inadequate safety programs.
time and then the war started and saved me This is litigation influence? I don't know:
from further problems. This is the way it Is it the influence of the overall public con-
goes, it Isntt like working for NASA or DoD eern for safety? I don't know, but it is there.
when you get into civil aviation. General aviation people, manufacturers, op-
MR. BOLGER: I would like to add a poet- erators are more acutely aware of the failures
script to that and something Hank back there due to lack of a good safety program today
commented on. You know, I think you made a than I think they ever ,"ere before.
statement that you don't win a program he- JOHN GRISWOLD: This will be Just an-
cause of a safety effort but you can sure lose othez postscript to the comment from thei
_ the follow-on without it, This same feeling back of the room. Just recalling within this
i pops up in the civil aviation field. I have year, 1971, and seeing the results of some
: found, and you might call it a threat if you debrieflngs, I know of two contract awards
i want to, but I have seen airlines, small ones which the statement was made, somewhat like
albeit, put out of business because of accident this, that the proposed safety program that
i problems. I have seen some big ones get was described in that proposal had a stgnffl-
awfully concerned over potential accidents and cant impact in the selection of the winning
take action wlatch they might not otherwise contractor. You can interpret significant im-
have taken. I have hear_ Presidents of the pact anyway you want, but it is something
General Aviation Manufacturers companies get bigger than zero as far as I am concerned.
i
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INTRODUCTION The Jet Propulsion Laboratory is respon-
sible for managing the Orbiter System, and the
Before discussing project safety I would Tracking and Data System. Figure 3 showsthe
like to give you a brief description of the Viking Spacecraft. The lander is enclosed in a
Viking Project, the Management asstgnments bioshield and is shown attached to the bottom
and the space flight hardware, of the orbiter in this figure. The spacecraft is
The Viking Project is part of a program attached to the launch vehicle in an inverted
for the exploration of Mars with the use of un- position from that which is shown. The Orbiter
manned spacecraft. The objective of the mis- System is responsible for providing the orbiter
sion is to significantly advance the knowledge and the adapters on both the lander side and the
of the planet Mars by direct measurements in launch vehicle side.
the atmosphere and on the surface. Observa- The Tracking and Data System provides the
t.tons of the planet will be made during the ap- ground based system of tracking stations and
proacb and from orbit. Particular emphasis communications networks required to fly the ,
will be placed on obtaining information con- spacecraft and receive data; however, there is
cerning biological, chemical, and environ- no flight hardware provided by this system.
mental factors relevant to the existence of life In addition to overall Project management .
on the planet at this time, at some time in the the Viking Project Office at Langley has re-
past, or the potentials for the development of sponstbflity for managing the Lander System
life at a future date. Two spacecraft, each con- and the Launch and Flight Operations System.
sisting of an orbiter and a sterilized lander Figure 4 shows the Lander System flight hard-
capsule, will be launched separately by Titan/ ware. The Lander System consists of the
Centaur launch vehicles from Cape Kennedy lander; an aerodecelerator system consisting
during the 1975 Mars launch opportunity. The of an aeroshell, a base cover, and a parachute;
orbiters will be used to insert the landers into and a bioshield to protect the lander from bin-
orbit about Mars. Scientific instruments , ,n the logical contamination after sterilization. The
orbiters will be used to obtain data to aid in the Launch and Flight Operations System does not
i selection of landing sites. Each lander after provide any flight hardware but does utilize
i separating from its respective orbiter will soft hardware provided by the Orbiter and Lander
+ land on the surface of Mars and transmit Systems in performing its responsibility to
! scientific data back to earth for a minimum of conduct spacecraft launch and flight opera-
90 days. ttons.
i I should point out here that the position of
PROJECT MANAGEMENT Project Safety Officer is a stafffunctionwtthln
the Viking Project Office and reports directly
•: The Office of Space Science and Appltca- to the Project Manager.
tions, Office of Planetary Programs at NASA
! Headquarters is responsiblefor the Viking
i Program Management. The Langley Research THE PROJECT SAFETY PLAN +
Center,Viking ProjectOffice,has responsi-
bilityforoverallVikingProjectmanagement. Next Iwould llketo talkaboutthedevelop-
The Projectisdividedintofivemajor systems ment oftheVikingProjectSafeW Plan,how the
as shown on Figure I. The Lewis Research requirement for such a plan was established, ,_
Center is responsible for managing the Launch and what I feel the plan does for Project Man-
Veh'cle System. Figure 2 shows the Viking agement in emphasizing and controlling safety.
Space Vehicle. The space vehicle is composed The safety program on an unmanned NASA
of the Titan Ill, the Centaur, the Orbiter, the spacecraft project begins with the signing of the ,
Lander, and the nose fairing. LeRC, as Launch Project Approval Document. This is the/nit/al Ii
Vehicle Management Cen_er, is responsible for document which authorizes project go-ahead
providing the Titan, the Centaur, the nose fair- and ass/gns the system level management func-
lng, and for space vehicle integration. Space ttons which were described to you earlier. In
Vehicle Launch Management has beenassigned the Project Approval Document each System
to the Kennedy Space Center. Manager is assigned _he respons/b/I/ty for '
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safety of his system. He is required to per- accomplish to ensure an integrated safety
form that function in accord with the require- program.
ments of the NASA Basic Policy on Safety and If the Project Safety Plan does not establish
the NAS,_, Safety Manual. requirements and is not directive in nature,
The next step in developing the safety pro- what value does it have to the Project and the
gram is to include the safety task tn the Proj- safety program7 I feel there are several lm-
ect Plan. This is the top management document portant functions that the Project Safety Plan
for the Project and records the Project obJec- accomplishes. These are shown on Figure 5.
rives and various management arrangements First, preparationoftheplan requires tech-
for the Project including safety. It is signedby nlcal interchange between safety personnel of
each System Manager, the Center Director for the various systems early in the program. Cer-
each participating NASA Center, and approprl- tainly a plan Is not required to have such an
ate NASA Headquarters management person- interchange but It does provide a focalpoint for
• nel. The Viking Project Plan places overall re- such discussions. Next, the plan identifies the
zponsibtlity for Project Safety with the Project detailed responsibilities for each System and
Manager, with each System Manager being the Project Office. The Project Approval Docu-
• responsible for safety of his system. The ProJ- ment and the Project Plan are general in na-
ect Plan also states that the Project Safety ture whereas the Safety Plan shows the speciflc
Officer is responsible for developing and tasks to be performed in fulfilling the general
implementing a Project Safety Plan. Imple- responsibility. Third, the detailed safety re-
mentation of that plan will be the method of quirements are consolidated in a single docu-
controlling Project Safety. merit. As I stated earlier, the requirements we o
The requirement for a Safety Plan having must meet are in existence. They are, however,
been established, the task now becomes one of located in many documents and the Safety Plan
producing a useful document. During the time is an excellent method of consolidating these
that the Project Plan was in an early stage oz requirements into a single document. Finally,
development and it was known that a Safety and I feel this is the most important function - .......
Plan would be required, a work statement was of the plan, it provides a method for review of
being prepared for development of the Lander the total Safety Program by top level NASA
System and Project Integration. As part of ff,e safety management personnel. This review
integration support to the Project Office t[,e ensures those of us working safety at the
contractor was required to prepare a Project Project level that our planning is in c,_ncert
Safety Plan• Martin Marietta Corporation, with basic NASA Safety Policy,
Denver Division, was selected for this effort I have discussed up l:o th/s point why we
and did prepare, under the direction of the have a Safety Plan on the Viking Project and
Viking Project Office, the Project Safety the function it serves. Now I would Hketo dis-
Plan• cuss the contents of the Plan with emphasis on
During preparation of the Safety Plan two the system safety requirements. The Safety
• basic facts that were mentioned a few moments Plan is divided into three basic sections with
ago had to be considered. First, the safety the first being an introduction. The second sec- !
responsibilities had already been assigned by tion deals with organization and responsibiU-
the Project Approval Document and the Project des. The Plan covers the responsibilities Ihave
Plan and, second, the basic safety require- already discus3ed but In muchmoredetail. The
meL_s we were to meet were already in third section of the Plan gives the Viking
ex/stence. These requirements are contained Safety Program Requir" menCs and I would like
in t1_ NASA Safety Manual, NHB 1700.1, to discuss these in some detail.
VolUme II KSC - KMI 1710.1A; and the Range
Safety Manual, AFETR 127-I. With these
conslderaClons in m/nd it was decided that VIKING SAFETY PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS
plan should not be d/rective In nature but,
rathW, should identify within a single docu- The two new major pieces of fl/ghthardware
merit *_bcme requirements which each. System to make a first space flight on Viking are the
Manage" and the Viking Project Office must Lander and the Orbiter. Referring to Figure 6, ,
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our first requirement is that a detailed safety been identified each potential hazard will be
plan be prepared for each of these systems, categorized according to the risk associated
These lower level plans will show both the with the hazard. A hazard reduction precedence
system safety and operational safety tasks sequence is established in the Safety Plan and
to be performed. Also included will be sections will be applied to each hazard which is identl-
on industrial safety, and personnel training and fled through the analyses or through any of the
certification. Our next requirement is related routine project reviews. The first item in the
to safety at the launch site. We have consoli- sequence is to design for minimum hazard. If
dated the requirements of the Kennedy Space a hazard is identified and can be reduced by a
Center and the Air Force Eastern Test Range desigh change, such a change will be requested.
into a single grouping which shows those docu- When a hazard cannot be reduced through a de-
ments and procedures which must be prepared sign change, a safety device shall be incor-
by the Project and approved by appropriate porated into the system. Where it is not pos-
launch site agencies prior to launch. Next there sible to preclude the existence or occurrence
are requirements in the area of industrial of a known hazard, warning devices shall be
safety and for each participant to prepare an used to permit early detection of the hazardous
accident incident reporting plan. These two condition. Finally, special procedures shall be
items are reasonably standard safety require- used to reduce the magnitude of ahazard where
ments so I won't go into details on them. it is not possible to elimxnate it. Data on those
The Viking Lander will receive electrical hazards which are in a category that could re-
power from two on-board Radiosotope Tbermo- suit in death or disabling injuries to personnel,
electric Generators. Use of these devices re- irreparable damage to the space vehicle, or
quires approval of the National Aeronautics damage to any ground equipment causing more
and Space Council and its decision is based on than a 24 hour delay in the launch will be
a Safety Analysis Report. This report is pre- placed in the Viking Project Hazard Catalog.
pared by the Atomic Energy Commission and is Hazard catalog inputs will be provided by
_ based on data packages prepared by the Viking each system and the catalog will be maintained
Project participants. The Project Safety Plan by the integrating contractor for the Project
includes a section on the requirements for these Office. First inputs will be made at or near each
data packages and the responsibilities for pre- system preliminary design review and will be
paring them. maintained thereafter until launch. This catalog
Another requirement we have is for a will be the method by which Project Manage-
Launch Readiness Review report on the status ment is provided a record of the status of each
of safety. I would like to delay discussion on hazard so h'mt the proper assessment of the
this until later because it is related to some hazard can be made and appropriate manage..
points I want to make on how the project will ment action token when required.
monitor and control safety.
Last, but certainly not least in the order of MANAGEMENT REVIEW
importance, are the requirements in the area
of system safety. The purpose of system safety The responsibilities have been assigned in
is to avoid injury to personnel and to avoid any detail and the requirements to be met by the
loss or damage to property. To accomplish this Project have been identified, It is now the re-
our first requirement is to identify all potential sponsihlRy of each system manager to imple.-
hazards and to eliminate them where possible, ment those requirements within his system.
When elimination is not possible we want to re- As part of the overall management responsi..
duce the hazard within practical limits. We then billty the Project Manager and Ida staff will
want to keep all levels of management aware of review and monitor the safety effort being ac-
these residual hazards so that they may assess complished by the system managers. To per-
the risk involved in proceeding with the launch, form this function the project has established
Potential hazards will be identified through a series of incremental reviews for each aye- |
analyses to be made of both the hardware de- tern culminating in a final Launch Readine
sign and proposed operations. After they have Review two weeks prior to the first isv !
ti
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These reviews cover all aspects of each system CONCLUDING REMARKS
including safety. Inclusion of the safety effort
in these project reviews ix considered an ira.. In conclusion I would like to say that it was
portant part of the Viking safety program. This not necessary to sell the importance of a good
action brings to the attention of project man- safety program to Viking Management. _afety
agement those items which are being worked has been an important element of the Project
by safety personnel, it allows an open dis- since its inception. A very good safety plan has
cussion of these items by a review panel with been developed; however, at this point in time
expertise in many technical areas, and it per- the flight hardware is still in design and the
mtts a method of tracking safety items to de- effectiveness of our safety program is unknown.
termine that a proper resolution of the item Our goal is no accidents or incidents and two
has been made. successful landings on Mars in 1976.
1
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SYSTEM SAFETY APPLICATION IN THE after the thinking process had culminated in an
OPERATIONAL PHASE end concept. The manufacturer could easily
envision the end product differently from a
The operational phase of aprogram assures process standpoint and, gentlemen, this pro=
completion of flight test programs and demon- cess analysis from a System Safety standpoint
stration of operational capability. It is mission desperately needs to be accomplished early in
performance. Support of this activity from a the program.
System Safety standpoint is failure analyses,
hardware changes, procedural changes, acci- We need to:
dent/Incident analyses, and a great amount of
involvement In ground operations. However, 1. Look at facilities for emergency backup
the operational phase really starts further back power, electrical protection against
than at mission performance. I say this because main power fluctuations, work platform
one never finishes destgutng and manufacturing locations, deluge systems, lighting,
the system since requirements seem to change noise, accessability. The relationship of
calling for improvements in the system. In this this equipment on the end product.
respect I consider the manufacturing, testing 2. Develop requirements for support items
and material handling an important element of such as work stands, hoisting, confined
the operational phase and should be treated as entry, emergency procedures, safety
such. critical operations such as welding and
No one disagrees with the concept pressure tests.
that a good, safe product starts with the de- 3. Conduct hazard analyses o the manu-
signer. System Safety effectiveness also starts facturing flow and develop disciplines to
there. During its short life. the major emphasis eliminate or reduce these hazards prior
of System Safety has been in engineering and to the start of manufacturing operations.
we can find voluminous material on System We have learned the hard way that playing
Safety engineering management, System Safety "catch up" is expensive and very hard on the
engineering, System Safety analysts, and so nerves, I might add. Lack of analysis has been
forth. With the emphasis on engineering, we the culprit in many instances, leading toward
sometimes forget that System Safety is a destruction of space boosters, test articles
totally encompassing task, as the word system and components. Lack of process control has
implies. As a result, important processes in led to untold embarrassing Pituations. The
the total system go unattended. Whatgood does accidents are often times shrugged off under
it do to engineer a functional, safe product; the umbrellas of statements that "to err is
build it on time within budgeted cost; thenhave human," "Murphy's law," and the like. It ts
it damaged by inattentive handling or worse yet often said, "We have time to do the job over,
' by not having handling equipment because the but never enough time to do the Job right the
interface was not there. Someone forgot-- first time." All of these so=calledexplanations
someone overlooked. We need to stop and eval- are, in my opinion, unacceptable crutches and
uate the total System Safety process to assure ways to avoid the basic problem. Many times
we really are talking about a "system" oriented we design traps for the men in ma:_ufacturing,
program, test, and material handling. They need a good
I'll cover System Safety concern in manu- process analysis that can identify for them
facturtng, test operations, material handling, situations that are hazardous to the product as
and flight test and flight operational phases, well as ways to protect them from personal
The reason for including manufacturing, test injury. They need to be reminded about safety
operations, and material handling is that is an features required to assist them In doing the i
area that has lacked proper System Safety con- Job right the first time.
cern. Let's back up a little and ask ourselves t
Most manufacturing people do not have the why not let the builders and users work closely
luxury of knowing why certain hardware is de- with the designer in the early stages of design. '_
signed a certain way. The engineer can only re- Not Just involvement in the design review but _':
fleet the design in drawings and specifications during the criteria development phase and the
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actual design. The outcome will be a safer and filter -- we should be helpful in making con-
more efficient process along with being cost structive comments to make the process better
effective: the ground support equipment and and safer. Another word of caution -- the re-
handling equipment can be brought into the sponsibiUty for safety must remain ineachde-
picture much earlier; and the trat_sportation or partment with each supervisor and with each
movement of subassemblies and delicate parts employee.
can have parts protection considered during the Testing operations provides a unique situa-
design phrase. You can already see that part of tion for System Safety. Testers must under-
what we consider System Safety is getting stand manufacturing since there always seems
everyone into the act n__otmerely the system to be some finishing up to do after the hard-
safety engineer but the people that are building, ware is manufactured. This discipline must
handling, and testing the product. System understand handling techniques and adapt them
Safety, then, is part of the labor that goes into to the hardware being handled while undergoing
the product-- a direct labor function that is checkout. They must also understand launch
looked at very carefully as to its contribution, checkout and launch procedures since testing
The payoff is accident prevention as opposed attempts in every way possible to duplicate
to cure. the launch conditions. The concept that is
(Refer to Chart) followed is manufacturers build and testers
• test, resulting in a better product.
, Early analysis in the manufacturing pro.- Closing the loop is an element that many
tess identifies not only what is required to people overlook.
build the product but also the required skills. Along with the imposition of standards and
, Training and certification of personnel helps reviews, a key element is monitoring, audits
: as_ ure that the job starts correctly. The next and surveys. This gives Safety the opportunity
step Is to match the process against System to evaluate whether or not operating depart-
Safety standards. Those of us who are fortunate ments are, in fact, living up to the safety
in having active standards know many of the standards. Modifications can be proposed "
pitfalls in process delays are avoided by as- through this performance monitoring, coupled
suring standards are satisfied. If some stand- with new methods, ideas, and worker behavior.
, ards cannot be satisfied, our job in System We also have other sources; an Important one
[ Safety is to work with respective departments being customer experience. Addt_onally, in-
, and keep the process moving in a safe manner, ternal and external experienc,_ can be evalu-
This Is our contribution that is looked at very ated. The final element of the action or most-
carefully. Don't misunderstand me here -- I toring loop is feedback from the departments
am not advocating disregar d for stamlards by themselves in the form of communication
merely signing a waiver. What I am saying is monitoring and direct communication. When
that we in System Safety should not use the we combine all these elements of experience,
standard as a shield and say, "You can't do performance monitoring, and communication,
• that- TM The approach is -- "we have a prob.- the next big step is to see if the resources we
. lem!" and our job is to help get the program have available support the recommended
out of that problem, changes arid If these changes support the goals.
Review of documentatlon eomes next. These We have to be practical here. System Safety
reviews require approval of safety critical has to consider the safety aspects but also cost
systems. That is of systems that need tighter effectiveness. Our talents are put to the test In
monitoring because of damage potential. Cer- walking the fine line between the two. An un-
rain installations, pressure tests, major hard- bending, non-innovative, to-the-book System ,
ware moves at times require that extra pair of Safety department is worthless in this sltua-
trained eyes from System Safety. So in these tlon.
reviews we assure ourselves that planning Our final step is to take the results of the
documentation and process documentatlonhave analysis and feed them back in the form of
proper back-out procedures in case of prob., constraints within the operating departments
Ictus; safety cautions and warnings are identt- which can take the form of additional checks
fled. Here again, we shouldn't only act as a and balances in the control and procedural ,
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Ldocumentation; in modifications to the system there must be a reasonable investment in study
safety standards. I might add that these modt- analysis and development testing to determine
ficattons can take the form of elther being more what is practical. This activity provides a
stringent or in easing of requirements. This is rationale for setting design requirements.
a constant learning process. The other con- The several occurrences of failures in
straint is a feedback into the engineering world flight, both major and minor, serve notice, in
by way of requirements, specification changes, view of space hazards and more ambitious pro-
retest requirements, hardware protection, and grams, that added attention to the potential
the like. requirements for operational safety can be
' In a short period of time, I have attempted justified. These operational emergencies are
to show a closed loop flow which includes the serious incidents which interrupt, either tern-
Impact of good System Safety Involvement in porarily or permanently, the normal course of
the early portions of the program as well as the mission plan. As indicated, such Incidents
the very Important feedback loop. It is obvious, may be anticipated or may occur unexpectedly.
If the Involvement comes at some time after Anticipated emergencies can be countered by
start of the program, we play "catch up" for careful planning and implementation of action
the remainder of the program. You don't have prior to the event, redundancies, and rapid and
enough trained safety personnel to go back and efficient action following the event. These ac-
review every drawing that was pumped out, r.lons all fall under the category of analysis that
every drawing that is being pumped out now, takes place early, prior to the design phase.
and attempt to mor ltor and take action on the The unexpected emergencies are those that
feedback loop. Gentlemen, you chase your tail were not thought to exist or were overlooked.
and never catch tt. During the hardware operational phase, these
I indicated to you earlier that I consider are the ones that bother us the most. What did
manufacturing, test, and material handling a we forget. The number of possible operational
part of the operational phase. There are two problems Is virtually endless. No situation or
elements of operations that fall within my system can be seen that is entirely Immune to
definition of operational phase. The first has all such events. We must select the credible
to do with manufacturing operations, test accidents or emergencies and act on them. So
operations, and material handling operations, from my Introductory definition, I find it dif-
This is the potential damage from people, ftcult to separate the "people building" from _
processes, procedures, checkouts, and the like. the "people operating" phase. Considerations
The second element is the hardware operation must be there for both, early and continually.
with potential damage to mission and crew from The actions taken early, prior to and during
Insufficient primary or secondary systems. In design phases, helps us get prepared to pre-
" the latter, the safe it posslble approach for vent emergencies and provide recovery ac-
overcoming hardwar, operational problemsor tions. There is ample opportunity for Safety
emergencies would be to develop all the equip- to become involved, to be able to raise ques-
ment and procedures so that the crew would tions as to readiness. The review process has
have the option to select the most applicable matured and includes: the preliminary design _
from the protocol of emergency actions. These review; the critical design review; the first
; emergencies could be single or combinations article configuration inspection; flight readl-
of explosion during boost or orbit; severe in- hess review; and the design certification re-
stability during boost or orbit; loss of thrust views.
, during boost; fir ;; trajectory deviation; cap- In summary, a continuing emphasis placed ,
sule decompression; life support system fall., on preventing accidents or emergencies 1
, ure; power failure; subsystems failure; and through hardware design, manufacturing, test
loss of retro thrust. And there are many more operations, handlIng, and operational mission
to consider In separation, docking, maneuver- analysis can give us the greatest return pos-
ing and the like. However, recognizing the slble In the area of safety for the resource
limitations in time, money, and manpower, expenditure devoted to that end.
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During the development of the Apollo Pro- hardware, ground support equipment and factl
gram spacecraft, the complexity of thevehtcle tties; the exchange of Information on hazart I
systems and the pressures of mounting costs assessments and accident experience, and re-
and time schedules established a requirement view and analysis of dlscrepeneies and anom-
for company and NASA management visibility alles reported during ground test and flight
to support intelligent decisions with respect to operations.
risk management. These considerations, with
the added emphasis of the Command Module REFERENCES
fire at Cape Kennedy in early 1967, led NASA The NASA Safety Manual (NHB 1700.1) and
to establish the Office of Manned Space Flight
Safety and to implement formal safety pro- the System Safety Requirements for MannedSpace Flight (OMSF SPD NO IA) are the prl-grams at all b_ASA Centers and at major con-
mary NASA source documenLs for the LM
tractor facilities. System Safety Program.
LM SAFETY Other documents utilized in the develop-
ment and Implementation of the Program in-
elude applicable Grumman Corporation Pro-Gruman, as a major contractor, was au-
cedures and Federal, State and local statutorythortzed ':o establish a formal LM S}stem
Safety program covering the main production requirements, and the USAF Systems Com-
mand System Safety Design Handbook DH 1-6.facility at Bethpage and field site opezatlons at
Houston, Cape Kennedy and White Sands. The
Gruman safety effort prior to implementation ORGANIZATION
of this LlVl System Safety program was limited The organizational structure adopted pro-
to a test operations group working with the vtded for a Manager on the staff of the LM Pro-
spacecraft assembly and test organization and gram Director heading a Safety group with two
an analytical safety effort within the LM engt- branches, System Safety and Test Operations
neertng organization. This early effort, co- Safety. The System Safety branch supportsLM
ordinated with Reliability and the engineering Engineering and provides liaison service to the
subsystems groups, had Identified crew haz- field sites and to cognizant NASA offices. The
ards in the spacecraft and had Implemented Test Operations branch supports production
hardware fixes or compensating operating pro- and test operations and provides Industrial
cedures for the flight crew data ftl_. The Ira- safety service to all LM Program personnel
plementation of a formal program based on an and facilities.
approved System Safety Plan provided a con- LM Safety provides support on a day-to-day
sistent and systematic effort, increasing the basis to all Program groups and, in turn, re-.
probability of detection of potentially hazard- ceives support from Engineering, Reliability,
ousconditions by ln-depthdeslgnrevtewbythe Q.C. and the Sub-Contract managers. This
safety group, closely coordinated effort assures maximum
utilization of all available documentation and t
OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE avoids duplication.
The objective of the program was and is the SAFETY FUNCTIONS
elimination or reduction of risk to personnel, There are four major functions of System i
material, and facilities resulting from failures Safety on the LM Program- Analysis, Re-
or malfunctions in hardware or procedures, view, Surveillance and Test/Mission Support.
The scope of this wide-ranging program was Each of the functions includes a number of de-
an integrated engineering, test operations and
tailed tasks - some basic to any system safety " '
industrial safety effort in direct support of LM effort and some peculiar to the LM program.design, production and test activity in the
Bethpage area. Indirect support and liaison was
provided to the Gruman field sites and NASA OAnal]tsts
offices. Safety support included analysis of The analysis functloza includes a hazard
design and proposed design changes for flight assessment of each spacecraft subsystem,
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qperformed on a functional basis for each mis- This major analytical effort has since been
sion phase. The FMEAs (FailureMode and utilizedas a base-linestudyfor theprogram,
EffectAnalyses)from Reliability,theMission witheach ofthefollow-upspacecraftreviewed
Time Lines,and thedocumentationfrom other emphasizingthehardware andmissionchanges
subsystem groups are utilizedfor a detailed incorporatedsinceLMS. Analysisoftheselater
study which considersboth ground and flight vehicles missions has identifiedadditional
crew operationsas wellas hardware failures hazards which have beencompensatedbyhard-
inidentifyinghazards.The studyeffortclassi- ware changes or proceduralworkarounds in-
tieshazards as crew safetyormissionsuccess corporatedin the crew check listsan_ mis-
and confirmscompensatingprovisionsorback- sionrules.
out procedures.Uncompensated hazards are
• Review
reported to the cognizantengineeringgroup
and are trackedtofinalcloseoutby hardware The Review functionincludesthose tasks
or proceduralchanges, involvedon a continuingbasiswiththereview
This techniqueisalsoappliedto[_roposed of testand working documents and theopera-
designchanges,whichareanalyzedforperson- _ons theycontrol.
nel or hardware hazardsand are followed-up Operational checkout Procedures (OCP)
through the approval cycletoinstallatlonand which are utilizedfor subsystem and system
re:estor rejection, checkoutare reviewed.Particularattentionis
An example of the hazard assessment el- devoted to revisedprocedures and tochanges
:: fortis the analysiswhich was completedfor proposed duringoperations.The hardware set-
LM-5, the vehiclewhich flewon ApolloII and ups uzJlizedfor testsare included,withem-
; made the first lunar landing, The functional phasis on safety provisions such as relief
analysis of each subsystem was performed for valves, hose restraints, proper bonding and
the missionphases duringwhlchthespacecraft groundingand the llke.Hazardous sequences
was active.The subsystem functionswere in these operationsare identifiedand marked
i evaluated for their effect on the flight crew, and special control exercised while they ate
vehicle, and mission; the adequacy of contin- in-work. Real-time deviations to procedures
gency procedures, and othercompensatingpro- are reviewed, with a safety concurrence and
visions.The comparison ofmission phase per sign-offrequiredforthosedesignatedhazard-
-_ sub=system functionwas relatedto methods of ous.
i detection,time criticality,and availabilityof An early and highlysatisfactoryReviewcorrective or backout procedures. Uncom- effortwas theOperationalReadinessInspection
; pensatedhazards were identifiedandevaluated (ORI) conductedon the LM InternalEnviron-
and a rationale for their acceptance or rejec- ment Simulator (IES). This altitude chamber
zion provided. This analysis revealed no crew facility was designed to provide checkout and
i safety hazards requiring hardware changes. All verification of the LM life support system and
hazards identifiedwere of the "acceptable involvedmanned runs in I00% oxygenenviron-' risk" category based on the compensating pro- ments. The ORI was conducted in accordance
visions available hi the vehicle. Procedural with NASA directive MSC18825.2, which estab-
changes were recommended, however, to en- lishes criteria for manned operations in
hance mission success. These included an in- oxygen-rich environments. GAC believes that
dependent exercise of the redundant explosive the ORI conducted under 8825.2 is an extremely
device systems and constraints on attitude valuable safety tool for any facility requiring
changes during the period while the lunar and man-rarlng. Effective program cost control
command modules were "soft" docked on the will tailor the ORI, the Board size, and the
capture latches. The capture latches are the scope of activity to the hazardous nature of the
devices on the Command Module probe which facility being inspecr_-_l.
initially engage and lock-on to the LM drogue Prior to the LTA-8 LM test vehicle opera-
mounted in the top deck tunnel area. "Hard" tions in the MSC Houston altitude chamber, a
docking is the subsequent action of re_'acting review of. the OCPs to be utilized during the
the probe and engaging the twelve docking Zests was conducted by a special team of sub..
latchpg, system engineers, coordinated by LM System
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Safety engineers. These tests, the first man- cidents per million manhours in 1969 and a low
ned LM operations in a simulated space en- of 2.2 in 1970. During a one year period, from
vironment, were identified as extremely May '69 through May '70 more than 8,000,000
hazardous and a thorough analysis of every man hours were worked without a disabling in-
phase of the operation was conducted. The jury. Analysis of the accident record indicates
Safety Review team identified numerous pro- that the majority of the accidents are caused
cedural problems, all of which were corrected by carelessness and failure to follow pro-
by changes to the documents prior to the cedures. Some typical examples include the
chamber runs. following:
A similar review of the test documents to 1. A facility technician installing a wo_'k-
be utilized during the checkout of LM-I, the stand on a concrete floor was setting
unmanned first flight spacecraft, was con- studs with an explosive-actuated gun.
ducted at Cape Kennedy by the LM HazardRe- To expedite the Job, he attempted to
view team. This review, chaired and coordi- drive a stud through a pre-drilled hole
hated by LM System Safety program personnel, in a flange of the stand instead of using
covered thirty-seven documents and identified a clip held by an additional stud. Miss-.
and documented fifty-three hazards. In three ing the hole, the stud ricochetted off the
cases, har:lware fixes were required and flange and floor and struck the man on
change requests were initiated. The remainder the Jaw, where it lodged and was sub-
of the hazards were satisfied by procedural sequentiy removed surgically.
changes incorporated in the test documents. 2. During installation of replacement com-
For the first manned flight, LM-3 in earth ponents in the spacecraft heat transport
orbit, the team reviewed the documents to be (cooling) system a technique involving
utilized for the preflight spacecraft checkout freezing the system fluid in the coolant
and altitude chamber runs at KSC. This team lines with liquid nitrogen coils was be-
also identified more than fifty hazards requir- ing utilized. (This process permits
ing changes to the procedures, all of which cutting lines withoutdraining the system
were incorporated in the test documents. More or introducing air into the lines). An in-
important than these statistics, however, was adequate temperature gage and tnatten-
the heightened interest stimulated in hardware, t.ton by the man monitoring the temper-
test set-up and procedural chanlzes when the ature allowed the plug to thaw and pop
Safety Review was scheduled and imminent, out. Attempting to stop the flow of glycol,
With each of these safety reviews, confi- the technician held his thumb over the
dence in the spacecraft and the test procedures open line. suffering second degree cryo-
increased and on completion of the LM-3 genic burns from the escaping fluid.
", assessment, formal reviews were terminated. In addition to the injury, extensive clean-
However, procedu_'al changes proposed during ing was required to remove the spilled
any test or opera,ton are still reviewed and glycol from wire Imndlesand spacecraft
approved by Safety prior to their inc,orpora- structure.
tion in t/le documents. 3. At the start of the transfer of approxi-
An additional Review task is the investige- mately 25C0 gallons of waste alcohol
tion and reporting of accidents which occur from a facility storage tank to a rank
during production or test operations. On the truck the 3" pickup hose ruptured,
LM Program. an accident is defined as any spraying approximately I00 gallolls of
unplanned event which results in injury or alcohol over the truck andthesurround-
damage to program material or facilities. All Ing area before the tranM,r pump was
accidents are thoroughly investigated and re- stopped. There were no injuries and no
ports submitted to cognizant management and other damage although the incident was
t__ 3A offices. Recommended corrective ac., potentially catastrophic con#Aderins
tlons are tracked to close-out, with periodic amount of alcohol involved and the Igni,.
status reports to responsible groups, tion sources present in the area. Prompt
Experience on _he Program to date shows a action by the Safety Engineer and the Fire
i steadily declining accident rate, with 3.9 ac.. Guard covering the operation minimized
!
I
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the spill and dissipated the free liquid. • Test and Mission Support
_ Cause of the accident was an unqualified Safety support of test operations includesdriver-operator on the tanker who did
not operate the pick-up pump andvalves participation in Test Readiness Review_ and
Pre-test Briefings. Safety requirements andin proper sequence.
" Also included in the Review function is the emergency procedures are reviewed with the
test team and qualification of test team mem-
tracking of close-out action on safety-signifi- bers confirmed w4th the Test Conductor.
cant failures which occur during test or flight Frequent surveTs of test facilities are con-
operations. While the primary responsibility ducted tc assure adherence to establishedfor failure close-out action res{s with the Re-
liability group, Safety is concerned with fail- safety requirements. SI> :ial attention is de-
ures in_olving hazards to groundor fllghtcrew voted to hoisting and li_cing equipment, pres-
sure hose restraints, proof testing of equip-personnel and makes full use of the Reliability
documentaCon which Is available. Identiftca- ment, and installation of safeguards such as
kick plates, guar_ rails, safety nets etc.tton of those failures for which Safety has a Test team training and certification (as
responsibility is based on criteria established required) are monitored and frequent drills inby the Safety group in accordance with hazard
classifications developed by NASA. Action in emergency shut down or back-out pxocedures
tracking these failures consists of coordinating are conducted. Authority for safety approval of
with the responsible engineering subsystems deviations to hazardous test procedures is
[ groups and continuing the follow-up to final delegated to the safety engineer on duty. The
i close-out. Safety Manager is the only Authority for
LM Safety also reviews all ground support waivers - which are granted for one-time ex-
equipment failures, assessing hazar,Js to per- ceptions to established safety requirements or
sonnel or hardware and coordinates with the rules. In all such cases, additional specific
safety requirements are imF_sed.GSE group on close-out action. For common-
During hazardous test sequences or opera-use GSE, which is shared with other contrac-
tions, a safety engtneex _ is required to .'_
mrs, an information exchange procedure has present at the test site at all times. His support
heen established to assure timely corrective of the activity includes real-time approval ofaction on all hardware at all sites.
We have found that the dally Program Statt:s procedural deviations, equipment changes, and
maintenance, of a safety test environment
meetings attended by the Program Director throughout the facility.
and Engineering subsystems managers, pro-
vkles maximum vislb_IRy on developing prob.- For the Apollo Missions, LM System Safety
engineers are assigned to the Mission Support
, lem areas and thr opportunity to initiate Im- Team and provide full coverage of all LM
mediate corrective action, This activity is a
major day-to-day function of the system safety active mission phases in _,le Bethpage mission
g-roup, support room. Activity in this role includes
, participation in the mission simulation training
•Surveillance runs,flightcrew debrlefings,andfollow-upon
flightanomaliesanddlscrepencles.
The surveillancefunctionisnrlmarllythe SUBCONTRACT SAFETY
acttviw of the Test Operations Safety group.
Allmanufacturing and test facilities are monl- For the task of reviewing the safety of the
toted for compliance with safety requirements Program sub.contractors, the LM Safety team
and for adherence to current Corporate Pro- monitors tim formal review activity of the Re-
cedures and legal requirements of local and liability, Quality Assurance, and Sub.system
Federal safety statutes. Identified hazards are Engineering groups which have primary re-
corrected Immed/ately or the work area is agons/blllty. Reports are reviewed regularly
tagged out-of-service. This coverage is pro- and thesafety group particlpates when requlred
v/ded by Safety on a full-time basis for all for on-site reviews. Documentation and ad-
scheduled operations, 24 hours ver day seven vlsory service are supplied to the regular in,-
r week
I days pe . spection teams and to the resident personnel ht
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the plants. LM Safety provides pel"sc,nnel :,nd for positive preventive actJ.on. All occurrences
partict pates on-call for investigations of acci- are recorded, utilizing a simple, one page form,
dents or when plant conditions involving safety and are followed-up until final close-out actio_
are being reviewed. Reco_,,.:nendations result- is complete. Reports and periodic summaries
ing from investigations or reviews are made to are distributed to Program, Corporate, and
Program Management, withfoilow-uptoassure NASA offices to assure maximum benefit to
implementation of approved changes. This co- other grot _r- with similar problenm.
ordinated effort with QA group has been demon-
strated to be a satisfactory, cost-effective MEETINGS
method of monitoring a vast network of hub-
contractors. Accident experience and preventive actions
were also shared with other contractors and the
NASA Centers by means of th_ STF,_Is {Safety
FIELD SITE SUPPORT Technical Exchange Meetings) sponsor( ,_ by the
An essential element of the I.M safety effort NASA. These valuable meetings _vere scheduled
Is support of the Grumman field sites at MSC periodically at the Centers or _t Cor.t':z_tors'
Houston and White Sands, wlth the Bethpage plants and provided _ useful fnrum ._or the ex-
Program office providing policy direction and change of informat_ol,.
liaison between sites. The Houston operation is Currently, :_: LM Safety grc, up particl-
primarily manufacturing and test in supporto! pates I:_ reguJ_r Safety Concern meetings via
Grumman activity at NASA.MSC. At White telcons with _he MSC Safety otiS,".% This co..
Sand_, the company provi_les engineering and ordinated approach avoids dul_'ication and
material support for the engine firing and a:_ures maximum effort on follow-up and
c!o_e-out of identified hazards.
propulsion system tests conducted in the test
cells. CONCLUSION
At KSC, the company maintains a safety
group which provides all required functions for
the iocal activity. Liaison and coordination for The appllcation of System Safet_ principles
",his group Is also provided by the LM Safety to the LM Program has been eminently suc-
organization at Bethpage, particularly in the cessful by any standard. In the face of the _,
area of spacecraft technical support and inthe pressur:_ of clght schedules and shrinking
exchange of operational experience and infor- budgets, LM manufacturlv_ and test operationshave ]_een on-time, wlrh a contlnuaily declining
mation, accident rate. The LM spacecrBft performance
,, on the Apollo missions to date - from the first
REPORTS lunar landing by Armstrong and P,ldrin in LM 5
to the late:t by Sbepard and Mitchell in LM 8 -
Management v/slb/llty, b,_th for NASA and has met or exceeded all mission objectives.
Gruman, is provided by regular and special The success of the total effort to put rnan on the
reports of significant event_ and safety ac- moon marks Apollo as probably the most :
compllshments on the, Program. A monthly significant program ol our age. As a small part
status report is prov/ded to the MSC Safety of that total effort, LM Systems Safety made a
office with other spec:al reports ss required, conc'Ibution which will continue, malntslning
An accideat reporting systenJ has been or improving the standards established for the _"
established to provlue the backgroond material Prolrram until the f/hal Apollo mission is flown. '_
i
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In keeping with the theme of this year's this asset reference is made to the flight of
conference, I would like to present to you the Apollo 13. Specifically, the capability of crew
differences in applying system safety tech- members to establish a lithium hydroxide
niques to present space programs and high- system as a part of the life support system
light the role that system safety plays in when standardization of lithium hydroxide
providing management a working tool for deter- canisters for all crew quarters, LEM and
mining the degree of risk or liabilities asso- Command Module, was not a part of the sys-
ciated with both the manned and unmanned tem design. This was an onboard fix and was
space programs. Two ongoing NASA programs in part a real contributing factor to decreas-
will be used throughout this discussion for ing the risk associated with crew survival.
comparison; they are the Skylab Earth Orbiting To present the degree of system safety
Laboratory (Slide I) and the Viking Mars application that is considered essential to the
Lander (Slide 2). safety of mission objectives, for both pro-
The most significant reason for applying grams, consider first the common aspects and
system safety to these programs, and therea- then review the details and differences that
son which precludes the need for any debate, are required for the individual programs.
is past accident/incident experience. When The safety objectives common to both
we relate to the monetary loss of aerospace manned and unmanned programs are:
hardware that the nation has experienced dur-
ing the last decade, it staggers the imagination. Initial System Safety Planning
Part of this loss experience can be attributed 1. Understanding the program objectives.
to our early days of trial and error, when 2. Identify gross hazards associated with
we were pioneering aerospace technology and the hardware concept. (Gross Hazard
at a time when international prestige was Analysis)
wavering because of the space efforts of other 3. Establish baseline safety design cri-
nations. Playing catch up is risky business teria.
and obviously risks were taken based on the 4. Draft the system safety program plan
availability of information at that point in commensurate with the program objec-
time. tives.
We have progressed significantly from
this period of time as substantiated by the The Design Phase
increasing number of space program suc- I. Analysis of systems and subsystems.
cesseso However, more ambitious projects 2. Detailed safety design requirements.
require more exotic and cumpllcated hard- 3. Hazard reduction program.
" ware. With the first manned flight came in.. 4. Management visibility to risk.
creased concern for crew safety, establish- 5. Flight crew procedures.
ment of safety requirements and standards,
and emphasis of safety to all program per- The Hardware Build and Test Phase ,
sonnel, This was done with the knowledge that 1. Review of procedures (manufacturing
the crewman is capable of using judgment and
and test).
would contribute to the decision making proc- 2. Test crew certification and training.
eases whenever a situation arose that en- 3. Review of tests' data.
croached on the margins of safety provided in _
the design of the hardware or the operation. 4. Launch procedures' review,5. Launch operations (KMI 1700.1 and
Manned space programs have one asset not AFETR 127-1). _:
enjoyed by unmanned space programs; this 6. Flight procedures. _':a the crew member and his abilities to
observe, assess and rationalize system mal- 7. Crew Training.
functions or unscheduled events during the
course of the mission. I would like to defer The Mission Phase
any reference co specific unscheduled events 1. Contingency plans.
or accidents that have taken placel however, 2. Emergency procedures.
to make a p_int very clear as to the value of 3. Simulations.
.. PRn G PAa SLANNOTnLM
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Having consideredthe commonalities,we requirea suitedmode. Istherea requirement
have to come t_ one conclusionand thatis; for a fireextinguishersystem lindcautionand
the techniqueis the same. The real differ- warning system; what requirementsarespeci-
ence liesin the degree and requirement for fled for material controllability(such as,
applyingthe techniquestotheindividualpro- NASA Document No. MSFC Spec 101B, "Spec
grams. Looking at the Program Planning Flammability,Odor, and OffgasslngRequire-
Phase we findthefollowing: ments and Test Procedures for Materialsin
Environments which Support Combustion"),
and any other program objectivesor mission
InitialSystem SafetyPlanning constraints.
I. Understandingthe program objectives.
2. Identifygross hazards associatedwith During thisinitialplanningphase,system
the hardware concept.(Gross Hazard safetymust identifythe gross hazards asso-
Analysis) ciatedwith the conceptiondesignofthehard-
3. Establishingbaselinesafetydesigncri- ware and the preliminarymission planning.
The gross hazard analysisis a requirement
teria, thatmust be accomplishedby boththe manned
(a)Design Handbook (AFSC/NASA DH and unmanned missions. Itis performed to
I-6 and DH l-X). obtain the initialsafety evaluationof the
(b)NASA Accldent/IncidentSummaries. program. The primary objectiveistoprovide
4. Draft the system safetyprogram plan the basis for subsequ,-:ntsystem safetytask,
commensurate withthe program objec- safety criter!aand other requirements that
tives, must be established. "
When the gross hazard analysis has been
In the unmanned program the crew is evaluated, safety must generate the baseline
essentially the science committee and Mission safety design criteria to be used during the
Control on earth, and all efforts are concen- detailed design phase. Since, at this point
trated on obtaining scientific data through the in time, we should know what the concep-
use of automated spacecraft. Therefore, the tton design will be we can now review the
role of system safetymust interfacewiththe AFSC NASA DH I-6, DH l-X, and theNASA
science authorityto the extentnecessary to Accident/Incldentsummary documents to
acquaint the scientist with the fact that system establish our baseline safety design criteria.
failureof hardware designed to launchand If we have criteriaavailabilityproblems,
deliver science experiments to theirdestl- we may use the AFSC NASA DH I-6 infor-
nation is as important as the experiment itself, mation sources listings, Through this listing
Further, it must be understood that the data we may contact knowledgeable people in the
acquisition of science hardware is still the technology field of interest for new criteria
scientist domain; however, the mechanisms being developed in laboratories that may be
that deploy it, energy and power for it, as useful to our program. After having developed
well as the communication linkbetween ex- an understandingof the above data we now ]
periment and earth,interfacewithtransport- can generate a system plan thatis commen-
ing hardware and thereforebecomes a matter suratewith the program objectiveswhich is
for system safety as well as engineering, cost effective and will provide us the safety
However, with a manned system the crew con= necessary to mission success.
sists of the Flight Crew and Mission Control |
and the safety effort concerns itself with pro- The Design Phase t
tecting the crew as well as the scientific 1. Analysis of systems and subsystems.
objective of the mission. System safety that is (a) Baseline.
concerned with a manned system must under- 2. Detailed safety design requirements.
stand the crew complement, the mode ofoper- (a) Update baseline incorporating pro-
ation of the crewman; i.e., suited/unsuited, gram peculiar criteria.
IVA/EVA and, in general, what tasks the 3. hazard reduction program.
crewman will be required to perform. To be (a) Hazard Catalog.
more specific in this area, what task will (b) Safety Assessment Reports.
187
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k4. Management Visibility to risk. are common to both manned and unmanned
(a) Design Reviews (PDR, CDR). programs, it can be identified that the degree
(b) Management Reviews. of analyses and the tradeoffs on the analytical
5. Flight crew procedures, results that identifies hazards are somewhat
(a) Mission Rules. different. Redundancy for precluding single
failure points on critical spacecraft system
When the program enters the design phase operating modes becomes a priority since
the safety engineer begins updating and ex- crew participation is not available. Therefore,
pansio, of the gross hazard analysis that was all critical or catastrophic hazards identified
conducted during the initial program planning, must be eliminated because the degree of risk
Many references are available on the types of is unacceptable for mission success. Onboard
analysis which are applicable to this expan- repair and/or flight plan revisions are not
sion. When the system safety engineer under- a negotiable tradeoff for unmanned flight and
stands the mission of the unmanned program, this dictates that system safety analyses con-
he is in a better position to select the safety sider the system reliability criteria to be
analysis method most applicable to the science verified during environmental testing and qual-
package and all of its ramifications as it lflcation and checkout of systems when care-
effects microbiology, terminal sterilization, gorizing the hazards identified as a product
and the varying degrees of hazards introduced of the analyses that are performed. The slg-
by fully encapsulated spacecraft which are nificant point to be made here is that system
armed, loaded and pressurized prior to reach- safety engineers must recognize and under-
tng the launch pad. Risk and hazard assess- stand the success criteria for environment
ment play an important role since you can and qualification testing of systems and that
no longer depend on procedurally controlling such criteria is equivalent to or exceeds the
hazardous configurations and the introduction safety of design requirements or margins to
of hazardous materials or devices as late in insure the system is not unsafe and will not
the countdown as possible. System safety risks in itself be the cause of mission or mission
are now beginning to present themselves at the objective loss.
laboratory and it is at this point in time that The system analysis that is selected for
effective system safety analysis and the con- the manned program must provide a smooth
clusions of those analysis can preclude poten- transition into the operational hazard analy-
tial hazards evolving later in the program, sis used during the operations phase of the,
Therefore, safety priorttles are established for pr3gram. This requirement is a must to in-
the hardware used to acquire scientific data sure that hazards identified during the design
as well as the hardware and operations that phase that cannot be removed by design can be
will deliver it to its destination, flagged until they are solved by procedure
The scientific community identifies what and/or caution and warning systems. ,_ an :
it wants to accomplish, where on the planet example, the next two slides (3 and 4) show
it can best make its acquisition, and what it an experiment on each of the programs (Viking •
believes the results should be. To get them and Skylab). The Viking soil sampler must ,
there becomes the challenge confronting engi- work every time, and if it does not, there is !
neering. Engineering now has to work the no one to fix it. However, the Skylab Experl- " i
problems of transporting and deploying the ment T025 extends through the Scientific
science package and this includes, providing Airlock of the Workshop and if it cannot be
:he capability to automate and control the retracted a flight procedure provides for
spacecraft to its final destination ,_nd to sup- a crewman to jettison the extension boom
port the life cycle requirements of the scien- overboard. Hazard reduction programs are
tific objectives. The system safety role for essentially the same for both types of space
unmanned space programs now must consider missions. However, with unmanned missions
the hardware and operational interfaces asso- you have the added responsibility to con-
clated with both the role of science and the sider long term transcrutse modes to planets. _
role of engineering.Although the system (For example, Viking is 360 days.)Tl_ as- \
safety analyses of subsystems and systems pect is a serious consideration of science,
188
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(management and engineering and should be as of additional science experiments and this
important to the safety role when searching for substantiates the reason for the interfacing of
system hazards and providing recommen- system safety with the scientific community.
dations for the reduction of hazards or risks With the safety analysis and deszgn re-
to the mission. Will it work when it gets there quirements completed for basic design reviews
is the responsibility of engineering, but will the operating methodology for hazard identt-
it work safely is still a priority and system fication and control is done in two different
safety should apply the "what if" technique ways. For the unmanned program the Hazard
and make a contribution by revealing any Catalog (HC) is used aa a summary of the
discovery of potential hazards to the respon- hazards that have been uncovered by the analy-
sible design engineering agency. Earth bound sis and have not been solved. The manned
accidents have been caused by some rather program uses the Safety Assessment Report
unique nonoperational conditions. Stress cor- (SAR) to evaluate each hardware system. Why
rosion, decomposition of materials during the difference- the unmanned program is
• long term storage, and ordnance explosions, usually very complicated, but uses very few
to cite a couple of examples. These examples contractors, one procurement agency, and all
' are of the obvious types; however, system of the hazards can be cataloged in one docu-
safety engineers make a contribution by f_r- merit; whereas, the manned program, Skylab,
feting out the not so obvious conditions that has four major modules, sixty experiments,
could cause accidents and this is a very slg- and over 20 contractor's, working with five
niflcant system safety role when you consider NASA centers which makes it much easier to
the length of time associated with the unmanned use the Safety Assessment Report.
mission versus manned missions. The reduc- The design reviews (PDR, CDR, TDR) is
tion of hazards can be substantial providing the place where the SAR and HC are reviewed
early identification can be accomplished, with the hardware design to assure all hazards
Therefore, system safety analyses and haz- have been identified and action taken to cor-
ard reduction programs are interdependent rect those identified as catastrophic (see
and you cannot be effective by accepting one Mil-Std-882). The remainingidentifiedhazards
and not the other. There is an old adage; are presented with recommendations for cor-
"Where therets smoke, there's fire," and so rection. The correction can be a redesign,
With unmanned aerospace systems there is a safety device, or procedure controls. Here
always good reason to be concerned about caution should be taken in the unmanned pro-
that which you cannot manually control or gram, a procedure fix is nearly always ruled
have visual observation and human capabili- out, a safety device should be used with cau-
. ties to secure before the not so obvious tien since it may have to be removed, there-
becomes the obvious, fore, either redesign or accept the hazard
As the safety analysis progresses, new and assure it is flagged in the hazard catalog.
requirements are necessary and at this point The flight procedures are now considered
t
the updating of the baselined design require- and if this term is used to include the ground
ments must be accomplished. If this is not (Mission Control) and Flight (Crew) proce-
done problems that have been solved continue dures, it can be seen that both programs need
to appear causing much effort in looking for the Mission Control procedures;whereas, only
solutions, the manned program require the Flight Crew
This approach results in the system safety procedures. Taking the SAR, HC, and outputs
discipline engaging in the task st establishing of PDR's, CDRts and TDRts we must see that
safety requirements and margins based on they are provided as initial input at this time
what needs to be done or what will be clone to these I.rocedures.
rather than being totally engaged inmonitoring Progressing through the development of
for inclusion of existing requirements. These the programs the next phase is the;
design safety requirements are extremely
m
important when you consider that each space- Hardware Build and Test Phase (Slide 11)
craft weight saving made (luring spacecraft 1. Review of procedures (manufacturing
.. acsign development is an opening for inclusion and test).
.,! 189
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2. Test crew certification and training. System safety has now progressed from
3. Review of tests' data. the initial program concepts to hardware that
(a) Special Test (Vacuum Chamber). is built and tested and now ready to perform
(b) EMI - Environmental. the mission.
4. Launch procedures' review. The hardware is now transported to the
5. Launch operations (KMI 1700.1 and launch center to be mated with the launch
AFETR 127-1). vehicle. If the safety engineer has performed
6. Flight procedures, his tasks throughout the program this becomes
(a) Emergency Procedures. a routine step, however, invariably it is found
(b) Contingency Plans. that someone has not complied with KMI
7. Crew Training. 1700.1 and/or AFETR 127-1 and many prob-
(a) Simulations. lems now occur with Range Safety. It is imper-
(b) Training Hardware. ative that compliance with the range documents
begin during the hardware design and continue
The procedures that will be used during throughout the program. The requirements for
the build and tests are subjected to a safety the unmanned program should be subjected to
review regardless of the type of program, a very strenuous review due to the fact that
In most cases these procedures are reviewed many times ordnance must be installed, pres-
by both System Safety and Industrial Safety sure systems require charging, and power
engineers. Another area that is considered is systems must be hot prior to movement to
_ the training and certification of the personnel a launch pad. Usually the manned program
: that will manufacture, test and checkout the does not require these hazards to be intro-
cr hardware, duced until the countdown for launch has7
The training of personnel required for begun.
manufacturing, handling, inspecting, testing, The launch and flight crews have been in
and launching of space programs assures training for quite some time at this point;
their capability for competently performing however, the training and simulations become
the required program functions. The cer- much more strenuous during this period. The
tiflcaflon encompasses system knowledge, emergency procedures must be validated,
training course completion, adequacy of indi- through simulation, and finally corrections
vidualand crew capabilities.To assureprod- made. The contingencyor backoutprocedures ,
uct integritythrough all phases of develop- have tobe practicedand finalized.This isthe
ment, test,and operation,it is mandatory time thatsystem safetychecks theHC or SAR
that all activitieswhich contributeto pro- to assure allhazards thathave been identlf
', gram success are performed by certified during the program are closed. The clos_.d
personnel, action may be redesign, procedure or program
Mil-Std-882 recognizes the importance of decision to fly with, regardless of how all
operationaland maintenancepersonneltrain- items n _t be closedout,Now, and onlynow, ,
ing and crew qualifications and certification is syste,,, safety ready at the Launch Readi- • ;
by requiring them as part of the sytem safety ness Revle,': to report to program management
_ program, that vehicleis safe and ready to commit to
Proceeding into the test program the safety the mission, with known safety factors and in _
engineers are concerned with the tests' per- the cases where total close out of the hazard
formance and the data derived from same. has not been accomplished, the degree of risk
Specifically, special tests such as, vacuum that is being accepted. , a
_,
chamber, simulations, aircraft zero-g (gc Management visibility to non-acceptable,
135), vibration, etc., are te_ts where the as well as acceptable risk, is in the final
safety engineer can learn much about the analysis _he product of an effective system
hardware that Is not built. The tests can vall- safety program for either the manned or
t
date the criteria that was used, and more unmanned program. Rarely has management _;
importantly, the daut can assure that the overlooked high risk areas of inherently hat- i
procedural requirements to be imposed during ardous materials, systems or operations,
l launch and mission are valid, when identification of the hazards were made :_|
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known and the proper controls, required pro- 2. The real difference are the tools used
cedures, and devices were provided to control and the extent of application.
: the risk. Conversely, management has been 3. Both programs require safety to begin
a victim of high cost losses and liabilities in the conceptual phase.
due to phenomena that was not controlled 4, The unmanned program requires more
because of lack of information on risks, and interfacing with the science community
cost constraints where the hazards are not than does the manned program.
Identified early in the program. 5. Both programs require design require-
The mission phase now becomes another merits.
major step, and the difference between the 6. Hazard analysis Is a requirement of
two programs are extreme, both programs; however, the method
of presentation of the results is dlf-
The Mission Phase ferent:
1. Contingency plans. Manned --Safety Assessment Re-
2. Emergency procedures, port
3. Simulations. Unmanned--Hazard Catalog
7. The manned program does require a
In reviewing our two programs (Skylab review of crew procedures and flight
and Viking) for their particular missions training requirements where the un-
we find that the initial launch of Skylab Is manned does not.
in reality an unmanned program. The Work- 8. The mission phase is entirely different,
shop is launched and mechanisms must oper- whereas, the manned program does
ate, such as, the Apollo Telescope Mount (ATM) require flight contingency plans and
must unfold from the stowed position to the emergency procedures, the unmanned
operational position, without a crew aboard to program does not.
make any visual observations, or take any In conclusion, It is quite evident chat the
corrective actions. However, if the deploy- system safety principals appl/ed to both pro-
ment systems were to malfunction there still grams are a contributing factor to mission
remains the contingency plan whereby the success. The discipline certainly has more
crew may be able to rendezvous with the than adequate support of top management, and
laboratory and fix the malfunctioning part of the results are effectively implemented at the
' the system. This ls where our simulations are hardware build and test level by technicians
so important because we could simulate the once the syseem safety requirements areactions to repair the system on the ground known. The key to its success, however, is
•I before launching the crew. the middle management acceptance and en-
, Considering a similar case for the un- dorsement. Design engineering, planners,
manned program where no crew is pro- project engineers, systems managers, etc.,
t grammed to rendezvous If the systems did not can and will inhibit a successful systemwork the total mission would probably be lost. safety effort if they don't understand the
For instance, considering Viking, if after following:
, launch and the long term transcruise to the 1. System Safety objectives.
planet, the orbiter and the lander did not 2. System Safety differences as it relates
separate properly, we would in all probability to QuaLity C o n t rc, I, ReLiability, and
lose the entire mission. Some contingency maintainability.
planning, redundancy in the unmanned systems 3. System Safety as a contributing check
is possible, however, there is no alternative and balance against oversights.
for the benefits of crew member/equipment 4. That successful program manage..
interfaces, ment responslb_Lities includes hardware
i In order to compare the manned versus safety and they should avail themselvesunmanned programs, a summary of the dif- of the results of the _ystem safetT
- ferences is in order, tasks. ,
1. The safety programs consist of essen- It has often bPen said; '_Ve always bavethe
: tinily the same elements, assets and resources to do it the right way
_, 191 ,
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the second time - why not do it right in the that cannot be measured in dollars and cents.
first place."System safety,when it is per- Nationalprestige,livesofcrewman, andscien-
mitred to function,is cost effective,con- tiflcdata thatmay holdthekey to man's very
tributesto mission success, and is a needed existence- what a price to pay, f3r justone
discipline.Ifitis not,thenindustryand gov- accidentor mission failurethe:iswithinthe
ernment are going to have to continuewith realm of our abilitytopredict,takeactionto
programs ofaccidentand riskcorrection,not correct and to controlthe levelof risk we
accidentincidentpreventionor risk control, must take to progress to the next plateauof
There is a lotat stake on Skylaband Viking space exploration.
, I
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Early this year, the fundamental design four pull pins to start the watch movements
concept of the Lunar Seismic Profiling (LSP) and to remove the mechanical, xedundant in-
Experiment was challenged when a mode of flight sate,y features when the packages are
operation on the lunar surface was identified in position on the lunar surface. (Figure 3).
which could concetvablyresultinthedetonation When the safe/arm timer actuates, it
of high explosive charges before the departure moves a slide from a position in which it pro-
of the Apollo 17 astronauts. As a quantitative vides complete physical isolation of the end
analysis of the problem was beyond our caps- detonating carL_idge (EDC) from the explosive
bility at the time and as the effects of an ex- block to a position in which a hole in the slide
ploston or( the lunar surface are unpredictable lines up to expose he explosive block to the
f_'om a safety viewpoint, we found ((necessary EDC. This provides a propagation path to
to report the problem to the Manned Space- detonate the package. If for any reason de(o-
craft Center as potentially "Safety Cars- nation does not occur and the package is still
strophic" as defined by NASA directive and by intact after two hours, the timer will cause
our own LSP System Safety Plan. the firing hole to slide past the EDC, thereby
In this paper, I will attempt to track through 9ermanently isolating the EDC from the ex-
the sequence of events, mainly as they relate plosive block.
to the system safety discipline, which resulted One hour after the safe/arm timer opera
ultimately in the reduction of this potential the firing time window, the battery timer re-
hazard t.o "Safety Negligible.." For the sake of leases a firing p_n which strikes a percussion
brevity, I have minimized the discussion of primer in a thermal battery. The heat garter-
the test results and some of the second order ated within the battery as a result of this
effects related to the operations of the hack action liquifies a normally solid material,
watches, creating an electrolyte which activates the
: The object of the LSP (Figure i) is to uti- battery for a period of approximately three
i lize artificially induced seismic energy to minutez. With power applied to the receiver,
investigate the physical characteristics of th_ decoder, and capacitive firing circuits, the
I lur, ar structure. It will be deployed on the explosive package is capable of responding to
! surface of the moon during the Apollo 17 rots- a firing command from the Central Station.
slon. Eight packages containing explosive ma- Early in the preliminary design phase of
terials ranging from 1/8 to 6 pounds will be the timers, it was recognized that environ-
I set out at distances up to 3.5 kilometers _rom mental conditions to which the watch move-
the Apollo Lunar SurfaceExperiments Pack- ments would be exposed on thelunarsurface
age CentralStationwhich willbe erectednear would cause an increase in the amplitude
i the Lunar Module. The packages are activated of their balance wheels_ this could cause
by the astronauts as they are set out by re- "overbanking" and re_,mlt in large timing
. moving pull pins which initiate internal timing err_,s and premature initiation of the timer
. functions. (Figure 2) fur, c_oqs.
i From a safety viewpoint, the key corn- The. terms "balance wheel amplitude" and
i portents of each explosive package are the overbuy(ring" are fundamental to the problem
timers, two per package, which establish the and _ertuire a short description of the operatlon
f conditions permitting the conversion of a fir- of a t,.echanical escapement watch movement
! ing command from the CentL'al Station into (._'r_.. 4) such as most of us still wear on
! the deto_stlon of an explosive package after our w,,-ists. It should be made clear that tuning
i departure of the a_tronauts from the lunar fork and quartz crystal r_gulated movements,surf ce. The(liners are completely mechanical which we all will ee mere and r or as
i and each contains a modified military 'qmck" time goes on, are not pertinent to this dis-
wrist watch movement which controls the cusslon.
I advance of a timing drum to a position whe_ e Timekeeping in a watch movement is actu-
j the output function is initiated. The tim,:rs a,, performed by controlling the rate of dis-are preset and there are no controls or ad- _', _tion of energy from the coiled malnsprmgJustments to be made during the mission, through a gear train. 11_e cont1_' ,unct/on is
It remains only for the astronauts to remove provided by the balance wheel and Ita/rsprt,,_
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assembly which, when properly adJusted, oscil- Is required to perform, and by the fact that
lates in :imple harmonic motion. The timer there are upper and lower 'traits to usable
hack watch,per common practice,oscillates watch amplitude.
at a rateoffivetimes per second. The lower llr.litwhich we have notas yet
To definethe terms previouslymentioned, dtscuP.sedis not a preciselyflxeapoint by
the measurement of angular displacementof an ill-d,'flnedarea of poorerand pooreroper-
a point on the rim of the balance wheel as It atton as the amplitude decreases. This is a
oscillates Is the "amplitude" and is measured condition which wf ¢orthbound people can
In "turns." The amplitude of a given watch relate to as this is exactly what happens to
movement ts a function of Its mainspring our watches whet, we fa_2 t_ take them in for
torque characteristics and is not adjustable. . periodic cleaning. The lubricant gum'. up,
The maximum amplitude in any watch move- the internal resistance of the mechanism in-
me must be less than that which wouldcause creases, and, as there is r,._ compensating
the balance wheel to come around full swing Increase in mainspring tozque, leas energy
and contact the escapement from the opposite is transferred into the balance wheel and Its
direction. If this were to occur, the harmonic amplitude decreases. This results In due
motion of the balance wheel would be 6isturbed course In noticeably large timtvg errors,
by the rebovnd off the escapement and the rate erratic operation, and ultimately, Inability of
e would increase, causing the movement r_ run the watch to run _,_ all. Low temp 'rature has
faster thaa normal. This con" ion, knov'- as the same effect in that it causes rLaewatch otl
"overbanklng,"isnever encounteredina nor- tocongeal.
reallyoperatingwatch here on Earth. When the overbankingproblem was origi-
However, we have reason to suspect that n,',.lly presented to us by the thner subcon-
astronaut wrist watches overbank. In an un- tractor, they were. unable ox unwilling to
official poll conducted at our request, when predict the mag_ituc, e of the revuitlr:E tin lng
this problem first arose, most of the astro- error. They would c, dy say that the watches
nauts who were questioned respon'Jed thatthey could conceivably run "several times faster
a tendency to run than normal". Th_ re_son _,_. this cov-noticdd their watches main
fast during a mission, and one was willing to servative approach probably was £.eir total
estimate approximately plus twenty minut_ lack of quantitative information on the effect
per day. We might also note that, typically, of th. lunar gravity.
the maximum possible amplitude of a fully- On our part, we had estabRshed a nominal
wound watch would be I 3,/_. turns and the 9b-hour runout time requ_.rem_nt in order to
operating amplitude would be 1 1/2 to 1 5/8 maintain a 1.5 safety factor, or thlrr.y noura,
turns with the balance wheel axis vertical between the contingency lift-of* tl_oe of the
", (watch lying fiat). With t:,e watch on edge, the LM and ,'he detonation of the first _.xplosive
typical amplitude would be 1 1/4 to I 3/8tur,_s package. We viewed any s_gnlflcant inroad on
i due to i_creased balaz,ce staff pivot friction 'n the safety n_argln with alarm and, for a timethis position, before we could put everything In proper per-
!n most instrume_tapplicationsof watch spectlve,were fearfulthatwe did not have
movemevts, the primary concern is not the a viable design concept. The steps chat we went
amplitude of the balance wheel but the rate of through in getting to where we are today are
the watch; whether it runs fast or slow, and noted In Fl_re 5. Each #111 be discussed
how much. The designer is Ires to allow the briefly in turn.
amplitude t 9 fall within a rather large rat. The sul_.ontractor had little qlfliculty in
a," it has only a second order effect on rate. verilying .that the problem was a real o.,e.
In the '.,SP Timer, where safety and tell- There we,_, test experience from other pro-
ability are of the ,utmost importance, highly grams to draw on-which indicated that tern-
precise timing is the second-order requ:re- perature and pressure were. factors and the
ment. We have determlned that balance wheel condition was demonstrable by the spphcatlon
amplitude, rather than rate, is the r;ore Ira- of excessive torque to the mainsprings of
portant factor due to tl,._ vnusually wide range rando_}y selected wat,_h_ :hrou'gh their wind- i
of environmental factors under whlchthewatch Ing stems. You qre all wel':omc to dup':.cate
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this experiment on your own watches, but see routine matter except for the necessity to
your local watch maker, not me, if you shear adopt a state-of-the-_rt fiber optic instru-
off your winding stem. mentation system to measure balance wheel
I would like to show you at this point the amplitude to the order of accuracy required.
form used to document this problem (Figure 5) The real problem was in the evaluation of
within our program. Although the concept for the effect of reduced gravity. It was known
the form and its format is my own, most of that balance wheel amplitude changes when the
the checklist items are the work of Mr. J. watch is changed from an edge position to
Richey of Bellcomm, Inc., and were taken a flat position because of changes in bearing
from a paper presented by him to the Wash- frir.tion. From this it could be inferred that
ington Chapter of the System Safety Society the effect of gravity which would cause a simi-
on June 19, 1959. Normally, this form is used lar change in bearing friction is not negligible
as a rough worksheet and has two purposes, and that a substantial increase in balance
First, it is intended to stimulate the imagi- wheel amplitude over the nominal earth value
nation both of the System Safety Engineer and could be expected when the watch was oper-
whomever he is trying to extract information sting on the lunar surface. The question was,
on a problem. Second, it provides some kind How much?
of record of all the chaff we sift through in A centrifuge test was initially performed
evaluating a problem, particularly the negative to provide g vs. amplitude data in t._ approxi-
ones which are otherwise not documented, mate range of 1 to 10 g and extrapolate back-
The fcrm has been reasonably successful and ward to the lunary 1/5 g area. Not being con-
has been adapted to other areas than manned vinced that this procedure was entirely valid,
spaceflight, additional test methods were sought for cross-
It seemed prudent, after overbanktng was correlation.
verified as a problem, to review alternate As a result, two other methods were
methods of providing the timing function for proposed - low or zero g flights in the C-135A
the LSP. Other methods had been considered aircraft operated by the United States Air
and rejected in trade-off studies from which Force as a zero g test and research facility
the selected design evolved. In the light of and in the 500 foot free fall zero g research
an overbanking problem of unknown magni- facility operated by the NASA Lewis Research
rude, they might have appeared more attrac- Center. Tests were ultimately performed at
rive on second look. I wonlt belabor this effort, both facilities under the sponsorship of the
for all the potential candidates were still NASA Manned Spacecraft Center, the procuring
unattractive for various reasons, primarily agency for the LSP Experiment.
weight and reliability. However, none could Although none of these three test ap-
have scored as high on safety as the concept proaches were in themselves completely con-
of two completely independent mechanical elusive, they all pointed in the same direction -
timers that could be initiated only by the that the increase in balance wheel amplitude
astronr_uts during EVA. For once, the re- under the influence of lunar gravity was no ,
quirements of safety, weight, reliability, and greater than one quarter turn. We thought at
volume were entirely compatible. We were this point that we had the most important
convinced that we had the best design, if we variable under control but, in fact, the most
could resolve the overbanking problem, and significant fact to be uncovered in the investi-
that a change at this point would guarantee gation was to come when the effects of pres-
nothing other than s,:hedule slippage and cost sure and temperature were investigated.
overrun. We then chose to move on to the The results, of these tests as presented in
next step - to experimentally evaluate over- Figure 7; substantiated the trend indicated in
banking, the initial tests, and a significant break point
It was originally predicted that amplitude was found to exist in the I torr range. The
would increase on the moon because of high maximum effect at 180° F, I torr, results in
temperature, high vacuum, and low gravity, an increase in amplitude of approximately
Experimental determination of the effects of I/4 turn. At the ambient temperature (ap-
temperature and pressure was a relatively proximately 75° F) only one of the three test _ ,
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movements showed any appreciable change in overbanklng would have been observed in at
amplitude (1/8 turn). However, beyond 1 torr least two of the test watches.
the slopes increase sharply and in the hot The close grouping of the data at the cold
case, extend into the overbanking region, end of the curve suggests that pressure has
Another surprise was that our test results little effect on amplitude at low temperatures
did not substantiate the traditional horological but that there is almost a straight line rela-
theory that aerodynamic damping significantly tionship between temperature and amplltudein
contributed to the total internal resistance of the range from stoppage at -35 ° F (-20 ° F in
balance wheel system. This case had been so a vacuum) to the point of inflection at 40-50 ° F.
strongly made in our early discussions that a The final piece of information needed to
streamlined balance wheel was actively con- evaluate the overbanking problem was related
sidereal at one point as a partial solution to to mainspring torque characteristics. Main-
the overbanking problem. Although our data in springs provide higher torque when fully
the range of aerodynamic interest is scattered wound up, and less as they run down. A char-
and somewhat questionable in an absolute acteristic torque curve is shown in Figure 9.
• sense, the general slope of the curve as it The erratic torque variations at the high end
approaches 1 torr is unrefutable and indi- of the curve are eliminated by the use of a
sated that the change of amplitude is less than recoil click in the winding ratchet mechanism
that which an expert watch maker can observe, which releases a few ratchet teeth before it
The significant conclusion to be drawn locks the mainspring ratchet after winding.
: from these tests is that, although maintenance The low torque of the low end is eliminated
° of one atmosphere of pressure within the by providing a longer mainspring run than is
'_; control module cavity is desirable for other required for the mission involved. The result-
reasons, non-catastrophic leak rates down to lng torque variations are thereby reduced to
t a minimum pressure of 1 torr during lunar account for an amplitude variation of approxi-
operations have no great significance to the mately one quarter c" a turn.
overbanldng problem. Tests were conducted measuring torque as
The results of holding pressure constant a function of mainspring wind as expressed inand varying temperature correlate. Two series number of turns of the mainspring barrel. This
of tests were performed, at ambient pressure information was used in correcting other test
: and in the range of 1 x 10-4 torr. The sum- data to eliminate torque variation dueto main-
results, corrected to eliminate and to establishmary torque spring position,
a represen-
variations due to mainspring wind down, ar.e tattve slope, which turned out to be 4.4, to use
i presented in Figure 8. in the presentation which follows. It should be
The effect of reduced pressure on the mentioned here that the test watches used in" results of these tests are dramatic. Whereas this investigation were "set down" to a nomi-
a sharp point of inflection is displayed on nal one turn amplitude by substituting a con-
l the ambient curve in the 40-50 ° F rangewhich venient available mainspring from a smaller
renders amplitude essentially independent of watch in the subcontractor's product line. The
} temperature above this point, the vacuum scope must be revertfled in the 140 hour
,_ curve rises steadily at a nearly constant rate mainspring With which the production'timers
and could cause a fully wound watch to over- will be equipped.
bank above 150° F. This, is demonstrated by Figure 10 shows the method by which the
the points plotted above the 1 3/4 turn line, a test results were put together to arrive at D
physical impossibility as the balance wheel and E conclusion that overbanking is not a
amplitude cannot increase beyond the point of matter of concern during normal operation of
overbanktng. These points result from large the LSP timer. Normal operation of course,
corrections on measurements made after the means a condition in which seal integrity is
vacuum chamber (and the watches) ran over maintained and the watches are operating
night to get down to test pressure. It may be at a nominal pressure greater than 1 Torr.
inferred that, had the measurements been As the O-Ring seals, three in number, con-
made immediately after winding the watches, stitute single point failures the next step was k
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to determine the worst resulting timing error equivalent torque which may be converted
on the safety of the astronauts and on the to a maximum error of +120 minutes per
probability of success of the experiment, day.
This was accomplished by overbanking a However, the two watch movements in a
watch under controlled conditions and mess- LSP package are aligned in planes at right
uring the resulting change in rate. By vary- angles to each other and only one of the two
ing the controlled condition a curve was con- timers will be lying flat when the package
structed of change as a function of overbank is lying on any side. Thus the overbanking
from which reliable predictions could bemade, condition would be applied to one of the two
This curve is presented in Figure 11. timers. This fatlsafe condition would tend to
On the left side of Figure 11, it may be cause a dud rather than a premature explosion
seen the application of a known torque to a since the timers must both be within their
fully wound down mainspring barrel resulted respective time windows for the firing oper-
in the winding of the barrel to a point of equi- ation to function.
librium at which a certain balance wheel Therefore, considering only a total seal
amplitude was attained. As the torque was failure as the worst case on edge condition,
increased incrementally, the barrel wound up the maximum torque value is approximately
further and the amplitude increased in a pre- 1480 gram millimeters or an effort of plus
dictable manner. When the barrel was fully 40 minutes per day. Ignoring the decrease
wound the amplitude continued to increase as in torque over 90 hours, this works out to
a function of applied torque until the maxi- approximately 10% of the established 30 hour
mum amplitude was attained and the bal- safety margin, and is the basis on which the
ance wheel overbanked. Up to this point there potential hazard has been reduced to ':Safety
was no timing error measurable with a stop Negligible."
watch. Although the worst case approach has suf-
The curve continues on the right side of riced to resolve our safety concerns, it does
, the figure but now, with the maximum ampli- little to resolve the residual reliability prob-
tude attained and the watch running over- lems. We are now at work developing a mathe-
banked, the error rate becomes the dependent matical model of the balance wheel system
variable. Figure 12 repeats this portion of to which we can apply our test results and
the curve as well as similar results for the predicted mission time line data to permit
other two test specimens, more meaningful analysis closer to the real
As amplitude has thus been demonstrated case conditions which will actually exist. The
to be a function of torque, the incremental O-Ring seal design is also under rigorous
increases in amplitude previously discussed review at this time as a result of this inves-
can be converted to equivalent values of torque tigation.
and, if combined tn a rational manner, the The remaining system safety task to be
resultant can be read out on the worst case performed is indicated in Figure 13, which
curves in Figure 12 as a reasonable estimate will ultimately become part of the safety
of the worst timing error to be expected durtng assessment report for the LSP Experiment.
lunar operations. This has been accomplished We must establish the maximum torque and
using graphical methods not discussed herein the slope of the production mainspring torque
to account for the non-ltneartty of the torque curve to assure lunar operation conforming
curves in the overbanklng range and to tntro- to that presented in Figure 10. It is now tra-
duce a factor in the temperature effect based portant to establish tolerances on these num-
on the ratio of lunar gravity amplitude to bers which will assure safe and reliable per- i
earth gravity amplitude. Also accounted for formance of the LSP experiment yet will have ,
and not previously discussed is the effect of an impact on product.ton costs and schedules :
an explosive package failing over on its side. no greater than required to achieve this goal.
After deployment the accumulative total of This is the sometimes forgotten system safety
these worst case conditions is expressed task which can not be overlooked in our ever
as a maximum of 1750 grammillimeters of more competitive industry. The system safety
/
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engineer must be as costconsciousas allthe tel,Swttzerland);to Mr. Jack Dye, The LSP
other engineeringdisciplinesand must see to Experiment Manager, withoutwhose encour=
itthatno more effortisbeingexpended inthe agement Iwould notbe here;toMr. Donald G.
name of safetythan is necessary to achieve Wiseman, Manager ofthe Lunar S1,rfaceProj-
the desiredresults, ectOfficeattheManned SpacecraftCenterfor
In closing,I would like to express my Authorizingthe presentationof thismaterial
appreciationtoseveralpeople;toMr. Charles and to BillScarborough,who bears the te-
A. Sauterof the Bulova Watch Company and sponsibiUty for me being a System Safety
Mr. Rene' Besson of Ebauches S.A.,(Neucha- Engineer.
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ESESSION V
Questions & Answers
MR. REX GORDON: John Gera, where do MR. GERA: I stated that one way to do it
you draw the line between what you consider is if you could Identify every conceivable
industrial safety responsibilities and your problem that you may have and when you do
operational Industrial. Are the industrial safety that then you would have to reduce that to what
responsibilities based on the talk that you you consider credible and work on those sic-
gave7 ments. If I misled you there I apologize. You
JOHN GERA: That is a tough one but the can't in my estimation plan for every con-
line is pretty well drawn in the area of tht. cetvable problem that could go wrong--I don't
manufacturing hardware Itself--the machin- see how you can.
ery. We consider the machine and the man MR. GORDON: Bill Scarborough, on the
itself, that is industrial safety as we see it. list of your functions, you start out with an
We start looking at the detailed processes and analysis review, surveillance, tests and rots-
the machine and the man. We sort of lap that stun support. Do you have any function to give
over Into the system safety activity, safety criteria Into the program7
REX GORDON: When you say machine are MR. SCARBOROUGH: I think that is in-
you talking about drill presses, etc. 7 herent in the analysis function, that is the
JOHN GERA: Yes, I am tailing about the feed back into the design stage or design °
manufacturing machinery Itself. function. I am not sure that I understand
MR. GORDON: You mentioned that you had exactly what you mean.
two plans. A system safety plan for operation MR. GORDON: Where did the system safety
and an Industrial safety plan. effort start on the LEM Program7 After the
MR. GERA: "Standards" requirements had already been defined?
MR. GORDON: "Standards." Who has the MR. SCARBOROUGH: We started very late,
responsibility of the Industrial safety standarcl, like about 3 years after the design was firmed
to prepare and Implement It? up. We dtdntt really make much of a contrt-
MR. GERA: The industrial safety standards button to design, to basle design. We have been
are prepared by Industrial safety people and on-board for all of the design changes since
the control or checking to see that they are we came Into existence, and we do feed back
adhered to Is also the responsibility of Indus- Into the sub-systems engineering groups.
trial safety. I'll throw one kicker In here. MR. GORDON: Are you talking about corn-
No. I is that on a program, the Industrial itag on late with a formal program ?
safety people work for the system safety MR. SCARBOROUGH: Yes
manager In our activity. MR. GORDON: I assume there was some
MR. GORDON: They both report to the safety on it before that.
same manager7 MR. SCARBOROUGH: Yes there was a
MR. GERA: That's right, they all report minimal effort.
to one man who is assigned to the Program W.H. SHAW (TRW): The comment about
Manager for safety. Sometimes we get Into a contingency planning reminds me that there is
little problem an to, is this the responslbtllty an important spin-off benefit to safety analyses
of industrial safety or is it the responsibility that we find often gets overlooked. It could
of systems safety. The point I want to make is apply to matrix hazard analyses but partic-
thet the Job does get done whether it is by one ularly to fault tree which is really before the
party or the other, fact or prior trouble-shooting. In systems that
MR. GORDON: One additional que,ltion. Involve maintenance planning, continuouslyop-.
You mentioned that you had contingency plans erated manned systems and even one-shot sys-
for all conceivable emergencies, is that true? terns that have activity at the cape, the output \
How much effort does it take to keep them of the safety analyses is an extremely Impor-
updated? Do you make changes in the System? ,ant and useful input to the trouble-shooting '
T"
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procedures and maintenance manuals. Wehave J. JONES: Primarily the alternate ap-
found frequently that this is a real Important proaches that we had were a series of other
spin-off that gets overlooked, kinds of timers or the use of more than one
BOB ROSSI (GSFC): Mr. Don Ward and transmitter. There Is one transmitter in the
Mr. George Mumma Indicated a certain fl:xl- system now. I didn't take the time to explain
bllity in the system safety analysis which was that but there are three functions that must
tailored to the mission and (please keep me occur in order to get it to firing. Each of the
honest if I am misquoting), however in two timers must operate and they must operate
Georgets presentation, I thought I detected an within certain time constraints relative to each
Inflexibility at the point where he mentioned other, and finally a signal must be received
with respect to launch operations when he from the central station. An obvztr,,,sapproaeh,
talked about 127-1 and 1700-1 and I am and It would have been terribly heavy Interms
wondering, I have run afoul of these many of weight, would be to use three transmitters
times myself, what are your views regarding which would mean three receivers in each
these documents, why shouldn't they be a little package. There are eight packages so any
flexible? weight penalty in the package is times eight.
DON WARD: They are flexible really. You Still, from a safety viewpoint, we didntt like
can get waivers but you have to show them that because there are too many ways of
where you need it and you have to show them generating spurious signals. The other alter-
that you are still safe. I dontt think that these hate we had were other kinds of tlmingdevlces
documents are necessarily the only sa/e way such as a tuning fork type watch or torts
of doing something, and we have a couple of crystal regulated watch or using mission time
systems that we are going to ask for waivers and picking that up some how. All these fell by
o0. One is a premature separation destruct the wayside either because they were heavier
system. We don't want to carry a destruct or, in our opinion, less safe. What weselected
package all the way to Mars, and we think that we fell is the best, if we can make it work,
we can show them that If this spacecraft and we are confident now that it will work.
should separate prematurely the engines cannot
fire and it would follow a ballistic trajectory QUESTION: I was very curious about the
Into the oeeasl. Hopefully we can get a waiver cause of temperature effect. Is the hair spring
on that. I think from a mission standpoint we temperature dependent or not?
will be safer without It than we would be with
It; and I mink to answer your question, those MR. JONES: It Is not defined. Our watch-
documents are not inflexible, but you have to making consultants are scratching their heads.
bare a good reason for changing the way of There are several theories. The most viable
doing business with them. one right now probably has to do with surface
tension of the lubricant. Something else that I
QUESTION: A quest/on for Mr. Jones on couldn°t Dosslble stuff into a half-hour presen-
the system engIneering of his seismic experl- tat/on is that the lubrication problems are
ment. One of the basic requirements of system extremely difficult and that in !tself is a two-
engineering Is to identify the function, In this hour presentation.
case the delayed arming function, and then you QUESTION: You have an oll type lubricant
consider all alternate methods of accompUsh-
on a Jewel bearIng. I thought Jewel bearingsIng it and then select the one particular method.
For many years In the naval mlne business ran off-free.
the delayed arming has been a required feature MR. JONES: No, all small watch mecha- I
of the naval mines and l'm sure the same In nisms such as this do have wet lubrication.
many types of fuses. The question is, what The particular lubricant that we are using
are the alternate methods of delayed arming costs about $I0,000 a gallon and reUabUlty
that were considered and did the safety aspects is going nuts trying to get tracablllty all the _
of each alternate enter Into the decision to way back to Switzerland on It. It Is good, It I\choose the halr-sprInger method of delayed works, and we are really quite surprised at
arming, the results of oar temperature tests. I '
I2O6 4
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INTRODUCTION modes are termed "critical paths" in
fault tree terminology.
At Idaho Nuclear*, a system safety analysts 3. To determine the relative importances
program is in existence for the routine safety of the individual critical paths.
and reliability analysis of control and safe- 4. To determine the qualttative andquanti-
guard (backup) systems. Though the systems tative impact on safety or reliability
analyzed are generally peculiar to the reactor due to proposed design modification
industry, the methods employed, and their or component upgrade.
applications, are generally utilizable in any 5. To determine the quantitative response
safety program. In Idaho Nue!2ar's safety of system availability with regard to
program, a diverse assortment of technlques particular maintenance schemes.
are employed, st_ch as fault hazard analysis, 6. To determine the quantitative safety,
failure mode analysis (FMEA and FMECA), reliability, or availability with which
failure matrix methods, block diagram model- to compare to established stand-
ing, and fault tree methods. The fault tree ards.
method and its applications in particular are The fault tree itself satisfies the first
discussed in this paper, since this technique objective since it portrays in a lucid manner
enters into a large portion of the safety analy- the logical chains of events which lead to the
sis performed at Idaho Nuclear. system failure or accident. The faul tree,
Fault tree methods are used to obtain both once drawn, is an effective implement b, _hich
qualitative and quantitative information about management, reliability or safety engineer,
the safety and reliability of tide sjstem an- and design engineer can communicate.
alyzed. For the analysis, the fault tree depicts From the fault tree, a simple qualitative-
all the primary causes for a particular system type evaluation determines all the modes, or
failure (or accident occurrence). The system critical paths, for the system failure or acci-
failure or accident occurzence is the topevent dent. A critical path is a group of primary
of the fault tree. The primary causes are causes which must all occur in order for the
usually component failures, administrative system failure or accident to occur; if one
errors or environmental conditions; m gen- of these primary causes does not occur then
eral, the primary causes depict the resolution the system failure or accident will not occur
, desired for the causes of the system failure by this mode. The complete set of critical
or accident occurrence. By use of the standard paths for the fault tree gives all the combina-
"AND" gate and "OR" gate symbology, the tions of primary causes which give rise to the
fault tree depicts the logical relationships of top event. If one or more of these combinations
: the primary causes, and their consequences, occurs, then the system failure (or accident)
which led to the specified system failure (or occurs.
accident). Figure I at the end of this paper A few simple illustrations may serve to
_ummarizes the basic fault tree representao best clarify the critical path definition. As-
tions. For a discussion of the fault tree sume a fault tree has been drawn and its
method, the reader is referred to Haasl(1) critical paths have been obtained. If one of
or Crosetti(2). these critical paths is "Resistor 1 Failure in
At Idaho Nuclear the fault tree analyses Mode A" and "Resistor 2 Failure in Mode B" ,_
are performed for the following objectives: then Resistor I must fail in Mode A and Re-
1. To represent in an objective and corn- sistor 2 must fail in Mode B in order for the
municative manner the causes of the system failure or accident to occur. If either t
system failure or accident occurrence, resistor does not fail, or fails in modes other
2. To obtain the modoq by which the sys- than A and B, then the top event (system
tern failure or accid,:nt occL,rs. These failure or accident) will not occur by this
narti,'ular route. If one of the critical paths
" .._of July 1, 1971, Idahol_uciear .ill be under the obtained Is "Resistor 3 in Mode A", then only
A_ _a,_,_rne_ .... ,_,m ' '.,:,..... a_ A,,"oi_ r,-.-_stor 3 foiling in Mode A _ _;ufftcient for
..... ,,_,, ;. , .... op event to occur, ann Kcststur d m x_
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Mode A" is termed a single failure. The set 4. The failure or accident frequency at
of critical paths obtained for this fault tree time t (the integral of this quantity is
represent all those primary cause combtna- simply the previous characteristic (3)).
t.tons, and only those combinations, which will 5. The failure rate (lambda) at time t.
cause the top event to occur. This information is obtained for any series
I'h_ critical paths are obtained from the of time points t desired by the user, and hence
fault tree by means of a number of existing time dependent curves are obtained which
safety and reliability computer programs; at portray the time history of the reliability or
Idaho Nuclear the programs PREP and KITT(3) safety. From these curves nne is able to dis-
are used. The critical paths are an important cern, for example, the degradation of relia-
class of information since they directly tie bility or safety with respect to time; lifetime-
the system failure or accident to the primary type information is thus included in the results
causes. If improvement is desired, the critical obtained. If a particular time is of interest,
paths identify the specific areas which are the then one point from these curves is simply
weakest and which would have greatest re- used.
sponse to an improvement. In general, optimal This time dependent information is obtained
improvement consists 9f increasing the size for each primary cause of the fault tree (i.e.,
of the smallest critical paths. If the fault tree for each component or environment effect),
: has one component critical paths (single fail- for each c_itical path of the fault tree, and for
ures) improvement should be centered such the top event of the fault tree (the accident or
that these paths become two component (a system failure of interest). As applied to a
redundancy added), if two component critical particular primary cause, the information
paths are the smallest that exist for the fault gives the frequency at which the primary
tree, then they should be designed into three cause occurs, the probability of the primary
i component critical paths and so forth, cause not occurring at all, the probability of
For the quantitative information in the the primary cause existirig at time t, and the
1 preceding list of objectives of the fault tree expected number of titres the particula_ pri-
analysis, the computer programs PREP and mary cause will occur. If the primary cause
I KITT are utilized. PREP and KITT employ is a component, the information thus gives thethe Kinetic Tree Theory approach to obtain detailed reliability and availability of the
quantitative information about the fault tree. component and shows, for example, the de-
The Kinetic Tree Theory technique has been tailed effects of repair or environment stresses
described in a number of articles (4,5,6)and on that particular component. Since this in-
the details of this approach will not be dis- formation is obtained for every primarycause,
cussed here. those primary causes, such as particular
' The fault tree as drawn by the engineer is component failures or environment effects,
simply input into PREP and KITT. The only which are most critical are readily identified.
other data needed as input are the failure The information obtained for a particular
rates or probabilities for the primary causes critical path gives the frequency, expected
(i.e., for the components and any environ- number of times, etc., the top event (i.e.,
mental effects) and the average repair times system failure or accident) will occur by this
for those primary causes that are repairable, particular mode. The primary cal,ses in the _
With this input data, PREP and KITT obtain particular critical path are soteiy responsible •
the critical paths of the fault tree and the for the system failure or accident and the
following quantitative information: obtained lnformatio_ describes how often this i
1. The probability that the failure or particular crILical path, or mode, will cause
accident will not occur at all to time t. the f_,!lure or accident. The lnfermation is ]
2. The probability of the failure or accident obtained for each of the critical paths of the
existing at time t. fault tree, and hence the most important
3. The expected number of times the fail- critical paths are identified, those by which
ure or accident will occur to time t. the failure or accident will most likely occur.
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Any safety or reliability improvements will may not be familiar. The aim of this section
be directed to these "weak links", is to demonstrate, as straightforwardly as
In addition to being obtained for each pri. possible, practical applications of fault tree
mary cause and critical path, the five rime analyses. By describing the results which
dependent characteristics are also finally have been obtained from these analyses, this
obtained for the top event of the fault tree. section will hopefully ilh_strate the power of
The characteristics give the frequency at fault tree analysis and the role it can play in
which the system failure or accident will a system safety program.
occur, the number of times it is expected to
occur, and the probability of it not occuring SPERT IV Protection System Analysis.*
at all. If the system analyzed is a safety
backup-type system, this information gives, The SPERT protection system is an elec-
for example, the availability of the system, trical control system which has the function
that is, the probability that the system will of shutting the reactor down when certain
perform correctly when an accident condition safety criteria are exceeded. In this particular
exists. For an on-line operating system, the instance, the system consisted of an automatic
information gives the percentage of time the control (time triggered) and a manual backup
system will operate without failure in any control, If the automatic control system failed,
time period. The information obtained is a a signal was relayed to an operating personnel
complete characterization of the failure or who was then to initiate the manual control
accident for any particular situation analyzed; system (by pressing a control button).
effects of repair, environmental stress, and A fault tree was drawn for this system, in
administrative procedures are explicitly ob- which the system failure (top event)was de-.
tained. Since the information is rime depend- fined to be both the automatic control system -
ent, a complete history of the safety and failing and the backup manual control system
i
reliability characteristics is yielded, failing, when accident conditions existed. In
The PREP and KITT codes obtain the this case, an analysis was performed on an
rime-dependent characteristics_ by an analyt- already existing system; the SPERT control
ical technique which does not entail any Monte system (automatic and backup) was operating,
Carlo simulation. The codes require little but an upgrade was desired. In order to up-
computer time, for example, approximately grade this system, the following information
two minutes of IBM 360/75 computer time is had to be obtained:
needed to completely analyze a i000 component I. An identification of all credible corn-
fault tree. For smaller trees the computer ponent failures and/or fault conditions
time is considerably less** Because of the that could result in the designated sys-
small computer time, sensitivity studies and tern failure,
' design modification studies are practically 2. An identification of the most critical
performed. The failure rates, repair times, weaknesses in the existing system
or particular portions of the tree are simply (termed the "base-line" system).
modified and the programs run again to assess 3. A determination of the impact on sys-
these possible deviations, tern safe_y due to proposed design
modifications.
PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS The fault tree was decided upon as the
most practicalmethod ofobtainingthisInfer- !
This sectiondescribesparticularfaultree marion.The faulttreeanalysiswas performed
analyses which have been periormed atIdaho independentlyof other safetyanalyses and i
Nuclear. The specific,technicaldetailsof the was the major effortfor thisparticularsys-
systems are not describedso thatthereader cem study.
is not encumbered with jargon with which he The fault tree, once it was drawn, con.. '
slstedofapproximately300componentfailures
*The computerrime isinsensitiveto the number
oftimepointsdesiredbytheuser. *SPERT IVI_thename ofaparticularreactor.
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and faultconditions(primary causes). The AutomaticControlFailure
primary causes (the "bottom ends" of the
fault tree) were basic component failures Failure
such as particularresistorfailures,relay Component Cont _bution
failures,and wire failures.Adverse environ-
mental conditionson these components were Timer (I) 0.9927
also included in the primary causes. The Relays (14) 0.0071
resolutionof the fauh tree was thereforeon Terminals and 0.0001
a basiccomponent level. Connectors (26)
A correct input to the automatic and Wires (71) 0.0001
backup control systems was assumed and
the faulttree analyzedthecausesfor no out-
put or incorrectoutput.Hence, the analysis The above tablelistsonlythe major con-
isolatedthe "signal-passlngfunction"of the tributorsto system failure;the numerous
controlsystem. No human errors were con- other components not listedhad negligible
sideredin the faulttree.Certainsubsystems contribution.From thetable,iftheautomatic
ofthecontrolsystemwere periodicaUychecked controlsystem failed,997oof thetime itwould
and thisscheduledmaintenance was includeo be due to the automatic timer mechanism
in the analysis.To draw thisfaulttree,a itselffailing,while only 0.01% of thetime it
totaltime of approximatelytwo man-weeks would be due to one of or more ofthe 76
/ was required.This task thus required little wires failing.If the manual backup system
time and effort, failed,657oof the time itwould be caused by
The faulttree itselfand thecriticalpaths one or more of the eightrelaysfailingand
determined by PREP and KITT yieldedthe 317o of the time would be caused by one or
firstclass of informationin the preceding both of the console switches failing.The
list.In the PREP and KITT computer run, criticalarea in the automatic system was
failurerates (lambdas)were assigned tothe thus the timer mechanism while the critical
components on the fauh tree to determine areas in the manual backup system were the
the most import criticalpaths,i.e.,toidentify eightrelaysand two consoleswitches.
the most severe weaknesses in the system. From the identificationof these critical
The resultsof thisrun are shown below, areas, and from the criticalpaths and fault
tree itself,which showed theinterconnections
these criticalareas had withinthe system,
Table 1 modificationsbecome evident which might
•, upgrade the safety of the system. The modifi-
COMPONENT FAILURE CONTRIBUTIONS cations were quite simple and consistedof
TO A SYSTEM FAILURE I) placinga second relay in parallelwithan
existingone ("ModificationI"),and 2)inserting
Manual ControlFailure a manually settimer in theautomaticcontrol
circuit ("Modification2"). The impacts of
Component Failure these modificationswere determined by two
Contribution additionalPREP and KITT computer runs
which analyzed thefaulttreewiththemodifi-
Relays (8) 0.6477 cationsinserted.The totalIBM 360/75corn-
Console Switches(2) 0.3076 purer time requiredfor these two runs plus
Terminals and 0.0262 the originalrun was three minutes, which
Connectors (27) was neglible.The resultof theimpact evalua-
Wires (76) 0.0185 tionsis shown in Figure 2 at theend ofthis
paper.
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In the figure, the "Failure Probability" is further detail was inappropriate in this con-
that both the automatic control system and the ceptual design phase and the functional level
manual control system will fail in any one or of resolution provided adequate information
more of the number of tests performed (a with a minimal expenditure of time and
"test" here is simply an operation of the effort.
control system). For example, the failure Six fault trees were drawn for the three
probability at 200 tests denotes the probability proposed designs, one fault tree considering
of control failure in one or more of these 200 reliability and one fault tree considering safety
tests. The "BASE-LINE" curve depicts the for each design. The studies were performed
failure probability for the existing automatic by system design engineers who were familiar
and backup system, the "MOD-I" curve is for with the concepts of fault tree analysis. Each
this system incorporating Modification 1 (de- fault tree consisted of approximately 70 com-
scribed previously), and the "MOO-2" curve ponents (primary causes) and the six fault
is for the system incorporating both Modifi- trees required two man-weeks to complete
cation 1 and Modification 2. (two engineers working five days).
As evident from the figure, the proposed Each of the three designs possessed re-
modifications significantly increased the safety dundancies in the electrical circuits. All the
of the control system. These modifications designs utilized two out of three coincidences
were made evident from the fault tree analysis to insure against spurious, undesired action,
and the impacts of these modifications were and all three designs were of the same order
then able to be objectively determined from of cost. It was not obvious from the design
the PREP and KITT computer runs. Modifica- as to which one design was the best and a
tion 1 (corresponding to the MOD-I curve) fault tree analysis was the only method deemed
was consequently decided upon as a change to practical, and of sufficient power, to solve
be incorporated in the system which would be this problem.
practical in cost and which would substantially For the safety fault tree of each design,
upgrade system safety, the system failure (top event of the tree) was
defined to be ',failure of the system to respond
Plant Protection System Pilot Study when protective action is necessary". For the
reliability fault tree the system failure was
The system analyzed in this study is an defined as "system responds when protective
on-line control system. Critical plant pars- action is not necessary". For the safety study
meters are continuously monitored and if any the failure thus investigated was the system
of these parameters exceeds safe operating not working when accident conditions existed;
limits the control system rapidly redu_:es the accident conditions were input to the qystem,
reactor power. The fault tree analysis was but the system did not respond. For the _.lia-
performed during the conceptual phases of biUty study, the failure was the system acting
system development. Three possible designs as ff accident conditions existed when they did
were proposed for the control system, and the not; normal, nonaccldent conditions were input
fault tree analysis served the rote of deter- to the system, but the sygtem responded as if
mining the "best" system design out of the accident conditions were input. In, the safety
i
three proposed. The analysis investigated both failure, the system gave no protection to an
the safety and reliability of the designs; in accident and in the reliability failure, the
fact, in this instance, if the system safety system gave unwanted protection which shut
was the only characteristic examined Me the plant down. _
wrong design wquld have been chosen. The fault trees, once drawn, were input to |
The fault tree analysis of the three designs the PREP and KITT programs to obtain the
was conducted on a functional level; the mini- quantitative system safety and reliability
mum component_ required to provide a discrete characteristics. Component failure rate data,
and separate function were considered as the gathered from existing report_, was alsoinput
basic building blocks of the system. This level to the programs. The same failure rate data
of analysis was sufficient to define the pri- was used for all the fault trees in order to
mary causes of failure on the fault tree. Any obtain valid comparisons. The six computer
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runs required a total of four minutes computer For this study, the fault tree analysis thus
time, which was inconsequential. The results allowed the best design to be chosen with
of the analyses are shown in Figures 3 and 4 little effort and cost expenditure. System III
at the end of this paper, was the simplest design and had the fewest
In Figure 3, the probability of a safety components, while System I, the design chosen
failure is plotted versus total operating time as the best, was the most complex. The fault
(hours). A point on a curve gives the proba- tree analysis showed that in this case, asmall
bility of the system failing during a particular amount of added complexity bought large re-
operating period. If, for example, the time turns in safety and reliability. As an added
period of 1200 hours is chosen (the x value) verification, the present finalized design
then the probability that the system will fail studies of System I substantiates completely
during this 1200 hour operating period is the results of the performed fault tree analyses.
obtained from the curves. (The curves In
Figure 3 are only plotted to 2000 hours since
PBF Poison Injection System Analysis
this is the proposed maximum continuous
operation time for the system.)
The system failure investigated in Figure The final study discussed in this paper is
3 is a safety failure, i.e., the failure of the an investigation of a backup emergency sys-
system to respond when protective action is tern. The poison injection system is used as
necessary, Each of the three safety fault trees an emergency reactor shutdown system; it is
for the three designs investigated this par- essentially a two out of three type control
ttcular safety failure (had this as the top, system which is manually initiated. A correct
undesired event on the fault tree), "System I", input to the system was assumed and no
"System II" and "System III" in Figure 3 response wasthesystemfailureexamlned(t.e.,
represent the three individual design pro-. this was the top event of the fault tree).
posals. From the figure, System I and II are Resolution was on a basic component level
the safest designs with System II being a bit and human errors were not considered. The
safer than System I. If safety was the only fault tree analysis was performed agalndurtng
consideration, then System II would be chosen the conceptual design stage. The fault tree
as the best design since it was simpler and consisted of approximately 200 components ,
slightly cheaper than System I. and, as in the previous cases, required ap-
Figure 4 illustrates the reliability of each proximately two man-weeks to complete.
of the three designs. The probability of a The analysis is different from the previous
reliability failure (the y-axis) is the proba- two in that the injection system is solely a
biltty that the system responds when protec- backup system and system availability Is the
tive action is not necessary. Total operating primary safety concern. ("Availability" here
time is again depicted on the x-axis. From is the probability the system will function
the figure, System I is the most reliable, when called upon at any particular time.
" while Systems II and Ill are highly unreliable Conversely, the "unavailability" is the proba-
and cause numerous unwarranted shutdowns, hillty the system will not function when called
Investigating both Figures 3 and 4, that is upon.) The fault tree analysis was performed
Investigating both safety and reliability, Sys.- to Investigate the following:
tem IIs clearlythebestdesign.The safetyof I. Possible weaknesses _,: the system
System I is acceptablewith regard to the design (thebase-llne system). These
established program standards and in fact the would be determined from the fault tree
difference between the safety of System I and itself and from the critical paths ob-
the safest design is Insignificant. The reila- rained by PREP and KITT.
blltty of System I equals its safety (-,-10-3 after 2. The response of system availability with
2000 hours) and far exceeds the reliability of regard to various maintenance checking ,
the other two designs. Because of this anal),- intervals used for the components. This
sis, System I was the design chosen and is would be determined from the quanttta-
presently progressing through the finalized tire characteristics obtained by PREP
design stages, and KITT. '
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3. Differences that would result in system hours, then the system unavailability would
availability due to particular design be 4x10 "1, i.e., there is a 40% probability that
modifications. The quantitative charac- the system would not function when it was
teristics from PREP and KITT would called upon at any particular time, (when
again be used he£e. accident conditions existed). The uriavaila-
The fault tree analysis was one part of a bility for the PARTIALLY REDUNDANT de-
larger safety analysis performed on this sys- sign or the COMPLETEI.,Y REDUNDANT de-
tern, sign, for a particular component checking
The fault tree, having been drawn for the interval, would be read from the figure in a
base-line system design was __nputto the PREP similar manner as above.
and KITT codes to obtain the critical paths The results from the fault tree analysis
and quantitative characteristics. The input also
and the subsequent PREP and KITT runsincluded the component failure rates and a
shown in Figure 5 are significant since they
range of checking times for those components show not only the response of availability with
that would have maintenance (not all compo- respect to various maintenance schedules for
nents would be checked and this was taken into
a particular design, but also show the impact
consideration). From the fault tree and criti-
of design modifications on the system avalla-
cal paths, possible weaknesses in the base- biltty. If a given availability is desired (or
line system were uncovered. A second and equivalently if a given failed probability, or
third computer run was then performed to unavailability, is desired), then either the
analyze two possible design modifications; in base-line system design with a given corn-
these additional runs, the same component portent checking interval may be used or afailure rates and checking times were used.
modified design with a larger checking interval
The total computer time required for the may be used. The design modifications have
three runs was five minutes IBM 360/75 time.
Figure 5 at the end of the paper shows the their chief impact on the checking interval,
system availability versus component checking allowing the same availability to be attained
with less maintenance.
interval for the base-line system design and
for the two proposed design modifications. The modifications which made the system
The quantity actually plotted on the y-axis is completely redundant (the COMPLETELY
the failed probability, or system unavalla- REDUNDANT curve in Figure 5) consisted of
btlity, which is one minus the availability. The incorporating more piping redundancy Into the
"NO REDUNDANCY" curve is the based-line system. These modifications Increased the
system, the "PARTIALLY REDUNDANT" independence of the flow circuits as verified
curve Is for a design modification making in Figure 5. The modifications have been
certain portions of the system redundant, and taken into consideration in the final design of
the "COMPLETELY REDUNDANT" curve is the system.
for a second design modification making the Finally, Figure 6 shows the failed prcba-
system completely redundant, bility (unavailability) for the completely re-
From the figure, for example, if the dundant design when possible errors in corn- ,
maintainable components of the base-line sys- portent failure rate data are taken into account.
tern were checked every 100 hours (102 on the The "MOST PROBABLE V,,._UE" curve in
x-axis) then the system unavailability would Figure 6 is the same as the COMPLETELY
be 6xl0 "2 (the corresponding y-value on the REDUNDANT curve in Figure 5, but is plotted
NO REDUNDANCY curve), Thus, for this destgn on a different scale. The MOST PROBABLE
and checking interval, 6% of the time the sys- VALUE curve represents the best value for
tern would not function when called upon.* the completely redundant system unavaila-
Again, for the base-line system, if the main- bility. The "90_o Upper Bound" and "90_o
tainable components were checked every 1000 Lower Bound" are the 907o confidence bounds
for the system unavailability (i.e., the curves
eCheckingevery 100 hoursmearmaperiodic mainte- reprt qent 90_ error bars when possible errors
nance check is performed after every 100 hours of in data are taken into account). These upper
operation. _nd lower bound curves were computed by
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%assuming a possible error of a factor of 10 in i.e., the modes by which the system failure
each component failure rate (to 90_ con- or accident will occur, the most criticalareas
fidence). These error curves serve to show likely to cause the failure or accident, detailed
the effect errors in component failure rate failure probabilities, and the response of
data have on the system computed safety safety or reliability to design modifications
characteristics. AS observed, the possible and maintenance schemes. The fault treeitself
errors did rot significantly affect the system is a significant result since it objectively
results. Even accounting for these possible defines the failure or accident and is valuable
component failure rate errors, the relative tool for comraunication. The faulttree analysis
differences between the curves in Figure 5 has most application in the design phases, but
remained the same (i.e., the possible failure it can be used on already existing systems.
rate errors merely shift all the curves in Finally, the fault tree can be as detailed as
Figure 5 up or down the y-axis without chang- desired, however, the fault tree need not be
ing their relative separations). The completely elaborately complex in order to yield useful
redundant system thus still showed the same and significant information.
gain in availability when possible errors in
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ABSTRACT
!
The manufacturer, tester, retailer, const.aer, repairer
i dlsFoser, trade and professional assoc;attons, national and
•,, international standards bodies, and governments 1_: several
roles are all involved in consumer product safety. A pre-I
ltmlnary anaiyslt, drawing on system safery tecnnlques, will
i be utill'.'ed to dlst!ngulsh the tnter-relatinn_ of _ese many
groups and the responsibilities that they are or could take for
product safety, including the "slow accident" hazards as well
as the more commonly discussed :'fast accident" hazards. ?
rhe importance of interactive computer-aided information
flow among these groups will be particularly *:tressed. !
NBS Document 411.00CM035 - Revised t
This document represents the views of the author, but
not necessarily th_se Gf the National Bureau of Standards
administration.
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INTRODUCTION consumer, are far less than the government to
specify or even to find out the level of safety
The simplistic pictures of life's problems or other use costs of the products he buys. The
confound efforts to deal with the solutions, in cost of safety features is localized with the
their intricate complexities. Some of us may price of the product; the savings of safety are
be attracted _ the slogan solutions- "acci- very distributed. But consumers, acting as
dents are caused by the nut behind the wheel" - voters, are expressing a group interest through
but study soon shows that human events, such legislation for more government concern with
as an injury while using a consumer product, increasing the safety of consumer products.
cannot be said to have one cause, one fault,
one solution. It obscures understanding and THE SAFETY INTERFACES
yie'_ds limited improvement to loot for and try
to act on th_____ecause of an accident, l_ _, Figure i diagrams some ol t,:_ moz: ira-
events have thousands of "causes" or anteced- portant safety interfaces. Traditionally, the
ent events, many of which might be modified to consumer exchanges money wl_, d_ , .... _a-
increase safety, facmrer for products, and has the responsi-
This is "c,_al to ",,:',v, " ' system'. " bility (caveat emptor - buyer beware)to,:.Aect
safety englneerF in their own specialties- par- the products that serve his needs, using i.q-
ttcularly space safety or military systems juries as experience in judging safety. As the
safety. But we are just learning to apply these market has proliferated so that experiencc with
techniques to consumer product safety. How particular products is more diffuse, and as
many aerospace systems safety ¢.ngineers products have become more complex, so that
apply these techn_.ques in their own homes? their hazards are largelyhidden, governments,
Instead of waling junior right away for leaving particularly through judicial powers and tort
i books on the stairs that pa tripped over, how law development, have held the manufacturer
i many of us analyse the many changes that increasingly responsible for his product
would have reduced the chances of this event - (caveat vendor - seller beware). As Morris
! improved lighting, wider stairs, tables near Kaplan put it, (1)
the bottom and top of the stairs for holding "The consumer has a lot of catching up to
things we wish to later take up or down, less do. Much has happened between the hoe and
i to drink before dinner, less shouting at the the mechanical cultivator, between home-
family and stomping on the stairs to show spun and polyester knits, between illus-
!: whots boss, etc.- before waling junior? trated books and color television. By the
: Clearly, the systems effectiveness and time he learns about a gas or electric stove,
systems safety techniques of analyses of re- there's a radar oven. After he learns the
", liability, maintainability, operability, support- difference between real and artificial silk,
ability (logistics), compatibility, design stm- he is confronted with acetate, nylon, poly-
plicity, human f a c t o r s, dependability, ester, acry!ics."
availability, hazards, failures, fault trees, The manufacturer gives an implied war-
environment effects, systems safety plans, ranty for his product, and may give an express
safety documentation and communication, warranty as well, but it is noted that his re-
safety audit procedures, etc., could be uti- sponstbility for his product Is far from com-
Uzt to increase the safety of consumer plete. His express warranty may cover only a
products and their use. few percent of the design use life of the prod-
For space and m lit ar y products, the uct, and products liability Insurance and case
government has the responsibility and the settlement payments of 0.05_o of sales are not
capability through contract requirements and unusual. (2)
payments to minimize the costs of product Looking ._galn at Figure 1, it ts the govern- .
purchase and product use, including the human ment far more than the individual consumer
and dollar costs of safety failures. For con- that has utilized injury information. Through
sumer products, the picture Is less clear as to legislation and regulation (or executive law),
who Is re_,ponslble for safety, and the capabtl- the government requires the manufacturer to
ttles of the Individual product purchaser, the consider certain aspects of consumer product
223 i
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safety (cave legem - beware of the law, an ex- curve fitting procedure, Figure 2, of the cumu-
presslon I suggest). However, the government iatlve percent of those who died in 1967 (4)
has had only a moderate impact on consumer versus the age at which they died, the pre-
product safety in any given decade - although liminary suggestion is made that the observed
the combined effects are very important, and curve could be accounted for by a "biological
total hazards perhaps particularly in food and death" probability distribution with mean age
drugs might be far worse without any govern= of death of 75 and standard deviation of 12
merit actior,. Hence, the practlce of the market- years, with a 2 percent "tail" of additional
place continues to be caveat emptor - buyer deaths prior to the age of 1 year representing
beware - however much we talk about products the early=lethal effects, together making up 70
liability, class action, self-regulation, and percent of the deaths, and a difference curve
government regulation trends. "stress death," which is within 4.5 percent of
It is the consumer who pays - is handed the being a straight line -- with less deaths before
responsibility - for most (I suggest about age 50 and more after age 50, curve fitting at
90%) (3) of the product performance failures, 30 percent of the deaths--or 600,000 people
and most (I suggest 507o) of the costs of in- per year in the United States.
juries involving the products he buys. (My On the basis of this very preliminary
rough working estimate (3) is that the manu- hypothesis, I suggest that in addition to some
facturer pays through productsliability settle- 100,000 fast accident deaths there are some
ments perhaps 57o of the injury costs of con- 500,000 slow accident deaths, and with an esti-
sumer products, i.e., that only 5% of the mated ratio of perhaps 500 injuries to ldeath,
injury costs show up dtrectlyinproductprices, there are 250 million slow accident injuries
Governments, through support of the medical per year -- to the extent of getting professional
establishment, pay some 30% of product injury medical treatment or being disrupted from
costs, I estimate- which show up later in normal activities for at least a full day. Most
taxes. And uninjured consumers, through in- of us are feeling some discomfort with our
surance distribution, pay perhaps 157oofprod- technological life style -- although I hasten to
uct injury costs.) emphasize that it is this same technology that
The Importance of the testing laboratories lets many more of us live out a biological life
and standards bodies in consumer product span than in years past. The median age
_ safety is now growing, of death in Massachusetts in 1850 was 40,
and even in 1900 for non-whites it was
SLOW ACCIDENTS 33, (4)
Th challenge in consumer product safety,
{ In addition to our dollar losses for unwise then, is not only to reduce atleastthe Involun-
', _ choices in the marketplace, we have our human tary imminent hazard aspects of product use,
i losses of deaths and injuries while using prod- but also to reduce these continuing hazards of
ucts. The National Safety Council Accident pollution, mutation, exhaustion of raw ma-
Facts reports some 115,000 accident deaths tertals, and other stresses of modern life. By
and S0 million injuries per year, of the 2 Increasing production of food, products, and
l million who die each year in the United States. services over the millennia man has indeedI call these the "fast accidents," a d am look- extended the median life span. Now, I this
ing particularly at the deaths and injuries in- generation, it becomes apparent that much
volving delayed stress effects of our life further increased production and populations '_
styles, the "slow ccid nts" (3) ofcarcinogens wlil decrease th edian life span unless we i
_' in our products and environments, heavy reduce the stress hazards. Living with man
metals in our streams, deaths and hospitall- rather than living with nature has become ther
_ zation (injury) for some people with "dis- challenge of survival.
°_ eases" including malnutrition whose cures or
_ prevention are known but not applied, and all INFORMATION VERSUS REGULATION ,
_ other effects of stress that lead to "premature
_ death" and hospitalization. Ralph Nader speaks As Figure 1 Indicates, there are several
of the "silent violence" of our society. By a ways in which product InJury lnformation could
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be more effectively utilized in the market- "Today in America, there is a general
place. The government staff could decide what sense of trust and goodwill toward the world
is needed to increase safety and by legislation of business. Those who violate that trust
and regulatioh require that these changes be and abuse that goodwill do damage to the
made. Many ol us are aware of the Inade- free enterprise system. Thus) it lsnotonly
quacies (6) of bureaucratic omniscience, and to protect consumers, but also to protect
feel that regulation should deal with only the that system and the honest men who have
unreasonably hazardous products, created and who maintain it that I urge the
A major alternative to encourage the use prompt passage of this legislation pro-
of safe and well-performing products, i.e., gram."
products with reduced imminent or delayed What then is the buyer's right to informa-
hazards, is for the government and the manu- tion about products to allow intelligentchoices
facturer to increase the flow of product in- In the marketplace? I shall present a pre-
formation to the consumer, to increase his li_inary and personal view here, with theem-
ability to choose safety. We often get the wrong phasis that it would be a great service of the
product or the wrong service -- not the one we engineering community and of this conference
would have chosen even with our present edu- to refine this list and begin to implement its use.
cation if we had been given adequate Informa- My view is that, just as one manufacturer
tion about products and services in the market- would require the following from another manu-
place. President Nixon, in his Consumer facturer supplying a product, so the consumer
Message to Congress (7) of February24, 1971, has a right to know
after noting the major success of our economy, - the name and address of the manufacturer.
said, If the manufacturer is outside of the
"In today's marketplace, however, the United States, the name and address of
consumer often finds himself confronted the importer should also be given
with what seems an impenetrable complex- - the model number, and perhaps for prod-
lty in many of our consumer goods, in the ucts costing over $100 a serialnumber
advertising claims that surround &em, the of the product
f merchandising methods that purvey them - the date of manufacture
and the means available to conceal their - the design performance under design use
quality. The result is a degree of con- conditions
fusion that often confounds the unwary, and - the design maintenance under design use i
too easily can be made to favor the un- conditions, and costs _.
scrupulous.I believenew safeguards are -the design repairs: characteristics, :
i needed, both to protect the consumer and costs, and frequencies under designto reward the responstblebuslnessnlan." use conditions
'| The President then presented legislation to - the design use life under design use con- i
implement the "buyer's bill of rights," tnclud- dttions
ing the right to information to make intelligent - the standards and test methods followed _,
choices among productsand services in the indesignand manufacture
marketplace,and concluded; - thequalitycontrolutilized.Testmethods, [
= "In submitting the foregoing proposals, frequency of use, results for the de-
! I want to emphasize that the purpose of this sign product, and accepted variations Ii program is not to provide the consumer with for all tested products sold.
something towhich he isnotpresentlyen- - the kinds ofaccidentsand theirfrequen-
titled; it is rather to assure that he receives ties and severities for products of this
. what he is, in every way, fully entitled to, category, and what has been done In
The continuing success of our free enter- this particul.ar product to reduce these
prise system depends in large measure accidents
i upon the mutual trust and goodwill of those - the residual risks of accident types --who consume and those who produce or with predicted frequencies, severities,
provide, and costs -.. for accidents which have
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not been avoided by theproductdesign, come factors in the marketptace, will in my
These residual risks must remain of view determine the extent that mandatory
user concern, regulation of safety is considered unnecessary.
-warning and hazard instructions--how to I suggest the phrase "Cave Consumptorem
recognize and avoid hazards, and what Prudentem - beware the wise consumer)'.
to do if hazards develop Either the consumer will be given the infor-
- warranty, if offered, including time and mation that will let his wise choice in the
procedures, and the percent of design market correct the unreasonable dangers and
product use life under design use con- waste of incorrect choice, or in his growing
ditions which is covered by the warranty political wisdom he will vote to remove these
- how to get in touch with the manufacturer dangers and wastes by regulation. The respon-
for complaints, repair advice, etc. sible manufacturer has nothing to fear, and
Ideally a reverse-charges telephone indeed in my view should speed thedayof wise
number such as is being used by one choice in the marketplace by preparing a
large manufacturer Buyerts Handbook on each model of product
- user experience concerning performance, sold, with all of the informatim listed above.
repair, problems, etc. as reported to
the manufacturer or to the government, THE MANUFACTURER
or as solicited by the manufacturer In an altruistic world, the manufacturer
from a statistically balanced sampleof would practice every known procedure to in-
users. Because of possible conflict of sure the short term and long term safety of
interest problems, this might better be the users of his product. But without altruistic
presented as a summary of government stockholders, his need is to show a profit from
complaint and use data rather than as his management. He may conclude that since
manufacturer data. he is only directly paying a small part of the
The responsible manufacturer, in his de- cost of Injuries and other failures Involving his
sign of a consumer product, already has most products, he may do less for safety, in keeping
of this information, and could now put it in a with his own financial realities (9). This con-
: Buyerts Handbook, available on request if not dltion may prevail until the costs of product
supplied with each product sold. But there is a failures are at least identified for the infor-
lot of work to do by industry, by government, marion of future buyers if nct indeed charged
by standards bodies, and by all engineers to back to the manufacturers.
indeed make this information meaningful to the The National Commission on Product Safety
consumer, and used to reduce waste and haz- examined the safety practices of a smallnum-
', ard in the marke_lace, her of manufacturers _f consumer products by
Dr. Lewis Branscomb, Director of the Na- means of a Manufacturers Questionnaire. Re-
ttonal Bureau of Standards, presented the sponses were voluntary, so perhaps better than
buyerts right to information in the following average performance Is practiced by those
form: (8) agreeing to respond. An index representing the
percentage of yes responses concerning the
"Information performance of recognized systems safety
practices was utilized to examine a number of
The buyer needs the answer to three industries (2). Figure 3 illustrates the spread
questions about a product: of total responses, from the 20_ for the foot-
1. How well will it do the Job I want it wear industry - whose questionnaires showed
to do, and for how long? almost no sense of involvement with the prob..
2. How much does it cost me, now and lem that the major source oflnJury in the home
later? is from faUlng - to the 88_o for the power tool
3. Is It safe? Will it annoy my neigh- industry, who are well aware of tool hazards
bors?" and attempting to reduce them. Reference 2
The extent to which industry and govern- should be examined for the kinds of safety
ment supply such information to consumers, practices of certain consumer product in-
so that short-term and long-term safety be- dustrles.
226
1972018311-207
Looking again at Figure 1, the manufacturer quality of the product design. Production fail-
could investigate product injury problems di- ures (i.e., products made not according to
rectly, and use this Information to improve his design) as well as design Inadequacies can lead
product. The National Commission on Product to hazardous products. A National Conference
Safety found very few manufacturers who had on Laboratory Evaluation and Accreditation Is
physicians or related personnel visiting hos- being developed under the coordination of the
pltals, medical researchers, and injured in- National Bureau of Standards to establishprc_.
dtvlduals to learn details of product Injury cedures to assure, possibly both nattonallyand
events. Although manufacturer injury investi- Internationally, the capabilities of Independent
gallon personnel, with medical as well as engt- testing laboratories in performing defined
neertng experience, would have difficulty tests.
finding appropriate cases to investigate work- But there are many aspects of consumer
tng alone, the time is at hand for at least all product use for which there are no defined
large manufacturers to designate staff injury tests. The National Commission on Product
Investigators or coordinators to cooperate with Safety found that for many consumer products
the Government in these studies. The patient there are no published standards (which
privacy and Investigator conflict of interest typically include test methods). The Admints-
issues are Important, so that the Government tration has proposed, with bipartisan support,
may do much of the initial investigation alone, a Consumer Product Test Methods Act, H.R.
But the manufacturer in my view should seek 6891," a bill to provide incentives for increas-
his own professional understanding of the public ing the amount of information available to con-
health product injury problem, and not walt sumers respecting consume." products." The
for the Government to spell out for him the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with
mandated engineering changes, the Office of Consumer Affairs, would promote
the deveh, pment, approval, and use of methods
THE TESTER for testing for consumer product characteris-
tics whose measurement would he in the in-
To help assure the safetyof a manufactured terest of consumers. Suppliers could then elect
product one can test the product. "Hazardous to advertise the results of these authorized
or unsafe conditions for individuals using, tests, and their use of accredited testers.Con-
maintaining, or depending upon the product" are sumers would receive more useful quantita-
considered "Critical defects" for products sup-. rave information to aid their choices in the
plied to th_ Government, and "the supplier may marketplace. The supplier reporting on a test
be required to Inspect every unit of the lot or in advertising or elsewhere would be required
batch for critical defects." (10) to fairly disclose the complete results of such
', _ The individual consumer can make no such testing. This legislation could provide a meas-
100% Inspection requirement, hut none the less urement language for the consumer interest,
the trend In consumer product testing Is toward and be an important element in providing the
100_o production Hne testing. The cost of ma- buyer's right to the Information that wouldchl_, testing Is going down in comparis n to allow Intelli ent choice in the marke.'pl ce.
i the cost of off-line "handcraft era" testing of THE RETAILERt older quality control methods, and the sav-
i lngs are going up in detecting a production The retailer today takes a limited responsi-
: failure right after it occurs, to minimize re- blllty for the safety of the products he sells.
work to correct the failure, rather than de- Only a few of the large retail chains (for ex-
tecting the failure after the product is corn- ample, Sears Roebuck, J. C. Penney's, and ,
pleted. Macy's) have their own testing laboratories,
Further assurance of product design and these are used more for buying decisions
quality can be provided by an independent test- than for continuous quality control checks. One
Ing laboratory. It is empahaized that the in- may note that the second largest United Stal_s
dependent laboratory should oversee the pro.. retailer, the Armed Forces Post Exchange
duction testing of the manufacturer, and vouch systems, are not prominent for the testing of
for these test methods as well as for the the products they sell.
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&At best, the retailer passes on the manu- cost of the satisfaction of what we bought and
facturez's information to the consumer, per- what we would have bought if we bad had in-
haps confirming some of it. More typically, formation for intelligent choice, are we85per-
the retailer is lost in the information retrieval cent right in our purchases? Perhaps indeed
problem, and gives the consumer only partial we are not that successful. Each of us should
answers if not wrong ones. reexamine his goals and see what Information
Some retailers, particularly in their repair he lacks in making choices in the marketplace
operations, are utilizing microfilm or micro- to attain them. That 15_o that we maybe wrong
fiche data systems to rapidly selectfrom large (unnecessarily unsatisfied) is $I00 billion, so
amounts of information the particular model the buyer's right to information has a golden
and part of interest. I foresee a further growth benefit indeed, and significant costs to insure
of manufacturer information retrieval with the this right are justified.
development of computer information and data
systems, already beginning to be used for in- THE REPAIRER
ventory and customer charging purposes. It is
a small step for the salesman who can use a Complex products may become unsafe in
computer to see if he has a given model and unsuspected ways with attempts at repair. The
color in stock for him also to search data necessary trend is that the repairer become
supplied by the manufacturer to see the char- increasingly professional, following standards
acteristics of that model. At that point, the and certifying successful testing of his work.
salesman becomes the tutor of the consumer The manufacturer, concerned about his liabil-
in the searching for data to ailow intelligent ity, will want to know the repairer's effect on
choice. Advertising would emphasizeinforma- the product and may best protect his name by
tion transfer, providing repair services.
THE CONSUMER THE DISPOSER
Many consumers, of course, will still elect Produc'," must increasingly be made with
an uninvolved contact with the marketplace, disposal o_ _ recycling in mind. This must be
buying on whim, buying on short-term emo- planned ": me design; the manufacturer may
tional interests which have no place for risk well be the one who should have the responsl-
calculations. We cannot makethe world"safe", bility for efficient disposal and reuse. The
but we can try to make it safer, and education practice should be encouraged that when a new
can show the benefits of this effort. With half product is received, the old one is taken away.
of today's highschool graduates taking some
college work, and with the efforts of Mrs. TRADE AND PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZA-
Virginia Knauer and the Office of Consumer TIONS
Affairs to increase consumer education, the
day of the wise consumer, consumptorem These bodtes have represented ttle narrowly
prudentem, may be at hand. We speed the day defined interests of their constituents, but are
by asking for information to allow Intelligent increasingly recognizing broader social re..
choice, sponstbillttes as well. Let them speak out on
What is the waste today of a marketpalce in product safety, organizing the special experl-
which the consumer does not have full informs- ences of their members.
tion to allow Intelligent choice? Of the $700
billion spent by consumers for goodsand serv- NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STAND-
ices, how much Is spent unwisely, not satisfy- ARDS BODIES
ing the need that would have been satisfied if
we had the information for intelligent choice? Standards and test methods are the neces-
How many frauds do we suffer, how many wrong sary language of informed choice. Even with ,,
repairs are made, how many wrong services some 19,000 U.S. voluntary engineering stand-
are performed, how often do we buy the wrong ards, (12) published by some 360U.S. technical \
product? If we include only the difference tn societies, professional organizations, and
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trade associations, tbe consumer standards tees (7) of local district attorneys, attorneys
needs have just begun to be emphasized, Grow- general, consumer protection offices, Federal
ing world trade is aided by international inspectors, weights and measures people, law
standards (13) and the ')multi-partite" agree- enforcement people, etc., to insure that local
ments to accept test results across national needs are recognized in Washington, and
borders, successful methods are shared.
GOVERb I_',NTS
COMMUNICATION
State and local governments, with their
building codes, electrical codes, and other The complexity of the "safety system ') that
regulations have an increasing influence on affects the safety of consumer products is such
local commerce. The issue of preemption of that an interactive computer Productlnforma-
local mandatory standards by Federal manda- tion Service is essential to let the many par-
tory standards, even when the Federal stand- ticipants in the safety system keep up with the
ard is weaker, is not finally settled by legis- many changes and have access to the inclusive
latures or courts. Communication is important representations of problems and data. An
to minimize differences; the National Bureau interactive computer system lets the user re-
of Standards secretariats of the National Con- ceive an answer to his question, and not have
ference of Weights and Measures and the to sort this answer from page after page of
National Conference of States on Building Codes printed text selected to answer many questions.
and Standards have been quite successful in A prototype system was the Consumer Product
helping to draft the Model State Packaging and Safety Index (15), although this never reached
Labeling Regulation, The Model State Lumber the interactive stage.
: Regulation, and in preliminary efforts to con- The service should receive from partici-
solidate building codes and redirect them to- pants (each of whom would sign his name,
ward performance criteria to aUow use of new organization, ana date of input) information on
I methods for Project Breakthrough. (14) injury statistics
Communication cannot erase regional needs case histories (without privacy aspects)
! for differences of regulation to deal with economic data (products in use)
t
regional problems of very low temperature, demographic data (user characteristics)
i earthquake, hurricanes, etc. The courts, con- complaints and analyses
I sidering preemption, may be expected to re- products
! spect these needs. The challenge is to write technical information (publications)
i the Federal regulation to include these special possibilities for product improvements
circumstances. (patents, etc.)
But how far a state can get ahead of the standardsi
nation in general safety requirements remains benefit-cost an_,lyses of mandatory stand-
an issue of our time. Minnesota's efforts to ards
place the emission standards below the Federal legislation
standards for nuclear power plants have thus court actions
far been denied in the courts.* Consumers professional people involved (addresses
may Indeed develop local values and wish to and phone numbers)
defend them by local standards, ff these are manufacturers
not recognized by the Federal Regulation. testing laboratories
The Federal Trade Commlssionlsincreas- and other information needed to make and
Ing its communication with local consumer choose the safer at_d more usefulproducts that
protection groups, establishing in many areas the Informed consumer will wish to buy. rhe
Consumer Protection Coordinating Commit- system would be intimately cross indexed and
subject Indexed, so that ideas would lead tc
*Northern States Power Co. v. IVllnnuota* U.S. related ideas, and each of us would not have to
District Court. Minnesota, December 22. 1970. See rediscover elsewhere what others of us have
39 LawWeek2367,2368,January12, 1971. found and entered into the system.
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Now we have, as Thoreau said, the matter eral Consumer Safety Legislation, A
of "putting foundations" under our "castles in Study of the Scope and Adequacy of the
the air." What does it cost you not to know Automobile Safety, Flammable Fab-
these things? rics, and Hazardous Substances Pro-
grams, A special report prepared for
CONCLUSION the National Commissiur_ on Product
Safety, Superintendent of Documents,The world is significantly less safe because
most of us are not aware of our hazards. With U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C. 20402, June, 1970,
computer information techniques, the con-
venience of identifying these hazards will allow Price $1,25,
us to use this knowledge to reduce our hazards. (7) President Richard M. Nixon. Consumer
Message to Congress, February 24,
How thoroughly we act with knowledge may yet
determine the survival of mankind. As H.G. 1971. Presidential Report, Volume 9,
P. 485-488, February 26, 1971. Avail-
Wells put It (Outline of History, i 920), "Human able from Mrs. Virginia Knauer, Of-history becomes more and more a race be-
t'ween education and catastrophy." fice of Consumer Affairs, ExecutiveOffice of the President, Washington,
D.C. 20,506, 202-456-2645.
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Rail rapid transit, as we know it today, dollars in assistance over the next 12 years.
came into being shortly after the turn of the In addition to Federal grants, a mar._ed i_-
century. Although Inter-city ratJroad passes- crease In the financial participation of State
ger service was well established and thriving, and local governments has occurred, with the
the opening of New York City's first subwayln prospects of adaittonal funds in the future.
1904 was the beginning of rail rapid transit in The Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1970
this country. Since that time, development of Includes as part of its purpose the word "safe."
the rail rapid transit industry has been spora- The meaning of the word safe ts r.ot spe!led out
die. Until very recently most activity took in the AT.t; however, we at the NationalTrans-
place prior to World War II. portation Safety Board have definite feelings
The term rail rapid transit as used in this about the future meaning of the word and will
paper refers to systems, excluding streetcars, make some recommendations to UM'IA regard-
that utilize single or multiple-unit trains on a ing its Implementation. These recommends-
two-rail track. As used here rail rapid transit dons are the result of several month3' observa-
Includes subway, surface, and eleveated trains lions made by Safety Board personnel of transit
operated by public or private tra,astt authorl- operations in New York, Philadelphia, and
ties as well as commuter-tr..lns operated by Chicago. These ob, ._rvattons were stipple-
railway companies, merited by consultation tth the personnel of
The current urban renewal activity and the Motropolttan Transportation _ t"Autm, r .y, the
emphasis on community planning and Improve- Port Authority, and Penn Central Trar, sporta-
meat has brought about a change in urban lion ComFany in New York; the Sot:_eastern
transportation phllosouhy. Once gain, the Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, the
modernization and expansion of rail rapid Port Authority Transit Company, t_. Reading
transit systems and the construction of entire Company, and the Penn CentralTransportation
new systems is underway. Large scale tin- Company In Philadelphia.
provements and expansions are being planned Let me elarLfy one thing at this point. The
or made to the systems in Boston, New York, rail rapid transit Industry historically has t, een
Philadelphia, Chicago, and Cleveland. New considered a safe method of urbantransporta-
commuter cars are being purchase for use In lion. Recently among the older systems this
the New York area on railroads and in the sub- image has been tarnished by highly publicized
way system, and on the railroads in the Phlla- Incidents of system failures. In spite o.*these
delphta area, and In Chicago. Complete new system failures, and tn spite of the absence of
automated rail rapid transit systemsare being statistical data to confirm It, passengers on
built in San Francisco and here in the Wash- board a rapid transit train are exposed to a ,
lngton metropolitan area, A successful auto- much lower risk than on any form of highway
mated system has been running for more than travel.
a year between Llndenwold, New Jersey and There is no single private or governmental
center city Philadelphia. Plans for rapid agency to which all of the rail rapid transit
tr_.nalt are in various stages of development industry reports comprehensive accident data
in Atlanta, Baltimore, Los Angeles, and Seattle, on a r, 2ular basis. Ral!roads and certain of the
while Pittsburgh's plans embrace an inter- interstate transit authorities are required to
modal concept whlcb includes the so called report accidents to the Federal Railroad Ad-
"Skybus." ministration; however, the methods are orl-
The avallabillty of Federal iunds has been ented to conventional railroad operations with I
a moving facter In_ this xeblrth. The Urban no separation for commuter operations.
Mas_ Transportation Act of 1964 offered the Within the transit industry, the American i
first continuing program for u_'ban mass trans- Transit Association complies _perating so. }
portation. The Urban Mass Transportation Act cident statistics for transit systems but In-
of 1970 continues and expand*., the role of the cludes only motor coach, trolley coach, and
Federal Government by authorizing 3.1 billion s.'reet err operations. Recently, there has been l
dollars for mass transportatlondurlngthenext an effort by the transit members of the Na-
five years. The 1970 Act also expresses the tional Safety Council to establish a unfft,,'m ,,,,
Intention of the Congress to provide 10 billion syst, ,n of compiling and exchanging accident
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information, but there has not been uniform stairs, escalators, platforms and passageways.
acceptance of these procedures. The net result injuries from assault or being pushed by other
is a complete lack of data that can be used as persons, and injuries resulting from smoke and
a comparison of safety within the industry or other miscellaneous causes.
betwee_ transportation modes. When one does The facilities involved in most station ac-
not know the characteristics of the accidents cidents are also those that receive substantial
and where they are happening, and both acci- architectural consideration during construc-
dent and use history data are not available, tion or modernization programs. Too often the
.
operations analysis to identify problems areas aesthetic viewpoint dominates the practical
becomes difficult, considerations. Open stairwells and barrier-
Rail rapid transit systems and railroads free escalator ht'_dholds challenge the acro-
are good examples of the highly wasteful, but batic capabilities of children. Street entrances
normally used approach which attacks prob- are often sloping ramps that resemble ski
lems as they are revealed by accidents. With- slopes during snowy winter weather. Subdued
in the present state-of-the-art it is most in- lighting in entrances greets patrons wearing
efficient to wait for the accidehts to occur and sun glasses. Wall and ceiling surfaces are
then to correct the problems by making covered with material which quickly lose their
changes. Obviously what should be done, of reflectivity upon exposure to rail and wheel
course, is to find the hazards in advance, dust and the graffiti experts.
Through systematic analysis of the system one It is significant to note that the highest in-
: m_ y predict the likelihood that those hazards cidence of fatality in rail rapid transit does not
will be activated by exposure of the system to occur to the r assenger on board the train but
a system failure, a human error, conditions to persons on the track, including trespassers
external to the system, or combinations of and those who have jumped from station plat-
these; determine the alternatives to the as- forms or were inadvertently pushed.
i sumption of this risk; and recommend the The train-person collision, where it in-
corrections before the system is put into volvespatrons,occursin theproximityofsta-
! operation, tion platformsand is most frequentat car-
i The problem becomes one of indoctrinating floor height platforms. Station accidents
i this concept into the rail rapid transit industry, involving a fall to the track are also experi-
i Historically, the rail rapid transit industryhas enced at these locations. In spite of this ex-
depended on a goo_l past accident record rather perience, the trend in the industry is towards
than focusing on mpans f__r identifying hazards open, car=floor height platforms to enhance
} and evaluating risks. Tnere apnears to be an faster discharge and receipt of passengers.
I attitude in the railread and transit community In our society there are very few places where
that no professional engineer would design or the public is allowed to congregate immediately
produce an unsafe produc_, and I agree that no adjacent to an unprotected opening four feet
_ professional would knowinglydothis.However,., deep. This is the case where commuters
_ there are concrete examples in the transitfield jostle each other on high-level platforms while
today where these safety-conscious profes- waiting for rapid transit trains. To increase
slonals have produced con_ponents that re- the hazard, trains pass through the opening at
suited in a system that contamed hazards which speeds up to 75 miles per hour.
could lead to disasterifthey had not been In most older systems, if a _patronwere
found, pushed, fell,or Jumped to thetrackthepos-
These examples of hazards are physical sibilityof beh_ghitby a trainwas minimized,
evidence thatthe applicationola disciplined, to some extent,by the use of express tracks
systematicreviewofa system isnecessaryif which were separatedhorizontallyfrom car-
optimum safety is to be accomplished. A re- floor height platforras. The newer systems are
view of some of these conditions will illus- not ut';lzing this concept and nonstop trains
trate the applicability of system s_fety to the whiz by crowded platforms. Platforms now are
rail z_ qd transit industry, located also in the median strips of crowded
Station accidents represent the highest ac- expressways where noise and other distrac-
cident ratio in the industry and include falls on tions are prevalent, Warning systems are not
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provided and therefore the likelihood of a train transit industry, in some instances the design
approaching without detection has increased of the car equipment is not consistent with this
markedly. Architectural considerations in new recognition. Tronsit cars originally designed
underground stations have dictated that the for operation in a closed system are operated
track zone be sparsely lighted so that un- over highway grade crossings. The pilot pro-
aesthetic views of the track are not high- tectlon, deemed necessary in the railroad in-
lighted. Therefore, a person who has falten on dustry to minimize the chance of derailment
the track is obscured by shadows and is less upon hitting an obstruction, is not provided
likely to be seen. consistently on rail rapid transit cars. In
Further, train-person collisions are ex- some instances, passengers are seated at the
perienced at surface stations constructed with front of the car immediately adjacent to a
low, rail-height platforms. The majority of large windshield. In the event of a grade cross-
these accidents involve patrons taking short ing accident, the passengers will h,,ve an ex-
cuts across tracks which either have nointer- cellent view of the event if they survive to
track barriers or barriers inadequate to dis- relate it.
courage this practice. Unfortunately, many at- Injuries that have occurred in the on-board
grade stations have highway grade crossings category have involved or resulted erom board-
at one end or the other of the station platform ing and alighting; falls on board, including falls
that make the erection of permanent effective between cars; vandalism; fire or smoke; and to
intertrack barriers extremely difficult, a lesser extent, derailments or collisions.
Grade crossings are not compatible with Original design has been a factor in allof these
rail rapid transit operations. The consequences incidents.
of a collision of a rail rapid transit train with Boarding and alighting accidents have in-
a truck load of hazardous materials could be a volved the car doors, the space bet_veen the
major disaster. In December, 1966 atEverett, platform and the car, open spaces between
Massachusetts a rail commuter car struck a cars, the car steps and the platform surface.
stalled tank truck of fuel otl and the resulting As a general rule, car=floor height platforms
fire killed 13 persons because they could not were observed more in inner-city type opera-
escape from the car. There were no emergency tions, with low rail-height platforms being
exits and the inward-Jwinging door was jammed provided at locations handling suburban serv-
closed by the press of the people trying to ice. The experience again indicates a lower
escape the fire. It takes very little imagination accident frequency at low platforms than at
to see what could happen to a commuter train the car-floor height platforms.
with several hundred persons on it if it struck New car equipment has been observed with
and ruptured a tank truck of gasoline or no protection provided for the space between
liquefied petroleum gas. cars. This has resulted in falls to the track
Grade crossing protection or elimination while boarding or alighting as well as on-board
programs have been unorganized, dependent in fall_. Understandably, the results have gen-
many instances, not on the hazards involved, erally been severe. Protection has been pro-
but on whether the road involved is classified vided with intercar chains as well as re-
as a "Federal Aid" route. Motor vehicle laws tractable gates, both of which appear to be
involving grade crossings are ignored by the only a partial solution added as an afterthcught.
general public and not enforced bylocal author- On several systems car-floor height plat-
ities. Zoning laws and other local ordinances forms ere inter-mixed with those of low rail-
are explicit in their requirement to insure height design. To accomodate boarding-and
compliance with environmental and other social discharge this has necessitated car vestibules i
values. These regulations also generally pro- with trap doors in the down-position for car-
hibit sight obstructions at street intersections, floor height platforms and in the up position
It is rare, however, to find any regulations af- for the low platforms. The trap door has been
fecting the type of construction or landscaping the source of numerous injuries and its use i
in the vicinity of a highway-rail grade crossing, should he discouraged.
Although grade crossing accidents are I think we :an assume that in rush hours {
recognizedas a hazard withinthe railrapid there ,viU be a large number of standees; 1
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however, minimizing the number of standees include in part: exit location and design,
will reduce the number of on-board falls. The passenger seating arrangements, accommoda-
provision of hand holds designed for passenger don of hand-luggage, motorman separation,
comfort and convenience should be recon- intra-car passageways and barriers, rear-end
sidereal. Improved car suspensionsystemsand illumination, front-end derailment and col-
smoother accelerating and braking character- lision protection, braking systems, car-theel
istics would be helpful also. metallurgy, and automatic control systems.
Some of the newer commuter cars have the While new rail rapid transit cars are sub..
'flop-over" seats so that when the train re- ject to differences in design criteria between
verses direction, the seat backs are "flopped systems, the_ also contain common innovations
over" to allow the passenger to ride facing which are valuable in furthering passenger
forward. There have been instances where safety. These include such items as two-way
emergency stops have been made resulting in radios or train-phones, complete train public-
the standees grabbing the seat backs to pre- address systems, speedometers, improved
vent themselves from falling. This )'flops ventilating systems, and emergency car light-
over" the seat backs with passengers sitting ing. The installation of these devices has been
in them. An analysis of this feature would have accomplished with safety in mind; however,
revealed the obvious hazard in this type seat experience has provided the hazard analysis.
arrangement. As in other transportation networks, the
Obviously, there are many operating fac- traffic-control system of rail rapid transit is
tors which affected the design of rail rapid a necessity in the safety and efftency of opera-
transit cars. Safety should be given high tions. Unlike other transportation networks,
: priority as a factor, however, a train must stay with the route
: Window designs vary from the large picture established for it by the track and the traffic
i window to the porthole type. Almost all transit control system. The engineer does not have the
passengerq face the hazard of being injured by option of selecting an alternative route at the
thrown objects, and design of windows can last moment when aa accident appears im-
lessen the severity of injuries from thrown oh- minent. Therefore, both safety and reliabitity
jects. Various types of glass panes are used must be designed and built into the traffic con-
and now tough plastic materialwhich will with- trol system as a prerequisite to efficient op-
_ stand the impact of a thrown rock is being used. eration without a high accident frequency rate.
The design of the front end of transit cars Although railroad and transit accident
can influence the severity of a grade crossing statistics indicate that the failure of signal
collision. Large expanses of glass on thefront systems does not caut. a significant number
ends of cars subject the operator and passen- of accidents, much can be done in the field of
gers to additional dangers from impacts of signals to enhance railroad and transit safety.
objects thrown from above as well as collisions Many accidents attributed to man failure and
at grade crossings, acts of God can be prevented by a good signal
There appears to have been no systematic and train control system. The modernization,
approach to the design and use.ofwindows. The and extension of existing lines appears to
obvious approach would be to determine the perpetuate existing signal systems without
environmental exposure of the windows and due regard to the accident experience of the
surrounding structures during their opera- system involved.
tional life-time. Once these environments are New rail rapid transit lines are being
understood, the optimum combination of window designed with the capability of a fully auto-
pane and surrounding structure can be deter- mated signal and train control system. These
mined as those which offer the least risk to the new systems should be subjected to rigorous
, passengers and crew. safety analyses to assure that the system will
i Although window design is the most con- operate safely for a prolonged period of time
¢ spicuous, there are many other car design under varied maintenance conditions. The
areas that warrant re-examination for de- analysis of a computerlzedsystemuslngdtgltal
[ termination of the optimum design. These data inputs requires the application of sophlsti-
[ design characteristics vary in importance and cared safety analysis techniques.
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Almost invariably rail rapid transit tunnel gers, trespassers and employees even though
design shown lack of foresight in providing for in both of the two basic designs, under-
emergency situations. Minor smoke or fire running and over-running, some protection
incidents in tunnels have turned into panic against electrical shock has generally been
situations, resulting in injuries andlossof life. provided. The third raft and the associated
Safety walks originally intended for use in connecting appurtenances on the transit car
the evacuation of passengers have been utilized have initiated fire and smoke incidents. Gen-
ts accommodate signaland electrical facilities, erally, the fire and smoke injuries have been
Walks are also used for the storage ofmainte- relatively minor, but serious accidents have
nance of way materiai. Emergency exits have been caused by subsequent detlaining and
been located immediately adjacent to turnouts evacuation. For new system_ _his design war-
presenting an obstacle course of running rafts, I ants a complete reappraisal.
guard rails and energized third rails. Exits are Rail rapid transit r onstruction recently has
sparsely located and difficult to identify under shown increased usage of the joint-corridor
normai circumstances, both inside and outside concept, sharing right-of-way with existing or
of the tunnels. Exits are narrow and steep, new highways or raiiroadsbecauseofeconomic
easily negotiable by a spry young man, but and social considerations. This concept has
another matter for a not-so-spry elderlylady, many proponents and the arguments for joint
In some instances, in-tunnel lighting is prac- utilization are indeed convincing.
tically non-existent and ventilation is depend- The safety of each mode mustbe assured at
ent upon natural drafts. The hazards of tunnel an Interface such at this and to accomplish this
evacuation are recognized in existing rule requires a systematic evaluation of the hazards
books that indicate that'detraining of passen- of each mode and the interface between the
gers within tunnels must only be accomplished modes. These evaluations must be made in the
tq a last resort, planning stage rather than after the system has
The minimization of the hazards in existing been constructed and alternative plans are too
emergency tunnel evacuation is an area that expensive to implement.
demands immediate attention. Upgrading pro- When one looks at the possibility of a gaso-
grams have been undertaken on some systems line or liquefied petroleum gas tank truckvio-
and the results are markedly apparent, although fating the transit track space the potential con-
no one system has accomplished all of the sequences are frightening. A comparable
followingsteps.The stepsthathave been taken prospect existswhere rapid transittracks
toimprove conditionsincludetheinstallation£ operatejointlyoradjacenttoafreight-carrylng
additionallighting,signs,emergency tele- railroad.Shiftedloads and derailments can
phones,firealarms, power disconnects,hand- foulthetransittracksresultingincatastrophic
rills and fire extinguishers.Portable era- collisions.
ergency equipmentsuchasde-trainingladders, Iwould beshockedgenuinelytofindatransit
bull-hornspeakers,stretchers,lanterns,air- operationwithouta safetydepartment.Iwould
paks,first-aidkits,andbetweenfrailwalkways expect to findthatsafetyisdeemed thefirst
have been strategicallylocatedeitherin tun= responsibilityof all employees, and eac,l
nels, at stations, or on equipment. The in- supervisor is charged with the responsibility
stallation of this type of equipment is manda- for safe operations within its jurisdiction. For
tory if operational delays, adverse publicity, the most part, bowever, management emphasis
lawsuits and most important, loss of life are to on safety involves employee activities. It
be minimized, would be completely unfair to imply that there
Closely related to the tunnel design problem is a lack of concern for passenger safety with-
is that of the third rail. The third raft con- in the rail rapid transit industry. There are
ducts the electric power for the operation of concentrated efforts to investigate accidents
most rail rapid transit cars. In most instances, and improve the lot of the passsenger; how-
the third rail carries 600 volts of direct-cur- ever, these efforts did not appear to receive !
rent power and is located immediately adjacent the emphasis that was regularly placed on _'x
to the tracks. The third rall has been a source employee safety by the safety depart-
of electrical burns and fatalities for pa_sen- ments.
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Safety department personnel generally are There is a ready application for system in
charged with the responsibility of "closing the the rail rapid transit field and the time to start
barn door after the horse was stolen" without "s now. The degree of safety achieved in any
having an opportunity to review a new facility system is dlrectlydependent upon the emphasis
during desigp and construction. The safety in- of management. In the rapid transit industry
put for new or modernized f_.clllties has been this management emphasis on safety includes
accomplished historically by the design engi- the management of the granting and use of
neers and/or operating and maintenance per- funds by the Federal Government. This man-
sonnel.Whlle these groups surely have safety agement emphasis must be applied during the
in mlnd, they are influenced also by archltec- conception, development, production, and oper-
rural, operating, maintenance, and economic ation of each system throughout its life cycle.
considerations. A system safery review of new Much needs to be done with the existing
or modernized facilities normally does not take operating systems. System safety programs
place during the conceptual stage. As aresult, for new systems are not the only needs in the
it has not been unusual for new facilities to be industry. Keen analyses of the present systems
modified after they are operational and the first would identify the hazards and evaluate the cot-
accident occurs, at a cost that is greatly in recttve actions so thatmanagementcould deter-
excess of that required to remove the hazard mine what degree of safety Is needed. The pub..
from the initial design. Safety personnel are lie which is paying the bills can no longer afford
not used to the extent of their potential, which the inefficient method of waiting for an accident
I understand is not a new situation, to occur and then correcting the problem.
!
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Thank you, it's nice to be back and to have the highways, there will be a more pronounced
the opportunity to bring you up-to-date on safety factor to work against the upwardpres-
what's new in the field of auto safety; espe- sures from more cars, more miles andhigher
cially in the area of design, since all vehicle speeds."
m_nufacturers must translate our Federal Figure 2, our systems approach, which
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards into designs I described to you 3 years ago, has begun to
that meet the safety performance require- pay off. LetJs take a look at one of the old
merits, system description slides. By using a sys-
First, IVd like to show you snmc figures tems approach to prevent or lessen the end
and discuss how _, activity has been re- results of deaths, injury and property damage,
flecr_d to these safety statistics. Much has we must either'.
happened in the field of motor vehicle safety !. Prevent the occurrence of crashes:-
since I spoke to you on May I, 1968. Later Precrash
we'll explore wharfs in store for the next two 2. Increase survivability in crashes that
or three years in the motor vehicle and high- do occur. - Crash
way safety field. 3. Provide prompt medical attention to
Figure I shows the traffic situation today, injured people and other postcrash
From 1961 through 1966 the average increase salvage measures: - Postcrash.
in fatalities was 6.87o per year. However, The systems approach (Figure 3) on the
since the expanded Federal Safety Program time ha,. -,_ecrash, crash and posterash,
got under way, this trend has dropped to is interfaced with the _ystem elements of the
0.9570--in spite of a 6_0 increase in vehicle driver, the vehicle and the environment. Of
registrations and d_rivers and a 47o per year these three systems, action on the vehicle -
jump in total miles driven. These fatality system will effect the greatest and quickest
figures represent a startling drop when you pay off. Design modification will reduce the
consider that only about I/3 of all the cars on national emergency proportions of highway
the road today have the new safety features, deaths, injuries and crashes. In working to
Our early projections indicated that the make these design changes, we deal with a
number of crash victims should start to de- small number of American and foreign vehicle
cline around 1972 or 1973. However, last year, manufacturers to effect the safety changes.
1970, we had 27o fewer deaths than in 1959 Vehicle design is the most direct and most
¢56,400 vs 55,300). We believe the tide has positive means for man to affect system safety
begun to turn. Additionally, recently tabulated in the shortest time. We (MVP) can do many
data shows a decline in severity of injury, things with vehicle design to keep the driver
as reflected in the number of days lost through out of trouble and make sure that he does not
reduced activity and hospitalization because of pay with his life for his first mistake.
motor vehicle crashes. The rate rose sharply Our enviable highway network contains
until 1966. For example, in 1967, an average millions of miles of roadway under local,
of 34 days was lost due to restricted activity State and Federal Jurisdiction. The Federal
while in 1969, this average was down to about Highway Administration and Traffic Safety
25 days. Programs, a part of D.O.T., are concerned
Evidence that later model cars are safer with the vehicle environment or roadway. They
is shown in a study, made by the Highway direct their system effort to saferroadwaysby
Safety Research Center, University of North improving traffic capacity, sight distances,
Carolina, of injuries to drivers in 270,000 speed, lighting; removing roadside hazards
vehicles involved in accidents in North Carollna and accident-producing obstacles, controlling
from 1966 to 1968. Result_ suggest that for safer traffic flow through better signs, slg-
every 100 serious and fatal driver injuries In nals and computer control systems. 1"he time
1968 models, 130 would h:_vo occurred tn a frame for this systems approach, as you
simil,_r array of crashes h._d 1966 models know, is longer than the vehicle approach.
been Involved. The Director of the HSRC Altering or changing the third system, the
ztatc_ that, "as more and _ure of the newer driver, is also a long term dpproach. With
cars, with more safety devices, come onto some 111 million licensed drivers, most
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good, some bad, operating 111 miUtonvehicles Also (Figure 14)equally important, we now
over 3.7 million miles of roads in 51 separate provide for the timely introduction of our
jurisdictions, you can readily see that the standards with effective dates that complement
education, training, licensing, and record the product cycle operation of the vehicle
keeping of vehicle drivers could not have manufacturers. Also, we nowcarefuUyanalyze
a fast payoff. The basic responsibilities for the safety benefits of each new rule as to cost
safe operation of highway traffic and for con- an_ pay off in terms of reductions in deaths,
trol of drivers remains with the States. injuries and accidents. These new approaches
Last month in Detroit, a high speed crash insure that new standards will be reasonable,
on the Edsel Ford Expressway (Figure 4) appropriate and practicabie.
illustrates the simultaneous contribution of When I spoke to you in 1968, we had issued
all three systems to a deadly crash: 23 standards. These original standards were
1. The Driver based, to a large e:¢ ent, on existing SAE and
2. The Vehicle other existing voluntary standards and various
3. The Environment. government requirements for vehicle safety.
While our systems approach is basically They did not specify, in many cases, the re-
unchanged, the organization which implements quirement for safety in quantifying terms.
the system has changed in structure and size. We have since addressed ourselves to these
Since I was last here in 1968, (Figures 5, deficiencies. For example, Safety Standard
: 6, 7, 8, 9, & 10) the National Highway Safety No. 104 required a windshield washer and
, Bureau has come of age and is now a full wiper. This has now been upgraded through
fledged Administration - the National Highway amendments to specify exact requireh, _,nts
Traffic Safety Administration. This Aamin- for how much of the windshield must be washed
! istration is organized as shown with Motor and wiped. The same is true for Safety Stand-
! Vehicle Programs being responsible for the ard No. 103 - Windshield Defrosting and De-
i development and issuance of safety standards, fogging. Since 1968, the original 23 standards
i Here we see the organization of Motor Vehicle have grown to 34 standards, 5 regulations, and
Programs and the three Offices assigned to 79 amendments. I want to point out that in
preparing standards. Operating Systems, many cases amending an existing standard is
Crashworthiness and Vehicles in Use. In the as complicated, if not more so, as issuing
i two other Offices shown- Defects Review a new standard. For example, we recently
is concerned with invc_tlgating and following amended Safety Standard No. 208. Thls was
up on problems affecting the operation of re- initially entitled, "Seat Belts." The amended
hicles in use by the motoring public- such version has been renamed, "Occupant Crash
i as the Ford lower control arm problem and Protection Systems" and now specifies among
the G.M. three-piece truck wheel which af- other things the requirements for passive
fected a great number of truck campers, systems to protect the driver and occupants
The Other Office-Compliance-is responsible from injury in the event of a crash. A ire-
for insuringthe compliance of new vehicles mendous effortwas requiredto promulgate
and vehicleequipment with therequirements thisamendment.
i of all safety standards in effect today. The systems approach here points up the
As more and more standardsand amend- validityofour emphasis on thevehiclerather
ments are issued(FigureII & 12)theybegin thanthedrivertoachievea reductioninhigh- :l
•
i to affect many of the same components and way fatalities. We have required seat belts in
! subsystems of a vehicle. It soon became all passenger cars since 1968, but we can't make
' too apparent that we had to supplement the people use them. i
systems approach in our thinking and subse- The National Safety Council claims that
i quent issuance of rulemaklng actions. To this if all available belts were always worn, be-
!. end (Figure 13) we now have an Engineering tween 8,000 and I0,000 lives could be saved
t Systems group - a staff function to the Asso- every year. We also know that seat belts savedelate Administrator - to insure that all of 2,000 to 3,000 live last year; even though only
our standards are properly interfacedwith 35 percent of the cars in thiscountry haveothersthataffecta common component, them.
t
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People say they get "all bunched up" and The likelihood is that he will run off the
get in the way. We11, the best way to keep road and crash into a tree or utility pole...
them from being bunched up is to fasten them He will die, usually instantly, of head and
around your waist. _ And then they say, "But chest injuries...
that's uncomfortable--it restricts me" and to Tests will show that he had an alcoholic
that, I can only say that seat belts are not as level of. 15 of one-percent in his blood--more
uncomfortable as a cast on the leg, and they than half again the Federal government's
don't restrict you half as much as a hospital standard for intoxication.
bed does. These are not guesses--these facts come
However, the trouble is, figures indicate from the results of a $1.2 million Department
that no more than 30 percent of the public of Transportation grant to the Commonwealth
uses its lap belts and only a paltry 4 percent of Massachusetts to computerize accident data.
uses the shoulder harness. So it is quite evi- The Massachusetts study shows that more
dent that we need a method which does not than two-thirds of a11 auto deaths were trig-
depend upon any action that must be taken by gered by alcohol. (We have been using, ha-
the driver or his passengers. So we are going tionally, the figure of "more than half." The
all out for a passive restraint system. The startling Massachusetts figures show that
leading type of these is called the "Air Bag." we may have underestimated.)
Pve seen them work and Pm convinced that We estimate that the use of alcohol by
they can do the job. drivers and pedestrians causes at least 25,000
I would be the first one to concede that deaths and 800,000 injuries each year. The
: improving the car alone will not end all road sickening aspect of this tragedy is that so much
fatalities. We are dealing with a _omplex of the loss oflife, limb and property is suffered
( system of man, machine, and highway. We by people who are completely innocent.
have to hit all three hard in a coordinated However, public myth has always held
attack if we are going to start saving those that you can't really do very much about the
55,000 lives being thrown away every year drunken driver. Well, the time has come--in(as revealed by the latest compilation of fig- fact, itts overdue--for us to demolish this
urea we have at D.O.T.). In addition to a better defeatist attitude. But it will take more than
machine, we need to complete our Interstate a simple Breathalyzer test.
system because for every 5 miles built, We have just set up an Office of Alcohol
we save one life per year---on a continuing Countermeasures to direct our top-priority
basis, campaign in this area. The job of this Office
In fact, since the Interstate highway pro- will be to identify the chronic drinker before
gram began, we have saved over 35,000 lives he becomes a statistic in the morgue--orkills
•, _ because the Interstate system is that much an innocent victim. The alcoholic, contrary tc
safer for motorists. Another thing we are legend, does have an identity. He is on some-
going to do is continue to improve the older body's book, either as a patient, a bad employ-
primary and secondary roads, ment risk, or troublemaker or a poor insur-
But perhaps the major improvements dur- ance risk. Most heavy drinkers are already
ing the 70's are going to be in the area of known to family counselors, welfare agencies,
driver qualifications. Let me give you a pro- local traffic courts and their long-suffering
file of a typical accident, neighbors.
The Profile: The wee hours of a Satur- So, whenever a man is convicted for drunk
day morning in December are apt to be driving, his entire background should be In-
the most dangerous time of the year for vestigaged before he is sentenced. The Judge
driving.., should determine whether the offender has
Death is most apt to occur at that time on ever been arrested before for drunkenness--
an undivided two-lane highway in a suburban on or off the highway. Then he can confront
area.., him with two options--either get treatment
The weather will be clear and the victim and dry out, or stop driving. Period. No Is-
will probably be a 2J-year old male driver nlency, no excuses, no extenuatingcircum-
aloneina sportscar.., stances. The tough approach has paid off in
244
.j _,'
A'
1972018311-224
countries as diverse as Sweden and Great Inches. These low emission vehicles will have
Britain. three different designs with accident avoidance
Much of this talk has concerned new ve- and crash injury reduction objectives in mind.
hicle., and new equipment and, if this were our We are requiring that the integrity of the
only approach, it would take 11 years ofintro- passenger compartment should be insured in
ducing standards on new vehicles to get corn- barrier crashes up to 50 mph0 that the com-
plete coverage of the vehi_._e population. To partment should also remain intact in roll-
determine the scope andlimitations of vehicle- overs at 70 mph. These all-new vehicles will
in-use candidate standards, detailedfau_t logic enable us to set improved future safety stand-
was used to identify vehicle safety critical ards for all automobiles offered for sale in
systems. This effort is reflected in the Booz- this country. One contractor will build and
Allen Hamilton Report No. FH-11-7316. test a total of 14 of these cars by tic end of
The hazard analysis technique used in 1972, after a run-off between prototypes.
aerospace was used during the development These mobile laboratories will help pro-
of the dual fuel project by General Services vide effective and realistic ansg:rs to the
Administration with Department of Transp,_i-- problem of cutting tto highway death toll.
tat!on assistance. This technique was also Three years ago, we were on a rising
applied to passive restraint system to a lim- curve of highway deaths and crashes (Figure 1).
tted degree. By systematically applying our research and
Before closing, I'd like to say a few words knowledge, we have turned the curve down-
about our experimental car pro!cot (Figure 15) ward. With our safety standards, improved re-
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle strair_t systems, alcohol programs, proposed
Safety Act of 1966 provides that the Secretary used car programs and our experimental
of Transportation shall conduct research, safety cars, we think we can bring ali the
development, testing and training on experi- elements of the safety equation into balance.
mental motor cars and equipment, We believe we can drive highway fatalities
We have awarded three contracts totaling down by 40% by the year 1980. When I say we,
nearly 8 million dollars for construction of I mean all of us you, the individual dr, _r,
an experimental vehicle. (Figures 16, 17 & 18) the manufacturers, the equipment suppliers,
A.M.F., Fairchteld Hiller and G.M. (their bid the State regulatory age_Jetes, and the tnsur-
was $1.00) have contracts for the production ance companies.
} of a S passenger, 4-door sedan weighing about We will all be driving for the greatest
! 4,000 pounds with a wheelbase of about 120 possession of all. We'll be driving forourllfe.
l
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INTRODUCTION many of the qualities associated with a city in
that large numbers of people work, are housed,
Man's concern with safety dates back to engage in recreational pursuits, are fed and
earliest pre-htstoric times, when his primary are tended to medically. It has the qualities
objective was survival against his enemies and of an industrial complex by virtue of the vari-
the elements. However, as is the case with ous shops it contains. It has many of the prob-
many other disciplines, the greatest advances lems usually associated with military oper-
made in System Safety have occurredin recent ations, such as armament activity, storage of
times. In the main, these advances have come large quantities of combustibles and the need
about through efforts focused upon twoclasses to conduct aircraft operations during good and
of activity. One engaged in by relatively few inclement weather conditions. Finally, safety
people but of great interest to the general interfaces that relate to ecology and pollution
public, relates to man's recent extensions of must now be considered in a more formal
his travels into new and unfamiliar environ- fashion. In relation to this latter interface
ments- into the depths of the ocean, through it can be considered that the ironclad rule
the atmosphere at great heights and speeds, usually accorded to ships' captains is now
into outer space and onto the surface of the being challenged as a consequence of the
moon. The other interfaces with larger hum- pre-dawn collision between two oil tankers
bers of people and is concerned with the pre- that occurred on 18 January 1971 which spilled
vention of hazardous events that are potentially nearly 900,000 gallons of oil into the eeologi-
catastrophic to many, such as inadvertent eally sensitive San Francisco Bay.
nuclear explosion, of either a military device
or a commercial power generating station, INTERFACE WITH SYSTEM
or loss of a large passenger aircraft. EFFECTIVENESS
The areas of System Safety Technology
which have benefited the most as a result of The disciplines that conventionally relate
these recent advances are: most intimately to System Safety are Relt-
1. The development of techniques for the ability (R), Maintainability (M), Quality Assur-
' identification of inherent problems so ance (Q), Human Factors (H), and Value Engt-
: that all hazards associated with a given neering (V). Unification of these, and other,i
: undertaking can be determined. This disciplines with System Safety can beachieved
aspect of System safety Technology through various techniques. The one chosen for
is discussed only peripherally in this use in this presentation is system effective-
document, hess, E, which is defined as
2. The formalizing of interfaces between
The measure of the extent to which a sys-
- System Safety and other technologies.
tern may be expected to achieve a set of
This aspect will be dealt with at some
stated system objectives.length.
The need for such formalization in a large, In general form the functional relationship
complex system can be illustrated by consid- between E and the "tittles" listed can be
erlng a large ship such as LHA. This ship has written.
since E is a function of t, and v,here J
a is the achieved level of each parameter at some specified time in the system's life, and ]
/
s is the specified level established for that parameter, t
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the functional relationship expressed by One problem is brought about by the fact that
equation (1) needs to be written as an explicit the components of E are almost never corn-
expression if a value of E is to be obtained at pletely independent of each other. Another
some point in time. However, no single explicit relates to the fact that the components have
expression can be proposed, for E(t) defends different "utility values", k i. When these are
upon factors that are unique to each system, known, equation _1_ ca,, he written.
E(t) : f , , , ... 2
O_ki__. 1
Because of the considerablecomplexitiesin ventinga system from performingitslntended
establishingand measurlngthevariousparam- function,thereby degradingthe reliabilityof
eters thatcomFrise equation(2),itisneces- the system.
sary to obtainvalues for E by a process of In order tc define an interfacebetween
optimization. This is discussed later, safety and reliability which can be operated
upon by conventional scientific methods, it is
INTERFACE WITH RELIABILITY necessary that both domains be quantified
using compatible units. In the safety domain
System Safety is more closely related to quantification is accomplished by assigning
: and allied with reliability than with any of probabilities to events and then combining
1 the other disciplines defined by E. The basis these individual probabilities into an overall
i for this strong interface becomes apparent probability. In most general terms, all safety
i upon examination of fundamental definitions, calculations are derivable from the expres-
The generaUy accepted definition of Reli- sion
i ability is P(S) + P(F) = 1 3
; The probability that a system performs
! its intended function for a specified period where
',I of time under a set of specified conditions. S is the set of events that describe L fe
i A definition for Safety that fits most require- performance
merits is F is the set of events that describe unsafe
Freedom from those conditions that can
performance
- cause injury or death to personnel, dam- P(S" nd P(F) are probabilities of the oc- '
age to, or loss of, equipment or property, cu.ence of S and F respectively
Disregarding, for the moment, the fact that
i the definition for safety is qualitative rather Having transformed safety into probabilis- i
, than probabilistic in nature, it is evident that tic terms, mathematical operation is carried
hazards which occur without causing injury or out through manipulation with sample points,
, death to personnel, can fall into either the sets and events. It is possible to represent [
safety or reliability domain Further, itis also the S and F sets by means of a Venn diagram
evident that injuries and fatalities can result such as the one shown in figure 1. In this
from the inability of a system to perform figure, the rectangle, I, is presumed to con-
its intended function, a reliability concern, rain a finite number of sample points. These
Conversely, the occurrence of a hazard which define the safe event, S, the unsafe event, S,
affects only personnel, a safety concern, can, the reliable event, R, and the unreliable event, \
as a secondary effect, be responsible for pre- R. In turn, each of these four events consist of
i
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a defined collection of sample points, and each Figure 2, all the relationships between S, R
is a subset that is whoUy contained in the and their compliments are the same as in
universe, I. The interface between safety and Figure I. The interface between M and S is
reliability is represented by the lined area represented in Figure 2 by the arc cdf, and
found between the arc acb, the extension of the interface be_veen M and R is represented
the safety event into the reliability event, by the arc ecs. The area common to all three
and the arc dbb, the extension of the reli= events, S R M, is represented by the cross-
abil_ty event into safety. Two implications, hatched area bounded by the arcs c, cdand db.
readily apparent from an examination of fig- Perhaps the most obvious relationshipobserv-
ure I are: able from Figure 2 is that not all the sample
I. R, the unreliaLle event, which is rep- points in the subset MNR relate to the S event.
resented by all of the area outside the This is due to the fact that the fundamental
R event, includes sample points that role of maintainability is to increase system
are in the safe event, life, without necessarily enhancing safety.
2. Similarly, S, the unsafe event, repre- As a consequence, the utility of maintainability
sented by aU the area outside S, includes to the system, reflected by the value of E,
sample points that are contained in R. is enhanced as:
It might be presumed from an examination I. It becomes more expensive to replace
of figure I that the common goal of both safety the system rather than to keep it main-
and reliability is to expand the intersection of tained.
S and R, Sf3R, unit Sf_R = I. This would be 2. Acl,:-ving longer system life through
valid goal 'under the circumstance that I is improved reliability or redundancy of .
comprised only of events in S and R. Compli- parts becomes less cost effective
cations arise when events and other disci- than carrying out maintenance activ-
plines must be included in I. ities.
Consider now the safe event in relation to
INTERFACE WITH RELIABILITY AND the R and M events shown in Figure 2. Let the
MAINTAINABILITY sample points in S be divided into two subsets,
one relating only to equipment damage, SE,
Suppose now that maintainability consider- and one relating only to personnel injury, Sp.
atlons, which are also closely alUed with the It is clear that Spcanoecurevenwhen SE does
safety domain, are now inserted in I as shown not. For example, consider the case in which
in Figure 2. Maintainability Is a characteristic the life support system of a submarine Is
of System Design, Installation and operations damaged during submerged operation_,. Pre-
which may be defined, for both hardware and suming that a monitor and at arm system exists
human systems as and that it can provide adequate warning time,
there can be various sample points in Sp that
The probability that the system will be may be selected such that the safe event can
retained in, or restored to, a specified nevertheless occur.
condition within a given period of time, Some sample points, in the area defined by
presuming that maintenance is performed SNM, presume that maintenance is possible, ,
in accordance with a set of prescribed while others, in SLUR, presume that the equip-
procedures and allocated resources, ment to be used for contingency, escape or
rescue is rellable. The following guldelines
in turn, the term maintenance may be de- are offered in assigning sample points to
fined as SNM, SNR or SNRNM.
All actions necessary for retaining this 1. Direct removal and replacement of
system or restoring it to a specified faulty equipment, or the repair by per-
condition, sonnel in situ, is contained in S('M. _t
Since this definition of Maintain;,_llity is 2. Switching to a redundant equipment .
already expressed as a probability, its inter- through remote means such as telem-
face _lth Safety and Reliability can be ex- etry or in sl_ by attending personnel,
pressed by means of a Venn diagram. In dtis, is contained in SNM.
254
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3. Switching to r e d u n d a n t equipment ational role for a function performed by a given
through the use of built-in, seifchecking system is often referred to as its "mission".
circuits is contained in SNMf-IR. A system may be described by specifying
4. Redundancy used in maJoi'ity voting, 1. Its inputs and outputs as function of
for use in a fail safe configuration for time.
replicated elements is contained in 2. All the possible conditions (states) of
S_R. the system; i.e., the system phase
The process of idealizing the interrelation- space.
ship described by Figure 1 involved an expan- 3. A descriptive model relating inputs,
sion by R and S sample points in I such that outputs, and system space as a function
SNR I. Although, in Figure 2, there are of time.
sample points located both in IV[andin R which System inputs for LHA includes, among
permit the event S to occur, this process of hundreds of others, operational plans, con-
idealizing can be extended to RNSNM by per- tingency operational plans, qualification and
mitting the union of either R or M to fill the training requirements of crew members,
universe. That is, maintenance and overhaul activities and a
description of weather conditions. The system
(S_R)U(Sf}M)- T model includes considerations such as the
rate of fuel consumption as a function of speed
It is clear that, even when there are as far and range as a function of pitch and roll and
as three variables, there will be advantages alternate modes of operation in response to
and disadvantages to selecting one of the two potential hardware and personnel problems.
possible intersections for expansion in I. A definition for System Safety which relates
Increasing the number of variables that inter- all necessary factors is
act within I emphasizes still further the need
An optimum degree of safety, establishedfor increasing the intersection of S with other
parameters through the process of optimi- within the constraints of operational effec-
tiveness, time, cost and other applicable
zation, interfaces to safety, that is achievable
SYSTEMS SAFETY IMPLIES OPTIMIZATION throughout the life cycle of the system.
It has been noted that the application of This definition does not imply that one,
scientific methodology to safety requires the unique optimum is appropriate for the life of
ability to quantify. Further, it is considezed a system, although this possibility is not
that scientific metho0alogy applied to system unacceptable. Rather, the definition estab-
safety implies optimization. To offer evidence lishes a requirement that sytems analysis
for this point of view consider first the mean- techniques be applied to the domain of safety,
ing of the term System Safety. First, a system and that these techniques include a quanti-
may be defined as fication of safety over the entire life of the
system based upon all facets of the system.
A devic,=., echeme or procedure wnich As such, optimization is the essence of System
behaves in accordance with some descrip- Safety. It may be defined as
tton, its function being to operate on infor-
mation and/or energy and/or matter in The application of mathematics and simu-
some time reference in order to yield lation techniques for identification, examS-
information and/or energy and/or matter, nation and calibration of the interaction
This definition places no restriction upon between and among the elements of the
the size or complexity of the device, scheme system.
or procedure under consideration. Large sys- OPTIMIZING SYSTEM SAFETY
terns such as the LHA, sre usually comprised
of some composite of operational and support Achieving an "optimum degree of safety"
equipment, personnel, facilities and software requires that choices b_ made among the
which ire used together as an entity to per- vsrious alternative means available forarriv-
form or support a t,pecffied role. The oper- ing at a chosen objective. Vsrious "alternative
i
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means" may be found within the domains of however, is not free to trade-off all possible
those disciplines defined by E or wholly within variations in system output. Specifically, it is
the domain of safety. This latter circumstance considered undesirable in our culture :o equate
is illustrated by Figure 3 and is taken from the value of human life in terms as inanimate
the domain of hazard analysls. On the left equipment or mo_ey. Similarly, the notion that
hand side are the kinds of hazard analyses risks may be intentionally taken as part of the
that are performed, generally successively operation of a non-military system, based
in time, on a large system. Gn the right are upon a schedule of compensation for injury or
shown the logical flow of hazard analysis out-- fatalities that mav occur is equatlyundesirable
puts as a function of time. At one extreme, in our culture. The suggestion that such an
at t=0, are those tasks which imply the pre- attitude is not rigorously pursued has, par-
vention of hazardous occurrences, and at the ticularly in recent times, brought about con-
other extreme are those safety activities frontat!on between various elements of our
which are intended to minimize the effects of society and the creation of a host of new
a hazardous occurrence. Although included industry and government agencies oriented
for completeness, the tradeoffs between alter- towards re_olving these differences. System
native means in one discipline are not as dif- safety c_.nnot t.elp but find itself at the focus
ficult as the selection of trade-offs among of such considerations, and can make a valid
differing disciplines. Examples of alternate con:ribution toward enhancing safety in our
means which could be selected as optimum society through techniques that are useful for
between various disciplines include conflgu- integrating multi-faceted programs for large,
rations_ complex systems.
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INTRODUCTION quality _ssurance tasks, as in fact they are
elsewhere in NASA. If some reliabili'y concepts
Every taxpayer has an Investment In the appear to be mi_",_ng, it is because they have
U,S. space program. A complete list of the been class'fled at MSC as quality assurance
many returns from U.S. manned and unmanned activities. Since the Apollo spacecraft con-
space programs would not be appropriate for stantly evolves to accommodate changingmts-
thts paper; however, the following examples sins requirements, the reliabltity analysis of
are cited as being indicative of the number of each soacecraft is affected. That is, the pro-
benefits that have been obtained. In terms of hlblttve cc_" of reliability demonstration,
domestic Impact, the returns range from na- coupled with limited production runs, has
tlonal pride to better paints. Early warnings caused NASA .o emphasize a qualitative rather
of hurricanes discovered by satellites have than quantitative at,aly._18 _._proach to ::eli-
saved lives and millions of dollaxs lnproperty ability. Quantitative .cliabllity evaluation de-
damage. The development of rechargeable pends on statistic,:l lnfo.matton that requires
batteries, stimulated by the space program, has large sample sizes such as those exper!eneed
brought remarkable changes in the design and in the automobile and chemical industries.
use of po:'table power tools and appliances. This characterlst_.c _n the Apollo Spacecraft
In addition to the domestic impact, the Program is precluded by the limited produc-
space program has also provided technology tlon. These qualitative techniques appP : In
applicable to many tndustrla: processes. Fire- achieving Apollo goals _iso have appltcatlonto
proof Beta cloth ,las been _ weloped and is the chemical industry. Effective translation of
already being used for fire-fighter suits in this technology, to the chemtcai industry re-
municipal departments and on board aircraft quires that special attention be given to dlf-
i carriers. The :equirements for deep-space ferences in (1) tndt_stry definitions, terms,
operations demanded major improvements in a_,d acx'cayms; (2) 'ndustry goals and mottva-
', the state of the art of computer technology ttc, ns such as perle-ms:tee, ost, schedules,
i The chemical Industry is already using these and _afc_ ; and (3) repeatability of product or
advanced computers in large data centers, process. The technological advances in relta-
The Agorous ^fftclency and performance bll_t_¢ -_re concerns..articularly with off-
requirements of the space age to the de- setting reliabilityled
det_onstration costs and
velopment of new technologies for achieving limited product.ion runs.
the required reltaolllty In the millions of corn- Part I of this paper descrlt,_.s the qualtta.
plex compo,aents in spece equipment. "these ttve d_.sciplines, the definitions and criteriarigorous requirements are particularly tru hat accom any th,- discipli es, andthe generic
,, | for the Apollo spacecraft with its complex application of the disciplines te the chemical
mission of taking men to the moon, landing industry. Part ii Zr,'ns_ates the disciplines into
them, ann returning them safely to earth. The preposed definlticns and criteria for the chem-
NASA Manned Spacecraft Center (MSC) at lc.'d industry, into a base-line rellat:.qtty plan
Houston, Texas, has responsibility for the de- that includes these disciplines, and into applt-
_ velop.nent of t_e command module, theservlce cation notes to aid tn adapting the base-iine
! module, and the lunar module. At MSC, the plan to a specific plan or operation.
i reliability and quality assurance organization
i iS at the highest level wlthin the center, and the PAINT I - APOLLO SPACECRAFT RELIA-
i Director of Reliability and Quality Assurance BIL_,TY PROG:_AM ELEMENTS
reports to thu center Dlrecto,', It Is a basic
philosophy within the center tl....rellabtlityand The basic objectl,0e of the Apollo Space-
t quality asrurance personnel have direct access craft ReY.abllity Program wac the development
: to top management for resolution of problems, of a spacecraft that would safely carry man to
._ Relia_lllty and quality assurance actlvltl_ are the surface o! the moon and back. The AFollo
i so clo_tely related that sore:; activities carl be Spacecraft Program Manager and the Design
classified as either reliability or quality as- Engineers were committed to this objective,
surance. Some of the --.llablllty activities de- which wa_ r_ached by strict attention to de.,
scribe_ in this paper may be considered ee tails throughout the Apollo Spacecraft Program.
2eo
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To accomplishthisbasicobjective,the Apollo Reliabilityprovisionsincontractsandsup-
SpacecraftProgram Manager was requiredto porting reliabilityprogram plans are the
L- emphasize qualitativegoals such as the fol- primary toolsofreliabilityprogram manage-
lowing:(1)safe transportofman tothe moon ment. Each contractordevelopsa reliability
and back, (2) minimizationofcriticalsingle- program plan to detailhow theprovisionsof
pointfailures,and (3)developmentofaspace- the contractwillbe implemented. This plan,
craftsystem thatcouldbe launchedintoearth which is reviewed and approved by MSC,
orbitby a Saturnlaunchvehicle.These goals establishesthe scope, applicability,and or=
were attainedthroughtheimpositionof r--lia- ganizationalresponsibilitiesof the contract.
bllityrequirementson allthreephases - de- The developmentofeach contractor'sor each
sign, manufacturing,and operations- of the subcontractor'sprogram planisguidedby the
ApolloSpacecraftProgram. Attentiontodetail ReliabilityDivision,which considersfactors
isachievedthroughtheaccomplishment ofthe such as the following:(I)the complexity of
followingI0 disciplines,which willbe dis- the equipment, (2)thefunctionalcriticalityof
cussed further: the equipment, and (3) the procurement size.
1. Program management In the plan, the 10 reliability tasks previously
2. Failure mode and effect analysis discussed are described in terms of their
3. Problem reporting and corrective action basic requirements, definitions, implementa-
4. Design specification review tion, procedures, exceptions, and data genera-
5. Design review tton. The plan also establisn_a guidelines for
: 6. Quantitativereliabilityanalysis schedulingthe analyses,reportingtheresults,
4
= _ 7. Reliabilitytestrequirements and distributingthe necessaryinformationto .
_ 8. Maintainability user agencies.
9. The partsprogram The ReliabilityDivisioncontinuouslymon-
I0. Reliabilitydocumentation itorsthe contractor'sprogress and conducts
These disciplinesconstitutea reliabilitypro- periodicmeetings with the contractorto re-
: : gram withtnefundamentalpurposeofidentify- solveimplementationandschedulingproblems.
ing and removing problem-causing elements These meetings are based on the continuous
i from the design and, ultimately, from the equip- interactions of the two organizations and on
i ment selected to implement the design. This periodic formal audits of the contractor'sapproach to identification and removal of prob- performance with respect to the program plan
i lem elements issummarized inFigure I. requirements.The ReliabilityDivisionofMSC
also places requirements on the contractor
_-_ Program Management concerningthe management ofsubcontractors
; and the reliabilitydatatobe generatedby the
Basic NASA reliabilityrequirements are subcontractors. Personnel from MSC may
containedin the NASA reliabilitypublication participateperiodicallywiththecontractorin
NPC 250-I,entitled"ReliabilityProgram Pro- his auditofthesubcontractor.
visionsfor Space System Contractors,"July The applicationof the ApolloSpacecraft
} 1963. These requirementsare furtherdefined ReliabilityProgram concept to the chemical
_ and modifiedforuse atMSC by MSC dccument industryconsistsofdevelopinga plan(I)that
MSCM 5315,entitled"SupplementalReliability establishesdivisionor corporate policyon
Requirements and ImplementationInstructions reliabilityrequirementssuch as (a)reporting
for Manned Spacecraft Center Equipment," failures and (b) criteria for accepting new
May 1969.These documents providethebasis equipmentfrom vendorsand (2)thatestablishes
for the Apollo Spacecraft Reliability Program, reliability requirements for turnkey plant de-
I which is implemented primarily by the contrac- sign and construction.
tore that have responsibility for major hard-
ware elements. Management of the reliability Failure Mode and Effect Analysisportion of a contract is the responsibility of the
Reliability Division of the Reliability and A designer usually evaluates his design by
Quality Assurance Office at MSG. a thought process in which he examines possible
261
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failure mechanisms, and protection for the launch commitments after assessment of re-
failure mechanisms thus identified is provided, maining risks.
In the Apollo Spacecraft Reliability Program, The discussion up to this point has been
this mental exercise is documented, put Into a focused on design activity. The Failure Mode
logic format, and complemented with the "what and Effect Analysis is used in other ways such
if" logic of the test, operations, and reliability as to provide an input to the test requirements
engineers. This documentation affords the de- by Identifying elements that require functional
signer an evaluation of the design concept in acceptance testing. Inputs are provided to the
which the complete set of requirements for the prelaunch checklist by identifying backup ele-
equipment is considered. This analysis is ments and workarounds which should be verl-
known as the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis. fled. The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis also
Inputs to the analysis include a description of serves as a working teol for the operations
the function the equipment is to perform and engineer by providing him with an aid in fault
historical performance data on similar equip- Isolation. The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
merit. The analysis is oriented toward discus- is a design tool which has application through-
sion of how items will fail rather than of how to out the life cycle of the equipment.
make them work. The analysis consists of (1) Figure 2 presents an exampleoftheFallure
an examination of each component of the system Mode and Effect Analysis format used at MSC.
or function and (2) identification of the modes The format in Figure 2 is simpler than the one
in which each component could fail. The effect actually used for the spacecraft, but is a good
component failure has on the system or func- example for illustration purposes. The Failure
tion is then determined. Where interrelated Mode and Effect Analysis format might might be
functions exi Jt, it is also necessary to evaluate used in the chemical industry in the following
the effect the failure has on other elements of ways:
the equipment. The failure effects are evaluated 1. As a joint analysis performed by plant
against established criticality definitions, with designer and customer to check the design
attention focused on major problems requiring concept against the operating procedures to
design modification or procedural work- be used.
arounds. Equipment (such as power, air con- 2. As an analysis performed as a design
dttioning, and structural support) that has tool and then charted in summary form as a
service functionz is included in the analysis, fault isolation aid during startup.
The criticality definition for the Apollo 3. As an analysis performed as an aid in
Spacecraft Program had three categories: (I) selecting instrument points for supervisory
personnel safety, (2) mission termination, and control of a plant or process.
(3) all others. For the chemical industry, this The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis is
•, definition is trans!ated directly to (1) life/ considered to be a major factor in achieving
property loss, (2) plant shutdown/product con- trouble-free performance. This analysis is
tamination or loss, and (3) all others. When the particularly useful where complex operations
selected set of definitions is used, the analysL_ with interrelated functions required design _
provides a list of equipment elements whose detail by serveral designers.
failure could cause an undersired event. In the The slngle-failure-polnt llst resultlngfrom
Apollo Spacecraft Program, these elements the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis provides :
are referred to as single-failure points, which the designer with an action-item list of pro- !
implies that the list does not contain combina- blems to be solved. When documented for the i
tions of failure points which could cause an final design, the Failure Mode and Effect :
undesired event. This list of equipment ele- Analysis traces the effects back to the causes.
ments is the basis for a management function
to force either redesign of these elements, Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
provision of a workaround to offset the failure
of these elements, or location of a different way Many unscheduled repairs, equipment fall-
to perform the function. In cases where no ures, and catastrophic losses are avoidable
corrective action is available for a single- if constant attention is given to prevention of
failure point, program management approves their occurrence. Recurrence of a problem can
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be avoided if effective corrective action is if they are using the same valve in the same
taken the first time the problem occurs, application. If a minor problem occurs when
Recurrence control depends on communication an engine is in a noncritical application, an
among all users of theproblem-causingequlp- audit can be made to determine if the engine
ment. A problem-reporting and corrective- Is used elsewhere In a more critical function
action system is used by NASA In the Apollo and whether corrective action Is necessary.
Spacecraft Program Program to report prob- This system can also be used (1) to provide
lems, monitor the application of corrective Inputs to Inventory control systems, (2)in
action, and Implement recurrence control, maintenance planning, and (3) in the support
Using a carefully selected problem deflni- of unit turnarounds. In addition, this system
tton, personnel concerned with the life cycle of can be used by management to maintain an
aptece of equipment report the occurrence of overview of program problems and their
: any problems. These problems are recorded status.
in a permanent record for that piece of equip-
merit. Each reported problem is checked for Design Specification Review
previous occurrence and for the adequacy of
previous corrective action. A solution must be Reliability considerations should form an
found for all reported problemsI that is cor- integral part of the pieparatlon, revlew, and
i recttve action must be Identified and imple- approval of all design specifications, vendor-
rnented. The corrective action must be based change requests, specification drawings, pur-
on a sound engineering solution to the problem, chase orders, and subsequent revisions or
Failure analysis is the basis for the solution amendments or both. A design specification is
and may range from simple inspection of the not adequate until the reliability requirements
failed equipment to special tests that duplicate are clear to the designer. The reliability re-
the conditions of failure. Sufficient engineering quirements include qualitative reliability
effort is applied to clearly identify the cause goals, reliability procurement goals, and re-
and to understand the conditions which Influence liability documents goals. The same require°
failure occurrence. The organization respon- merits must also be applied to vendor-deviation
stble for the reporting system verifies the requests. This approach todeslgnspecification
corrective action before the problem Is of- review is directly applicable to the chemical
fictally considered to be solved. This problem- Industry.
reporting and corrective-action system pre-
vents inferior elements or concepts from Desl[_n Review
reaching the operational status. Also, when
used along with the Failure Mode and Effect The entire reliability program represents
" Analysis, this system provides a dual approach a continuous design review effort. From con-
to reducing the occurrence of problems ceptual configuration studies to eventual de-
throughout the life cycle of the equipment, sign freeze, rellahillty continually evaluates
The important elements of problem report- the systems and updates analyses. Design
trig are (1) the basic problem definition, (2)the reviews are conducted at the following hard-
basle critical-function definition (should be the ware levels: (1) component, (_) subsystem,
same as the Fallure Modeand EffectAnalysis), and (3) system. Each contractor has his own
(3) effective reporting techniques, (4)well- method of conducting design reviews, but
plannedcorrectiveaction,and (5)carefulcot- participationby representativesof alldis-
relationof the recurrer_cecontrol history, clplines(such as engineering,quality,relia-
The applicationof the problem-reporting bility,manufacturing,and purchasing)Is re-
and corrective-action system to the chemical qulred. Some of the primary purposes of the
industry can be related to the development of design review are to determine the following:
new equipment and to the distribution of prob- (I) Have all potential failure mechanisms been
lem histories to other plants and divisions eliminated? (2) Is the item manufacturable?
within the user company. If a valve Jams in the (3) Can the item be inspected? (4) When put
open position and cannot be closed, all other together as a subsystem or system, will all
plants in the organization should be notified components work togetlier as specified?
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Reliability personnel have a prime role to Test planning and menitoring are continuous
play in the major system design reviews, disciplines covering programs on design con-
which are the Preliminary Requirements Re- cept, design verification, prototypes, thermal
view where the spacecraft rc-quirements are or environmental (or both) conditions, quali-
established; the Preliminary Design Review fication or certification (or both), acceptance,
where the conceptual design is reviewed and parts and materials, subsystems, systems,
approved; the Critical Design Review where and end-ltems. Each program requires unique
final design approval, along with the go ahead analysis and evaluation to ensure prompt cor-
for the manufacturing phase, is granted; and rection to design concepts for a progressive
the Flight Readiness Review where approval evolution to product rel'.ability. Special era-
for launch is given after a review of all data phasts is placed on monitoring the qualification
associated with the spacecraft. Table I corre- test program which tests the equipment in the
lares the system design reviews to equivalent actual usage environment including vibration
events in the development of a chemical and thermal conditions.
process. In development and qualification tests, the
objectives are related to verification of the
Quantitative Reliability Analysis design approach. Dv-ing acceptance test and
The Apollo Spacecraft Reliability Program checkout, the emphasis shifts to v,.rifi,.a,,,,n
consists primarily of qualitative disciplines, of the manufacture and assembly of the equip-
As stated pvevtgusly, limited production quan- ment. Reliability supports these activities
titles, extremely high reliability requirements, with design information and test histories.
and evolut!onary changes to the spacecraft Maintainabilitypreclude the ,_ae of statistical Inference to
assess the numerical reliability of the space-
cratt. Reliability predictions using historical The Apollo spacecraft was designed with
standby and redundant systems to free the
data of similar equipment have been accom- crew from lnfllght maintenance tasks which
pltshed for the purpose of comparlngalternate might Interfere with critical crew functions.
approaches. These design studies that have a
common historical base are valuable for ecru- Maintainability for the spacecraft consists
primarily of fault isolation and switching to
parlson of different configurations of equip- backup systems. Because of the need to con-
ment selected from the data base.
trol the operating time which accumulates on
Differences among the equipment in the
certain equipment prior to launch, equipmentdata base and the actual Apollo hardware
with limited operating life time Is Identifiedpreclude accurate predictions of the total
spacecraft re!tablllty. However, statistical _nd carefully monitored during ground tests
and checkout. If insufficient operating llletlme
analysis of test results, performance param- remains, the equipment is replaced prior to
eters, and physical properties are performed launch. The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis,
by other organizations, which was discussed previously, provides in-
Reliability Test Requlrement_ puts to the ground-support-equipment mainte-
nance program by identifying critical equip-
The reliability organization functions as ment for which rapid repair or replacement
an integral part of the contractorts test pro- is required during launch operations.
gram and is required to ensure, through anal-
ysis and proof, that all equipment will perform Parts Program
to the design intent. The reliability organlza-
tion concurs in all test plans, specifications, The NASA reUabllltypublicatlon NPC 250-1
and reports. The responsibility of the relia- establishes parts criteria for space system
blllty organization is to evaluate all perform- contractors. This document requires con-
ance aspects to ensure that all parameters tractors to implement a program covering
(thermal, vibration, environment stress, etc.) sel_tlon_ sp_Iflcatlonj qusllflcstlonp and up-
are properly applied and that the results plicstion reviews of parts for sU items to
demonstrate the design competence, be used in a system. A parts program plan \
I
_4
t
1972018311-253
must also be submitted as part of the reliability involved In the program. Clear, concise lnfor-
program plan. By review and approval of the matron concerning results from reliability
plan, NASA assures that an acceptable parts activities is necessary, and a level of docu-
control program is Implemented by Apollo mentatlon to support this requirement is
contractors. The elements of an acceptable necessary. Documentatton requlrementsadjust
control program Include qualification, lot ac- as the associated program evolves from its
ceptance, parts screening and burn-in, and design conceptual phases through design ma-
derattng, turlty and product operational phases. The
When departures from program criteria necessity for accuracy and technical excellence
are Identified, a detailed technical review of Is obvious when the Impact on crew safety or
the critical part applications is accomplished mission success is considered. Reliability
to ensure that an adequate rationale for such design analysis is made available for use by
usage is provided. The assessment activities operational personnel in a large program or
also include the evaluation of part failures In company only through documentation.
equipment, the corrective action taken, and
an evaluation of the possible Impact of prob- PART II - APPLICATION TO CHEMICAL
lems reported by the NASA ALERT system INDUSTRY
and other sources. The NASA ALERT system
is a program which requires that all NASA Introduction
Installations exchange Information on signifi-
cant parts and materials quality or application With careful attention to economic factors,
, problems of general concern. A computerized the techniques discussed in Part I can be
parts master file provides the Identification applied successfully to the chemical industry.
and applications oi all spacecraft electrical, This paper describes the qualitative program
electronic, or electromechantcal p_ ft. The use elements which are the basis of the Apollo
of this file permits a rapid evaluation of the Spacecraft Reliability Program. The appltca-
potential Impact of a problem with any given tton of the techniques to the chemical industry
part type. Significant electrical, electronic, requires careful attention to economic feasi-
and electromechanical part problems receive hillty. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis and
particular program management attention, problem reporting are the basis for a sound
Effective resolution and eloseout are verified qualitative reliability program In the chemical
progressively at major milestone reviews, industry.
The Apollo parts program has concentrated The high reliability of the Apollo space-
on electrical, electronic, and electromechan- craft Is a demonstration of the effectiveness
teal parts because of their predominance In of quslltative reliability requirements. On the
the space program. The program outlined Apollo 8 mission, only five of 5,000,000 parts
previously was based on acceptance of each failed to perform their function. If a level of
part. The high design margin of mechanical 99.9 percent had been achieved for the relia-
parts used predominantly In the chemical In- bIllty of these parts, then one part In a thousand
dustry suggests a program which emphasizes might be expected to fail. Thus, on each flight,
the rejection of bad parts. This control can be approximately 5,000 parts could be expected
accomplished through a system similar to the to fail.
NASA ALERT program.
Reliability Program Implementation
Reliability Documentation
The reliability program elements described
The quantity of documentation of the Apollo previously have been effectively applied to
Prog _m is very large. Yet, the complete, large and small procurements. Procurement
clear story that can be retrieved concerning size Influences the associated reliability plan
problem history and equipment tests serves in two ways. Most smaller procurements are
a purpose In such an immense program as accomplished by a prime contractor on a sub-
Apollo, with approximately 40,000 companies contract basis. The reliability program of the
1972018311-254
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prime contractor is extended to cover the sub- b. Examine each reliability require=
contracted equipment. In other small procure- ment In terms of the implementation factors
merits, the function of the equipment may be (scope, contract tier, criticality of the function,
completely noncritical to the mission objec- and criticality definitions). Judge the effec-
tives. In this case, minimal reliability re- ttveness of the requirement in supporting
quirements are implemented, overall objectives (schedules, minimum non-
For all procurements for the Apollo space- productive time, reduction, effective turn-
craft, the definitions "loss of life" and "mission arounds, and product quality).
termination" are used to judge the criticality c. Develop a procedure for each basic
of the function. For the chemical industry, it reliability requirement which is economically
may be necessary to use a variable definition feasible when the factors in items a and b are
of critical function. For example, an auto- also considered.
maritally controlled process which has a d. Document the procedures In item c
throughput capability in excess of demand is as a plant reliability plan.
not sensitive for loss of life or of productive e. Develop the forms, data flow, and
time. But, the process may have an economic signature approvals to support the plan.
hazard of much consequence such as contami- f. Implement the plan, and train per-
nation of a catalyst, spillage of an expensive sonnel. (The Importance of proper training In
feedstock, or destruction of property. Although reliability requires careful planning for this
this example oversimplifies safety constdera- step.)
tions, it is obvious that variability of defini-
tions is necessary. The following are the major Implementation for Equipment Suppliers
factors which influence the degree of imple-
mentation of a reliability program for a given Equipment suppliers should consider the
elements of the baEieltne plan in developmentplant or process.
1. Scope - Plant size, number of similar of new product lines. However, the Failure
plants,f procurement size Mode and Effect Analysis and design specifi-
cation review techniques can strengthen the
2. Contract tier-Turnkeydesigner, equip- sales brochure or application guides. Docu-
ment supplier, volume component supplier
3. Criticality of function-Obvious critical menting the results of environmental tests
functions, unknown or obvious lack of critical and other demonstrations of specification
functions requirements aid the customer In his design
review. The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis '4. Definition of criticality - Safety, facll-
can be used to define configurations of lnstru-
', Ity loss, production schedules, economics mentaticha power sources and physical position
The following are the steps lnlmplementing which offset potential failure modes. This
an effective rellablllty program utilizing the acknowledgment of posslblefallure modes does
Apollo disciplines: not detract from the qualifications of the equip-
1. Use the disciplines previously described ment to the customer who is reliability
to structure the basic reliability requirements oriented. ::
for a plant, division, or corporation. More . . ;
extensive commitment to the basic require- Implementation for Turnkey DeslgnCompanies
merits means more success In the individual
applications. The basic requirement should The base-line reliability plan can probably
include a definition of problem and definition be most effectively adapted for use by an
of criticality categories coordinated with the organization having total responsibility for
intended users, development of a process facility. P,eliability
2. Perform the following for each segment requirements can be Implemented at the be-
of the organization, plant, or process: ginning of the project. The Failure Mode and
a. Extend or subdivide the definitions Effect Analysis proves its value in the selec-
of problem and criticality to fit special con- tion of the best equipment configuration.
dltions. Definitions need not be changed, only Problem report summarie_ provide an effec-
_ supplemented, tire way of directing project management and
l
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customer attention to the critical problems of Reliability Program Plan
the development cycle, and the customers feel
less Inclined to oversee the details of the Appendix A contains a base-line reliability
project. An effective set of milestone reviews program plan for a multiple-plant division or
can be established in which the major prob- corporation. The plan defines requirements,
lems and corrective actions are reviewed In including procurement of equipment or turnkey
detail and in which the majority of the project plants, for the total life cycle of plants within
ts reviewed In summary format. The problem- the division. Implementation of the plan for a
reporting system must be good enough to pro- division should be accomplished by coordina°
vide confidence that the Important problems tion of the requirements with managers, op-
will stand out. The criticality categories sort erators, and engineers from each plant and
all problems into tiers of Importance, which by modification of the requirements until
allows effective audits of lower tiers. This practical implementation Is possible. The
procedure, which is "management by excep- plan should then become official procedure,
tton" In the basle form, requires dependence subject only to periodic review and update,
on accurate reporting of events, as necessary for solving operational prob-
lems.
Implementation for Startup and Operation
CONCLUSIONS
The qualitative approach to reliability as
described In this paper focuse,: attention on The reliability program atMSCIS basically
designing reliability Into a system. Require- qualitative in nature, with major emphasis on
ments for replacement of limited-lifetime the disciplines of problem reporting and cor-
equipment and for preventive maintenance recttve action and Failure Mode and Effect
: are translated Into operational requirements. Analysis. This qualitative approach Is most
' Problem reporting continues into the opera- appropriately applied to complex, one-of-a-
tional phase and becomes the focal point of kind projects. Several chemical Industry sem-
i operational reliability. Qualitative reliability ments meet this criterion.
documented analysis performed during the Success In implementation of this approach
development program benefits this phase. The will depend on implementation of each dis-
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis provides s ctpltne, using definitions and criteria derived
: basis for fault isolation diagnosis during separately for each application. Carefully
startup and operations. Review of the Failure planned and correctly scoped, a reliability
Mode and Effect Analysis and of corrective program and Increase profitability ot many
J_ action for problems provides a list of Items chemical operations through reductionofdown-
to be given special attention or checks prior time, reduction of equipment losses, and re-
to startup. These data also provide inputs fro duction of contingent liability. Implementation
! supervisory control instrumentation points and of the reliability program for effective man-
! control functions. The later addition of equip- agement and control Is best accomplished by
ment such as supervisory control to the process developmer/t of a program plan that has been
requires that the new equipment be subjected to coordinated with all organizational elements
the total requirements of the reliability plan. involved.
r
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APPENDIX A
BASE-LINE RELIABILITY PROGRAM PLAN
INTRODUCTION requirements. Each specification will be re-
viewed for performance requirements, safety,
The purpose of this document is to set human factors, test criteria, maintainability,
forth the basic reliability requirements for environmental requirements, and equipment
the Division of Chemical that has a limited operating lifetime. The
Company. Management directive specification shall be reviewed against the
authorizes this document and necessitates basic operating plan and appropriate emer-
implementation of the requirements for all gency and standby procedures,
processes put into operation after (date) .
All processes put into operation prior to Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(date) must implement the require- The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis shall
ments which have operational application. (See be accomplished for each new process facility,
implementation guide, page___.) Requirements The analysis shall iden_ try possible failurefor safety, quality assurance, maintenance,
and testing should be considered in imple- modes, the effect en the process, and the criti-
menting these requirements in order to avoid cality of the effect, A control list of the equip-
duplication of effort, merit which has Criticality I and II failure .
modes shall be established and shall be main-
RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS rained as a major status document during thedevelopment of the process. The list shall
The Division reliability program contain the equipment name, the critical failure ,
consists of the following activities which take mode, the effect, and the proposed corrective
place during the development and operation of action. A process cannot be put on llne until
all Criticality I failure modes have been ell-
processes, minated and until all Criticality II items have
adequate workarounda. The following are the
Reliability Program Plans criticality categories:
A reliability program plan shall be devel- I. Destruction of life or process facility
oped for each plant or operation in this dlvl- II. Interruption of the process
sion. Each requirement shall be implemented Ill. All other critical factors
by a plant procedure or operating rule. Any
procedure or rule which conflicts with t_s plan Problem Reporting and Corrective Action
must be approved by d/vislon management. A problem is defined as the failure of an
Requirements shall be implemented to the
extent appropriate for each of the following equipment to perform its intended function
cagegories of equipment: when required. A problem may be caused by
I. Equipment previously installed design in_-dequacy, quality defect, procedural
error, or human error. Problems are cate-
2. Standard off-the-shelf equipment pro- gorized as Criticality I, Criticality II, or
cured or, s lot bs _s Criticality IIl. A system will be developed
3. Special procurements of major equip- for reporting problems which occur in anyment items
4. Multiple equipment procurements (turn- equipment during or subsequent to acceptance
testing. A list of Criticality I and II problems
key plants) and the associated corrective actions will be
Design Specification Review established and maintained as a major status
report during the development and operation of
Each design specification shall be reviewed a process. Any problem on this llst for which
in order to accomplish a correlation between correctlv,.; action has not t',--o,, taken is con- \
the design and the operating plan functional sidereal to be an open problem. A process will
268
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not be put on line if any equipment has open curement stoppage will result untiltheALERT
problems. The following are other features of can be Investigated. An ALERT report from a
the system: plant should Include Identification of the suc-
1. Reporting of open problems to manage- cessful substitute.
ment will be scheduled so that timely knowledge
of risks will be provided. Reliability Test Requirements
2. Each problem reported will be corre-
lated with the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis For test under the cognizance of this dirt-
to determine the criticality category. If the _lon, problems encountered during testtng must
problem has not been identified tn the Failure be reported as defined in the section entitled
Mode and Effect _ralysls, the criticality "Problem k,,3orting and Corrective Action."
category shall be identified through analysis, Problems rrtt,,_t be reported during and sub-
and the data shall be addedtothe Failure Mode sequent to acceptance testing for equipment
and Effect Analysis. which is intended for use in this division. If
3. Each problem report of a Umtted-ltfe- the test Is conducted prior to transfer to this
time Item shall include the operating time at division, problem reporting requirements will
the time of failure, be Included In the specification or procure-
ment document. The acceptance test for equip.
Parts Program merit to be assigned to this division must
include a functional demormtratlon in the ape-
Equipment with basic design proven tna..le- clfted environments of pressure, temperature,
quate for a process is defined as an ALERT atmosphere (salt water, etc.), vibration, and
i item. Each item will be reported to the_ compatibility with process feedstocks and
Division headquarters for distribution to other products for lot-procured Items. Prevlounly
plan,s. If Division headquarters receives an documented tests of threeor more urttts satt_fy
ALERT concerning lot-procured Items, apro- this requirement.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper describes applications of Sys- during the design of TACRV, is included in
tern Safety Engineering to the development of Part III. The safety engineering effort applied
advanced surface transportation vehicles. The during the design of the Tracked Air Cushion
concept of System Safety has matured with Research Vehicle reflects the experience
aerospace programs and is now contributing gained from a wide range of operational sys..
safety methodology to non-aerospace segments tems designed and manufactured by the Grum-
of our society. As a pertinent example, the man Aerospace Corporation. These include
paper describes a Safety Engineering effort commercial and military aircraft, space ve-
,,tailored" to the particular design and test hicles, hydro.foils and an experimental scien-
requirements of the Tracked Air Cushion Re- tific submersible. Incorporation of the appro-
search Vehicle (TACRV), developed by the prtatefeatures into the TACRV design provides
Grumman Aerospace Corporation, under con- the desired result of a safe research vehicle.
tract to the Department of Transportation. The Hazards to operating personnel have been re-
test results obtained from this unique research duced to a minimum.
vehicle, will provide significant design data Part IV of the paper describes System
directly applicable to the development of future Program techniques and the analytical
tracked atx cushion vehicles that will carry methodology that is applicable to public trans-
passengers in comfort and safety at speeds up portatton systems of the future, derived as a
to 300 miles per hour. "spin-off technology" from aerospace pro-
Part II of the paper summarizes the Safety grams. Two typical tracked air cushion ve-
Epgineering efforts implemented during the hicles for future public transportation are
TACRV design phases. A detailed outline of illustrated in Part V and the related system
the significant safety provisions, incorporated safety objectives are highlighted.
I
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II. TACRV SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM
• OBJECTIVES
°SCOPE
DESIGN, MANUFACTURE AND TEST
°APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
DESIGN SAFETY CRITERIA AND GUIDELINES
SAFETY REVIEWS
DRAWING REVIEW AND SIGN-OFF
SAFETY CONTROLS IN VENDOR SPECIFICATIONS
- •MANUFACTURE PHASE MONITORING
)VEHICLE TEST CONSIDERATIONS
This part of the paper discusses the Safety hazard, hazardous failure-mode and sys-
Engineering Program implemented during the terns integration studies on the vehicle.
TACRV design and manufacturing phases, and subsystems, crew station, wayside power
¢ reviews future test program considerations, and guideway/vehlcleinterfaces
The primary objectiveofthissafetyprogram *Participationof SafetyEngineersatde-
, has been to eliminateor reduce potential sign reviews, safety reviews and in-
hazards associatedwithoperationandmalnte- formal inspections
nance of TACRV. Potentiallycatastrophic *Recommendations for emergency sys-
items were eliminated duringearly design, terns,safetydevices and/oremergency
Criticalhazards identifiedhave been elim- procedures,for identifiedpotentialhaz-
inated or reduced through use of safety de- ards which cannot be eliminated ,
vices, warning systems and/or precautionary #Provide guidance and support to design
procedures. In summary, the objectives of the personnel through development of safety
l program have been to establish requirements, design criteria and check lists "tall•red"procedures, and methods, to ensure personnel to the operating environment of TACRV
safetyand minimum riskofdamage, or deg- Many technicaldisciplinescontributedtothe
radationtoequipment, safetyassuranceeffort,including: i
i
- •Reliability/Maintainability-failure and
SCOPE OF PROGRAM maintenance
studies. !
The scope of the TACRV Safety Program •EMI- Safety inputs on vehicle grounding,
_k
includes the active participation by Safety internal bonding, dissipation of
Engineers,design and systems personnel,in ofelectrostaticharges andlight.,
allphases ofdesign.The significantprogram ningprotectionconsiderations.
milestones and related system safety engi- •Power Plant- Crashworthy fuel system
neering tasks are illustrated in Figure 1. The technology, thermal pro=
Grumman approach to system safety is "the tection and combustion
total integration of available skills and re-. p r e v e n t 1 o n consider-
sources to achieve maximum safety as- ations.
surance." Safety Program ,_ctiv!ttes generated •Crew Systems Design - Human Factors
by this concept included: aspects of Con-
trois and Dls-
•Performance of analyticalstudiesto a plays.
practicabledepth for hazard identifica= ¢System and Project Engineering;GAC
tton. These include preliminary (gross) System SafetyStaff.
274
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MANUFACTURE PHASE MONITORING eDevelop a pre-accident plan for coordi-
nated Grumman support in accident in-
The system safety effort planned for the vestigations
manufacturing phase of TACRV includes moni- eDuring subsequent phases, Sy'_tem Safety
toting the vehicle assembly stages, equipment will review all previous safe _/studies,
installation and systems checkouts. The pur- develop operating and maintenance pro-.
pose of this effort is to identify and correct cedures and monitor vehicle Lest site
,\
any potentially hazardous interface conditions, operations
between lines and equipments, that were not
anticipated during the design phases. The APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
safety engineer will make corrective action
recommendations to the project engineer, Although there are some differences in the
whenever unsafe conditions are identified. In Safety Engineering effort between Lunar Mod-
summary, the safety tasks will include the ule, Military Aircraft, TACRV and similar
foUowtng: advanced surface transportation systems,
eobserve acceptance tests of major equip- there are significant differences in the acci-
ments and propulsion systems, to verify dent potential and the approach to practicable
: compliance with safety requirements, solutions to reduction or elimination of injury
before installation in the vehicle and damage to equipment. In addition, the level
eMonitor installation of all major systems of risks that are acceptable in military and
and subsystems in order to identify po- space operations are not acceptable in public
- tential ignition or combustion hazards, in transportation. This aspect is what we are
i each compartment, from possible leak- ultimately dealing with, in our approach to
age, chafing, and/or electrical shorts, achieving safety assurance.
i due to close proximity of interfacingline In the absence of a formal system safety
connections or interference with vehicle engineering standard, such as the milltaryre-
i structure quirements of MIL-STD-882, {"System SafetyeInspect turbofan engine Installation to Engineering Program for Systems and Asso=
identifypotentiallyhazardousconditions ciatedSubsystems andEquipment;GeneralRe-
related to engine/vehicle integration, quirements for"), special attention was given
Examine engine control linkages for to "tailoring" a system safety program to the
freedom of travel. As_re adequate specific needs of the TACRV Program. In
t
thermal protection for equipments and lieu of costly and extensive systems safety
i linesinhightemperatureareas.Review analysesdescribedinMIL-STD-882, allengi-
. | all potential fluid leakage ant: drainage neers and designers were provided with a
paths, in engine compartments ,,design safety criteria and guidelines" docu-
eMonitor installation and checkout of all ment, developed by the Safety Hngineer, to
emergency equipment {i.e., fire detec- enable all personnel to assist in hazard
r.ton/suppression, caution/warning, etc.) identification and elimination In the early
and safety devices to verify failure-free phases of design,. The majority of these "guide-
operation lines" has been previously established for use
elncorporate safety oriented requirements in the design of military and civil aircraft and :
into each vendor specification and specl- soacecraft. The criteria were used continu-
fication control drawing ously by design personnel as a check=off list
eConduct drawing review and sign-offon duringthevehicleand subsystemsdesign.
selected major installationdrawings Where criticalhazards were identified,
where safetyprovisionsare involved the Safety Engineer conducted accidentand
eReview of test plans, test reports and safety equlpment research to review the"state-
operating procedures tOdetermine impact of-the-art" in safe system design and offer
on safety. Review and evaluate precau- practicable recommendations. For example,
tionaryprocedures.Review alltestfail- TACRV has thecombinationofalargevolume
ures for unanticipatedhazardous condl- of JP-5 fuelfor theturbofanwitha 7000-volt
. t.lons and recommend corrective action LIM electrical propulsion system on board the
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vehicle. Crew survival is now assured by in- warning, fire detection/suppression, vehicle
corporation of a crashwo=flay fuel tank and grounding, brakes and fuel systems.
piping system. Another typical safety study Effective control of design safety, for sub..
involved evaluation of the required number, contractor supplied equipments, was estab-
size and locations of doors and escape hatches lished by incorporating safety oriented
to assure safe exit and/or rescue, under any requirements into each Specification Control
conceivable mishap condition. Drawing (SCD). Preliminary and final"SCD's"
were reviewed to verify compliance, or make
Drawing Review and Sign-Off additions, to the safety requirements. These
included such items as safety factors, leakage
Drawing reviews were conducted during the tests, proof tests, fail-safe and non-flammable
early stages of systems and equipment design requirements, where applicable. All "SCDts ''
to identify and correct unanticipated hazards required final sign-off by the Safety Manager.
and to recommend appropriate emergency
systems, fail-safe features and safety de- Useful Inputs from Other Disciplines
_. vices. Particular attention was given to review
of critical systems that are employed during Employment of the "Safety Criteria and
emergency situations. Typical examples of Guidelines" document, prepared by the Safety
layouts and drawings reviewed for these sys- Manager, enabled aU design personnel to con-
" tems and equipments included crew station, tribute safety assurance features throughout
emergency controls, escape hatches, caution/ the design effort.
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these areas would greatly endanger both crew ing of PCU equipment and controls. Hence, loss
and equipment, a fire detection system is of wayside power, or electrical failures aboard
located in each of the engine nacelles and in the vehicles, will render LIM braking corn-
the PCU compartment, pletely ineffective. The Braking System has
The means for fire detection is an element been designed to have multiple devices for sup-
which changes resistance with temperature, plying braking forces. This per_ntts evaluation
This element is a continuous cable which of braking effectiveness, and enhances the
threads through each engine nacelle so that it safety of the crew and equtpment during testing.
will detect hot spots or high average tempera- High speed testing on a relatively short length
ture. The detection circuti: is triggered when a of guideway requires back-up braking modes.
tempera_re of 450°F is detected. When this With exception of the friction brake pedal, all
occurs the Master Caution Lights flash, an braking device controls are within reach of
audible alarm sounds and the appropriate both operator and observer.
warning light goes on. The fire detection cir- Friction Braking
cuits have a "press to test" feature which
allows the operator to test the continuity of Friction braking has several importantad-
the sensing elements and output amplifier, vantages over LIM braking. It t,,. not dependent
on wayside power and it is lees complex; thus,
Fire Suppression the probability of failure is reduced. The fric-
r.ton braking system is also equipped with re-
The means for fire suppression is through dundant actuators. The main acmators get high
the release of bromotrffluoromethane (CF3 Br). pressure oil flow from the three engine-driven
This material is stored in bottles, in a Hquid pumps. Friction braking is the main back-up
state, and when released forms a heavy blanket for LIM braking at low speed, whereas the
of inert gas which excludes oxygen from the speed brake is used at high speed.
fire zone. This gas is released into the nacel- Speed Brakeles by the operator who presses a switch which
ignites a pyrotechnic valve. Once opened, this An aerodynamic speed brake, located on
valve allows all of the gas to be expended. The top of the engine nacelles, produces a drag
pyrotechnic valve switch is located so that the force that augmenm vehicle drag for normal
operator's Fire Control "T" handle must be braking.
pulled out first. This assures the cut.off of Emergency Braking Modesfuel and hydraulic oil flow to the engine com-
paruuents before the fire suppressant gas is As a backup to normal braking modes pre-
released, vlously described, there are a number ofemer-
Fire suppression in the LIM PCU equip., gency modes which assure stopping when pri-
ment compartment will also utilize CF3Br. mary braking fags. The friction brake pads
Detection of a PCU fire will be displayed on have redundant actuators which are deployed
the Operator's Caution and Warning Panel and by flowing hydraulic fluid from a charged ac-
will also initiate the Master Caution Lighm cumulator. Thus, loss of pressure in the main
and Audible Alarm. hydraulic systel will not void the use of fric-
tion brakes. A drag chute is aboard for use in
NORMAL AND EMERGENCY BRAKING major emergencies where falure or late applI-
SYSTEMS cation of a primary mode require additional
braking force, Release of the chute is manual,
LIM Brakin_ through a cable.pulled mechanical latch; re- i
liability is thus enhanced due m the direct,
The Linear Induction Motors (LIMs) are positive control. Friction braking can also be
capable of exerting the highest braking force accomplished by shuu:Ing off the three engines,
of all braking modes provided for the TACRV which causes the levitation cushion sk/ds to rub
and will be the primary means of stopping, ag,ainst the guldeway. If all methods ofbraking
However, LIM braking is dependent upon pick- fall to stop the vehicle before it reaches the
/ng up wayside power, and the proper function- end of the guldeway, an arresting cable engages
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the nose ofthechassis.As thecableextends, "Cautionand Warning System". Individualfire
energy isexpended ina waterbrakeatthe side alarm lightsdesignatethe compartment in
oftheguideway, which a fireisdetectedand ahornprovidesan
audiblealarm. The areas monitored are the
ELECTRICAL HAZARD PROTECTION PCU compartment and left,center and right
enginecompartments.
The vehicleand associatedelectricalequip-
ments have been designed to provide ground NORMAL AND EMERGENCY EXIT
pathsso thatprotectionofoperaUng andmain= PROVISIONS
tenancepersonnelisassured.Electricalequip-
ment inthevehiclebody ispositivelygrounded The personnelcompartment has a totalof
with straps or with aircraft=tTpeapproved sixpossibleexitsfor itsoccupanm. Doors are
bonding. Body-to-chassisgrounding is done providedon each sideofthevehiclefornormal
with grounding strapsnear the fore and aft and emergency exitfor alloccupants.Ifthe
suspensionpoints.The LIMs are grounded to doors are inoperative,two escape hatches
thechassissurucmre and totheLIM raftwhen above the operatorseatscan providea means
the vehicleisnotunder way. The vehiclewill of egress.The direct-visionwindows, justaft
be grounded duringfueling, of the Windshield,are designedto slideback,
alsopermittingegressas a lastresort.
VEHICLE GUIDEWAY RETENTION
PERSONNEL COMPARTMENT AND CRASH
The vehiclelevitationcushionsaredesigned SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
! so thatthe top of the cushion structurewill
engage the guideway guidance panels ifthe The design of the personnelcompartment "
chassislifts, employs featuresthatare consistentwithap-
proved safety and human factors practices for
i SUSPENSION SYSTEM commercial aircraft. The selection of aircraft-
I type seats, restraint harness, bird-proof wind-
i The suspension system is designed so that shield, and the arrangement of instrument
loss of electric power to the Control Amplifier panel, caution/warning panels and contl ols, all
Unit will result in the reversion from active contribute to safe and efficient operation of the!
_ to passive suspension. Other failures, which TACRV.
! may affect only one channel of the active sus-
, i pension system, will not cause automatic Seats and Restralnt Systemi switching to passive suspension. The operator
can select, with a mode switch, "passive For maximum protection of occupants, ap-
suspension". This switch puts all actuators in
the passive mode, and assures a safe, well proved-typ_ aircraft seats are installed in the
damped ride. personnel compartment. Safety belts and
shoulder restraint harnesses are installed on
the seats for protection during emergency
i CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM braking conditions. The standard aircraft re-
straining harness has a single-point release
The TACRV has a caution and warning mechanism that is capable of instant release
_ystem which is similar to that used in corn- by the occupant or by" rescue personnel. The
mercisl aircraft. Two master caution lights, shoulder harness is equipped With an inertia
located on top of the operatorts control and reel and cable mechanism which prevents for-
display panels, flash in the event of a detected ward pitching of the body during emergency
failure or unsafe condition. These master braking. A ratchet mechanism, Within the reel,
warning lights alert the operator and observer restrains the shoulde in the last angular
to visually scan the control panels for a Lighted position of the body wl_,, a sudden stop occurs.
caution indicator which identifies the maifunc- This device reduces chance of crash-induced
tlon area. Fire warning is separate from the head injuries.
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IV. SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM APPLICATIONS
TO ADVANCED PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
• PROGRAM PARTICIPATION BY SYSTEM SAFETY
• SAFETY ANALYSES METHODOLOGY
• SAFETY REVIEWS
Thls part of the paper describes System Is to enable the reader to visualize the tnnova-
Safety Engineering techniques an J methodology tlve approach to vehicle design, wherein system
that are applicable to advancer: public trans, safety applications are essential, in the interest
portation systems of the future, derived as a of public safety.
"spin-off technology" from _terospace pro-.
grams. Although recent commercial and mill- Aspects on Safety Programs Plannin_e Particl-
tary aircraft des/gns have utilized the systems pat/on and Analyses
safety discipline, design of surface mass trans.
portation systems and automobiles has not. The Based upon the approach used in the aero-
TACRV Is pioneering in hlgb speed - 300 MPH- space industry, the planning guidelines for
surface transportation. Th:,s alone produces a future safety plans will be derived from
whole new spectrum of h:Azard potentials re- Government Standard MIL-STD-8S2 and from
quiring system safety aralyses for the first prior contractor's experience on similar pro..
time. Failure Effects ArAalysls, Hazard Mode grams. The formal safety programs which In-
, Analysis and System Integration Safety clude the application of analytical techniques
Analyses are useful ',IJpin-offs" from aero- and scheduled safety reviews will identify and
space technology which are applicable here. eliminate, or reduce potential hazards asso-
There has never before been any requirements ciated with operation and maintenance of the
for such in-depth salety studies In surface overall system. In many cases, the use of
1 transportation. Formal safety reviews can be safety devices, emergency systems, warning
anticipated to resolve or correct hazards devices, or procedural changes will be em-
identified in all systems within the vehicle, ployed.
• guideway and relat._d power distribution sys. Subcontractors will be subject to specific
terns, design safety requirements in the appropriate ,
• The contents ol this section are graphically specifications and contracts. As technical
illustrated in Figares 4, 5 and 6, to depict the systems manager, the prime contractor monl-
elements of formal safety program planning tors all safety efforts of each sub_.ontractor,
based upon the _ipproaches used on aerospace ensuring that these requirements are met. On !
programs. Figure 4 presents the typical safety major subsystems, subcontractors are re-
program milestones for a prime contractor's quired to submit safety plans descrlt_ng in _
Program Plan, Figures 5 and 6 provide insight detail their system safety organization, scope
into system wdety participation during the de- and effort. These plans will be integrated with "
slgn, manuftLcture and testing phases of a the prime contractor's plan to ensure a co-
typical transportation system, ordinated overall effort that w/ll include the
Safety wlalyses methodolog7 is illustrated foUowing activlt/es.
in Figures I,8, 9 and 10, also included in this • Develop a "System Safety Engineering
section. These charts indicate the aerospace Program Plan", (SSEP) and submltto the
"systems approach,' for effective utilization c_stomer for mutual agreement on scope,
and coor_'.inat/on of ana/ytical .-fforts, that may schedule and cost
be applied to future transportation systems. • Perform preliminary (gross) hazard
Seqetal representative',tracked ah-cushion studies and system analyses on the ve-
vehicle_J" for future public transportation are hicle, subsystems, operator station con-
descri_,d in Part V of this paper. The purpose f/gura_on, wayside power and guideway '
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systems (reference Figures 4, 5 and 7) failures modes and make recommenda-
eperform failure mode analyses on major tions for corrective action (reference
systems to ensure that system or equip.- Figures 5, 6, 8 and 9)
ment failures will not cause hazardous During subsequent vehicle tests, all pre-
conditions (reference Figures 5, 8, 9and vious analyses will be reviewed to assess
10) adequacy of emergency provisions, develop
eprovide guidance and support to design operating and maintenance procedures, and
personnel through development of safety monitor final test and checkout operations
design criteria and check lists appro- (reference Figures S, 6 and 8).
priate for each discipline
• Define both design and operating safety
requirements for all normal and emer- eSAFETY ANALYSES METHODOLOGY
gency systems operation (reference Fig-
ures 4, 5, 6, 7 and I0) •OBJECTIVES:
• Develop safety procedures for compli- HAZARD IDENTIFICATION, ELIMI-
ance by operating and maintenance per- NATION AND/OK COMPENSATING
sonnel before and after each vehicle run, PROVISIONS
to reduce chance of accidents or injury
(reference Figures 4, 5, 6 and 10) •SAFETY ANALYSES UTILIZATION
e Perform safety reviews during accept- FLOW
• ance testing to demonstrate that oF•rat- •PRIME A N D SUBCONTRACTOR
ing and emergency procedures are ade- ANALYSES, A COORDINATED EF- *
quate (reference Figures 4, 5, 6 and 10) FORT
• Participate in design reviews and conduct
safety reviews (reference Figures 4, 5, •COORDINATION OF RELIABILITY
6, 7 and 9) "FMEA" WITH SYSTEM SAFETY
• Monitor all pre-production equipment and "HMEA" ANALYSES
_ systems tests to identify unanticipated
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V. A LOOK AT FUTURE MASS TRANSIT SYSTEMS
eADYANCED CONCEPT STUDIES
eSYSTEM SAFETY OBJECTIVES
ADVANCED CONCEPT STUDIES eThe system should not create or ap-.
pear to create a hazard to the corn-
The growing need to improve our nationts munity, its environment, its children, or
surface transportation systems is currently its animals
recognized. While improvement of existing e The operational reliability must be suf-
modes is a logical step, we are a!so pursuing flcientiy high and recovery from failures
new and innovative concepts as the only means that do occur must not present a poten-
through which a dramatic upgrading of ground tially hazardous condition to people,
transport can be achieved. The tracked air equipment or other means of transport
cushion vehicle with linear induction propul- close proximity to the system
sion is an excellent example of a developed
concept that employs technology new to the • The system should not pollute the op-
transportation field. TACV promises a safe, erating environment with exhaust or
fast, comfortable, all-weather, non-polluting excessive noise
alternative to present systems. Applications
:. of this concept, in the near future, will pro- In summary, the primary objectives of
vide a major first step toward gaining public the System Safety Engineering Programs
acceptance of this new mode of travel. The planned for new modes of public tran_porta-
TACV is considered to be an innovative ap- tion, include the following:
proach to provide high-speed ground access • Identify potential hazards by analytical
i to our airports, as well as a safe and com- methods and by equipment test sur-fortable means of inter-city mass transit, veillancefor the near future. Figures 11 and 12
illustrate typical development studie_, of the • Determine hazards effects on passenger
aforementioned Tracked Air C u s h i o n and public safety
i • Develop corrective and/or preventative
Vehicles.
measuresSYSTEM SAFETY OBJECTIVES
• Identify rescue requirements peculiar to
The system safety objectives that are new transportation system
considered uppermost in the TACV System e Establlsh safety guidelines for design, '
and all new modes of transport development, test operation and maintenance phases of ,'
are as follows: vehicle life cycle '
• The system must ensure safety of pss- • Identify need for technology development
sengers, operators and maintenance per- and additional _uidy where safety as-
sonnel surance appears uncertain ,_
t
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUMONS
SUMMARY In many cases, materials and hazard con-
trol techniquesdeveloped in our aer.o_pace
The concept of System SafetyEngineering programs are being appliedto advanced sur-
has matured with aerospaceprogi'amsand is facetransportationsystems.Typicalexamples
now contributingsafetyassurance methodol- in TACRV are use _ non-flammable mate-
ogy to the non-aerospace segments of our rials, system hazard and human factors
society.As an appropriateexample, a Safety studies,redundant systems for criticalcon-
Engineering effortdiscussed in thispaper, trol function's,and fire-proofingof fueland
hns been "tailored"to the particulardesign, propulsionsystems.
schedule and operatingrequirements of the
Tracked Air Cushion Research Vehicle It is anticipatedthat many of the ap-
(TACRV). The safetyconsiderationsusec'dur- proaches tosafetyassurancedescribedinthis
ing the design of TACRV are the resultof paper will be directlyapplicableto future
experiencegained from a wide range of air- publictransportations/stems and vehiclesas
craft, sp_ ;evehiclesandexperlmentalsystems a "spin-off technology" from the aerospace
designed and manufactured by the Grumman industry.
Aerospace Corporation. The incorporation of
the appropriate features into the TACRV de- In summary, the significant safety features
sign provide the desired result of a safe provided to compensate for potential hazards
research vehicle with minimum hazard to ident_led on the aforementioned TACRV, in-
operating personnel, clude the following: . -
POTENTIAL HAZARD CATEGORY COMPENSATING SAFETY PROVISIONS
i
• ECS Fresh Air SupplySystem, Two Sliding '"
Winoowo, Two Overhead Hatches
• Fire Detection and Suppression System for
Fire and Toxic Smoke Critlc_lAr_as
• Non-Flammable MateriaD inPersonnel J
Compartment /
• FireShu_-OH Valve.s for Fluids
a
• Crashworthy Fuel Tank and Lines; Fuel
Tanks Assembled with Reticulated (Porous)
Explosion "Safety F-_am"
• Fuel Tanks Isolated From Crew
• Dralnag_. and Ventilation in Fuel Area
• Aircrah Seats, Safety Belts, Shoulder
Harnesses and Inertia Reels
Emersency Stopping and Crash Condition
Hazards • Padded Instrument Panel Visor
• Two Doors and Two Eecape Hatche,,
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POTENTIAL HAZARD CATEGORY COMPENSATING SAFETY PROVISIONS
• Friction Brake Backup System
• Drag Parachute
Brake Failure Emergencies
• Arrestment Cable System
• Settle Vehicle on Cushion Skids
Critical Systems Failures (i.e., Fluid • Caution and Warning System Located on
'_ower, Electrical, Turbofan Operator's Panel
_'- ' _r_'s, etc.)
"_ • Vehicle Grounds Externally to LIM Rail
When Vehicle Stops, Plus External
• Grounding Cable Provided
Electrical Shock to Personnel _-
-, .-._mal Vehicle Bonding and Grounding
Bird Strike Hazards to Crew • Birdproof Aircraft w._._ _ .
Fog, Rain or Ice on Windshield • Electrically Heated Aircraft Windshield
* • Operator can Switch From Active to _
: Secondary Suspension System Malfunction
i PassiveSuspensionSystem t
i
; • Positive Retention of Vehicle Provided by
VehicleLeaves Guideway Air Cushions Extended Under Guideway
- SideRails
3
CONCLUSIONS readily incorporated during the initial design i
stages.
Judicious use of System Safety Engineer- The Grumman approach to system safety
ing techniques during early phases of design is "the total integration of available skills _,
can yielda highlyeffectiv(safetyassurance and resources to achieve maximum safety
program in terms of accidentprevention, assuravce".Safetyprogram activitiesgener- Iavoid-n,:eof costlychanges and assurance ated by this "system approach" and total
of safeoperationand maintenance,throughout team effortyieldan effectiveprogram with-
thelifecycleofthesystem, outcostlyduplicationofefforts.
As we pioneer intohigherspeed concepts
Timeliness of SafetyEngineeringstudies of sux'facetransportation,extensiveapplies=
is an essentialfactorfor earlyidentification t!on of in-depth failureand hazard mode
and elimlnatlcn of potentialhazards and analyseL_,systems integrationanalyses and
latentdesigndeficiencies,By thisapproach, formal s_fetyreviews can be anticipated,in it.,.
the al)propriate safety devices, emergency the interest of passenger and community I\
systems and fail-safe features can be safety.
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SESSION VI
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
JERRY LEDERER: Mr. Arnzen: If you ce_aJn birds up as high as 30,000 feet.
have those two high speed tracked vehicles Destructional integrity is such of these crash
going to opposite directions and apparently resistent windshields that they will take bird
very close together according to the slide, strikes, However, the gentlemen who referred
what do you do about the negative pressure to the transit program and the various prob-
between the two vehicles, aren't they going lems presented came up with something in-
to be drawn together? Question No. 2- The teresting which we have to put in our cap.
Airlines have for years used JP-4 for safety Bricks dropped by children from overpasses,
What do you use JP for? No. 3 - In connection icicles and things of that sort, warrant new
with the bird strike on the windshield, are and fresh consideration. There will be a
you considering the possibility of things like whole new spectrum of hazsrds--a whole
icicles hanging down from bridges hitting the new ball game and I think that is a good
windshield too. They can be pretty tough, question,
MR. ARNZEN: In regard to the first
question, this is a necessary portion of wind QUESTION: Mr. Driver, everyone has a
tunnel research. I believe you struck on a car so everybody is an expert. Assuming
very good point: the bow wave from one that speed of course is by definition a prob-
vehicle would impart a shock wave against lem on the road, in the diagrams that you
the opposing vehicle coming in the opposite showed I saw nothing being done about what
direction. I believe this would be an essential might be described as too much engine and
part of the wind tunnel work to study this not enough bumper. Is anything being done
interaction. Conceivably it could be a violent in that area or contemplated?
whack and you might call it similar to two
snow plows passing each other with a three- MR. DRIVER: We have out now a notice
foot gap. The wind tunnel data would indicate that controls rulemaking which addresses the
the optimum distance. Conceivably, it might problem of speed control. It identifies speed
be better to put one guideway on one side of warning and speed control, they are two
a turnpike, whether it be an interstate park- separate functions. One to advise the driver
way or priority real estate already assigned, that he is going too fast and the other one is
and perhaps the wind tunnel data would tell to keep his car from going too fast, either by
us it should go on the opposite sides. In re- virtue of control of horsepower or by virtue
gard to the use of the fuel. These particular of a speed control device like a governor. In
engines, the engine manufacturer recom- the area of bumpers, amazingly enough most
mended use of this, this is not our selection of the bumpers that you now have will not
although one fuel would be slightly less survive a two-mile an hour impact, without
volutable than the other, we think we have humping the front end. I have had personal
eliminated the volutable problem by the non- evidence and I guess most of you have had
destructive crashworthy tanks, the well- also. We are now proposing a five and a ten
ventilated compartments of these tanks, the mile an hour bumper however the bumper is
isolation from vapor even getting into lem Just the first thing to get hit and is Just a part
compartment and the overboard venting pro- of the total energy absorption system that
cedures during refill. We are aware of many we are trying to develop for a vehicle. This
precautions which have to be taken in handling will include not only "energy absorbing "
this fuel. The last question in regard to bird bumpers" but also "energy absorbing front
strike damage, on Gulfstream 1 and 2 we ends." For example, the hinge front end,
have conducted tests with 15 lb. birds and Ford now calls it the X-member. Shock con-
this is interesting. You actually can encounter tinuaflon through the entire body frame plus
t
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the passive restraintto keep you where you Youtve been concentrating,and Pm sure you
shouldbe so you can ride down the G forces know what I say is quiteobviousto you and
insteadof smacking up againstthe interior you know itthoroughly,but your description
of the vehicle at High-G forces. We think we refers entirely to the saving, the safety of
are taking a systems look at it. Those two life, I'll say or reduction of accidents. You
you mentioned are a part of the total prob- cannot isolate that from the cost. Politically
lem. we say to save a life is worth an infinite
R.M. WILMOTTE: This is really a corn- amount of money, well, that just isn't true
ment about a statement of Mr. Williams. The because we never do that. In the case of
comment I want to make is in connection with automobiles you have two ways of obtaining a
operating correctly the first time. I think price for safety. One is by taxing in which
there is a danger in referring to doing any- the federal government or the state govern-
thing correctly. There is always a residual ments impose a regulation, impose a tax and
failure,a residualuncertaintyand thatcom- pay for some thingssuch as improving the
, ment has influencesffyou say thatyou have road bed. The other istoimpose a structure
done something correctlythe firsttime. It in theequipmentwhich costssomethingand is
influencestwo groups; one management, the politicallyeasier tohandlebec,mse itmerely
manager says well now I can do what Iwant is represented in a price which the buyer
I have no dangers, but there is always a doesn'tknow specfficallyhow much ofthatis
probabilityof a danger. The second is the for safetyand how much isfor betterpaintor
operatinglevel I'llgive you the example of something. Beslda.sthe price angle,thereis
the well documented zero defectpropaganda, the pollutionangle.Does the safetyrequire-
I'IIquote a comment from a manufacturing ment that you put on increase pollution7I
engineer manager whom I held very highly, suggest thatgenerallyitdoes.The realprob-
: His statement was something like this; After lem, I give you an example that came rather
' the Preaider, t had made his one-half hour interestingly; There were a number of acct-
speech saying we must have zero defectin dents on tractors and the tractormanufac-
thiscompany etc.,_re was an improvement turer improved histractorinorder toreduce
in his shop for somethingliketwo weeks and the accidentsand indeed itwas a prettygood
then it fell back, not to where it was, but improvement but strangely enough the number
son,ething to worse than it was. What were of accidents remained the same. Why? Be-
reasons? The reasons are rather interesting, cause the operators of the tractors now used
He said, before ti_at speech I used to know it in more dangerous conditions because there
, pretty well where in my shop the troubles were less accidents. Until the number of
came. anal was generally told about them in accidents drew up to about the same as they
+ some way or other.After thatspeech there were before then they stopped endangering
was a very wonderful cooperation among the the equipment. There is a strong tendency
workers that they wouldn't tell me where the which I think is very much to the point of the
troubles were and I couldn't find them any- automobile process. You will find over the
more. From that point of view the product years that the accident rate strangely enough
of my shop dropped. I heard that specifically has remained remarkably constant with all
from this individual but I also heard a con= kinds of changes that have been put in. It is
firmation of that in other places so I would true that recently there has been a decrease.
like to give a warning, the possibility of using But there were decreases like that as some-
in any form, that anything can be perfect or thing happened and for a while it decreased;
that anything can be done right the first time but there is a tendency to go back. In other +
has associated with it certain danger_, words, I think that probably we are generally !
The next thing th-t I want to say concerns increasing the speed of our automobiles up to
Mr. Driver. I am always interested in the the point that we don't llke to get killed any-
relationship between an activity that looks as more. That is, we hear of our friends or
though it was self-contained but never is. It people know of someone who has been killed
is _.lways connected with some other activi W. in an automobile accident. If we hear too
" i 291
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much of that then we drive more carefully, ff and we hate to equate the life to a dollar but
we hear less of that we drive lest carefully, you have to do it sometime and we take a
We speed up and there is a tendency to, I good hard look at what are we getting for
think you'll find some literature on the sub- our money. If we institute safety device or
Ject, for humans to build up their danger up to safety requirement No. 1, approximately how
a certain point and strangely enough that point many lives are we going to save, how many
is very much the same in all kinds of acci- injuries are we going to reduce. How many
dents. In the case of automobiles and where crashes are we going to avoid7 We equate
we put heavier bumpers and reduce the acci- that with how much it is going to cost you as
dent rate because of something Of this kind, a consumer per vehicle to get that. Then we
you are likely to find over the years, if the take a look at those figures. If they are in
philosophy I am describing is correct, you ti,e red it doesnt, mean we won't do it. I'll
will describe over the years, first Of all a give you a very concrete example. The furor
IncreaPe in weight Of automobiles which about power windows. A safety standard came
will use more gasoline for more pollution, out on power windows, it required certain
Secondly, a higher Speed because there are minor changes to the power window system,
few accidents, therefore, we want to build up in actuallity the number of lives lost as a
the accidents and one Of the benefits of course result of improper action of power windows
of all this is that you want to balance not was low but those that happened to get killed
only the accident rate but the price. The pol- happened to be kids and one of them happened
lutlon and the value of the automobile. Namely to belong to somebody in pretty high places.
reducing time and under the strange pres- The same thing of school bus standards, you
sure that our society and civilization has have many more school kids getting killed in
built, time seems to be not necessarily meas- automobiles than you have getting killed in
ured in dollars but I do art have time to do school buses but what do we do for automo-
what I want to do ther,.ofore I want to go bfles to protect children, what do you do for
fast. a school bus when something happens. In sum-
MR. DRIVER: I'll respond yes. No. I on mary, we are doing something and we are
cost to save. I quite agree that there is a trying to implement it in such a way that the
cost penalty for practically any innovation or cost is minimized. In terms Of increase in pol-
anything new. In our case what we try to do h, tion, the only standard that lknowofthat per-
is to institute a performance of clamor with tsins to pollution in our particular case is one
such an effective lead time that it can involve that reduces it and that is the one on the fuel
only redesign of an existing l_iece of equip- tank for example. The _uel tank is no longer
ment. Like redesign of a brake h,-_tead of add vented to the atmosphere and ff I remember my
on of another piece of equipment. This cuts figures right from when I was working on the
the cost down quite a bit. In addition, some low pollution automobile about 15_of yourve-
of our performance requirements involve the hicle pollution is plain ole evaporation out of
elimination of some parts of the vehicle and the fuel tank. I admit that ffwewould come out
' the substitution, say the elimination of two and require that vehicles have bigger engines
i pieces of equipment and the addition of one and lower rpm etc. and give more exhaust out i
piece of equipment so that in many cases the of the exhaust you might be adding to pollution,
i cost is balanced off. We do run safety cost I'll Just quarrel with you on that a little bit {
i benefit analysis in each case to determine that*s all. l
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This has been a very stimulatingmeeting. At,other criticismistheproblem towhich
Before making my observationsand reflec- C.O. Milleralluded,ofmaking writingeasier
tionsI feelwe should thank Phil Bolger for to grasp.Much of our phraseologyishard to
orgr ,izingit. understand by managers whom we are trying
I'llbeginwitha few criticisms, to influence.Pope suggested a replacement
The emphasis was on hardware,yet soft-, phraseology such as "performance error" in
ware is of vital importance. Miller and place ofthe word "accident"inorder tomake
Arnzan tried to drive home the fact that safety(a motherhood term) more acceptable
system safetycovered more thanengineering, in management circles.His recommendation
Mistakes in procedures,Incomputation,even to change an accidentreport intoa manage-
the way words are used ina manual are ira- ment critiquewrittenby the people involved
portant.They may be misinterpretedor mis- inthe accidentis anotherexcellentideainmy
understood.My boss in the OfficeofManned opinion.He questionsthe use of the word
Space Flight,Dr. George Mueller,had a large Safety.Pm sure he has wide support.We pre-
and unusual photographon thewallbehindhis fer risk management. What is meant by
desk. Figure1. "critical"in the phrase "criticalhazard
Itwas simply a photographofa minus (°) analysis."Why not simplyuse hazardanalysis.
sign.Some years ago a computer programmer "Optimization"is frequentlyused.What does
had neglected(o feed the minus sign intoan itmean7 Why use cyclein "lifecycle?"l_ug-
equation going into a computer to guide a gest thatthe phraseologyofsystem safetybe
space vehicle.This "software" mistake cost combed for simplification.It isalsoofgreat
about$18 million,as Irecall.So do notforget importance to do thiswhen system safetyis
softwarewhen you thinkof system safety, translatedfrom aerospacetootherindustries.
Other important subjects,not hardware The lectureby Williams broughtthisout.
oriented,are part of System Safetyor the There isbackground tousepalatablewords
systematicapproach tolossprevention.Some in aviationsafety;lap beltsor seat beltsin
30_oof missile failureshave been causedby placeof safetybeltsisan example.
human errors. Yet in these lecturesthere The firstgroup of papers was devotedto
was littleor no referenceto motivationand the philosophicalaspects of system safety
certificationprograms. Motivation(aware- especiallythe management aspects.Dr. John
ness) is an important t)art of the NASA pro- Clarke, Congressman Pettls, Admiral Smith
gram. The blue collar worker can be the discussed the nature of the problems that face
Achilles heel of programs that depend on us. Dr. Wilmotte lectured on basic personal
single point failures. The only reference to resistences to the acceptance of safety. Lator
motivation was the NASA Awareness Bulletin on, Hurt of USC on System Safety Education
cn the table. Mr. Pope alluded to motivation added to this. It is not unusual for sophisti-
when he stressed the importance of communi- cated management and non-safety personnel
eating up. I heard very little about human to feel that safety act,l as an obstruction to
factors. Gera of NAR did have behavior fall- progress. Could these resistences, voltages,
urea in his closed loop vugraph. Humal._fac- amperages be put into the form of a mod_l _
i
tors should be considered to include the electrical circult for further analysis?
environment in which men work, the shop, Dr. John Clark p_inted out that ff safety
test center or the cockpit, as well as human were applied to unmanned vehicles as it is
factors in the design of the product such as applied to manned vehicles, it could cost the
shape of control handles, unmanned vehicl_ out of existence. This is
Except for the lecture on Viking, I heard also true of manned vehicles ouch as air-
no reference to Safety Analysis Reports. This craft. Space vehicles are a special problem
is a vital report prepared for the top decision because of the serious political and prestige
maker prior to operation, showing him what implications of mission failure. This Justified
risks remain, how they are rationalized, why the $100 million do_lars or so spent tocorrect
they were accepted. Without this, top manage- the faults showr, up by the 204 fire. In the
merit cannot &lye or deny a go-ahead, with case (g more mundane vehicles there comes
. prudence, a point where small increments of Inc_-eased
294
1972018311-283
safety are hard to Justify on the basis of cost airlines and general aviation combined
benefits. For example, Slldes 2, 3. (largely because of the grade _.ross_ngs). The
An example of cost benefit is h.2 current impact of accidents on society might be
requirement for crash flre rescue operations measured by the loss of the deceased's
at airline airports. Relatively few airports useful service to society. The following slides
meet the minimum requlremcnts of the bring this out - slides 4-10.
National Fire Protection Association. Most Congressman Jer:T Pettt_'s Inspirational
airline crashes occur on the approach to a talk urged the application of space age tech-
landing off the airport where the crash fire niques, especially the system8 approach to
equipment cannot get to the crash quickly. A solve our many probhans on earth. The
ten year survey made for the piston era agenda was slanted that way in relation to
disclosed only two crashes in which a fire hardware, not social problems. We had talks
brigade saved the lives of airline passengers, on application of system safety to nuclear
To meet NFPA requirements would have safetT, consumer product safety., rail transit
added some $80 million per year in firemen safety, alito safety, petroleum safety, and ad-
saiarles alone, with. the possible saving of I0 vanced surface transport safety. These aro
lives per year. These lives of course should not the social ills which Mr. Petals wants
be saved. The airlines would have to pay for attacked. On the same morning that Congress-
this via landing fees. But resources are man Pet, s gave his talk the. _.w York Times
limited. Pal]senger safety would be better reported this-
advanced by applying this sum to the imple- "If we can go to _he moon, it is often
mentation aT landing _t.s such as IL_ and ap- said, why can't we s_'_e some of our
proach lights and other means by design or pressing problems on earth7 Speakers at
procedures to prevent the accident. Now with the Urban Technology Conference here
funds from fuel taxes to be applied to the stressed the point yesterday that solutions
development of airports and alrwsys, progress on earth were not as neat and straight-
should be better. Is it easier now to Justify forward as developing a space-flight sys-
JS0 million or more for crash fire protection tern."
because aircraft are carrying more pas- "Aerospace technologists were told
sengers, more cargo and the structures on yesterday that they must come out of the
the airport are costly enough to support the clouds and understand political considers-
expenditure for adequate fire flg,t'ing bri- tions, city finances, labor problems and
gades, human relations before they can help the
The cut off of money for safew is a man- nation's cities solve their transportation
•. agement decision, as C,era said. The safety needs. There is much more than tech-
organization should provide the basis for this nology to solving these problems, James M.
Judgment. It should not be left to the staff Beggs, Under Secretary of Transportation,
that creates the problems or are willing to told aerospace :ndustry representatives at
accept the hazards or fail to recognize them. the Urban Technology Conference at the
Styles' paper on the Application of System New York Coliseum.
Safety to Rail Transit Systems interred this When I was asked ,o come to the de-
and gave proof of the need for a monitoring partment, he continued, I was asked that
program. His paper supports Dr. Wtlmot_e's old saw. 'Tf we can go to the moon, why
papel- describing how and why management can't we get across town?' Well, the
tends to underestimate risk. reason, I learned, is that It's tougher.
During the course of th_s conference there Ther_ are people in the way of getting
was a question or two about measuring the across town, and L_ere aren't any people
economics of safety. This should be done by on the way to the moon."
searching for the total economic impact of
accidents on society. For example, the num- One reason for the success of spac_ age
bet of passengers killed by rsflroads is very performance or for that matter most suc-
small, but in their total operstioral, the ceases in business is that a dictatorship oz 1
railroads in 1970 killed more people than the an autocracy exists which gives order8 with l295,.A
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considerable assurance of compliance. Not so safety is often not coordinated with the design
wi_h social problems, at least in a democratic of the station platforms for safety (except for
society, until a crisis occurs. The crisis of height), as Styles pointed out.
pollution is beginning to draw people together While he considers himself an employed
socially to fight that problem. People tend to professional, and he is, this is not in the sense
protect their i-_dividual prerogatives, using of the independent professional such as a
the democratic system to do so. Physician who can more easily abide by the
I'm afraid that Mr. Beggs is correct. The Hypocratic Oath than the engineer can abide by
enemy of peop!e are people. Is there a system the Canons of Ethics. This is because the phy-
technique to tackle this? sician is not an organization man and further-
In my opening comments I referred to more because he see. the end product of his
lawsuits based c_ pro_luct liability as a fore- labor--the patient who lives or dies. If en°
ing function to stimulate adoption of system glneers could see the injuries caused by
safety. I was interested therefore in Mr. Hayes their design they too might be more forceful
comment that "a prudent and reasonable per- in their satety work. Decision makers should
son would make a system analysis to avoid be given O_e safety picture by an independent
being held guilty of negligence in laweuits." source, not by men subject to other pressures
Styles (and others) pointea to the well or who create the problems. Dr. Wilmot_e
known feeling among design engineers that emphasized this.
they d'_ not need the help of safety specialists Suppose we were meeting here in 1889 in-
because they know all about it. Then he pro- stead of 1971 and our topic of discussion was
ceeded to give a devastating attack on this "Should the Automobile Be Encouraged From
belief in his account of errors made in rail the Standpoint of Safety?" What would our de-
transit 5esign. Dr. Ball indicated that the cision be if a systems analysis were to show
DOD was considering a process of deem- that the automobile would kill a million people
phasizing system safety as an independent in 50 years, maim millions more, pollute the
discipline. But the weakness in the argument air. On the other hand the automobile would
that the engineer/designer needs no inde- also save millions of lives, offer independent
pendent risk management help is that - means to get out of the city, get to far off
He is subject to the dictates of his im- places unexpensively with one's family, ira-
, mediate supervisor who must contend with prove the standard of living of millions. Could "
schedules, performance, costs, pol'tics. In you come to a rational decision, balancing
shot L the engineer, in spit of his Canons of the good against the bad? Using what we know
Ethics dealing with safety, is an organization about system analysis now, most of the nega-
man. He depends on his organization (boss) tire aspects of the automobile would probably
for a living, have been engineered out.
He is not generally exposed to the safety These remarks are personal and do not
interfaces, e.g., the design of railway car for represent the official opinions of NASA.
L.
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